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1 INTRODUCTION 
At the level of individuals and households, economic behavior and outcomes do correlate with 
religion. 
Iannaccone, 1998: 1475 (emphasis in original) 
Since the seminal work of Max Weber, “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” 
(1905 [1958]), there has been a large interest in the effects that religion has on individual 
behavior and, more recently, on the collective performance of societies. Researchers have 
examined, among others, religion’s effect on economic, demographic and pro-social behavior, 
as well as on values and happiness, and have predominantly credited religion with favorable 
outcomes. 
Besides religiosity, religious institutions shape the social and political sphere of a country. 
Taking the example of Germany, the two dominant churches, the Protestant Church called 
“Evangelical Church in Germany” (EKD) and the Catholic Church, are not only the largest 
providers of welfare services such as kindergartens, hospitals and elderly care facilities, they 
are also the second largest employer in the country (only surpassed by the state). They finance 
themselves predominantly by church taxes that are imposed on their members and amounted 
to more than 9 billion euro in 2011. 
Against this background, the constant and quantitatively significant loss of members of these 
two churches should be of considerable interest to economic research. In fact, in 1956 only 
4 % of the (West) German population did not belong to one of the two major churches, while 
this share has risen to 41 % in 2011. 
The aim of this dissertation is to shed some light, both from a theoretical and from an 
empirical perspective, on the causes of the membership loss of the two large churches in 
Germany, the Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church in Germany, and to examine the 
consequences, specifically in the field of voluntary giving. I pay particular attention to the 
church financing system, which can be expected to exert a significant influence on the church 
membership decision. In addition, when church membership has pecuniary consequences for 
the members, it can also be expected to be interrelated with other financially relevant behavior 
such as making donations. 
2 
Before I explain the outline of this work and the research questions in Section 1.4, I motivate 
my work with a short review of the issues raised above: the literature on the economic effects 
of religion is reviewed in Section 1.1, the economic and social importance of the two main 
Christian churches in Germany is discussed in Section 1.2, and the membership change in 
those churches is the focus of Section 1.3.
1
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 For a more profound analysis of church financing systems, in particular the church tax system in Germany, the 
reader is referred to Section 2.4. 
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1.1 A brief literature review on the economic effects of 
religion 
McCleary and Barro (2006a: 51) distinguish two paths through which religion can influence 
outcomes: “religious beliefs” and “networking associated with attendance at formal religious 
services”. Both factors affect the costs and benefits of individual behavior (see Höhener and 
Schaltegger, 2012: 396). Beliefs in the afterlife, heaven, and hell require the consideration of 
a (possibly very large) afterlife utility or disutility in the decision making of an individual. If 
religion is seen as a “social club” (McCleary and Barro, 2006a: 51), the consequences of 
individual behavior on club membership and the status within the club need to be taken into 
account. In the words of Lehrer (2011: 39): “The economic perspective views an individual’s 
religious affiliation as affecting economic and demographic behavior because the norms and 
teachings of various faiths influence the perceived benefits and costs of numerous decisions 
that people make over the life cycle.” 
The economic consequences of religion can be measured both at the individual and the social 
level. Effects at the social level arise either through the concurrence of individual effects or 
through effects on the cooperation between individuals (Höhener and Schaltegger, 2012: 395-
396). 
Lehrer (2011: 40) reviews studies from the US which look at denominational differences in 
demographic behavior and human capital. She concludes that some groups such as 
conservative Protestants or Jews differ from mainline Protestants in fertility levels, age of 
marriage, educational attainment and family wealth. She further reports that individuals 
without a religious affiliation show higher marriage instability and a lower level of education 
(Lehrer, 2011: 40-41). A high level of religiosity is linked to less drug use, less youth 
delinquency and a higher educational attainment (Lehrer, 2011: 41). 
Other literature reviews on the economic outcomes of religion, such as Iannaccone (1998) and 
Gruber (2005), support Lehrer’s (2011) conclusions about religion’s effect on family 
formation, crime and drug use. Iannaccone (1998: 1476-1477) additionally emphasizes that 
religion is found to positively influence mental and physical health, and life satisfaction. 
Gruber (2005) also stresses the positive effects of religion on health, well-being and earnings 
as well as the depressing effect on deviant behavior. Höhener und Schaltegger (2012: 397-
398) distinguish four large areas in which religion matters for individual behavior: education, 
labor supply and income; deviant behavior; values; and life satisfaction. Steiner, Leinert and 
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Frey (2010: 16-18) review the literature on the impact of religion on happiness and well-being 
in some detail. They conclude that both religious beliefs and religious participation positively 
affect well-being. In addition, there might be denominational differences, with Christianity 
being particularly beneficial for well-being. 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) test the influence of religion on economic attitudes with 
a large cross-country survey data set. They find that “[r]eligious people trust others more, 
trust the government more, are less willing to break the law, and believe more in the fairness 
of the market” (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2003: 249). In their research, they distinguish 
between atheist, non-religious and religious people. When looking more closely at religious 
people, they find that both religious upbringing and religious participation matter, but the two 
aspects can differ in their importance for each value and attitude. This result disaccords with 
McCleary and Barro (2006a), who claim that only beliefs, but not participation, matter for the 
effects of religion. The findings of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) also contradict 
Iannaccone (1998: 1477), who claims that religion has no effect on attitudes towards 
economic institutions. 
Steiner, Leinert and Frey (2010) investigate the impact of religion on happiness in 
Switzerland. They find that Protestants and Catholics are happier than people without 
religious affiliation.
2
 The positive effect for Protestants remains even after controlling for 
church attendance, which itself promotes well-being. In contrast, there appears to be no 
significant impact of the frequency of prayer on happiness. Clark and Lelkes (2009) examine 
if there are spill-over effects of the religiosity of one individual on the life satisfaction of 
another person. They find that in Europe people are happier when the share of individuals of 
their own denomination in their region rises. Protestants are also happier when they are 
surrounded by a high share of Catholics. However, all individuals report lower life 
satisfaction when the share of not religiously affiliated individuals in their region is high. This 
is even true for the non-religious themselves. 
One explanation for the higher life satisfaction of religious individuals could be the “[s]tress-
buffering effects from religion” (Clark and Lelkes, 2005: 14). In particular, individuals who 
consider themselves as belonging to a religion experience a smaller drop in life satisfaction 
when they are unemployed than the non-religious. The research of Dehejia, DeLeire and 
Luttmer (2007) confirms the results of Clark and Lelkes (2005) by showing that religious 
participation dampens the psychic cost of negative income shocks. Apart from psychological 
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 Adherents to other religions are excluded. 
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effects, religion might also have tangible effects for the individual. Dehejia, DeLeire and 
Luttmer (2007) find that the more someone gives to a religious organization, the more he or 
she can insure consumption against income shocks. 
If individuals can insure themselves through religion, then being religious might also affect 
opinions on welfare spending and income redistribution. Scheve and Stasavage (2006) use 
individual data from various countries to test if there is a connection between the frequency of 
church attendance and preferences for social spending. Both for the whole sample and for 
Germany as an individual country the authors find that religious attendance reduces the 
support for government spending for the unemployed, the sick and the old. Neustadt (2011) 
tests in an experimental setting whether religion influences preferences for redistribution. He 
finds that Catholics and Protestants demand less redistribution than the non-affiliated. 
However, the hypothesis that individuals with stronger beliefs in God have a lower 
willingness to pay for redistribution cannot be supported. 
A possible reason for the insurance effect of religion could be that members of a religious 
community receive (material) support from their church and their fellow believers. This fits 
with the frequent observation that individuals who are church members or attend church 
frequently give more freely, both to religious and secular causes. A literature review by 
Bekkers and Wiepking (2007: 5-6) reveals that the overwhelming majority of studies support 
this result, while only few present contradictory evidence. 
To sum up, there is a considerable body of research that suggests that religious and non-
religious individuals differ in their values and preferences, e.g. their attitudes towards the 
government and social spending. Such differences in individual preferences should also 
translate in collective economic outcomes that are then expected to vary between regions 
which differ in the religiousness of their inhabitants. 
Therefore a strand of the research looks at religion and its economic effects at the social level. 
A well-known paper in this regard is McCleary and Barro (2006a), who aim to explain GDP 
growth in a country with the average beliefs in hell, church attendance and the share of 
different denominations in that country. They find that wide-spread beliefs in hell, heaven, or 
the afterlife positively affect economic growth, while a higher average attendance has a 
negative influence. These findings foster their conviction that beliefs are the factor that 
matters for economic outcomes, while religious participation is merely a waste of resources 
unless it helps to strengthen beliefs (McCleary and Barro, 2006a: 68). Lipford and Tollison 
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(2003) look at the share of church members in US states and use them to explain the per 
capita income in these states. They find that religious participation and income simultaneously 
affect each other: being a church member negatively affects income, while a high income 
disincentivizes religious participation. Scheve and Stasavage (2006) test hypotheses relating 
the religiousness of a country to its social security spending. They find that there actually 
exists a negative connection between the average importance of God and church attendance, 
and social security spending as a percentage of GDP. This suggests that the capacity of 
religiosity to insure against adverse life events, which researchers find at the individual level, 
also has consequences for society as a whole. 
The effect of religion is not limited to economic outcomes. MacCulloch and Pezzini (2002) 
test the effect of religion on revolutionary tendencies. They find that in general people who 
identify themselves as belonging to a religion are less supportive of a revolt in their countries 
than people without religious affiliation. The dislike for revolution is particularly high for 
Christians who live in “free” countries, while Muslims who live in “unfree” countries are 
even more likely to have a taste for revolt. 
This brief literature review suggests that religion has a large influence on economic and 
demographic behavior, such as fertility rates, deviant behavior, health and income. It is also 
an important predictor of life satisfaction and of a broad range of economically relevant 
values and attitudes, e.g. income redistribution or trust in institutions. These effects on the 
micro level impact on the macro level where religion has been associated with income and 
GDP growth, tastes for revolution and government spending. 
However, the literature reviewed so far is quite heterogeneous in how it measures religiosity. 
Some studies use the denomination, others rely on measures of belief (in God, heaven, hell, 
the afterlife, etc.) or on the frequency of church attendance. There is some dispute as to which 
of these measures best captures the “real” mechanism through which religion unfolds its 
effects on individuals and society as a whole. While McCleary and Barro (2006a: 68) argue 
that only beliefs are important for economic outcomes, whereas attendance is not, Dehejia, 
DeLeire and Luttmer (2007: 276) argue that for their outcome of interest – the insurance of 
happiness against income shocks – participation is necessary, “just believing is not 
sufficient”. 
An indicator of religiosity that has rarely been used so far is formal church membership, 
which will be the focus of my research. Formal church membership does not necessarily 
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coincide with religious beliefs and religious participation; therefore it is difficult to assess the 
relevance of the aforementioned studies in the context that I am interested in – the steady 
decline in formal church membership in Germany. 
However, even if the correlates of religiosity were completely independent from formal 
church membership, the drop in membership numbers would still be expected to have an 
effect at the social level. What the above research disregards almost completely is that 
churches are institutions which often have a large influence on society, not only by shaping 
the values and preferences of their members, but also by being an employer, a social welfare 
provider, and by commenting on relevant social debates. In Germany this is certainly the case. 
Moreover, in Germany the power of churches significantly depends on membership numbers, 
since these determine the revenues of the churches. 
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1.2 The social relevance of the two major churches in 
Germany 
The two major churches in Germany taken together are the second largest employer in the 
country, only surpassed by the public sector (Schipper and Budras, 2012). In the institutional 
church there are about 150,000 employees in the Catholic Church (Sekretariat der Deutschen 
Bischofskonferenz, 2012: 11) and 223,000 in the Protestant Church (Kirchenamt der EKD, 
2012: 21). In addition, roughly 560,000 people work for “Caritas” (Deutscher Caritasverband 
e.V., 2012: 7), the welfare association of the Catholic Church in Germany, and 453,000 
people work for the Protestant welfare association “Diakonie” (Diakonisches Werk der 
Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland e.V., 2011: 3). Taken together the two large churches 
have almost 1.4 million salaried employees.
3
 There are also a large number of volunteers: the 
Protestant Church claims to have 1.1 million people volunteering (Kirchenamt der EKD, 
2012: 21), the Catholic Church estimates the number of volunteers to be 600,000 (Sekretariat 
der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, 2012: 11). 
Churches also contribute to conserve the cultural heritage in Germany. The Evangelical 
Church in Germany owns roughly 21,000 churches and chapels of which 16,600 are under 
monumental protection (Kirchenamt der EKD, 2012: 35). The Catholic Church reports that 
23,000 of their 24,500 churches are under monumental protection, plus an additional 40,000 
other buildings. Sustaining these buildings costs the Catholic Church 418 million euro each 
year, and the state contributes less than 5 % of the costs (Sekretariat der Deutschen 
Bischofskonferenz, 2007: 2-3). The Evangelical Church in Germany reports that the 
maintenance of buildings amounts to 11 % of its total expenditures (Kirchenamt der EKD, 
2012: 35). Both churches claim that they find it increasingly difficult to raise the financial 
means which are necessary to maintain these buildings in the face of declining membership 
numbers. 
An important field of activity of churches are the welfare services they provide. In Germany, 
the principle of subsidiarity is of high importance (Leis-Peters, 2010: 97), which states that 
help should be provided at the level closest to the citizen, and if possible by social groups 
instead of the government. In the welfare sector, this task is mainly assumed by six welfare 
associations, of which Diakonie and Caritas are the largest ones. They offer a variety of 
services, in particular for the sick, the elderly, the handicapped, families, children and 
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 The data is the latest data available, but it does not always refer to the same base year. 
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adolescents, and people in special situations, such as the unemployed, the poor, the homeless 
and addicts (see Diakonisches Werk der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland e.V., 2011). To 
give only a few examples: of the almost 52,000 day-care facilities for children in Germany 
which existed in 2012, more than 26,000 (50.3 %) were run by one of the six welfare 
associations. Caritas and Diakonie together were running 17,855 facilities (34.4 % of all 
facilities) (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012c: 12). Of the 1,758 general hospitals that existed in 
Germany in 2010, 644 belonged to not-for-profit private owners (“freigemeinnützige 
Trägerschaft”), of which 161 were run by Diakonie and 329 by Caritas.
4
 In the field of 
elderly care there were 10,384 in-patient facilities offering long-term care in Germany in 
December 2009, of which 5,632 were run by not-for-profit private owners. Caritas provides 
1,309 such facilities, Diakonie 1,582. The number of available beds in in-patient facilities was 
roughly 819,000; Caritas reports providing 112,000 beds, Diakonie 135,000 –– which means 
that around 30 % of all beds are provided by the two church welfare associations.
5
 In the field 
of youth welfare services the share of the religious welfare associations is also roughly 30 %. 
Of the 316,000 places offered in this field in Germany in 2010, 47,000 were provided by 
Diakonie and bodies connected to the Protestant Church and 49,000 were provided by Caritas 
and other Catholic bodies (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012b: 19-20). However, if one only 
looks at children’s homes, the share of places provided by church welfare associations is 
above 50 %. 
This short overview illustrates that the welfare services provided by the two large churches in 
Germany are quantitatively important. Moreover, they are seen as a core activity of churches. 
43 % of Protestant church members in West Germany and 54 % in East Germany say that the 
support that the church provides to the poor, the elderly and the sick is one of the reasons why 
they are church members (Schloz, 2006: 61). Both church members and non-members expect 
the church to help people in need and care for the old, the sick and the handicapped. This 
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 Data concerning the total number of general hospitals refers to December 31st, 2010 and is taken from 
Statistisches Bundesamt (2011b). The number of general hospitals run by Caritas refers to the same date and is 
taken from Deutscher Caritasverband e.V. (2012: 1). The number of hospitals run by Diakonie refers to January 
1st, 2010 and is taken from Diakonisches Werk der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland e.V. (2011: 6). 
5 Data concerning the total number of facilities and beds refer to December 15th, 2009 and are taken from 
Statistische Bundesamt (2011c). By “in-patient facilities offering long-term care” I refer to the German term 
“Pflegeheim mit vollstationärer Dauerpflege”. The number of beds includes both long-term and short-term 
(“Kurzzeitpflege”) in-patient care. Data for Caritas are taken from Deutscher Caritasverband e.V. (2012: 3) and 
refer to December 31st, 2010. I report results for “Vollstationäre Altenpflegeeinrichtung mit Versorgungsvertrag 
nach §72 SGB XI”. The number of beds additionally includes beds in “Kurzzeitpflegeeinrichtung (solitär)”. 
Data for Diakonie refer to January 1st, 2010 and are taken from Diakonisches Werk der Evangelischen Kirche in 
Deutschland e.V. (2011: 26). In order to arrive at the number of facilities I added the two types of in-patient 
facilities reported in the statistic. The number of beds is the number of beds in those two types of in-patient 
facilities and beds in short-term care facilities. 
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aspect is ascribed almost the same importance as celebrating religious services and church 
festivities (weddings, funerals, etc.) (Pittkowski, 2006: 107). However, while many church 
members also agree that the church should contribute to the education of children, the 
agreement among non-members is considerably lower (Pittkowski, 2006: 107-108). 
Diakonie and Caritas are also well-known among the German population and have a good 
image. A study by Diakonisches Werk der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland e.V. (2006) 
found that in 2005 94 % of the German population knew Caritas and 82% knew Diakonie. 
Seventy-three percent of the respondents found that Caritas should be supported, while 58 % 
agree that Diakonie is worthy of support. 71 % said that Diakonie has a good or very good 
image in society. 
Considering the important tasks of religious communities, it seems likely that a considerable 
drop in church membership also affects the ability of churches to carry out these activities and 
the acceptance of religiously affiliated social welfare providers. First, it reduces the potential 
number of volunteers in the church, since recently only 3 % of people who volunteer for the 
church are non-members (Grosse, 2006: 9). Second, it complicates the process of finding 
highly skilled employees, since it is often still a requirement to be a church member in order 
to be allowed to work for the institutional church or one of their welfare associations 
(Oelschlägel, 2008: 257-258). Third, religious organizations might retreat from running 
particular services because they do not have the financial means to sustain them when a 
decrease in membership also leads to a decrease in church tax revenues (Leis-Peters, 2010). In 
some cases, the lack of religious facilities might force the state to step in. In order to see if this 
is the case, it is instructive to compare East and West Germany. In East Germany, the share of 
church members in the population is much lower than in West Germany. Consequently, one 
would expect that there are fewer facilities run by the church, especially when the facilities 
(such as kindergartens) are (partly) financed through the churches’ own financial means.
6
 
Unfortunately, the data available at the level of the Länder only distinguishes between public 
and non-public ownership of facilities, but says little about the share of religiously affiliated 
facilities. However, when looking at day-care facilities for children, one can at least suspect 
that the share of church welfare organizations is smaller in East Germany than in West 
Germany. While in West Germany 31.7 % are public, the share is 44.5 % in East Germany 
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 According to Frerk (2005), churches do not use any of their own financial means to run hospitals, elderly care 
facilities or youth welfare services (with the possible exception of counselling), since these services are financed 
through social insurance and government grants. In contrast, they do use some of their revenues to finance 
church-run kindergartens. 
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(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012c: 65). Although the share of religiously affiliated day-care 
facilities is not reported, it seems unlikely that it is higher than in West Germany. Similarly, in 
East Germany 28 % of general hospitals are run by private not-for-profit organizations and 
35 % are public, while in West Germany 38 % have private not-for-profit ownership and 
31 % are public (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013a).
7,8 
In sum, in East Germany some welfare 
services – but not all – are provided to a lesser extent by churches and to a greater extent by 
the state. Nevertheless, even in largely unchurched East Germany churches and their welfare 
associations play a prominent role in the provision of welfare services. 
Apart from the potential difficulties of maintaining this huge number of services financially, a 
large share of non-members might also undermine the acceptance of church-run services 
(Gabriel, 2007: 77). A survey by the Protestant Diakonie found that between 2001 and 2005 
the desirability of the Christian background of its services has dropped from 52 % to 46 %. 
Among the younger cohorts (aged 18 to 39) only one third of the respondents found the 
Christian background desirable (Diakonisches Werk der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland 
e.V., 2006: 21-26). Recently, the high importance of Christian welfare services, especially 
hospitals, was critically discussed in the German media because a young woman was denied 
some treatments in two church-run hospitals in an emergency situation because the treatment 
was not acceptable from a religious (Catholic) point of view. Such a case illustrates the 
dilemma that the decline in (Christian) church membership poses for the German welfare 
state. On the one hand many welfare services are organized in such a way that private not-for-
profit providers have priority over public providers, which increases the variety of these 
services and makes it easier for people to find one that best fits their needs. On the other hand, 
with a growing number of non-members it is important to make sure that those who do not 
appreciate the Christian profile of welfare services can find an alternative. 
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 The remaining hospitals are run by private for-profit organizations. 
8
 Concerning other types of welfare services, such differences between East and West Germany do not exist. 
Frerk (2005: 151) shows that after German reunification the structure of elderly care facilities has rapidly 
changed in East Germany. In 1991 almost 80 % of places in elderly care belonged to public providers (West 
Germany: 20 %), by 2001 the share of public providers had dropped to 15 % (West Germany: 11 %), while the 
share of private not-for-profit providers has risen to 64 % (West Germany: 62 %). The situation today resembles 
that of 2001: there is no systematic difference in the shares of these providers between East Germany and West 
Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013b: 6). There is no information about the share of religiously affiliated 
organizations among the private not-for-profit providers. In the provision of youth welfare services, the situation 
is similar: private organizations have about the same share in East and West Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2012b: 93-104). 
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1.3 The development of church membership numbers in 
Germany 
The religious composition of the German population has changed significantly in the last 50 
years. While the membership of the two major churches in Germany, the Evangelical Church 
in Germany (EKD) and the Catholic Church, has decreased almost constantly since around 
1970, the number and share of persons who have another or no religion has steadily increased. 
Figure 1.1 shows the development of the number of people in Germany who are members of 
the Evangelical Church in Germany, the Catholic Church or none of these two. 
Figure 1.1 shows that in 1961 there were slightly more Protestants (28.5 million) than 
Catholics (26.2 million) living in the Federal Republic of Germany.
9
 The number of 
individuals who did not belong to either of the two Christian churches was negligible (1.9 
million). Until roughly 1970, the membership of all three groups was growing, as was the size 
of the total population in Germany. The Catholic Church gained more members than the 
Protestant Church, partly because more children were baptized in the Catholic Church and 
because migrants to Germany were more often Catholic than Protestant. Since 1968 
(Protestant Church) and 1973 (Catholic Church) both churches have constantly lost members 
while the number of inhabitants with another or without religious affiliation has grown 
rapidly. The membership decline is faster in the Protestant than in the Catholic Church. In the 
1980s, there were more Catholics than Protestants in Germany and the number of others (i.e. 
with another or without religious affiliation) surpassed 10 million. With German reunification, 
the number of inhabitants of the Federal Republic of Germany increased from 62.7 to 79.8 
million. The majority of the new inhabitants (the former inhabitants of the German 
Democratic Republic) did not belong to one of the two large churches. Although only 21 % of 
the German population lived in East Germany in 1990, roughly half of all citizens without 
affiliation to the two large churches in re-united Germany were East Germans. The Protestant 
Church could also significantly increase its membership and once again had more members 
than the Catholic Church, which hardly had any members in the former GDR. Since 1990, the 
trends of the 1970s and 1980s continue: both large churches constantly lose members, the rate 
of decline is higher for the Protestant Church, and the “other” group grows constantly. Since 
1998, citizens who do not belong to any of the two major churches form the largest of the 
three groups and the Catholic Church again has more members than the Protestant Church. 
                                                 
9
 Reliable data for years before 1990 is available only for the Federal Republic of Germany. 
13 
Figure 1.1: Total population, Protestants, Catholics and others in Germany between 1961 and 
2011 
 
Data sources: Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin (2010: 589), Statistisches Bundesamt (2011d, 
2012d), Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz (2012), EKD (2012). 
Note: Data for years before 1990 refer to the former FRG only. 
 
The changes described in the previous paragraph have various reasons, which can be analyzed 
with the tools of demographic research. At first glance, it may appear unusual to apply the 
principles of demography to churches. Researchers often use the term “religious change” (see, 
for instance, Hout, Greeley and Wilde, 2001; Crockett and Voas, 2006), which does not only 
sound similar to “demographic change”, it also applies its techniques because “as long as the 
church is composed of human members, they are subject to the laws of population dynamics” 
(Fliegenschnee, Goujon and Lutz, 2004: 18 [my translation]). In what follows, I will describe 
the demographic forces that churches face. This section is structured according to the three 
components of religious change that Eicken (2006: 178) identifies: the natural component, the 
spatial component and the behavioral component. Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 give an overview 
of the quantitative importance of the natural and the behavioral components since 1956 for the 
Catholic and the Protestant churches. 
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Figure 1.2: Natural and behavioral components of demographic changes in the Catholic 
Church in Germany between 1956 and 2010 
 
Data sources: Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin (2010), Statistisches Bundesamt (2011a, 2012a, 
2012d). 
 
Figure 1.3: Natural and behavioral components of the demographic changes in the 
Evangelical Church in Germany between 1956 and 2010 
 
Data sources: Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin (2010), Statistisches Bundesamt (2011a, 2012a, 
2012d). 
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lose most of their members through death and gain most of their new members through 
(infant) baptism. This has been the case in every five-year period in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3. 
The number of deaths of church members clearly depends on the age structure of the church 
members and their mortality rates. Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin (2012: 83-85) show, using the 
example of the city Stuttgart, that the share of church members is much larger among the 
older age cohorts than among younger cohorts. This can also be seen in Figure 1.4. Since the 
1970s the share of church members among individuals who have died is higher than the share 
of church members in the total population, which points to the fact that church members are 
concentrated in the older age cohorts. 
 
Figure 1.4: Share of church members in the German populations, share of church members 
among people who have died in Germany and baptisms in the Protestant and Catholic Church 
as a share of children born 
 
Data sources: Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin (2010), Statistisches Bundesamt (2011a, 2012a, 
2012d). 
Note: All shares are average shares in the respective five-year period. 
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between 1961 and 1965 5.2 million children were born and 3.3 million persons died in 
Germany. 94 % of the latter group belonged to one of the two major churches. This means 
that if only 59 % of children had been baptized, the natural losses could have been replaced. 
As one can see in Figure 1.4, in reality around 94 % of children were baptized in that period.
10
 
Between 2006 and 2010 4.2 million people died in Germany, of which 74 % (3.1 million) 
were members of the two large Christian churches. In the same time span 3.4 million children 
were born. In order to replace the church members who died, 92 % of the newborns would 
have had to be baptized. However, the actual share of baptisms was only 54 %. 
The observation that the number of baptisms as a share of children born is below the share of 
church members in the population can have two causes: first, the fertility of non-members is 
higher than that of church members and second, not all of the children that are born to 
Christian parents are baptized. 
There is some evidence that suggests that fertility rates might be of importance. Goujon et al. 
(2007) note that the fertility of Muslim women in Austria is higher than of women of all other 
religious groups (p. 250) and if this differential in fertility persisted it would be a major source 
of the future growth of the Muslim share of the population (p. 261). In Germany, the share of 
children who are born to parents without affiliation to either of the two large Christian 
churches is currently higher than the share of the non-affiliated in society. In 2010, non-
members made up 40.6 % of the German population, but of the children born in the same 
year, 43.8 % of the mothers and 49.2 % of the fathers were not members of the Evangelical 
Church in Germany or the Catholic Church.
11
 
The second cause is the rate of baptisms. As a rough estimate, I compare the number of 
children born with at least one parent who is a church member with the number of baptisms. 
In 2010, 403,000 children were born who had at least one parent who was a church member.
12
 
In the same year, 344,000 baptisms took place (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012d: 65), which 
corresponds to a share of 85 %. Although the willingness to have their children baptized 
appears to be quite high, there is also a considerable share of children who never become 
church members although their parents are. 
                                                 
10
 The share of baptisms should be seen as a rough estimate because it implicitly assumes that all children which 
are baptized in a period are also born in that same period.  
11
 Data on the religious affiliation of parents is taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (2012a). Shares refer to those 
births where the religion of the parents is known. For 6 % of the mothers and 13 % of the fathers the religious 
affiliation is not known. 
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 This number again only refers to the cases where the religion of parents in known, therefore the real number 
will be even higher. 
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1.3.2 The spatial component 
The spatial component concerns the religious composition of immigrants to and emigrants 
from the country or area under research. Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin (2010) argue that 
currently migration plays a minor role in the development of church membership numbers for 
the Evangelical and Catholic Churches in Germany. Between 1991 and 2008 the Protestant 
Church has experienced a net gain of one million members and the Catholic Church of 
850,000 members through migration (Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin, 2010: 582, 586). In the 
same period, Germany has gained roughly 4.2 million inhabitants through spatial mobility 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011d: 66), which indicates that the majority of immigrants do not 
belong to one of the two major churches. Goujon et al. (2007: 252-253) show that the number 
of Muslims and “others” (mainly Orthodox Christians) in Austria is increasing because their 
share among the immigrants is higher than their share among the emigrants. To summarize, 
spatial mobility has had a negligible influence on membership numbers in the Protestant and 
Catholic Church in Germany. Immigration can hardly mitigate the loss of members caused by 
natural and behavioral processes. However, the data suggest that immigration accelerates the 
growth in the share of persons in Germany who do not belong to one of the two large 
churches. In the past, the situation was different. Using the example of Stuttgart, Eicken 
(2006: 178) explains that in 1975 half of the foreign inhabitants of Stuttgart belonged to the 
Catholic Church. Those people were often labour immigrants from countries such as Spain 
and Italy who came to Germany in the 1960s. In contrast, the Protestant church could hardly 
gain members through immigration, not only in Stuttgart, but in all parts of Germany (see 
Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin, 2010: 589). Today, the large majority of foreigners in Stuttgart 
belong to neither of the two Christian churches. Eicken (2006: 178) attributes this to the high 
number of immigrants from Muslim countries. 
1.3.3 The behavioral component 
The behavioral component comprises disaffiliations and affiliations (switching, re-affiliations 
and baptisms of adults). In Germany, disaffiliations have been a major cause of membership 
decline for the Evangelical and Catholic Churches (Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin, 2010) in the 
past few decades, although both churches have always lost more members through death than 
through disaffiliation (see Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3). The number of church disaffiliations is 
subject to considerable fluctuations over time. Figure 1.5 reports yearly disaffiliation numbers 
for Germany in the period 1956-2011. 
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Figure 1.5: Number of church disaffiliations in Germany between 1956 and 2011, separated 
by Protestants and Catholics 
 
Data sources: Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin (2010), Sekretariat der Deutschen 
Bischofskonferenz (2012), Statistisches Bundesamt (2012d). 
Note: Data for years before 1990 refer to the former FRG only. 
 
From Figure 1.5 one can see that disaffiliation numbers in the two churches have been 
running parallel, with the Protestant Church at a significantly higher level. Between 1956 and 
2010 4.5 million people have left the Catholic Church and 7.6 million the Evangelical Church. 
Researchers explain the peaks in the number of disaffiliations with social and political events 
as well as changes in the tax system in Germany (Pollack, 2001: 1053).
13
 Disaffiliations from 
the church have been a negligible phenomenon in post-war Germany until 1968, when there 
was a first significant increase. Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin (2010: 580) attribute this first rise 
in disaffiliation numbers both to the political climate in Germany in 1968 and the introduction 
of the value added tax. The two peaks that follow in 1970/71 and 1973/4 can be attributed to 
the introduction of “Konjunkturzuschlag” and “Stabilitätsabgabe”, which were temporarily 
limited taxes levied as additional taxes to the income tax (Pollack, 2001: 1053). In the 1980s 
church disaffiliation numbers stabilized, although at a much higher level than before 1968. By 
far the largest number of church disaffiliations in Germany occurred in 1991 and 1992. First, 
the solidarity surcharge (another additional tax to the income tax) was introduced in 1991 and 
second, church taxes were re-introduced in East Germany where they had not existed during 
GDR times. There is a small peak again in 1995 which coincides with the re-introduction of 
the solidarity surcharge. In the years to follow disaffiliation numbers declined steadily. In the 
Protestant church they reached roughly the level which they had had before 1990, in the 
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 Changes in the tax system which have an effect on church disaffiliation appear not to be limited to changes in 
the church tax regulations, but rather extend to the taxation of income and consumption. 
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Catholic Church they were higher than before 1990. In the past few years they have risen 
moderately again and in 2010 for the first time the Catholic Church lost more members than 
the Protestant church. This can probably be attributed to the scandal about sexual abuse of 
children in the Catholic Church which was revealed in 2010. 
 
Figure 1.6: Church disaffiliation rates in selected regional churches of the Evangelical 
Church in Germany between 1990 and 2010 
 
Data sources: Statistisches Bundesamt (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998), 
EKD (2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011a, 2011b). 
Note: Disaffiliation rates are calculated as the number of disaffiliations in a year in a 
regional church divided by the number of members of that regional church at the end of the 
preceding year. Blue lines indicate regional churches in East Germany, black and grey lines 
indicate regional churches in West Germany. Disaffiliation numbers for East German 
churches for 1990 are not available. In 2008 the regional church of Thuringia and the 
Church Province of Saxony were united and became the regional church of Central Germany. 
The names of regional churches usually indicate their location, although they rarely coincide 
with political borders. The Church Province of Saxony covers the largest part of Saxony-
Anhalt as well as some northern parts of Thuringia and Saxony. The Evangelical Church of 
the Rhineland covers the south-west of North Rhine-Westphalia and large parts of Rhineland-
Palatinate and Saarland. The regional church of Hanover covers the largest part of Lower 
Saxony. 
 
Disaffiliation rates do not only differ between Protestants and Catholics, but also between 
regions in Germany. Figure 1.6 reports the disaffiliation rates of several regional member 
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churches with a large number of members and from different regions of Germany, which do 
not reach beyond the formerly existing border between the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the German Democratic Republic. Looking at the early 1990s, one can distinguish three types 
of regional churches: East German churches, churches in the South of Germany and churches 
in the North and West of Germany. In all East German churches (blue lines) the disaffiliation 
rates are exceptionally high, up to 2.7 % in 1992 and 1993. At the end of the 1990s the 
disaffiliation rates had dropped to West German levels and have remained there since. In 
Thuringia and Pomerania disaffiliation rates lie below West German rates since 1999. In the 
West German churches disaffiliation rates at the beginning of the 1990s are also higher than 
in the 2000s. One can clearly see the two peaks in 1992 and 1995. Fluctuations are parallel in 
all four West German regional churches, but the rates are at two different levels. In the 
regional churches of Hanover and Rhineland (in the North and West of Germany) they are 
significantly higher than in Bavaria and Württemberg in the South of Germany. In recent 
years, differences have narrowed and Bavaria now has the highest disaffiliation rate. In the 
Catholic Church, similar patterns as in the Protestant Church can be observed. The difference 
is that disaffiliation rates are in general at a lower level. This is even true for disaffiliation 
rates of Catholics in East Germany at the beginning of the 1990s when disaffiliation rates 
were above the West German level, but not as high as in the Protestant Church. In the last 10 
to 15 years they have been at the same level as the rates in West Germany. 
However, apart from the pure numbers it is equally important to ask at which age people leave 
the church. Data for Germany and Austria shows that most disaffiliations happen between the 
age of 18 and 40 with a peak in the age group 25 to 30 (Eicken, 2006: 180; Goujon et al., 
2007: 255; Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin, 2012: 88-89). This implies that many people leave 
before they have children themselves. If these people then enter marriage they will probably 
not pass on their (former) religion to their children. Previous research on church attendance 
has shown that couples where both spouses attend church are significantly more likely to have 
church-going offspring than couples with only one church-goer (Voas and Storm, 2012). A 
countervailing effect could be that there is a clear excess of men leaving the church in their 
younger years while women catch up with men’s disaffiliation rates only after they have left 
their reproductive age (Eicken, 2006: 180; Goujon et al., 2007: 255). Since women are more 
likely to pass on their religion to their children than are their male partners (Fliegenschnee, 
Goujon and Lutz, 2004: 10; Crockett and Voas, 2006: 577), the problem might be somewhat 
mitigated. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in some families where the husband has a high 
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income he leaves the church to save taxes while the wife remains a church member to ensure 
that their children can be baptized. 
Re-affiliation, religious switching and baptism of adults can also be an important driver of 
church membership numbers. In Germany, every year a non-negligible number of adults enter 
the Evangelical Church while this source of new members is irrelevant for the Catholic 
Church (see Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3). Figure 1.7 shows the number of (re)affiliations for the 
Protestant and the Catholic Church split up in three types: baptism of adults, religious 
switches and re-affiliations. For the Catholic Church there is no separate data on baptism of 
adults and religious switches, therefore these two categories are summed up under the heading 
“affiliations”. 
 
Figure 1.7: Church (re)affiliation in the Protestant Church and the Catholic Church in 
Germany in the period 1990 to 2010 by type of (re)affiliation 
 
Data sources: EKD (2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011a, 2011b), Statistisches Bundesamt (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011d, 
2012d). 
Note: For years before 1997 only combined numbers are available for the Evangelical 
Church. Affiliations in the Catholic Church include switches to the Catholic Church and 
baptism of adults. 
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The data in Figure 1.7 show that in the Protestant Church the number of (re)affiliations has 
been fluctuating around 60,000 per year with a peak in the year 2005 and a drop thereafter. In 
the Catholic Church, the number of (re)affiliations has been rising slowly, but steadily, since 
the beginning of the 1990s and has reached a peak in 2005 with more than 16,000 people 
joining, immediately followed by a sharp drop. The strong increase in (re)affiliations in the 
Catholic Church in 2005 is most likely due to the fact that in April 2005 Pope Benedict XVI 
(a German) was elected. Whether the peak for the Protestant Church is also connected to the 
election of the pope is less clear, but possible. The data also reveal that there is a very large 
and stable gap in the number of (re)affiliations between the Evangelical and the Catholic 
Church, with the Evangelical Church gaining a multiple of the number of new members of the 
Catholic Church. 
The data in Figure 1.7 show that re-affiliation is the most important source of membership 
gains within the behavioral component for both large churches. However, the number of re-
affiliations is much lower in the Catholic Church than in the Protestant Church; Catholic 
numbers are between 30 and 40 % of the Protestant numbers, although they have increased 
since the beginning of the 1990s. The Protestant Church additionally gains a significant 
number of new members through switches (mostly from the Catholic Church) and baptisms of 
adults, while these two types of membership gain are negligible for the Catholic Church. 
The numbers of church (re)affiliations are more stable than those of church disaffiliations and 
appear to be rather influenced by church-related events (the election of Pope Benedict XVI in 
2005; the child abuse scandal in the Catholic Church in 2010, which might have driven the 
number of switches to the Protestant Church in that year) than by political and economic 
events. 
1.3.4 Summary 
The natural, spatial and behavioral components of religious change have different weights in 
different countries and denominations. For the Evangelical and Catholic Churches in 
Germany both the behavioral and natural component are of exceptional importance, with the 
behavioral component playing a larger role for the Protestant Church because it simply has 
higher numbers of affiliations and disaffiliations (Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin, 2010). In the 
remainder of this dissertation I will concentrate on the behavioral component. It is not only 
quantitatively important for the development of membership numbers, it is also less 
mechanical and predictable than births and deaths. In addition, affiliations and disaffiliations 
can have a decisive importance for the natural component of membership development, e.g. if 
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individuals disaffiliate before they have children. For the economic situation of the two large 
churches in Germany, which are mainly financed by church taxes, affiliations and 
disaffiliations are also probably more important than deaths of church members, because the 
individuals who disaffiliate are usually young and pay a considerable amount of church taxes, 
while those who die are often pensioners who hardly pay church taxes. I will therefore try to 
establish what influences the behavioral component of membership change. 
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1.4 Outline of the dissertation 
The introduction has provided evidence for both the individual and the social significance of 
religiosity and has underlined the prominent role of the church as an institution shaping the 
welfare sector, parts of the labor market and the voluntary sector in Germany. Moreover, I 
have briefly illustrated the secularization of Germany and the decisive role that church 
disaffiliations play in this regard. 
Against this background, the focus of the dissertation at hand is the phenomenon of church 
disaffiliation – its potential economic causes and consequences. Particular attention is given to 
the institutional setting in which church membership decisions are taken. The institutional 
determinant I center on is the system of church financing and in most of this work I will 
concentrate on the German church tax system. 
In Chapter 2 I start with a literature survey of religious consumption choices, which will serve 
as a basis for my own theoretical contribution. This survey will show that previous research 
has largely neglected the institutional framework of religious choices. Therefore in Chapter 3 
I set out to develop a simple theoretical model that incorporates the church financing system 
as a decisive institutional factor in the church membership decision. I compare the systems of 
three different countries: the US, Italy and Germany. Apart from the church membership 
decision the model also incorporates the decision about charitable giving. This seems 
reasonable since church contributions are often considered as a form of charitable giving and 
churches are strongly involved – and are expected by both members and non-members to be 
involved – in the provision of welfare and charity. Therefore the model in Chapter 3 asks if 
and how the church financing system and the church membership decision might influence 
voluntary giving. The results in this chapter suggest that the church tax in Germany has an 
effect on the church disaffiliation decision. The higher the income of the individual and the 
church tax rate and the less he or she agrees with how the tax is used by the religious 
community, the higher is the probability of disaffiliation. In contrast, in other church 
financing systems such as the tax assignment system which exists in Italy, church 
membership decisions are independent from parameters of the tax rate and the use of funds by 
the church. In addition, when church contribution and charitable giving are seen as 
(imperfect) substitutes, the church financing system should influence charitable activity. For 
Germany, the model predicts that church members give less to charity than non-members, but 
the sum of charitable donations and church contributions exceeds the giving of non-members. 
Furthermore, when individuals disaffiliate from the church and the duty to pay church taxes 
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does not apply anymore, individuals are expected to start giving to charity if they have not 
given anything before, or to increase their giving. 
Chapters 4 and 5 comprise empirical contributions which focus on the church tax system in 
Germany and are based on German income tax data. In Chapter 4 I look at the church tax as a 
potential cause of church disaffiliations in Germany. Based on the predictions of the 
theoretical model in Chapter 3 I test the hypothesis that the higher the church tax an 
individual has to pay – controlling for other variables, most notably income – the higher the 
probability that he or she disaffiliates from the church. In addition, I also discuss the influence 
of demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the individual as well as regional 
differences in the church membership decision within Germany. The results suggest that the 
amount of church tax an individual has to pay has a significant, but moderate positive effect 
on the probability to leave the church. In contrast, income seems to be irrelevant for the 
membership decision after controlling for the price of being a church member. In line with 
previous research, I find that the propensity to drop out of church varies strongly with age and 
depends on the region where the individual lives. While I find no gender differences in the 
likelihood of disaffiliation, interregional mobility appears to facilitate the decision to leave the 
church. 
In Chapter 5 I turn my attention towards the consequences of the church tax system in 
Germany and of the decision to leave the church. Again, based on the model in Chapter 3, I 
test whether church members and non-members systematically differ in their voluntary giving 
(excluding church taxes). In addition, I ask if voluntary giving changes during the process of 
disaffiliation, i.e. from the years before to after disaffiliation. In this respect, I am also 
interested in the question whether those individuals who leave the church differ in their giving 
behavior from those who stay. This observation could help to infer something about their 
motivation for leaving the church. Finally, I look at two different categories of giving, one 
which includes religious giving and one which is purely secular, in order to see if church 
membership and church disaffiliation has differential effects on giving depending on which 
cause it benefits. The results suggest that church members are far more likely to make a 
donation than non-members, but when they make a contribution, the amount given is lower 
than that of non-members. However, the higher giving of church members is found for only 
one – although the quantitatively more important – category of giving. Those individuals who 
leave the church are significantly less generous that church members who stay, but during the 
process of disaffiliation I observe a moderate increase in giving.  
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2 A LITERATURE REVIEW OF MODELS OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICES 
CONCERNING RELIGIOUS CONSUMPTION AND AN INSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF CHURCH FINANCING SYSTEMS 
2.1 Introduction 
Religion has long been considered by economists as irrational and outside the scope of 
decisions that can be explained by economic models. With the exception of Adam Smith in 
the “Wealth of Nations” and the “Theory of Moral Sentiments” (for a review see Anderson, 
1988), economists have long avoided the topic. This approach has radically changed with 
Azzi and Ehrenberg’s (1975) seminal model of religious consumption choice. Since then, the 
economics of religion has seen pronounced interest from economists and different sub-fields 
of investigation have emerged. Iannaccone (1998) gives a comprehensive overview of the 
development of research in the economics of religion. A similar categorization of research is 
presented in McCleary and Barro (2006a). The field can be separated into research on the 
“economic consequences of religion” (Iannaccone, 1998: 1466 [emphasis in original]) where 
religion is seen as an “independent variable” (McCleary and Barro, 2006a: 50) – a brief 
overview of this literature can be found in the introduction in Section 1.1 –, and the 
“economic analysis of religion” (Iannaccone, 1998: 1478) where religion is the “dependent 
variable” (McCleary and Barro, 2006a: 49). The latter strand of the literature can be further 
divided in a part that studies the supply side of religion by examining the religious market 
structure and the decision-making of religious organizations; and another part that examines 
demand for religion. One way of approaching the demand for religion is the development of 
rational choice models of individual and household decision making with respect to religion 
(McCleary and Barro, 2006a: 49-50). This strand of the literature is based on Azzi and 
Ehrenberg’s (1975) seminal paper where they model a household which engages in time-
consuming and money-intensive religious activities in order to derive both current benefits 
from religion and a pleasant afterlife. 
Various researchers have subsequently taken up the ideas of Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) and 
have suggested modifications to their model – simplifications, changes of central 
assumptions, the introduction of new features. To name only a few, researchers have modeled 
both individual and household decisions on religiosity, they have considered one-period and 
multi-period models, they have looked at external effects of individual religious activity, and 
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they have introduced various sources of uncertainty into the decision on religious 
consumption. 
However, up to now the focus of research has almost exclusively been on the degree of 
religious consumption, which depends on monetary and time inputs into religious activity, 
while the decision on membership in religious organizations has been disregarded. In 
addition, the connection between religiosity and charitable giving has largely been neglected. 
Despite the large body of empirical research on this topic, very few theoretical contributions 
exist. Furthermore, all previous models start with the assumption that the individual is 
completely free to choose his or her amount of religious contributions; which is not a valid 
description of the situation in many European countries where churches are often financed 
through some kind of taxes with exogenously determined tax rates. 
The aims of Chapter 2 are, first, to provide a thorough review of the existing theoretical 
literature on religious consumption choices, and second, to present and compare three 
different models of church financing: reliance on voluntary giving as in the US, church taxes 
following the German example, and the tax assignment system as it exists in Italy and Spain. 
The literature review and the comparison of institutional frameworks lay the basis for my own 
theoretical contribution concerning the simultaneous decision about church membership and 
charitable giving under three different institutional arrangements concerning religious 
communities. This contribution will follow in Chapter 3. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2, I give an overview of the various 
models of religious consumption, beginning with the simplest model and introducing 
modifications step by step, while discussing their implications and empirical predictions. 
Section 2.3 reviews the few existing models of simultaneous choice concerning religious and 
secular charitable activities. Section 2.4 discusses the institutional framework for 
denominational membership as well as religious and secular voluntary contributions in three 
particular countries: the US, Germany and Italy. Finally, Section 2.5 draws some interim 
conclusions and outlines open questions and research gaps. In particular, it points out the lack 
of theoretical models concerning the simultaneous decision on religious and secular giving 
and the incorporation of different institutional arrangements into the decision on religious 
consumption. 
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2.2 Religious consumption choices 
In this section I review various models of individual rational choice over religiosity. Some of 
the models that will subsequently be discussed have also been reviewed by Iannaccone 
(1998), Schmidtchen (2000) and Mangeloja (2003). The latter two papers heavily build on the 
much-cited literature review of Iannaccone (1998). While all of the aforementioned papers 
treat a variety of topics in the economics of religion, such as household decisions on religion, 
religious markets and economic consequences of religion, my own review focuses only on the 
individual or household decision on religiosity. In addition, my review centers on formal 
aspects of the model, whereas the previous papers only define the utility functions and budget 
constraints, but discuss the results verbally. I also try to incorporate all relevant theoretical 
models in one framework where only some of the assumptions vary. In addition, my review 
includes some additional aspects, in particular the joint decision on religiosity and voluntary 
giving; and it incorporates recent contributions such as Melkonyan and Pingle (2009) and 
Papyrakis and Selvaretnam (2011) that have not been reviewed in earlier papers. 
The models of individual and household decision making on religiosity which are reviewed in 
this chapter differ in various respects. First, there are different possibilities to model the 
commodities in the utility function, in particular those that describe benefits from religion. 
Second, the inputs into the production of commodities vary; they can be only time, only 
money, or both. Third, inputs can be exogenously given or endogenously determined. Fourth, 
some models include risk or uncertainty, while others do not. This in turn influences the 
modeling of the decision making, which can be utility maximization under a budget 
constraint, maximization of expected utility or comparison of discrete utility levels. Table 2.1 
provides an overview over the models that are discussed in this section. The most important 
features of the models and/or the novelties in comparison with previous models are 
highlighted in bold letters. 
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Table 2.1: Overview of models discussed in Chapter 2 
Section Commodities in utility 
function 
Inputs in 
production of 
commodities 
Budget constraint Uncertainty Decision making Object of 
interest 
Time  
2.2.1 Secular consumption, 
religiosity 
Time, money Limited time, 
exogenous income 
None Maximization of 
utility under 
budget constraint 
Individual One 
period 
2.2.2 Secular consumption, 
religiosity 
Time, money Limited time, 
exogenous wage, 
endogenous income 
None Maximization of 
utility under 
budget constraint 
Individual One 
period 
2.2.3.1 Secular consumption 
and afterlife 
consumption 
Time, money Limited time, 
exogenous wage, 
endogenous income 
None Maximization of 
utility under 
budget constraint 
Individual Multiple 
periods 
2.2.3.2 Secular consumption 
and current religious 
consumption 
Time, money Limited time, 
exogenous wage, 
endogenous income 
None Maximization of 
utility under 
budget constraint 
Individual Multiple 
periods 
2.2.3.3 Secular consumption, 
afterlife and current 
religious consumption 
Time, money Limited time, 
exogenous wage, 
endogenous income 
None Maximization of 
utility under 
budget constraint 
Individual Multiple 
periods 
2.2.4.1 Secular consumption, 
current religious 
consumption 
Time, money Limited time, 
exogenous wage, 
endogenous income, 
tax exemption for 
religious spending 
None Maximization of 
utility under 
budget constraint 
Individual Multiple 
periods 
2.2.4.2 Secular consumption, 
current religious 
consumption 
Time, money Limited time, 
exogenous wage, 
endogenous income 
None Maximization of 
utility under 
budget constraint 
Household 
(husband 
and wife) 
Multiple 
periods 
2.2.5 Secular consumption, 
afterlife and current 
religious consumption 
Time, money, 
stock of 
religious 
capital 
Limited time, 
exogenous wage, 
endogenous income 
None Maximization of 
utility under 
budget constraint 
Individual Multiple 
periods 
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2.2.6 Secular consumption, 
afterlife and current 
religious consumption 
Time, money, 
stock of 
religious capital 
and quality of 
religious group 
Limited time, 
exogenous wage, 
endogenous income 
None Maximization of 
utility under 
budget constraint 
Individual Multiple 
periods 
2.2.7.1 Secular consumption, 
afterlife and current 
religious consumption 
Time, money Limited time, 
exogenous wage, 
endogenous income 
Timing of 
death 
Maximization of 
utility under 
budget constraint 
Individual Multiple 
periods 
2.2.7.2.1 Secular consumption, 
afterlife and current 
religious consumption 
Time, money Limited time, 
exogenous wage, 
endogenous income 
Existence of 
afterlife 
Maximization of 
utility under 
budget constraint 
Individual Multiple 
periods 
2.2.7.2.2 Secular consumption, 
afterlife and current 
religious consumption 
Money; discrete 
choice about 
inputs 
Exogenous income Existence of 
afterlife 
Expected utility Individual Two 
periods 
2.2.7.2.3 Secular consumption, 
afterlife and current 
religious consumption 
Money; discrete 
choice about 
input in religion 
Exogenous income Total 
ambiguity 
about 
existence of 
afterlife 
Multiple decision 
criteria 
Individual Two 
periods 
2.2.7.3 Secular consumption, 
afterlife and current 
religious consumption 
Money No budget 
constraint, only 
exogenous income 
Timing of 
death; 
existence 
and quality 
of afterlife 
Comparison of 
absolute utility 
levels 
Individual Three 
periods 
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2.2.1 The basic model 
In the basic version of the religious choice model, which underlies all following models, a 
utility-maximizing individual derives utility from two types of goods: secular consumption   
and religiosity  , 
         . (2.1) 
Benefits from religiosity can be manifold. Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975: 32) distinguish three 
different types: “afterlife consumption”, “current satisfaction” and social recognition. 
“Afterlife consumption” (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975: 32) is the sum of utility a person 
receives in life after death and is a credence good as pointed out by Hull and Bold (1989:11) 
and Gill and Lundsgaarde (2004: 405).  
In contrast, “current satisfaction” (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975: 32) or “temporal bliss” (Hull 
and Bold, 1989: 8) comprises “solace in this life” (Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison, 1992: 10), 
“entertainment” (Hull and Bold, 1989: 8), private religious festivities like marriages and 
baptisms, but also personal social capital, that means networks from which the individual 
receives utility, be it in the form of “fellowship” (Hull and Bold, 1989: 8), personal support, 
societal status
14
 (see Sherkat and Wilson, 1995: 995, 999), access to the marriage market 
(Cameron, 1999: 441) or access to parts of the labor market. The greater the share of the 
regional population that attends (the same) church, the higher the utility from being a church 
member (Smith and Sawkins, 2003: 1581; Brañas-Garza, García-Muñoz and Neuman, 2007: 
7). Participation in religious groups can therefore be seen as complementary to other activities 
like child-raising, leisure consumption or reputation-building (Ulbrich and Wallace, 1989: 8). 
However, there is a negative side to this, too. When a large share of a person’s reference 
group attends church, religious participation becomes a social norm that individuals need to 
conform to in order to gain “acceptance, recognition and affirmation from their peers” (Smith 
and Sawkins, 2003: 1581). Gruber (2005: 11) finds that a high market density of a religion in 
a region increases church attendance for the adherents of this religion. There is a “social 
pressure motive” (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975: 32) related to religious attendance meaning 
that abstaining from participation could impose cost on the individual (see also Brañas-Garza, 
García-Muñoz and Neuman, 2007: 9). This pressure need not only come from a person’s 
                                                 
14
 The social capital motive is also discussed by Brewer, Jozefowicz and Stonebraker (2006: 390). They state 
that some individuals are more interested in connecting with important people than in the religious teachings 
when they attend church.  
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peers, it can also come from the church itself when it instills a bad conscience in a person that 
does not follow church rules. This mechanism functions like a tax on all kinds of non-
conformist behavior (Smith, 2002: 109). 
From a theoretical point of view, the main difference between these three types of benefits 
from religious activity is that afterlife consumption takes place in a future period (after the 
person’s death) while the other two types of benefits accrue in the same period when they are 
produced. I discuss the implications of this difference below. However, in the basic one-
period model this particularity is of no relevance and for the moment I leave open the nature 
of the benefits derived from religiosity  . 
The individual disposes of an exogenous endowment of time, , and monetary resources,  . 
Both religiosity and secular consumption require the input of time (   and   , respectively) 
and money (   and  ). 
            (2.2) 
 
            (2.3) 
Consequently, the individual faces the following time and budget constraints: 
         (2.4) 
 
         (2.5) 
The Lagrangian function to be maximized is 
                                  (2.6) 
Solving the maximization problem and rearranging yields: 
   
  
  
  
 
  
   
  
   
 
  
   
  
   
 (2.7) 
which is equivalent to 
                   (2.8) 
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where    is the marginal rate of substitution between the two commodities consumption 
and religiosity and       is the marginal rate of transformation of the input in brackets.15 
The results imply that both the marginal contribution of secular consumption and religiosity to 
the utility of the individual and the marginal productivity of the two inputs (money and time) 
determine the level of religiosity chosen and its mode of production. If the form of the utility 
function is such that religiosity creates large benefits in an (infinite) afterlife, individuals have 
a high marginal utility of religiosity. The same is true for individuals who live in an area 
where religious communities are important institutions in the everyday life, e.g. as a meeting 
place and organizer of leisure activities. This is more likely to be the case in rural areas 
(Mangeloja, 2003: 6). It might also be the case in regions where state social security systems 
are absent and support in the case of need is provided by religious communities (to their 
members). 
The choice over inputs into religion depends on how religiosity can be produced (see also 
footnote 19). If the marginal productivity of contributing money to religion is high (a good 
example is selling of indulgences by the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages), individuals 
will mainly choose monetary inputs. In contrast, if religious persons are supposed to spend a 
lot of time reading the bible, attending services or praying, they will exhibit a high level of 
  . Since religions and denominations differ in their teachings about how religiosity should 
be produced, e.g. through intensive study of holy scriptures or through being generous, the 
denomination has an important effect on the marginal productivity of time and money and 
therefore on the combination of inputs chosen. 
Furthermore, it can be expected that exogenous increases in the marginal productivity of 
inputs in secular consumption will lead to reductions in time and money spent for religion.
16
 
Gruber and Hungerman (2008) provide an impressive example. They investigate the effects of 
the repeal of so-called “blue laws” (i.e. laws that prohibit special activities, such as retail 
activities, on Sundays) on religious participation and religious contributions. When a state 
allows the Sunday opening of shops, individuals have greater secular opportunities to spend 
their time and money on Sundays – in other words, the marginal productivity of inputs into 
                                                 
15
 A somewhat different illustration of the model results can be found in Clain and Zech (1999: 930). 
16
 For such an outcome it is necessary that the substitution effect exceeds the income effect. 
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secular consumption increases. As expected, Gruber and Hungerman (2008) find that 
religious attendance and religious giving drop significantly after the repeal of “blue laws”.
17
 
2.2.2  Endogeneity of income 
The first extension of the model concerns the exogeneity of income. Such a modification has 
been suggested by Neuman (1986). Instead of assuming that the individual has an 
exogenously given monetary income  , I now assume that the individual has some exogenous 
income    and at the same time faces an exogenously given hourly wage rate  . The income 
of the individual depends on the number of hours worked,  , which in turn reduce the time 
available for secular consumption and/or religious activities. The time and budget constraints 
can be written 
           (2.9) 
 
             , (2.10) 
while the utility function of the individual is the same as in Section 2.2.1. 
The Lagrangian function to be maximized is 
                                      (2.11) 
Maximization of the problem yields 
  
  
  
  
  
   
   
  
  
  
  
   
     (2.12) 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
   
   
  
  
  
  
   
    (2.13) 
Rearranging (2.12) and (2.13) yields exactly the same results as above in (2.7) and (2.8): The 
marginal rate of substitution between the two commodities equals the marginal rate of 
transformation, i.e. the ratio of the productivities of an input (time or money) in the 
production of the commodities. 
                                                 
17
 Adam Smith was probably the first to write about the substitutability of religious and secular consumption. In 
the “Wealth of Nations” he argues that the impact of overly strict religious sects could be limited if the 
government reduced restrictions in the market for entertainment. Lower prices for “jugglers, clowns, and actors” 
(Anderson, 1988: 1073) would – in the terms of my model – exogenously increase the marginal productivity of 
monetary inputs in secular consumption and thereby, according to Adam Smith, reduce the demand for strict 
religion (Anderson, 1988: 1073). 
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The budget constraint also determines the combination of inputs into a specific commodity: 
 
  
   
   
 
  
   
   
   
 
  
   (2.14) 
which is equivalent to  
                   (2.15) 
For both religiosity and secular consumption, the marginal rate of technical substitution must 
equal the wage rate. In other words, the inputs must be chosen such that an increase by one 
unit of time spent with secular consumption (religiosity) reduces the monetary inputs 
necessary to maintain the same level of secular consumption (religiosity) by   units. An 
exogenous increase in the wage rate will lead to a substitution of time spent with secular 
consumption (religiosity) with money spent for secular consumption (religiosity), given that 
both types of inputs have a positive marginal productivity with respect to secular activities 
(religiosity) (Neuman, 1986: 1195-1196). The condition that the wage rate determines the 
ratio of time and money spent on religion is not only valid within individuals, but also 
between individuals. Persons with a comparatively high income are expected to engage in 
religions or denominations that do not require large time inputs but highly appreciate financial 
contributions by their members (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975: 51-52). 
2.2.3 Life-cycle models 
In order to derive theoretical results about the changes in religiosity over the life cycle, it 
proves helpful to derive a multi-period model. This was first done in the seminal paper of 
Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) and has been taken up in most of the more current models. 
When looking at life-cycle models, it is necessary to make explicit assumptions about the 
nature of religious benefits and in particular the period of their occurrence. I start with Azzi 
and Ehrenberg’s original assumption that individuals derive only afterlife utility. After 
presenting some of the critical points of this assumption, I continue by discussing a model 
where individuals derive only current utility and I conclude with the case where both current 
and afterlife utility are present. 
2.2.3.1 Afterlife consumption 
According to Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975: 32), the utility function of the individual can be 
written as 
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                                  (2.16) 
where    is the discounted present value of expected afterlife consumption (see Azzi and 
Ehrenberg, 1975: 33) and   indicates the time period. Note that secular consumption takes 
place in every period of the individual’s earthly life while afterlife consumption only occurs 
in the future after the individual has died. The length of an individual’s life is   periods, 
which is exogenously determined and known to the individual. I assume that both the 
production of the secular consumption good and the production of afterlife consumption 
require the input of both money and time.
18
 
               (2.17) 
 
                                   19 (2.18) 
As in the previous model, the wage rate is exogenously given and the individual 
endogenously determines the number of hours worked in each period,   . In each period the 
individual faces a budget constraint 
                               (2.19) 
where     is an exogenously given non-labor income in period  . In order to make 
intertemporally optimal decisions the individual needs to transfer money between periods. 
Therefore I introduce the variable    which captures saving and dissaving. The individual 
does not inherit wealth,      , and does not leave any bequests,         
 
     , where 
        
    is the discount rate and   is the interest rate. The individual receives interest 
on his or her stock of savings. 
The resulting first order conditions for each period mirror those derived in Section 2.2.2, 
equations (2.12) to (2.15). 
The intertemporal budget constraint is: 
                                                 
18
 In Azzi and Ehrenberg’s (1975) original model, the production of afterlife benefits requires only the input of 
time. However, they discuss the model as it is presented above in their conclusions. 
19
 Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975: 33) point out that the production function of afterlife consumption “need not in fact 
actually exist”, but “be only perceived … to exist” (emphasis in original). Afterlife consumption is a credence 
good and there is no objective evidence that the production function is correct. In fact, adherents of different 
religions may assume different production functions. However, if the individual perceives no uncertainty about 
the form of the function, it can be used in the context of the model. If there is (subjective) uncertainty about the 
production function (e.g. about the existence of the afterlife or the transformation of an input into afterlife 
consumption) the models discussed in Section 2.2.7 may be more appropriate. 
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 (2.20) 
Saving and dissaving cancel out. 
The Lagrangian function to be maximized is:
20
 
 
                   
                  
 
   
                           
 
   
  
(2.21) 
The main results concerning pecuniary and time inputs into religion over time are the 
following (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975: 35-36): 
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 (2.23) 
If the wage rate is constant over time,    and      cancel out in (2.22) and the right-hand 
sides of (2.22) and (2.23) are the same. If I additionally assume that the production function of 
afterlife consumption is the same in periods     and  ,                            , 
then both religious giving and time spent with religion should increase over time. The slope of 
the increase is determined by the interest rate  . In early stages of his or her life, the individual 
spends a lot of time working and saving money for which he ir she receives interest. In later 
stages of life, the individual spends more money and time on religion. The reason for this 
result is that in the model the individual can accumulate interest on his or her savings, but not 
on his or her inputs into religion. I can also relax the assumption that the production function 
of afterlife utility is constant over time. For example, the theory of “religious human capital” 
(see Section 2.2.5) states that proficiency in religion grows over time. An hour spent with 
                                                 
20
 In the present model – as in most models of religious consumption choice – monetary variables are discounted 
using the interest rate. Blomberg, DeLeire and Hess (2006) present a model where the individual does also have 
a time preference, i.e. the utility of future periods is discounted. 
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religious activities is more productive the more experience one has. If this is the case, the age 
profile of time spent for religion becomes even steeper. 
If, however, the wage rate increases over time the increase in religious participation from one 
period to the next will be less steep. Even decreases in time spent with religion are possible if 
the wage increase is large enough. As a result a U-shaped profile of religious participation is 
possible. During childhood, opportunity costs of religious participation are low and 
participation is high. During working life, wage rates increase and the individual tends to 
replace religious participation by pecuniary contributions. In the prime working years, 
participation is lowest, but increases thereafter as opportunity costs of time decrease again and 
proficiency in religion, i.e. productivity, is highest. Neuman (1986) finds a U-shaped age 
profile of religious time inputs for male Jewish workers. 
Some authors criticize the modeling of the afterlife in Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975). Ulbrich 
and Wallace (1983) and Pyne (2010) claim that Azzi and Ehrenberg’s assumptions about the 
afterlife do not match the belief systems of most religions. Both the “continuous distribution” 
Pyne (2010: 47) of afterlife consumption and the idea that afterlife consumption is 
“monotonically increasing” Ulbrich and Wallace (1983: 44) in inputs of religious activities 
are questionable. Furthermore, the present model is not able to explain the religiousness of 
people who do not believe in the existence of an afterlife. 
2.2.3.2  Current religious consumption 
In contrast to the model above, I now assume that the benefits from religiosity accrue in the 
form of temporal bliss or social pressure and completely disregard the afterlife. Such a model 
was first proposed by Sullivan (1985) and was later taken up by Sawkins, Seaman and 
Williams (1997). 
The utility function of the individual includes utility from both secular consumption and 
religiosity in all   periods of life. 
                                            (2.24) 
Note that the main difference between this model and the model in the previous section is that 
religious consumption accrues in each period of the individual’s life, therefore I write    
instead of   . 
In each period, the two commodities are produced by inputs of money and time: 
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                (2.25) 
 
                (2.26) 
The intertemporal budget constraint is the same as above, see equation (2.20). 
The Lagrangian function to be maximized is: 
                  
                  
 
   
                           
 
   
  
(2.27) 
The main results concerning pecuniary and time inputs into religiosity over time are the 
following (see Sullivan, 1985: 311): 
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 (2.29) 
In contrast to the previous model (equations (2.22) and (2.23)) the marginal utilities might 
now be different in each period and do not cancel out. In some periods of an individual’s life, 
benefits from a certain level of religiosity might be higher, e.g. when one is dependent on help 
from fellow believers, or when one consumes goods which can be complementary to 
religiosity, such as children or leisure. If such a situation occurs, one would expect an increase 
in the resources spent for religious activities. In the present model the age and income effects 
on religiosity are less straightforward than in the previous model because they additionally 
depend on the distribution of the marginal utility of religiosity (and implicitly on the 
consumption of goods which are substitutes or complements to religiosity) over time. 
The model in this section is helpful to avoid some of the problems that occur when religiosity 
only produces afterlife utility. In particular, the researcher need not make assumptions about 
the afterlife and how afterlife consumption is related to this-worldly activities, which is 
usually not the core competence of an economist. However, one could argue that religious 
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activities thereby lose their specific features and the model could easily be applied to all 
human activities that require the input of time and money. The most comprehensive and 
realistic approach is certainly to account for both this-worldly and afterlife benefits. 
2.2.3.3 Afterlife and current religious consumption 
The two approaches of modeling only afterlife consumption or only current religious 
consumption can easily be combined in one model (see Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975: 37). The 
model and a detailed discussion of results can be found in Appendix A.1. The results are a 
combination of the results of the previous two models: while afterlife considerations imply 
increasing or U-shaped religious participation over the life-cycle, high current benefits from 
religion might induce the individual to deviate from such a time path. 
2.2.4 Extensions of the framework 
Various extensions of the model of religious consumption choices have been discussed. In 
this section I present the implications of a tax exemption for monetary contributions to 
religion and of joint household production of religiosity. In order to keep the model simple, I 
assume that only current utility from religion is produced. The extensions to the cases when 
only afterlife benefits or both afterlife benefits and current utility are produced are 
straightforward. 
2.2.4.1 Tax exemptions for monetary contributions to religion 
Sullivan (1985) introduces a tax exemption for religious giving, which makes financial 
contributions to religion less expensive in comparison to spending on secular consumption 
goods. The corresponding intertemporal budget constraint is 
 
                     
 
   
                           
 
   
 (2.30) 
where    is the marginal tax rate of the individual. The marginal tax rate is chosen because 
voluntary charitable contributions, such as contributions to religious organizations, are tax-
deductible in most countries. In other words, they reduce the taxable income and thereby the 
income tax. The higher the marginal tax rate on the last unit of income is, the higher is the 
reduction in income taxes. Therefore the term        can be called the “price of giving”. 
The resulting first-order condition for pecuniary religious contributions over the life cycle is:  
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 (2.31) 
Compared to the result of the model without taxes (equation (2.29)) the marginal tax rate of 
periods   and     appears on the right-hand side of the equation. Provided that the marginal 
productivity of religious inputs and the marginal utility of religious consumption are constant 
over time, the individual shifts his or her religious contributions to those periods when the 
marginal tax rate is highest (i.e., the price of giving is lowest). If the price of giving was fixed 
over time, as in the model of Chang (2005: 5-7), it would only affect the amount of giving, 
but not the time path, since the terms        and          would cancel out.
21
 
Adding the tax exemption also yields additional insights concerning the within-period 
substitution of monetary and time inputs in religious production. For each period  , one can 
write 
 
  
    
    
 
     
 
  
      
 (2.32) 
The left hand side of equation (2.32) is the marginal rate of technical substitution between 
monetary and time inputs into religion, keeping current religious consumption constant. When 
one compares this result with equation (2.14) the marginal tax rate now appears on the right-
hand side of the equation. If the tax exemption reduces the price of monetary religious 
contributions, individuals will substitute time spent with religious activities with religious 
giving. 
2.2.4.2 Joint household production 
Another extension, which is thoroughly discussed in the original paper by Azzi and Ehrenberg 
(1975), is the joint household production of religiosity. The formal presentation of the model 
can be found in Appendix A.2. It is assumed that husband and wife jointly produce current 
current religious consumption and secular consumption for the household. The central result 
is that the marginal rate of technical substitution between the time inputs of husband and wife 
                                                 
21
 Apart from changes in the tax system, the most obvious reason for changes in the marginal tax rate is the 
existence of a non-linear (usually progressive) income tax. Formally showing all implications of a progressive 
tax system when wages change over time is beyond the scope of this model. However, assuming that wages 
increase with rising age, marginal tax rates rise as well and religious giving becomes less expensive over time. 
This should result in increasing religious contributions as individuals get older (Sullivan, 1985: 311-312). At the 
same time individuals have a further incentive to substitute religious participation with religious giving when 
their wage is highest. 
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into religiosity are determined by the ratio of the two wage rates. Since men and women often 
face different opportunity cost of time in the form of different market wages, the model 
predicts that the partner with the lower wage – often the wife – spends more time producing 
the religious commodity while the husband engages in market activities. According to Azzi 
and Ehrenberg, this reasoning provides an explanation for the higher religious participation of 
women that is often found in empirical studies. (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975: 34-35)
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2.2.5 Religious human capital 
In Section 2.2.3.1 I already pointed out that the productivity of time spent with religious 
activities may increase over time because of learning effects. Iannaccone (1990, 1998: 1481-
1482) describes and formalizes this idea, which has become well-known in the literature on 
economics of religion under the term “religious human capital”. The main idea is that the 
production of religious commodities – both current and afterlife religious consumption – do 
not only depend on pecuniary and time inputs in the current period (as in the models in 
Sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.4), but also on the stock of religious capital that has been accumulated in 
earlier stages of the individual’s life,    . 
                (2.33) 
 
                    (2.34) 
 
                                                  (2.35) 
Religious human capital is in turn a function of previous inputs into the production of 
religiosity, 
                          (2.36) 
One can think of religious human capital as experiences and knowledge about a specific 
religion and the integration in a religious community. It is an additional input in the 
production of religious commodities and increases the marginal productivity of money and 
time spent in the production of the religious commodity. As an example, a person who has 
been a member of a certain religious organization for a long time knows which charities are 
most compatible with the religious teachings of the group and will spent his or her money on 
                                                 
22
 In the original model by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) the spouses also jointly produce afterlife utility. The 
assumption that the inputs of husband and wife in the production of an afterlife for the couple are substitutes has 
subsequently been questioned (see Ulbrich and Wallace, 1983: 44; Pyne, 2010: 47). Most theoretical models 
therefore restrict themselves to look at one single individual. 
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such charitable projects. Similarly, if someone is accustomed with the teachings of a religious 
group, it will be easier to follow a worship service. 
An aspect that is not covered by the formal model of Iannaccone (1998: 1481-1482), but that 
he implicitly mentions when he writes that religious human capital helps to “produce and 
appreciate religious commodities” (Iannaccone, 1990: 299), is that religious human capital 
also increases the marginal utility from religiosity. If someone is accustomed to the teachings 
and the typical behavior of a religious group, he or she will find it easier to derive utility from 
his or her religious efforts, e.g. support from co-religionists, social contacts or pleasure from 
participating in church-related leisure activities. Both effects of religious human capital 
suggest that religious inputs should increase over the life-cycle. 
Since religious human capital is religion- or denomination-specific, the model also suggests 
that most people will stay in the denomination they grew up with or switch early in life. As far 
as spouses jointly accumulate religious human capital, one should expect most marriages to 
be homogamous. (Iannaccone, 1998: 1481-1482). 
2.2.6 Religious clubs 
The theory of religious clubs incorporates the existence of religious communities into the 
model (Iannaccone, 1998: 1482). So far in this chapter, individuals (or households) have 
made decisions that were completely independent from the religious choices of other 
individuals. Iannaccone (1992, 1998) suggests making the religious production function of the 
individual dependent on fellow worshippers’ religious inputs. The previous model is extended 
by including the group quality,   , into the production function of current religious 
consumption goods.
23
 It is also helpful to introduce a superscript indicating the individual. 
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 Iannaccone (1992, 1998) does not differentiate between current and afterlife religious consumption, therefore 
it is not quite clear whether he assumes that group quality also has an influence on afterlife utility. However, 
from the discussion in his papers and the examples he gives it appears as if he concentrates on current benefits. 
In addition, it seems to be more in line with the common understanding of most faiths that the religious inputs of 
the individual matter for the afterlife, not so much the environment he or she lives in. This thinking is also in line 
with the criticism of Azzi and Ehrenberg’s (1975) household production model, where critics argue that one 
spouse cannot produce afterlife consumption for the other. 
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The quality    is a strictly increasing function of the average religiosity of all other 
individuals,   
    
   
    
    
    (2.40) 
which can be calculated as 
   
    
  
 
      
. (2.41) 
with   being the size of the religious community of individual   (Iannaccone, 1992: 277). 
Group quality can be interpreted in various ways. It comprises the devotion of co-religionists 
during prayer and worship and their engagement in religious volunteering and charitable 
religious activities. Berman (2000: 922) stresses that in the case of Ultra-Orthodox Jews the 
quality of the religious group is the welfare that is provided to all members who are in need. 
With group quality entering the religious production function, producing the religious 
commodity does not only increase one’s own utility, but also has a positive externality on 
fellow believers by increasing their level of religiosity. However, if the religious community 
is sufficiently large, individuals will take others’ religious contributions as given and 
disregard their own influence on the religious consumption of the other members. 
Consequently, participation levels are too low. (Iannaccone, 1992: 278) 
Iannaccone (1992, 1994) and Berman (2000) discuss two ways to overcome the free-rider 
problem: production of religious commodities can be subsidized or production of secular 
commodities can be made more expensive. Often the second path is chosen: strict religious 
organizations prohibit a certain diet, alcohol, gambling, some kinds of sexual behavior, etc. 
(see also Hollander, Kahana and Lecker, 2003: 494). This way, they can screen out the most 
committed members and the average quality of the group is increased. 
To sum up, the club model of religion provides an explanation why some people get involved 
in religious groups that require high sacrifices in terms of time or money. In this way the 
groups seek the most committed members and increase group quality. However, this only 
works if the group offers some highly valuable benefits, such as social security, exclusively to 
its members. 
2.2.7 Uncertainty 
In the models I have presented so far, individuals had full information about all features of the 
model. However, in reality there are various sources of uncertainty. In what follows, I discuss 
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some aspects, in particular uncertainty about the existence of the afterlife, about the one 
“right” religion and about the length of the individual’s own life. For simplicity, I abstract 
from both “religious human capital” and religious club models and go back to the model I 
discussed in Section 2.2.3. 
2.2.7.1 Uncertainty about the timing of death 
Blomberg, DeLeire and Hess (2006) present a model that explicitly takes into account the 
influence of the probability of death in each period. The basic idea of the model is that the 
higher the probability of death in the next period, the higher should be the weight of afterlife 
utility in the utility function of the individual. 
I re-write the model of Blomberg, DeLeire and Hess (2006) in order to fit it into the previous 
framework. The lifetime utility function now includes the probability of death in each period, 
while the budget constraint is virtually unchanged, except for the fact that the number of 
periods is no longer fixed at  , but infinite. The Langrangian function to be maximized is 
 
        
                     
       
 
   
 
                  
 
   
                           
 
   
   
(2.42) 
where       is the probability of death at the beginning of period   and    is the probability 
of having survived until the beginning of period  , 
 
       
 
   
       
(2.43) 
I first derive the first-order conditions for a specific period  . When looking at one period in 
which the individual is still alive, the probability of having survived so far,   , is irrelevant 
for the current decision while the probability of death in the next period is crucial: 
                                                      (2.44) 
 
                                                      (2.45) 
The higher the probability of death in the next period, the more religious activities the 
individual will undertake in comparison to secular consumption (Blomberg, DeLeire and 
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Hess, 2006: 8). This would suggest that older people as well as severely ill people should be 
more religious than young and healthy people. 
When comparing decisions in different periods, the following first-order conditions occur: 
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 (2.47) 
If         is large compared to      ,    and     have to be large in comparison to      
and      . That means that individuals tend to shift religious activities to periods when the 
probability of death is high. 
Demographic changes which are characterized by a longer average life expectancy and a 
lower probability of death in the early periods of life therefore have the effect that young 
people are not forced to think about the afterlife when they are still young and postpone the 
production of religious (afterlife) commodities. However, the model also shows that high 
current utility from religion can still induce individuals to keep up a high level of religiosity, 
even when they are young. 
2.2.7.2 Uncertainty about the existence of an afterlife 
2.2.7.2.1 A simple approach 
A simple way to incorporate insecurity about the existence of an afterlife into the model is to 
postulate a utility function with two additively separable parts: (secular and religious) current 
utility and afterlife utility, where afterlife utility is dependent on the (subjective) probability 
that an afterlife exists,     24: 
     
               
                    25 (2.48) 
                                                 
24
 In most of the previous models it was implicitly assumed that the probability of the existence of an afterlife is 
one. 
25
 The model can easily be extended to incorporate the possibility of choosing the “wrong” religion: 
    
                    
                     
where      is the (subjective) probability of having the “correct” religion (see Pyne, 2010: 51). 
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This model is briefly discussed in Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975: 52). More recent applications 
include Tao and Yeh (2007) and Pyne (2010). The optimality conditions now incorporate the 
probability of existence of an afterlife: 
                                                   (2.49) 
 
                                                   (2.50) 
(see Tao and Yeh, 2007: 774). The model predicts that the higher the subjective probability 
that the afterlife exists, the higher ceteris paribus the inputs of time and money into the 
production of the religious commodities. 
The intertemporal decision about the resources devoted to religion is unaltered by the 
introduction of      because the probability is modeled to be time-invariant. However, if 
there is an increase in the subjective probability of the existence of life after death, one 
expects that time and money spent for religion will grow as well. 
The model can be put in an insurance framework where individuals insure themselves against 
the existence of an afterlife. A detailed discussion can be found in Appendix A.3. 
2.2.7.2.2 Religion as a discrete choice 
Instead of determining the level of religious inputs one can also go one step back and ask 
what the determinants of the decision to be religious are. In other words, I model a discrete 
decision. This type of model is outlined in Montgomery (1996: 443) and Melkonyan and 
Pingle (2009). The individual faces two states of the world – the afterlife exists, or it does not 
– and he or she has only two choice options – being religious or not. For simplicity I assume 
that there are only two time periods (this life and the afterlife) and that the income of the 
individual is exogenously determined. Furthermore I make the assumption that only monetary 
inputs in the production of religiosity exist. These monetary inputs   are set to a fixed level 
    in the case the individual decides to be religious, while the second choice option is 
being an atheist with    . It is assumed that            , i.e. the person has a more 
pleasant afterlife when he or she is religious. The respective payoff matrix can be seen in 
Table 2.2. Payoffs   are the sum of secular consumption and current and afterlife religious 
consumption. Superscripts indicate the choice of the individual (afterlife insurance or no 
afterlife insurance), subscripts indicate the state of the world. The first derivatives of all 
commodities with respect to their respective inputs are assumed to be positive. 
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When the individual chooses no inputs into religion, his or her secular consumption 
opportunities are larger, but he or she does not have any current utility from religion and – in 
case the afterlife exists – also has a much less pleasant afterlife. 
 
Table 2.2: Payoff matrix in different states of the world and with different choices concerning 
afterlife insurance 
 State 1: Afterlife exists with 
probability      
State 2: Afterlife does not exist 
with probability        
Afterlife insurance 
     
  
                       
               
No afterlife insurance 
     
  
               
       
 
The individual compares the expected utilities of both alternatives 
                                 
                          
(2.51) 
and  
                                           (2.52) 
The individual has to weigh the loss in secular consumption caused by religious contributions 
against the current benefits from religious activities and the possible afterlife benefits. Which 
alternative will be chosen is a priori unclear and depends on   as well as on the form of the 
utility function and the production function of each commodity. The individual will choose to 
be religious if the probability of afterlife existence, this-worldly or other-worldly religious 
benefits are high; or if the secular costs of religion are low (e.g. because there are limited 
opportunities for secular consumption). It should also be noted that the specific theology is 
important: people who grow up in religions or denominations that promise a particularly 
blissful afterlife for the faithful and serious punishment for non-believers, i.e.             
is large, will be more likely to choose to be religious. 
The framework can easily be extended to capture more than one religion (see Melkonyan and 
Pingle, 2009: 11-16). The general reasoning remains the same, however, now the so-called 
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“differential penalties” (Melkonyan and Pingle, 2009: 12) enter the decision. By this term the 
authors mean the differences in afterlife costs of two religions if a third religion was the 
“true” one. For example, if it turned out that Catholicism was the true religion, some people 
could argue that the penalty in the afterlife for choosing the wrong religion would be smaller 
for Protestants than for Muslims. 
2.2.7.2.3 Religious choice under total ambiguity 
Some researchers express criticism of the assumptions underlying the previous models of 
religious choice under uncertainty. Montgomery (1996: 444) argues that the subjective 
probabilities of the existence of an afterlife or the truth of a specific religion might depend on 
the religious choices of the individual and could therefore change during life. Montgomery 
(1992, 1996) and Melkonyan and Pingle (2009) question whether individuals can actually 
form these subjective probabilities. Melkonyan and Pingle (2009: 6-7) stress that even if the 
probability distribution is completely unknown (i.e. there is total ambiguity), the individual 
must still make a decision about religion. As decision criteria, Melkonyan und Pingle (2009: 
8) suggest the following: max-max criterion, max-min criterion, Hurwicz criterion, min-max 
regret criterion and principle of insufficient reason. The expected utility approach which was 
discussed above is not available because it requires that (subjective) probabilities of the 
different states of the world can be formed. 
Appendix A.4 shows which decisions about religiosity each of the criteria imply. In general, 
optimists can be expected to choose religion when afterlife utility is high, while pessimists 
choose religion if the punishment for not being religious is high (Melkonyan and Pingle, 
2009: 16). A critical point of this model is that one has to assume that the benefits of religion 
(in particular the afterlife benefits) are finite, measurable and known to the individual. If they 
were infinite, being religious would be the only rational choice. 
2.2.7.3 A multi-period model of discrete religious choice under uncertainty 
One of the most recent models of religious choice is by Papyrakis and Selvaretnam (2011). It 
combines various features of the different modeling approaches discussed in this section so 
far. The authors use a multi-period model, however, the number of periods is restricted to 
three of which the last period is the afterlife. Furthermore, they introduce various forms of 
insecurity: insecurity about the probability of death in the second period, insecurity about the 
existence of an afterlife and insecurity about the probability of receiving afterlife benefits, 
given religious activities during one’s earthly life. The religious choice is discrete: in each of 
the first two periods the individual can decide whether he or she is religious or not. 
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The decision problem of the individual is solved by backwards induction, first looking at the 
decisions when old and then modeling the religious choice of the young cohort, given what 
they will do when they are old. 
As in all previous models, being religious comes at the cost of reductions in secular 
consumption, but at the same time creates current religious benefits and increases afterlife 
utility.
26
 The marginal productivity of the inputs and the marginal utility of all commodities 
are strictly positive. 
An individual in the second period of his or her life faces the following decision: given he or 
she was religious in the first stage of life, the individual will leave the religious community if 
 
                 
           
  
          
           
  
    (2.53) 
where   is a share of secular consumption that is lost if the person decides to be religious,    
is the exogenous income in the second period of life, which is smaller than income in the first 
period,   .    is the current benefit from religiosity in period 2 and              is the 
probability of going to heaven, which is dependent on the religiosity in both periods of this-
worldly life. We have 
                             (2.54) 
where   signifies being religious and   non-religious. The first argument refers to the first 
period of life, the second argument to the second period. If the individual dies at the end of 
period 1, the probability of heaving a pleasant afterlife is        if he or she was religious as 
a young person and        if not. 
If the individual was not religious in period 1, he or she would stay a non-member if 
 
                 
           
  
          
           
  
    (2.55) 
From both inequalities it is possible to derive a critical level of secular consumption,      , 
above which the individual will choose to not be religious. Rearranging (2.53) yields 
                                                 
26
 The functional form of the utility function is the same as in (A.16). 
51 
 
      
   
    
  
                    
 
 
(2.56) 
The critical level derived from (2.55) is 
 
      
   
    
  
                    
 
 
(2.57) 
The difference between (2.56) and (2.57) is the probability of going to heaven. Since  
                                  (2.58) 
the income threshold for leaving the church when one was religious as a young person is 
higher than the threshold for remaining unreligious when one was not religious in the early 
years of life. However, the model clearly shows that it is individuals with a high second 
period income who tend to be not religious in the second period. 
Now that the decision in the second period is clear, one can determine religiosity in the first 
period. Here Papyrakis and Selvaretnam (2011: 441) make the assumption that the income in 
the second period is lower than in the first, resulting in a lower maximum secular 
consumption,            , and that the current benefits of religious participation are the 
same in both periods,      . 
If second-period income is sufficiently low, i.e. below the level determined in inequality 
(2.57), the individual will always be a church member in the second period. He or she 
therefore compares the utility of being religious in both periods with the benefits of 
postponing religious activities to the second period. 
In both cases, the second period utility will be the same because the individual is a church 
member with all the costs and benefits this implies. However, he or she trades off the 
(monetary) costs of being religious in the first period of life against the this-worldly benefits 
from religious affiliation in the first period and the higher probability of going to heaven in 
case of early church membership. The increased likelihood of a pleasant afterlife is present 
both if the individual dies after the first period and if he or she lives in the second period. 
Formally, the individual will postpone religiosity if 
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(2.59) 
where       is the probability that the individual dies before period 2 starts. Note that 
afterlife consumption is discounted more heavily if the individual lives when old,      .  
If the second period income of the individual is so high that he or she will always be non-
religious in the second period - no matter what the choice in the first period was
27
 – the 
relevant decision is between being religious in the first period and then disaffiliating or being 
non-religious throughout the whole life. Again, the utility in the second period is the same, 
but secular consumption and current religious benefits in the first period as well as expected 
afterlife utility differ. The individual decides to renounce religiosity completely if 
                   
  
     
  
                 
         
  
                  
(2.60) 
If the second period income of the individual is sufficiently high to disaffiliate in the second 
period, as determined by inequality (2.56), then inequality (2.60) is always fulfilled, i.e. the 
individual will be unchurched throughout his or her whole life. In other words, being a church 
member and disaffiliating when old is never a rational strategy. Of course, this result hinges 
on the assumptions that the income in the first period is higher than in the second, that current 
benefits of religion are not larger in the second period than in the first and that leaving the 
church during life is worse for the probability of enjoying an afterlife than not being religious 
at all. The latter point is somewhat contrary to the models I have presented earlier, such as in 
Section 2.2.3.1, where religious inputs in all periods have a positive effect on afterlife 
consumption. 
Finally there might be some individuals whose second period income is high enough that 
being non-religious in both periods might be rational but not high enough that they would 
disaffiliate from the faith even if they had been religious when young. In other words, their 
second period income is between the two levels determined in (2.56) and (2.57). Those 
individuals compare the utilities of being religious in both periods with being unchurched 
                                                 
27
 This is the case described in equation (2.56). 
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throughout their whole existence. On the one hand, being religious causes (monetary) costs in 
both periods, on the other hand the individual has current benefits from being a church 
member in both periods and a higher probability of going to heaven regardless of whether he 
or she dies prematurely or not. The individual will decide to be non-religious if 
 
        
     
  
        
     
     
  
      
     
  
 
         
  
                  
(2.61) 
In all three cases a high (subjective) probability that an afterlife exists, high afterlife 
consumption or high current benefits from religion make being religious a more likely choice 
for the individual. The same is true if the individual believes that being a church member has 
a strong (positive) effect on the probability of going to heaven. These findings are in line with 
all other models that I have discussed in this chapter. 
One central result of Papyrakis and Selvaretnam (2011) is that a decrease in the probability of 
dying young induces individuals to postpone church affiliation. This is formally proven by the 
authors for inequalities (2.59) and (2.61). One prediction of their model is therefore that 
demographic change causes the average age of denominational members to increase. This is 
in line with the model by Blomberg, DeLeire and Hess (2006) in Section 2.2.7.1, although the 
two models differ in many respects. 
Papyrakis and Selvaretnam’s (2011) model prominently shows that a high exogenous income 
in either of the periods makes being religious in that period less likely. However, it should be 
noted that this is partly due to the fact that in their model being religious does not reduce the 
income itself; instead, it reduces the utility from secular consumption derived from this 
income by a certain percentage. In that case, the utility loss from being religious grows with 
income. However, if the authors had assumed that being religious reduces the income, the 
result would have been less clear. This is because without further assumptions about the form 
of the utility function it would not be possible to determine whether the utility loss is higher 
for rich or poor people. While the duty to pay a certain share of one’s income to a religious 
community leads to a larger reduction in income for wealthy individuals, it is not clear 
whether the burden is also heavier for them. It might be that for a millionaire it is easier to pay 
a certain percentage of his or her income to a religious community than for someone who can 
hardly feed his or her family.  
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2.3 Simultaneous determination of religious and secular 
charitable contributions 
Although the models in Section 2.2 all take secular activities into account, they completely 
neglect non-religious charitable activities. While religious giving,   , can easily be 
interpreted as charitable contributions to religious communities, secular spending is usually 
thought to buy a secular consumption good. The models allow several predictions about 
charitable contributions to religion, e.g. that they should increase with age, they should be 
higher when the denomination offers significant afterlife benefits or provides important this-
worldly benefits to the individual and that they should be higher if the individual has high 
opportunity costs of time, e.g. in the form of high hourly wages. However, the models do not 
allow for any direct predictions how religious and non-religious charitable contributions 
interact. 
2.3.1 A simple approach 
A rather simple modeling approach of religious and secular charitable contributions is 
presented in Hrung (2004) and Chang (2005). These two authors use a simplified Azzi and 
Ehrenberg (1975) model, but disregard secular consumption and interpret all non-religious 
spending of money (and time) as secular charitable activities. 
In Hrung (2004: 733-735) the individual receives utility from secular charitable giving,    , 
      , in all   periods of his or her life as well as from afterlife benefits,   . Afterlife 
benefits depend on religious contributions in all periods of life,   , 
                      (2.62) 
The Lagrangian function to be maximized is 
                          
         
  
 
   
  
  
  
 
   
  (2.63) 
where    is the exogenous income in period  . 
The following first-order conditions arise: 
    
    
   
      
 
 
   
 (2.64) 
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 (2.65) 
Note that in this simple model religious contributions only influence utility through afterlife 
benefits, since current religious benefits do not exist. In contrast, secular contributions directly 
affect utility. 
From equation (2.64) it can be seen that religious contributions increase in time if an equal 
amount of contributions (in nominal terms) produces the same marginal utility in all periods 
(Chang, 2005: 7).
28
 Of course, this conclusion depends on the fact that contributions to 
religion are depreciated, but produce the same amount of afterlife utility (Hrung, 2004: 734). 
If the marginal utility of a fixed amount of giving remains constant also for secular giving, 
then one would expect to see an increase over the life-cycle of the individual. If, however, the 
marginal utility of a fixed amount of secular giving is higher in some periods of life than in 
others, one would expect to see a higher intensity of giving in these periods. (Hrung, 2004: 
735)  
Chang (2005: 5-7) derives exactly the same results for religious and secular giving, although 
his model is slightly more complicated and includes also time restrictions as well as different 
prices for religious and secular giving. 
When looking at a single period  , the following equation must be fulfilled: 
                        (2.66) 
In each period the individual splits up religious and secular contributions such that their 
marginal contributions to utility are the same. If the individual believes that afterlife 
consumption cannot be bought with monetary contributions, the individual can produce only a 
low level of afterlife consumption    with a given monetary input   , which means that the 
marginal productivity of     will be low for all levels of    and in turn    will be high. 
                                                 
28
 A possible function for afterlife utility    which fulfils this requirement is                   . 
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2.3.2 Incorporating secular consumption and a time constraint 
Clain and Zech (1999: 928-930) present a more complex model, in the sense that it 
distinguishes between secular consumption and secular charitable activities, which both enter 
the utility function of the individual, together with religiosity,  
            (2.67) 
where   is secular charity,   is consumption and   is religiosity. All commodities are 
produced by inputs of money and time. Since the model does not have a time dimension, 
religiosity can refer both to this-worldly and other-worldly aspects. The following production 
functions apply: 
            (2.68) 
 
          
    
   (2.69) 
 
            (2.70) 
An interesting feature of the model is that production of religiosity requires inputs of two 
different types of time-consuming activities:   
 , which is religious volunteering and   
 , 
which is time for worship and prayer. 
The Lagrangian function to be maximized is 
                                     
    
        (2.71) 
The first-order condition concerning religious and secular giving yields 
                                        (2.72) 
From equation (2.72) one can easily see that the individual tends to focus his or her giving on 
the sector that yields higher marginal productivity for a fixed amount of monetary inputs 
and/or higher marginal utility of the commodities produced. If the individual has strong 
beliefs in a blissful afterlife or hopes to profit from membership in a religious community, he 
or she tends to focus giving on religious purposes; he or she might switch to secular purposes 
if these yield high reputation for the individual or high intrinsic satisfaction. However, the 
marginal productivity of monetary inputs is also important. If, for example, the marginal 
productivity of monetary inputs in religion is low because the faith or the specific religious 
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community emphasize good deeds or intensive bible studies as the way to nourish religiosity, 
one would also expect religious giving to be low. 
Turning now to the time use of individuals, first-order conditions require 
                         
              
                (2.73) 
Again, the time choices of the individual depend on the marginal utility of religious and 
secular activities, i.e. how much the individual values these two, but also on the marginal 
productivity, i.e. to what extent time spent volunteering for secular or religious charities or 
attending services and studying the bible influences the secular and religious commodities. 
For religious activities it must be true that 
      
        
   (2.74) 
A religious person will primarily engage in those activities that yield the highest productivity 
in the production of religiosity, either volunteering and helping others or studying the faith 
and attending religious ceremonies. The marginal productivities are primarily determined by 
the rules and beliefs of the denomination. With the distinction between religious volunteering 
and religious study the authors allow for the possibility that individuals are heavily involved 
in religion, but still exhibit a low level of charitable religious activity. This is new in contrast 
to Hrung (2004) and Chang (2005) who interpret all religious activity as being of a charitable 
nature. 
Another interesting part of the discussion in Clain and Zech (1999) is that they consider the 
possibility that the cross derivatives of the production function with respect to two different 
inputs can be either positive or negative. In all previous models, including those described in 
Section 2.2, it has been assumed that the chosen level of one input does not have an effect on 
the marginal productivity of another. 
For example, the marginal productivity of secular giving could increase with the level of 
religious giving. One might think of someone who donates to a religious charitable 
organization. Thereby he gets in contact with other donors and learns about an interesting, 
trustworthy secular organization that he or she would also like to support. By giving to a 
religious charity, the individual can also increase the marginal productivity of his or her 
secular giving and one would expect that religious and secular charitable contributions 
increase simultaneously – in other words, they are complements. 
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The model of Clain and Zech (1999) therefore allows for the possibility that inputs in 
religious and secular charitable activities can be increased simultaneously, while the models 
of Hrung (2004) and Chang (2005) do not. If the marginal productivity of a certain type of 
charitable activity (religious or secular) depends on the level of the other type, the individual 
can simply reduce secular consumption in the world of Clain and Zech (1999). However, if 
secular consumption is left out of the model, as in Hrung (2004) and Chang (2005), then 
individuals cannot increase charitable religious and secular inputs simultaneously because of 
budget (and time) restrictions. Consequently, the models can lead to divergent results 
concerning the influence of religious activities on secular charities. 
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2.4 Institutional analysis of different church financing 
systems 
2.4.1 Overview 
The financing of religious communities takes multiple forms and differs from country to 
country. It depends on the relation of church and state in the particular country (Marré, 1991: 
13-16) and on historical and cultural factors. Often religious communities rely on more than 
one form of financing. Marré (1991: 17), Kiderlen (1996: 37-38) and Hammer (2012: 68-78) 
distinguish the following sources of revenues: donations and fund-raising, fees for church 
services, interest from financial assets or profits from business activities, direct financing 
through the state, church taxes, obligatory church contributions, tax assignments and state 
support for facilities run by the church. 
In countries where the state is neutral or hostile towards churches, the latter must rely on the 
contributions of their members or dividends on their own property. The same is often true for 
minority churches (Marré, 1991: 17). If they own financial assets or businesses, the resulting 
profits can be important sources of revenue. Otherwise they have to rely on members’ 
contributions. One possibility is to raise fees for particular services, e.g. weddings or funerals. 
More common is to ask members for donations independent of their specific use of church 
services. This form of financing prevails in the US, but also in France and the Netherlands 
(Marré, 1991: 17). Governments can support voluntary contributions to religious communities 
by making them tax deductible. An advantage of financing through voluntary contributions is 
that the religious communities do not depend on the courtesy of the state. In addition, 
religious communities are forced to offer the kinds of benefits which their (paying) members 
desire. This has a positive aspect in that the churches have an incentive to satisfy their 
members’ needs as best possible. A critical point is that conflicts may occur if members do 
not fully agree with the prevailing interpretation of the holy scriptures of their own 
denomination. Furthermore, giving might be directed to a few popular church projects, 
whereas other less well-known or unpopular church services which are nevertheless vital in 
the teachings of the denomination might lack financial resources (Feldhoff, 1996: 57). 
Funding churches only by voluntary giving might also result in a high dependency on a small 
group of the most generous givers and it might lead to a reduced scope of services in poor 
neighborhoods (Marré, 1991: 21). Pastors would also need to spend a large share of their time 
trying to secure funding, which leaves less time for spiritual guidance (Feldhoff, 1996: 56). 
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The models of individual choice on religiosity that were discussed in Section 2.2 often 
implicitly assume that churches are financed by voluntary contributions. This can be seen by 
the fact that in these models individuals can freely decide how much money they spend for 
religion and that decisions taken by religious communities themselves or the state do not play 
a role. 
All other forms of church financing that were listed above rely on the cooperation of the state 
in one way or the other. Direct financing through the state is common in countries where state 
churches exist. The state pays the state church directly from tax revenues that are often 
collected from all citizens. Examples are Nordic counties such as Norway, but also the Greek 
Orthodox Church in Greece (Kiderlen, 1996: 42). This form of church financing entails a 
close connection between and mutual influence of church and state. 
The state can also pay religious communities for providing education or welfare services to 
the public or for the maintenance of buildings of historical value. Such state financing is of 
considerable importance in Germany. Religious communities run schools, but also 
kindergartens, hospitals and nursing homes. A large share of expenditures for these facilities 
is remunerated by the state. This differs from direct state financing of churches in that the 
money provided is to be used for education, health or welfare services specified by the 
government; it is not at the free disposal of the religious community. In addition, other 
(secular) not-for-profit and for-profit organizations that provide the same services receive the 
same remuneration. 
Finally, churches can finance themselves by levying church taxes or obligatory church 
contributions on their members or by participating in the tax assignment system. Although 
these instruments seem similar, they differ in some important details. The similarity is that 
churches – often in an agreement with the state – determine an amount of contributions that 
all members have to pay depending on the members’ incomes (and sometimes also wealth). 
One difference to voluntary contributions is that the taxes or church contributions are 
obligatory and administered by the state itself or by the religious community with the help of 
the state legal system. Although many religious communities which rely on donations ask 
their members to give a certain share of their income and sometimes exert considerable 
pressure on their members to pay, they cannot provoke legal consequences on those who do 
not. Under a church tax system as it exists in Germany, Finland and parts of Switzerland, the 
national or local governments collect church taxes from citizens together with the national or 
local income taxes and they automatically apply the same force and legal instruments to 
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collect both types of taxes. In a system of obligatory church contributions, which exists in 
Austria, the church itself collects contributions on the basis of members’ incomes. If a 
member refuses to pay, the church can take legal action against the member within the state’s 
legal system. The church contribution in Austria has a lot of similarities with a membership 
fee in any voluntary organization. In church tax and obligatory church contribution systems 
individuals can avoid paying taxes and contributions by disaffiliating from the church. In 
contrast, if there is a tax assignment system in place, e.g. in Italy and Spain, all taxpayers – no 
matter what their religion is – need to pay a certain share of their income. They have the 
choice between contributing their money to a religious community or to the state, which uses 
the revenues for charitable, social or cultural purposes. 
A disadvantage of the church contributions system – compared to church tax and tax 
assignment systems – are the high costs. For the churches it is more expensive to keep records 
of their members, the incomes of the members and to collect the tax than it is for the state 
which carries out all these tasks together with the levy of the income tax. Furthermore, taking 
legal action against taxpayers in default is not only costly but might harm the reputation of the 
church and is therefore used rarely – which makes church contributions appear voluntary and 
undermines tax equity. (Marré, 1991: 22-23) From a theoretical point of view, if payment of 
contributions was strictly enforced, the church contributions system would be very similar to 
a church tax system, but with a lower level of resource efficiency; if, however, payment was 
not enforced at all and churches had no reliable information on members’ incomes, the church 
contribution approach would by very similar to a system of voluntary donations. 
Table 2.3 gives an overview over some common ways of church financing and names some 
countries where these systems exist. However, it should be noted that often more than one 
type of financing is used in a country. 
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Table 2.3: Overview of types of church financing with example countries 
Type of church financing Countries (examples) 
profits from financial assets, land and 
business activities 
England, Portugal 
voluntary contributions of members and 
fund-raising 
US, Netherlands, France 
obligatory church contributions Austria 
church tax Germany, parts of Switzerland, Finland, 
Denmark, Sweden 
tax assignment Italy, Spain, Hungary 
state remuneration of social services provided 
by churches 
Germany 
direct state financing Norway, Greece, Luxemburg 
Data sources: Marré, 1991: 17-29; Hammer, 2012: 68-78. 
 
In what follows, I concentrate on three types of church financing: the voluntary giving 
system, with the US as an example; the church tax system as it exists in Germany; and the tax 
assignment system according to the Italian and Spanish examples. These three systems were 
chosen for various reasons. First, the US system has already been modeled in the previous 
literature and it is also a system where individuals make decisions freely without any external 
restrictions. It will therefore serve as a benchmark to which the Italian and the German 
systems will be compared. Second, the church tax and tax assignment systems are rarely 
discussed in scholarly articles on the economics of religion, whereas other arrangements like 
state financing is in the focus of researchers. Third, interest lies in choices of individuals or 
households. However, if churches finance themselves through business activities or interests, 
or if they receive state funding, decisions are taken by the church and the state, respectively, 
and not by individual church members. Fourth, opponents of the church tax system in 
Germany often suggest a reform of the church financing system and the introduction of 
church financing through a tax assignment system or through completely voluntary 
contributions without any state interference. (see Branahl, 1992: 34-42; Feldhoff, 1996: 41-
48) These two are in fact the most viable options for Germany, while other options appear 
inapplicable: Direct state financing is at present neither in the interest of the major German 
churches nor the German state. It would also run counter to the prevailing interpretation of the 
German constitution (“Grundgesetz”) which guarantees freedom of religion. Freedom of 
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religion includes the right not to have a religion and not to be forced to contribute financially 
to a religious community. Levying church contributions as in Austria is also not an attractive 
alternative to the church tax system because it is very costly while at the same time revenues 
are lower than in a church tax system and tax equity is negatively affected. 
I now explain the voluntary giving system in the US, the church tax system in Germany and 
the tax assignment system in Italy (and Spain) in some more detail since they will be taken up 
in the model in Chapter 3. 
2.4.2 Voluntary giving to religious communities in the US 
Voluntary giving by members makes up the largest share of revenues of religious 
communities in the US (Chaves, 2002: 42). How the communities encourage their members to 
pay and how they collect the money depends on the traditions and the teachings of each 
denomination (Chaves, 2002: 49). Some denominations expect their members to give 
generously, independent of the community’s specific needs. Others ask members to give for 
well-defined projects or activities. Some denominations request tithing, i.e. giving a certain 
percentage of one’s income, traditionally 10 %. Members can also be asked to pledge, i.e. 
making a commitment to give a certain amount of money over a period of time. Requests for 
giving can be voiced during or after services, or members might be contacted by mail, phone 
or personally at home (Miller, Parfet and Zech, 2001: 46-47). Members can also be asked to 
give money regularly, usually on Sundays and holidays, using envelopes handed out for this 
purpose. Again, members are expected to give according to their income. (Fischer, 2005: 314) 
Giving to religious organizations is usually tax-deductible. For the model that follows, the 
most important feature of this financing system is that individuals freely determine the 
amount they give and that this amount is not directly connected to the individual’s income. In 
reality, social pressure can induce individuals to give at least a minimum amount (Meuthen, 
1993: 186) and certainly most people would agree that one should give more the more one 
earns. But since religious communities have no right to review member’s income statements 
or tax declarations, the final decision remains with the individual. 
US citizens are often considered very generous when it comes to voluntary giving, in 
particular giving to religious congregations (Marré, 1991: 18). Empirical studies seem to 
support this view. In a telephone survey of more than 4,000 Americans above the age of 21 it 
was found that in the year 2000 only around 11 % of households did not make a charitable 
contribution and the average size of the contribution was $1,620, which corresponds to 3.1 % 
of household income (Independent Sector, 2001a: 17).  
64 
The same survey found that of those households who do give, roughly 10 % give only to 
religious congregations
29
, 59 % give to religious congregations and secular purposes and 
31 % give only to secular organizations. When it comes to the amount given, those who give 
to both causes make the largest contribution (of which 58 % are assigned to religious 
congregations), followed by purely religious and purely secular givers. (Independent Sector, 
2001b: 11-13) 
2.4.3 The church tax system in Germany 
In Germany, the major source of revenues for the two large Christian denominations (Roman 
Catholic and Protestant) is church taxes collected from their members (Daiber, 1995: 70).
30
 
The church tax is an additional tax to the income tax. It amounts to 8 % or 9 % of a member’s 
income tax payments. Which tax rate applies is dependent on the region where the individual 
lives, because religious communities have regional organizations which negotiate – within 
certain limits – the relevant church tax rate for their members with the regional government. 
Church taxes are collected by state tax offices along with income taxes.
31
 Therefore 
government has to be informed who is a church member and who is not. Church membership 
usually starts with baptism; individuals who were baptized as children are automatically 
considered church members until they disaffiliate. Church disaffiliation generally has to be 
declared formally before government employees. An administration fee of up to 60 euro is 
charged. The duty to pay church taxes terminates after church disaffiliation. (see also Daiber, 
1995: 71-72) 
The particularities of the German church tax system evoke some problems. First, the state 
needs to be involved in church membership issues, which are typically the concern of 
religious communities themselves. However, since the state collects taxes on behalf of the 
religious communities, but on the other hand guarantees religious freedom – which involves 
each citizen’s right not to be religious and not to support any religious community financially 
– it needs to provide the opportunity for citizens to disaffiliate from the church and elude the 
duty to pay church taxes. The consequences within the religious community of a church 
disaffiliation that is only declared before government officials is a much-debated topic (see 
also footnote 43). 
                                                 
29
 The term “religious congregations” here refers only to places of worship, excluding any charities that are in 
some way connected to them. 
30
 Some smaller religious communities such as the Old Catholic Church (“Altkatholiken”), Religious humanist 
communities (“freireligiöse Gemeinden”) and some Jewish communities also participate in the church tax 
system. 
31
 An exception is the federal state Bavaria, where churches run their own tax offices. 
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Second, there are some complications when married couples are jointly assessed for the 
income tax, but only one of them is a church member. If both spouses contribute to the family 
income, church taxes are only levied on the income of the church member. However, some 
couples decide to split their responsibilities such that only one partner earns a market income 
and the other does family work. In that case it is assumed that the partner without own income 
has a right to some of his or her spouse’s income and consequently needs to pay church taxes 
on his or her share of that income (see Petersen, 2010: 75-76). In practice, the joint taxable 
income of the couple is calculated according to the regulations of the Income Tax Law. In a 
second step, a graduated tax plan is applied. This regulation disincentivizes family 
constellations where the partner earning the family income disaffiliates from the church in 
order to save church taxes and the partner without his or her own income remains a church 
member and secures the family access to benefits for church members. 
Third, churches face the problem that people might disaffiliate only to save church taxes. For 
this reason, there are some special regulations that are meant to ease the tax burden especially 
for members with high incomes. Many regional churches have introduced maximum church 
tax rates. Since the income tax in Germany is progressive, the church tax is progressive as 
well, i.e. the amount of church tax as a share of income increases as income increases. The 
maximum church tax rate secures that above a certain amount of income the church tax 
increases only linearly with income.
32
 As well, there are some hardship regulations that 
release church members from paying the full amount of taxes if they have an extraordinarily 
large one-time income, such as a compensation for loss of office. 
Figure 2.1 reports church tax revenues of the Protestant Church in Germany (“Evangelische 
Kirche in Deutschland”) and the Catholic Church for the years 1991 to 2012 in real terms, i.e. 
they are inflation-adjusted using the consumer price index for Germany with the base year 
2010. The data strongly suggests that both churches face the same changes in revenues over 
time. However, in the early 1990s the Catholic and the Protestant Church received almost the 
same amount of church taxes from their members, but ever since the gap in revenues has been 
widening steadily and currently the Catholic Church receives more than 500 million euro 
more in church taxes than the Protestant Church. Taken together, in the last few years total 
church tax revenues amounted to more than 9 billion euro. In nominal terms, the church tax 
                                                 
32
 The regulation differs from the income tax scheme. In the income tax scheme, above a certain income the 
marginal tax rate on an additional euro of income is constant (currently at 45 %), and the average tax rate 
converges towards the maximum marginal tax rate. In the church tax scheme, the tax ceiling entails a constant 
average tax rate. 
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revenues of the Protestant Church have fluctuated around 4 billion euro since the beginning of 
the 1990s. Only during the economic upturn between 2005 and 2008 was there a strong 
increase to well above 4 billion euro. For the Catholic Church I find a similar pattern, 
although at a slightly higher level. In real terms, however, both churches have continuously 
lost revenues, interrupted by two periods with increasing revenues from 1997 to 1999 and 
2005 to 2008. 
 
Figure 2.1: Church tax revenues of the Protestant Church and the Catholic Church in 
Germany for the years 1991 to 2012 in real terms 
 
Data sources: Deutsche Bischofskonferenz (n.d.), Statistisches Bundesamt (1993, 1994, 1995, 
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 2006, 2007, 2012d). 
Note: Numbers indicate church tax revenues excluding local church taxes less administrative 
costs paid to the state tax offices. Revenues are adjusted for inflation using the consumer 
price index for Germany (2010=100) (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013c). 
 
In 1991, the Protestant Church reported 29.2 million members (36.4 % of the German 
population), while the Catholic Church reported 27.7 million members (34.5 % of the German 
population). These numbers dropped to 23.6 million Protestant members and 24.5 million 
Catholic members in 2011. Simply dividing the church tax revenue (in 2010 prices) by the 
number of members shows that the average amount of church tax paid in 1991 was 189 euro 
for a Protestant and 200 euro for a Catholic. The numbers declined to 154 euro and 166 euro, 
respectively, in 2005. Afterwards there was a considerable increase to 180 euro and 197 euro, 
respectively, in 2011, which corresponds almost to the level in the early 1990s. However, it 
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should be noted that a considerable share of church members do not pay any church taxes at 
all, which means that the average burden of those who pay church taxes is much higher.
33
 
Data on voluntary contributions (other than church taxes) is more difficult to find for 
Germany. Sommerfeld and Sommerfeld (2010) report the results of various surveys and 
statistics. They conclude that there is no solid statistical base to determine the share of people 
who give to charities, but estimate the total yearly amount given in the period 2006-2008 to be 
roughly 5 billion euro (Sommerfeld and Sommerfeld, 2010: 44-46). Of this sum, presumably 
only a minor share goes to religious organizations. The Protestant Church reports that in 2005 
(the latest data made available) it had revenues from donations and offerings during services 
of 266 million euro, which amounts to 2.7 % of their total revenues (Kirchenamt der EKD, 
2012: 37). 
2.4.4 The tax assignment system in Italy 
The main source of revenues for religious communities in Italy – originally only the Catholic 
Church, other religious communities joined the system later – is the so called “otto per mille” 
(“eight per thousand”). The basic idea of the system is that each taxpayer has the possibility to 
assign a share of 0.8 % of his or her income tax payments either to a religious community or 
to the state. The religious communities which participate in the system are: the Catholic 
Church, which is by far the largest beneficiary, the Waldensians, the Seventh Day Adventists, 
the Jewish community and the Lutheran Evangelical Church. The choice for the receiver of 
the assignment tax is to be signaled on the income tax return. The money that is assigned to 
the Catholic Church is to be used for supporting the faith, paying the clergy and for charitable 
activities in Italy and in the Third World. The state is also supposed to use the money for 
social support or humanitarian causes, in particular fighting famine all over the world, help in 
case of natural disasters and help to refugees as well as to conserve Italian cultural heritage. 
The total tax revenue is split up according to the choices expressed by taxpayers, which 
means that the individual taxpayer does not decide how his or her “otto per mille” is used, but 
has a say in how the total amount of tax collected is allocated. The revenue coming from 
taxpayers who do not make a choice is split up according to the decisions of those who have 
chosen one of the alternatives.
34
 
                                                 
33
 Data on church membership numbers in 1991 and 2005 are taken from Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin (2010: 
589); membership numbers in 2011 are taken from Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz (2012) and 
EKD (2012). 
34
 The most important regulations described in this section are stipulated in law nr. 222 of 1985, articles 47 and 
48.  
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In 2011, the total tax amount to be assigned to one of the destinations was 1.149 billion euro, 
of which 152 million went to the state and 977 million went to the Catholic Church. Of all 
taxpayers, 43.5 % made an assignment choice, of which 85 % chose the Catholic Church and 
11.9 % chose the state.
35
 (Camera dei deputati, 2010) These shares equal the average shares 
for the whole period since the introduction of the tax assignment system (Servizio studi del 
Senato, 2012). 
Tax assignment systems also exist in Spain and Hungary. In Hungary, several religious 
communities profit from the system (Schanda, 2009). In Spain, the Catholic Church is the 
only religious community profiting from the tax assignment system. It receives a share of 
0.7 % of the income tax of those taxpayers who assign their tax to the church (Ibán, 2009: 
315). Until recently the Spanish state subsidised the Catholic Church by guaranteeing a 
minimum amount of revenue for the church in case the tax assignments did not suffice 
(Garcimartín Montero, 2006: 185). Similar to the Italian system, if the taxpayer does not 
choose to assign his or her taxes to a religious community, it is used for charitable purposes. 
Those purposes cover a larger scope of activities, they should be “carried out by the Spanish 
Red Cross and other non-governmental organizations” and benefit “the elderly, people with 
physical, mental or sensory disabilities, people unable to work, people suffering from drug 
addiction or dependence, and the socially marginalized” or can go to “underdeveloped 
countries” (Royal Decree 825/1988; cited after Garcimartín Montero, 2006: 182, footnote 25). 
The taxpayer also has the opportunity to choose both the Catholic Church and charitable 
organizations; in that case, 1.4 % of his or her income tax is split between the two purposes 
(Ferreiro Galguera, 2009: 148). 
The overall idea behind the tax assignment system is that taxpayers are free to choose 
between financing a religious community and supporting a secular charitable cause (Pistolesi, 
2006: 179). Their available income always remains the same. 
2.4.5 Comparison of church financing systems in the US, Germany and Italy 
A similarity between the Italian and the German system of church financing is that both take 
the income tax as the basis for calculating church contributions, although in Germany the 
church tax is an additional tax to the income tax and in Italy taxpayers can assign a part of 
their “regular” income tax to the church. In both countries, this results in a strong dependency 
                                                 
35
 The share of revenues of the state is higher than 11.9 % since some of the smaller religious communities only 
receive a share of revenues equalling the share of taxpayers who have expressed a choice and chosen the 
respective religious community. The state receives their share of revenues from taxpayers who have not 
expressed a choice. 
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of church revenues on state income tax legislation, in particular the tax rate and the definition 
of taxable income (see Carmignani Caridi, 2006: 161). A striking example is public pensions 
in Germany, which have been predominantly tax-free until recently. As a consequence, the 
majority of pensioners did not pay income tax (unless their pensions were very high or they 
had some other sources of income) and they did not pay church taxes as well. In other words, 
a group whose church involvement is disproportionately high had no obligation to contribute 
even if they were financially able to do so – caused by the government definition of taxable 
income.
36
 This is in sharp contrast to the US, where one would expect that people base their 
religious giving decision on religious involvement and their overall income, taxable or not. In 
fact, research from the US shows that giving to religious communities by the elderly is 
disproportionately high (Hrung, 2004: 742). 
Another aspect that distinguishes the German and Italian from the US system is that in 
Germany and Italy churches are free to use their church tax/assignment tax revenues in the 
way they prefer. Taxpayers have no say in the use of the money, whereas in the US giving is 
voluntary and can always be earmarked for the use in a particular project. 
Religious communities in all three countries depend on a positive attitude of their members, 
as well as taxpayers in the cases of Italy and Germany, towards these communities. In 
Germany, taxpayers can decide to disaffiliate from the church; in Italy, taxpayers can simply 
assign their taxes to the state or a different religious community; in the US, members can 
lower their contributions or switch to another religious community. In all countries this is a 
source of uncertainty for religious communities since they heavily rely on (tax) revenues to 
pay their clergy.
37
 Concerning uncertainty, the church tax system and the tax assignment 
system are in the middle between two extreme ends that are marked by complete state 
financing of churches on the one side and voluntary contributions on the other side. In 
countries where the government provides all funding for religious communities churches are 
financially completely independent from temporary changes in the public opinion. Still, 
church tax and tax assignment systems provide a more stable source of revenue than 
voluntary contributions because in the German context church disaffiliation is a significant 
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 Such a view is only correct in a cross-sectional perspective. From a longitudinal point of view pensions were 
already taxed when the individual was actively working and earned income, since contributions to the pension 
insurance were not tax-exempt. This changed in 2005. Since that time contributions to the pension insurance are 
tax-exempt and pensions gradually become part of the taxable income. In both tax systems the total amounts of 
income tax and church tax paid are the same, but in the present system payment is extended to a longer period of 
time. As a result, at each point of time a larger share of church members pay church taxes. 
37
 Before the system of “otto per mille” was introduced in Italy in 1987, the state subsidized clergy that were not 
able to live from other sources of income (Petersen, 1997: 162). 
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decision for many (former) church members that is not easily reversed and in the Italian 
context contributions need to be paid anyway and the number of alternative recipients is 
limited. 
One important difference of the US system and the Italian system compared to the German 
case is that there is no need for the state to define membership in a religious organization. The 
state has no incentive to keep books about who is a member, who joins a religious community 
and who disaffiliates. Consequently, there is no necessity to discuss the rather complicated 
issue of which consequences religious communities attribute to a church disaffiliation that is 
declared in front of state officials. (Carmignani Caridi, 2006: 142)
38
  
The Italian system completely disconnects affiliation with a particular religious community 
from the obligation to contribute to its financial resources. In fact, smaller religious 
communities, such as the religious Jewish community, are chosen by four or five times more 
taxpayers than what one would expect given the size of their membership (Carmignani Caridi, 
2006: 145). This is in sharp contrast to the German situation, where members are obliged to 
contribute, while non-members only have the possibility of making voluntary donations to 
religious communities.  
Since the marginal cost of church membership in Italy is zero, there is no significant financial 
incentive to disaffiliate. The weighing of benefits and costs which characterizes church 
membership decisions in Germany does not exist in Italy. At the same time, it is impossible 
for churches to base the benefits that they provide to their members on their willingness to 
contribute financially, since this is not observable. 
Another difference between the Italian and the German system is the weight that is attached to 
each taxpayer. In Italy, the tax amount is partitioned according to the share of taxpayers who 
make an assignment choice. Each taxpayer has the same amount of influence on the final 
outcome. (Petersen, 1997: 164) In Germany the churches directly receive the taxes their own 
members pay. Therefore the total church tax revenues depend on the number of members and 
on the average income of the members in comparison to the average taxpayer.  
                                                 
38
 According to Carmignani Caridi (2006: 142), avoiding these problems was one of the reasons why the system 
of “otto per mille” was chosen in Italy instead of a church tax on the model of the German system. 
71 
2.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have reviewed previous approaches to modeling individual and household 
decisions on religiosity, in particular pecuniary and time inputs into religious activities, in a 
rational choice framework. I have also summarized models relating religious activities to 
secular charitable contributions of time and money. Subsequently, I have briefly described 
three different systems of church financing: the reliance on voluntary contribution in the US, 
the church tax system in Germany and the tax assignment system in Italy and Spain. 
The literature review in Section 2.2 has demonstrated that the rational choice approach can 
fruitfully be used to explain religious behavior. Demographic variables such as age, socio-
economic variables such as religious upbringing and income, but also faith-related variables 
like beliefs about the afterlife, subjective probabilities of the existence of God and variables 
related to the religious group such as current benefits from religious membership and average 
devotion of fellow members can have an influence on individuals’ current level of religiosity. 
Section 2.3 has pointed to the fact that theoretical approaches modeling the simultaneous 
decision on religious consumption and secular charitable activities are sparse. They provide 
heterogeneous conclusions as to whether these two types of commodities are substitutes or 
complements. 
Section 2.4 has provided a brief overview of different ways through which religious 
communities are funded, with a focus on systems of voluntary contributions as in the US, the 
church tax system in Germany and the tax assignment system in Italy. There are some 
similarities, but also a lot of differences between these approaches. 
The analysis has revealed insights but also shortcomings and gaps in the research which I try 
to fill with my own theoretical model: 
First, all previous models are well-suited to describe the religious market in the US, where 
individuals are free to contribute to religious organizations, and congregations are responsible 
themselves for keeping records of their members. However, the models are less suitable to 
describe the church financing systems in many European countries and the incentives the 
individuals face there. In particular, the models disregard the binary choice concerning church 
membership and they do not allow for the exogenous determination of the minimum amount 
of compulsory church contributions. Most previous research applies only a marginal analysis 
which is unsuitable to explain non-continuous decisions. In such a model, non-religiosity 
would appear if the marginal utility of religiosity was zero for all levels of religiosity that the 
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individual can achieve given his or her resources (e.g. there is a minimum level of financial 
resources required in order to receive any religious benefits which exceed the total income of 
the individual) or if the marginal utility of religiosity is so low that it does not exceed the 
marginal utility of consumption (e.g. if the individual is so poor that he or she exhausts his or 
her resources in order to secure the survival of his or her family). However, in order to 
account for the particularities of the church tax and tax assignment systems, it is necessary to 
model discrete choices and the weighing of overall benefits and costs. 
Analysis of discrete choices in religion is carried out in the models of Durkin and Greeley 
(1991), Melkonyan and Pingle (2009) and Papyrakis and Selvaretnam (2011) presented in 
Section 2.2.7. The focus of these models is to explain how rational individuals make church 
membership decisions facing insecurity about the existence of God. In order to do so, they 
make some simplifying assumptions, such as fixed costs of religious membership. This does 
not accurately represent the German church financing system. Neither do the models provide 
for the possibility of making voluntary contributions in addition to compulsory church 
contributions, nor do they help to understand the effects of church contributions based on 
income. Considering the tax assignment system in Italy, the existing models are not at all 
helpful in explaining the decision as to whether to assign taxes to a religious community or 
the state. 
Second, secular voluntary contributions are also disregarded in these discrete choice models, 
while the models discussing the interrelation of religious and secular contributions (see 
Section 2.3) do again not account for the discrete choices characterizing many church 
financing systems in Europe. 
Third, previous theoretical approaches distinguish between this-worldly and afterlife benefits 
from religious contributions. The nature of afterlife benefits is usually derived from the 
teachings of the religious community, although it is debatable whether they should be 
modeled as depending strictly positively on individuals’ inputs. Characteristics of this-worldly 
benefits are also discussed; they include commodities as diverse as private religious 
festivities, business contacts, access to the marriage and part of the labor market, enjoyment 
of services, meaning in life, and personal support in case of need. However, all these benefits 
are modeled in the same way, as a commodity in the utility function that depends on money 
and time spent for religiosity. In such a framework it is difficult to determine how different 
ways of making religious contributions – either through taxes or through donations – affect 
religious benefits. 
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Fourth, in previous models it is assumed that individuals derive current utility from every euro 
they give to religious communities, even if the marginal utility is decreasing. This assumption 
seems hard to maintain in tax systems where religious communities decide independently 
about the use of their revenues and taxpayers have no possibility to earmark their 
contributions for activities they prefer. 
In the next chapter I will determine a model that incorporates these neglected features of the 
decision concerning religious spending.  
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3 A MODEL OF RELIGIOUS CONSUMPTION WITH A FOCUS ON DIFFERENT 
SYSTEMS OF CHURCH FINANCING  
3.1 Introduction and research questions 
The aim of Chapter 3 is to develop a theoretical model which contributes to understanding 
individual decision making on religiosity under the three different institutional arrangements 
concerning church financing that were introduced in Section 2.4 (the voluntary contribution 
system in the US, the church tax system in Germany and the tax assignment system in Italy) 
and to derive hypotheses as to how these institutions affect church membership decisions, 
voluntary (monetary) contributions to religious organizations and to secular charities. The 
research questions to be answered are: 
 Does the institutional framework affect decisions on religious and secular charitable 
giving? Which are the variables that influence the decision on the amount given and 
the division of contributions between religious and secular beneficiaries? 
 Does the institutional setting influence the church membership decision? If yes, which 
variables affect the decision and how? 
The basic assumption underlying my model is that there are two types of charitable activities 
– religious and secular – and that the individual cares about both, possibly to varying degrees. 
I assume that individuals receive an intrinsic satisfaction from giving to these charitable 
causes. I do not make any assumptions about whether it is the act of giving itself or the 
contribution to the public good that creates utility.
39
 In practical terms this means that the 
amounts given to both religious and secular charitable causes appear in the individual’s utility 
function. The model treats church taxes and contributions in the tax assignment system as 
imperfect substitutes for voluntary charitable contributions, but with an exogenously given 
total amount. 
                                                 
39
 Andreoni (1989, 1990) distinguishes two types of utility from charitable giving: “warm glow” indicates the 
part of an individual’s utility that directly derives from the amount given, while “altruism” is the utility that is 
generated by the size of the public good, which depends on own contributions, but also on contributions of all 
other individuals in society (and possibly the government). This distinction is important for the discussion of 
crowding-out of contributions to the public good. However, in my theoretical framework the public good is not 
explicitly modeled and crowding-out does not exist. Therefore a differentiation between “warm glow” and 
“altruism” is not necessary. I return to this point in Section 3.6.3 when I discuss the welfare implications of the 
different church financing systems. 
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My model incorporates the discrete decisions that the institutional arrangements in the 
German and Italian church financing systems imply, in particular the church membership 
decision in Germany and the decision who should be the beneficiary of the assignment tax in 
Italy. Moreover, it attempts to explain the decisions about secular giving. This allows a 
comparison of church financing systems in the US, Italy and Germany, especially with respect 
to the level of religious and secular contributions. The model also accounts for the fact that 
religious communities in Italy and Germany decide about the use of tax revenues 
independently from the influence of taxpayers. 
Despite all the differences and innovations, my model follows the basic features of previous 
theoretical approaches. In particular, I model a single individual
40
 who maximizes utility 
deriving from secular consumption and religiosity. Most features of the model are kept as 
simple as possible. There is only one period, as, for example, in the model of Neuman (1986). 
This has several implications. First, no discounting is necessary. Second, the difficult question 
of afterlife benefits can be circumvented. Although in the model religious benefits can easily 
be interpreted to incorporate afterlife benefits, I interpret them to be this-worldly benefits. 
That way, the uncertainty about the existence of God is excluded from the model and I need 
not make any assumptions about the production function of afterlife benefits, e.g. if they 
increase in religious activity. What is more, only a minority of individuals in Germany believe 
in life after death (Köcher, 2009: 803), therefore it would not be wise to put too much 
emphasis on the afterlife when explaining church membership and church contribution 
decisions in Germany. 
Another simplification of my model in comparison to the existing literature is that I only 
consider monetary inputs, not the input of time into the production of religious and secular 
commodities. The reason for this is that my main interest lies in the different church financing 
systems and their effects. Church taxes and assignment taxes are only defined in monetary 
units; they cannot be substituted by inputs of time. In a similar vein, church membership in 
Germany is dependent on the payment of church taxes and does not imply any requirements 
of time spent with religious activities. Since the time dimension is left out of the model, the 
income of an individual is exogenously given instead of earned through time-intensive labor 
activities. 
In contrast to previous models discussed in Section 2.2, I also make specific assumptions 
about the forms of the utility function and the production function of each single commodity. 
                                                 
40
 In order to keep the formulas simple, the subscripts to denote the individual are suppressed. 
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The model is to the best of my knowledge the first formal model that compares church 
financing systems, in particular the church tax and the tax assignment system, with a 
microeconomic analysis. However, it is not the first analysis of the economic incentives on 
voluntary giving that the German church tax system implies. In fact, Borgloh (2012) provides 
such a model. In Section 3.4 I discuss in some detail similarities and differences of Borgloh’s 
(2012) model and my own. 
I start by presenting the general model framework and then incorporate the specific features 
of the voluntary contribution, church tax and tax assignment systems. At the end of the 
chapter I discuss the welfare implications of the church financing systems, analyse some 
recent suggestions to change or reform the financing of churches in Germany and Italy, 
discuss how model results change when individuals are motivated to give through the prestige 
raised by charitable behavior, and summarize the hypotheses derived from the model. 
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3.2 The general model 
I assume that individuals have an exogenously given income   and a utility function that 
depends on the amounts of secular consumption   , effective religious charitable 
contributions of the individual   , effective secular charitable contributions    as well as on 
the church membership status   : 
                  (3.1) 
More specifically, I assume that the utility function is  
     
          
     
            (3.2) 
where       are membership benefits and           and        . Secular 
consumption and effective charitable contributions are assumed to be non-negative, 
          . 
The utility function consists of two additive parts. The first part captures the utility from 
consumption and from charitable giving. It has a standard Cobb-Douglas form with 
parameters    and   . The Cobb-Douglas type was chosen because it is common in economic 
models and easy to handle. In addition to the Cobb-Douglas utility, the second part of the 
utility function captures the utility of church membership      ,           . The 
utility from membership in religious groups is different from the other commodities because 
the individual cannot choose a level of       from a continuous set of alternatives, he or she 
can only choose to be a member (and receive the utility      ) or not. This binary decision is 
captured with the indicator variable   . The utility of church membership can be positive or 
negative.  
For both religious contributions    and secular charitable contributions   , two types of 
contributions can be distinguished: taxes such as the church tax in Germany and the 
assignment tax in Italy as well as additional, completely voluntary donations. The latter type 
of completely voluntary religious and secular donations is represented by    and   , 
respectively. Taxes and voluntary donations are assumed to be non-negative. 
Taxes are modeled in a simple way by applying an exogenously determined tax rate   to the 
income  , such that the amount due is exogenous to the individual. I assume further that the 
individual has clear preferences for which specific causes his or her donations should be used. 
When it comes to additional religious and secular giving    and   , the individual is 
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completely free not only about the amount he or she gives but also to choose a specific cause 
for which the money must be used in line with the individual’s preferences. In contrast, taxes 
are managed by religious or secular organizations (such as the state) which decide about the 
use of the funds. Therefore the beneficiaries of taxes often do not fully coincide with people’s 
preferences. In Germany, one of the justifications that is given for the collection of church 
taxes is that churches can use their revenues in the way they prefer without asking for the 
assent of taxpayers (see, for example, Kirchhof, 1996: 56). They argue that they can support 
important charitable causes that do not receive much support otherwise (see Feldhoff, 1996: 
57). Such arguments suggest that revenues through taxes are not fully used in the way the 
single tax payer prefers. I therefore assume that only a fraction          of the taxes are 
used for causes the individual agrees to. I call   a fitting parameter.41  It varies between 
taxpayers. The fitting parameter is   if the use of funds by the institution collecting the taxes 
is completely in line with the preferences of the taxpayer. Since the perception of the use of 
revenues by religious and secular receivers of the tax can vary, I use separate variables when 
referring to churches or the state. In the following,   indicates the fitting parameter in relation 
to the church and   indicates the fitting parameter when the state receives the tax, 
 
   
                                      
                                         
  (3.3) 
I argue that the individual only receives utility from paying taxes that are used according to 
the individual’s preferences, i.e. the fraction     of the overall tax amount   . The remainder 
of the tax amount,        , does not provide any utility to the individual. Consequently, the 
personal benefits generated from giving do not depend on total charitable expenditures of the 
individual, which are           in the case of religious contributions and  
         
in the case of secular contributions, instead they depend on effective giving    and   , where 
     
           (3.4) 
and 
                                                 
41
 Ribar and Wilhelm (2002: 435) use similar parameters to characterize the efficiency of different charitable 
institutions. However, in their model the efficiency parameters are objective, in the sense that they capture the 
share of charitable expenditures that is actually used by the institution to create public goods. In my model the 
fitting parameters are subjective, capturing the share of expenditures that is earmarked for purposes which 
generate utility for the individual. 
Meuthen (1993: 196) also elaborates on the idea that church tax payers and tax payers in the tax assignment 
system cannot decide freely about how their taxes are used. In contrast, non-members in a church tax system can 
spend their money completely according to their preferences (also for charitable purposes) (p. 196) and church 
members in the voluntary giving system can earmark their contributions such that they “correspond to their 
actual preferences” (p. 184 [my own translation]). 
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            (3.5) 
     and      are indicator variables taking on the values zero or one.      (    ) only takes 
on the value one if in a given institutional environment religious (secular) charitable 
organizations are financed via taxes and the individual actually assigns his or her taxes to the 
church (the state). 
While the utility function of the individual only takes up effective contributions    and   , 
the budget constraint necessarily includes the total amount given. In general, the individual 
can spend his or her income   on secular consumption  , on taxes for religious or secular 
charitable purposes and on additional voluntary giving    and  . 
The resulting budget constraint of the individual is 
                            (3.6) 
In all three institutional systems, the individual chooses the utility-maximizing levels of 
           . In addition, he or she decides about the church membership status    and – 
as far as the institutional setting provides for the possibility – about the assignment of his or 
her taxes to the church or the state,      or     . 
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3.3 The voluntary giving system 
3.3.1 The giving decision 
The particularity of the US system of financing charitable activities is that there are no 
compulsory and strictly income-dependent contributions such as taxes, therefore      and 
     are zero by definition. Consequently, purely voluntary contributions   and   equal 
effective contributions    and   . Plugging this information into the utility function and the 
budget constraint, I obtain the following Lagrangian function 
        
          
     
                          (3.7) 
Maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint, I receive the following 
solution. It will be the benchmark against which the tax financing systems are analyzed: 
   
        
          (3.8) 
 
   
        
          (3.9) 
 
   
                 (3.10) 
Total giving is 
   
        
               (3.11) 
The results are standard results in a Cobb-Douglas world. The consumption of each 
commodity is determined by the income of the individual and the respective Cobb-Douglas 
parameter. The church membership status and the benefits from membership do not have an 
effect on charitable giving, which is in line with the assumptions made when setting up the 
model. 
3.3.2 The church membership decision 
As could be seen from the utility maximization above, the church membership decision is 
completely disregarded in the decision on voluntary giving and can be considered a separate 
problem. The individual simply chooses the church membership status (member or non-
member) that maximizes his or her utility. In order to see this more clearly, I insert the utility-
maximizing levels of   ,   and   into the utility function 
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              (3.12) 
For ease of notation, I define            
          
     
  , such that 
                   (3.13) 
It is now easy to see that the individual will decide to be a church member,     , if 
       , and not to be a member if the individual has disutility from membership, 
       , e.g. when the individual disagrees with church teachings or behavior. The utility 
of an individual under a voluntary contributions system, which serves as a benchmark for the 
tax-based systems, can be summarized as 
 
        
           
                 
  (3.14) 
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3.4 The church tax system 
I now incorporate the most important features of the German church tax system into the 
model outlined in Section 3.2. There are two main differences with respect to the US. First, 
taxes for financing religious organizations do exist, i.e.      can take on the value one.42 
Second, the church membership decision is not independent from the decision on religious 
contributions. In fact, being a church member entails the duty to pay church taxes, such that 
       . As was laid out above, when individuals pay taxes, they are not free to decide 
about the amount they give or the purposes their money is used for. 
In exchange for paying taxes, the individual receives access to certain benefits from church 
membership,      . Since there is no time dimension in the model, it is not necessary to 
distinguish between afterlife benefits
43
 and this-worldly benefits (such as participation in 
church groups, access to church-run schools and kindergartens and church ceremonies as well 
as the possibility to be employed by the church). The model would still be valid if the 
individual did not believe in the existence of an afterlife.       also captures how satisfied 
the individual is with the organization of the religious community and to which degree 
personal values and religious doctrine coincide. 
In sum, effective religious contributions,   , include the share of church taxes spent for 
purposes the individual values,    , and the full amount of additional voluntary contributions, 
  , 
              (3.15) 
                                                 
42
 As in the voluntary contribution system,      is zero by definition, since financing of secular charitable 
organizations through taxes does not exist in the church tax system. 
43
 There is some debate about how church membership is connected to afterlife benefits and what the 
consequences of church disaffiliation declared in front of state officials will be. Nikolaus Schneider, the head of 
the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD), whose duty is to represent Protestant Christians in the 
German public discussion, contributed an article to the Protestant monthly journal “Chrismon”, in which he 
claims that it is not possible to live the Christian faith without church membership (Schneider, 2010). The 
German Bishops’ Conference, the assembly of all Catholic German bishops, published a declaration in which it 
states that church disaffiliation is a schism and will be punished with excommunication (Deutsche 
Bischofskonferenz, 2006). Feldhoff (1996: 60) argues in the same direction as the German Bishops’ Conference. 
Recently, the German Bishops’ Conference has published another decree (Deutsche Bischofskonferenz, 2012) in 
which it does not officially declare church disaffiliation a schism, but explicitly points out a whole list of rights a 
church member loses when he or she declares church disaffiliation (see Section 3.6.4.2). The predominant 
opinion in the scientific discussion on church law is that church disaffiliation declared in front of state officials 
automatically has consequences for the membership in the church as a spiritual community (Muckel, 2012). 
However, some authors argue that disaffiliation from the church in its legal form as a corporation under public 
law (“Körperschaft öffentlichen Rechts”) does not immediately entail consequences for the membership in the 
religious community (Zapp, 2012). 
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Since church membership implies the duty to pay church taxes, effective religious giving 
differs between church members with      and non-members with     . 
Secular contributions are completely voluntary and individuals can always choose 
organizations that support the causes the individual considers most worthy of his or her 
contributions, therefore      . 
The resulting utility function of the individual is 
             
                   
     
            (3.16) 
Not surprisingly, church taxes also appear in the budget constraint of the individual 
                  (3.17) 
The resulting Lagrangian function is 
 
         
   
                   
     
           
                     
(3.18) 
Secular consumption and voluntary contributions are required to be non-negative, 
          . By comparing the Lagrangian functions of the voluntary contributions case 
and the church tax case, it becomes obvious that in the church tax system the decisions about 
church membership and voluntary giving are interrelated, since the church membership 
indicator    appears in both additive parts of the utility function and in the budget constraint. 
Hence, the solution of the utility maximization problem is slightly more difficult than in the 
voluntary giving case. 
The individual again has four decision variables:   ,  ,   and  . In a church tax system 
he or she faces a sequential decision structure. After deciding about church membership 
(     or     ) the individual maximizes his or her utility given the respective church 
membership status by choosing the levels of   ,    and   . The decision problem is 
depicted in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Decision problem in the German institutional setting 
 
Source: Adapted from Maier and Weiss (1990: 39) 
 
I solve this problem by first specifying the utility-maximizing choices of  ,   and   for 
each discrete value of    and then determining the membership alternative that yields the 
highest utility for the individual. 
My model of the German church tax system shares some important features with the model of 
Borgloh (2012): both models assume a utility function where the individual derives utility 
from consumption, from voluntary giving and a (positive or negative) additive utility from 
church membership. In addition, the models share the assumption that the church tax is 
perceived as a charitable contribution and is a substitute for non-tax charitable giving. The 
propositions derived from the models refer to the amount given by church members and non-
members and the church membership decision. However, there are some important 
differences. First, while Borgloh (2012) considers only one type of charitable giving, I 
distinguish between religious and secular giving. Second, Borgloh (2012) assumes that church 
taxes and donations are perfect substitutes, while they are only imperfect substitutes for 
religious giving in my own model. Third, in my own model church taxes are a function of 
income, while they are fixed and independent from income in Borgloh (2012). In the 
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discussion in Section 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 I will outline how these differences in assumptions affect 
the model results. 
3.4.1 The giving decision 
3.4.1.1 The non-membership case 
I start with the non-membership case,     . All variables that refer to this solution are 
marked with the subscript  . Taking the first derivatives of the Lagrangian function and 
solving for  ,   and   yields: 
                 (3.19) 
 
               (3.20) 
 
               (3.21) 
This corresponds to the benchmark solution (the voluntary contributions case) because non-
members do not face any obligatory taxes or any other institutional factors that distort their 
decision. The similarity to the voluntary contributions case can easily be seen when      is 
inserted in the Lagrangian function (3.18), which leads to cancelling out all taxes. As a 
consequence, the Cobb-Douglas part of the utility function and the budget constraint are the 
same as in a voluntary contributions system. 
3.4.1.2 The membership case 
The situation is different when the individual is a church member,     . The giving 
decision of the individual will then depend on the exogenously given tax rate   and the use of 
tax revenues by the church,  . Maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint 
and the non-negativity constraints for  ,   and   and solving for  ,   and   yields: 
 
      
                             
  
        
         
   
    
     
  
        
  (3.22) 
 
 
      
                          
  
        
     
  
        
  (3.23) 
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  (3.24) 
where the subscript   denotes the solutions in the case     . 
Both regular and corner solutions are possible. The upper expressions in equations (3.22) 
through (3.24) give the result in the regular solution and the lower expressions the result in the 
corner solution. Corner solutions occur when the individual’s optimal level of voluntary 
religious giving is negative, which is not feasible. In that case      is at its lower bound 
zero, as can be seen from equation (3.23). I discuss first the regular solution and continue with 
the results for the corner solution. 
In the regular solution with       effective religious and secular giving levels are 
                                  (3.25) 
 
                              (3.26) 
Both non-tax giving    and    and effective charitable giving      and      are lower 
than in the benchmark case. Only if    , i.e. the tax money is used exactly in the way the 
individual prefers, the effective giving levels of the benchmark solution can be reached. The 
reason for the reduction in additional giving is that with    , some part of the church tax 
paid is used for purposes that do not generate any utility for the individual. From the point of 
view of the individual, this corresponds to a reduction in income. This can easily be seen if 
one compares the results for effective giving in equations (3.25) and (3.26) to the benchmark 
outcome in (3.20) and (3.21). Effective giving of church members is multiplied with the factor 
           in comparison to the benchmark. The factor denotes the share of income that 
the individual can use in line with his or her preferences, i.e. one minus the share of income 
paid as church taxes and directed to purposes which the individual does not support. 
Total revenues of all charities, religious and secular, are 
                                        (3.27) 
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This is larger than in the benchmark case for all    . Although additional voluntary giving 
is smaller than in the benchmark case, the sum of church taxes paid and additional giving is 
greater and reaches its maximum when    . While a reduction in   is comparable to a 
reduction in income, at the same time it ensures that individuals do not cut their voluntary 
contributions by the same amount that church taxes increase. This is because paying taxes is 
not a perfect substitute for non-tax voluntary giving when    . When    , total giving 
reaches its minimum. In that case the individual can simply adjust his or her additional 
religious giving      such that he or she is back in the benchmark solution without church 
taxes. 
I now turn to the corner solution where voluntary religious giving      is zero. There are 
feasible values for      and   for which the preferred level of voluntary religious giving of 
the individual is negative. In such cases the non-negativity constraint for    is binding. The 
critical value for    can be calculated by setting the regular solution for     in the upper 
part of equation (3.23) to zero. The result is 
    
  
        
   (3.28) 
For    below (above) this critical level   , voluntary religious giving is zero (greater than 
zero). This critical value increases in   and reaches its maximum,  , when    , i.e. the 
higher is the accordance with the use of money by the church, the less likely it is that 
individual makes additional voluntary contributions. In any case, the corner solution requires 
that the church tax rate   is higher than   , which corresponds to the share of income that is 
voluntarily given to the church in the benchmark case. If    is below its critical level, the 
amount of church taxes that have to be paid exceeds the utility-maximizing amount of 
charitable contributions to religious organizations. Consequently, the individual will only pay 
taxes and will refrain from giving an additional amount    . 
If    is below the threshold level and       , voluntary secular giving will also be 
affected (see equation (3.24)). Secular giving in the corner solution is smaller than in the 
benchmark and even smaller than in the regular solution,     
            
          
     . 
The reason is that individuals try to off-set some of their higher than optimal spending on 
religion with cuts in secular voluntary charitable giving. 
Total revenues of all charitable organizations, religious and secular, are 
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     (3.29) 
which is again higher than in the benchmark case. Although a higher than optimal church tax 
rate and/or a low fitting parameter induce individuals to reduce their voluntary giving, the 
overall giving level will rise. 
This shows that church members always have a higher total giving, i.e. the sum of church 
taxes paid and additional voluntary giving, than non-members, except when the fitting 
parameter   is one. However, when only non-tax giving is considered, one would expect non-
members to be more generous, both to religious and secular charities. 
The discussion also shows that churches have two major instruments to increase their 
revenues in comparison to the benchmark. First, they can increase church tax rates, which 
raises their tax revenues, but will not decrease voluntary contributions by the same amount as 
long as    ; alternatively, they can lower the fitting with the preferences of the members by 
spending revenues on purposes that do not correspond to the preferences of their members 
and hope for increased voluntary contributions which will then be earmarked to the purposes 
that matter most to the members. Whichever way a church chooses, it will probably lower 
revenues of secular charitable organizations, which are exclusively dependent on voluntary 
contributions. The only action taken by churches that will not affect secular charities is an 
increase in the church tax rate under the conditions that the church tax rate stays below the 
critical level    and the fitting parameter   is one. 
The mechanisms described in this section can be seen in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. Figure 3.2 
shows total, religious and secular contributions for church members (solid lines) and non-
members (dashed lines) and the amount of church taxes that church members have to pay 
(dotted line) as a function of the fitting parameter  . In order to calibrate the model, the 
following parameter values were chosen: income   is 4,000 euro; church tax rate   is 0.05; 
and Cobb-Douglas parameters    and    are 0.03 and 0.025, respectively. 
The first point to notice is that all contributions of non-members stay constant since they are 
not affected by the fitting parameter of the church. The specific values are 120 euro of 
religious voluntary contributions    , 100 euro of secular contributions     and 220 euro 
of total contributions. 
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Figure 3.2: Religious, secular, and total charitable contributions as a function of the fitting 
parameter   for church members and non-members 
 
 
When looking at the contributions of members (solid lines) there is a sharp bend between the 
values 0.5 and 0.6 of the fitting parameter  . This bend indicates the threshold between the 
regular and the corner solution. The values left of 0.588 belong to the regular solution. It can 
be seen that the highest religious voluntary contributions and the highest total charitable 
contributions (consisting of religious and secular voluntary contributions as well as church 
taxes) can be achieved when the fitting is lowest, at    . The more the individual agrees to 
the use of tax revenues by the church (   increases), the lower are religious and total 
contributions. At the same time secular contributions are lowest when the fitting parameter is 
zero and increase moderately as    grows, but not enough to counterbalance the drop in 
religious contributions. 
After the threshold value for   is reached, religious and secular contributions stay constant. 
Religious voluntary contributions are zero, secular voluntary contributions are below their 
non-membership values. Nevertheless, adding up both types of voluntary contributions and 
church taxes, total contributions are above the non-membership level.  
In sum, the church tax does increase total contributions to charitable organizations, but it can 
significantly crowd out voluntary contributions. The crowding-out is strongest when church 
taxes and religious voluntary contributions are perfect substitutes. 
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Figure 3.3 is quite similar to Figure 3.2, only that the fitting parameter   is now fixed at 0.7 
and the contributions are shown as a function of the church tax rate   in the range of 0 to 0.1. 
Although this does not cover the full range of possible church tax rates, it does cover the 
typical range of church taxes in Germany, which make up between 2 and 3 percent of income, 
and reaches up to 10 percent, which corresponds to the literal meaning of “tithing” and is 
usually considered a generous contribution. 
 
Figure 3.3: Religious, secular, and total charitable contributions as a function of the church 
tax rate   for church members and non-members 
 
 
The contributions of non-members (dashed lines) are the same as in the example underlying 
Figure 3.2 and they remain constant since they do not depend on the church tax rate. 
Contributions of members (solid lines) again show a sharp bend, signifying the threshold 
value between the regular and the corner solution, which is between church tax rates of 4 and 
5 percent in the example. The graph clearly shows that an increase in the church tax rate leads 
to an increase in total contributions of church members (solid black line). However, this 
increase is completely driven by rising church taxes, while both types of voluntary 
contributions drop. Religious voluntary contributions decrease until they reach zero and 
remain there in the corner solution. Secular voluntary contributions decrease only moderately 
in the regular solution. However, when the individual is not able anymore to cut religious 
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voluntary contributions because they have already reached zero, individuals cut their secular 
contributions even faster. 
The two graphs show that churches have two possibilities to increase total charitable 
contributions: increase church tax rates or spend the money for purposes that do not matter 
much to the taxpayer. However, this always results in a crowding-out of secular contributions. 
Overall revenues of the church increase in both cases, but increasing the tax rate leads to 
higher tax revenues that the church can use according to its own ideas, while lowering the 
fitting with the preferences of the individual increases earmarked non-tax contributions. 
Furthermore, the numerical examples do not take into account that such decisions by religious 
communities might also affect church membership decisions. This will be considered in the 
next section. 
3.4.2 The church membership decision 
The aim of this section is to determine which factors influence the church membership 
decision in a church tax system. 
This can be done by comparing the utility levels reached by church members and non-
members, assuming that the alternative that yields the higher utility will be chosen. The 
individual faces a trade-off: as a church member he or she needs to pay church taxes that 
might distort the optimal choice of voluntary religious and secular giving, but in turn receives 
the additional utility from church membership,      . As a non-member he or she avoids the 
distortions in the giving decision but at the same time renounces the possible membership 
benefits. 
3.4.2.1 The non-membership case 
For non-members,     , the maximum utility can be calculated by plugging the optimal 
choices for    ,     and    from equations (3.19) to (3.21) into the utility function 
(3.16). The result is the conditional indirect utility function 
    
                  
          
     
         (3.30) 
Not surprisingly, this corresponds to the utility level of non-members in the benchmark 
solution (3.14). This utility now needs to be compared to the utility of church members, 
    . Here it is again necessary to distinguish between regular and corner solutions. 
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3.4.2.2 The membership case 
Starting with the regular solution    
  
        
, the utility can be calculated by inserting 
(3.22) to (3.24) into the utility function. The result is 
            
        
          
          
     
                     
                      
(3.31) 
(3.31) differs from (3.30) in two important details. First, in order to arrive at the utility of 
members, the utility of non-members is multiplied with the factor           , which is 
smaller than one for all    . Second,       is added to the utility of members. 
If    , the distortion captured in the factor            disappears. Consequently, the 
individual will be a church member as long as membership does not entail any disutility, i.e. 
whenever        . Individuals can realize their optimal level of giving, even if they are 
church members. In addition, church membership provides additional benefits, captured in 
     . If membership is seen as providing disutility for the individual,        , he or she 
will not be a member. 
If    , the individual will weigh the distortions in his or her giving decision against the 
benefits of membership and the final decision depends on the specific values of all 
exogenously given variables. Again, if the utility of membership is negative, the individual 
will decide against membership. However, even if being a church member entails small or 
moderate benefits, those might be more than outweighed by the distortions in the giving 
decision caused by a low fitting parameter  . 
Turning now to the corner solution with    
  
        
 and plugging in     
         and 
    
       from equation (3.24) in the utility function yields: 
 
          
                  
                 
    
   
    
 
    
         (3.32) 
Similarly to the regular solution, the utility derived from the Cobb-Douglas part of (3.32) is 
lower than the utility in the non-membership case because distorting taxation is again present. 
However, this utility loss might be counterbalanced if the utility from being a church member 
is positive and large enough. As before, the decision for or against church membership 
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depends on how large the wedge is between the preferred level of church contributions and 
the prescribed church taxes on the one hand, and the extent of the benefits from membership 
on the other hand. 
From equations (3.31) and (3.32) it can be seen that some individuals are church members, 
while others are not, even when churches provide benefits for their members. I now rearrange 
the utility levels such that a critical level of income for which the individual is indifferent 
between being and not being a church member can be calculated. In order to do so, one has to 
equate the utility in the case of membership and the case of non-membership and then solve 
for  . Starting again with the regular solution, the result is: 
 
        
  
     
                   
     
         
 
     
        
 (3.33) 
Calculating the critical income        
  for corner solutions yields 
        
  
     
         
          
      
    
   
    
 
    
        
 
(3.34) 
For income above the critical level   , the individual is expected to disaffiliate from the 
church, for lower income, he or she remains a church member. Since the critical level of    is 
negative when        , the condition for leaving the church is always fulfilled for 
individuals who perceive church membership as a disutility. 
It is also easy to see why the decision to leave the church depends on income. As can be 
observed from the utility of non-members in equation (3.30) the marginal utility of income is 
constant for the specific utility function chosen. When comparing the utility of non-members 
and the utility in the regular solution for members (3.31), one can see that there is a wedge in 
the Cobb-Douglas part of the utility which is equal to           . This wedge grows 
linearly in income, i.e. for each additional euro of income the utility is decreased further by 
         in comparison to a non-member with the same income. While the wedge in 
utility in the Cobb-Douglas part of the utility function becomes wider as income increases, the 
utility of membership       is constant and independent from income. Therefore the loss in 
utility caused by the duty to pay church taxes that are too high or not used in line with 
individuals’ preferences will at a certain point exceed the benefits of membership. 
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The most important properties of the critical income level   , which apply to both the regular 
and the corner solution, are 
   
      
  , i.e. an increase in the benefits of church membership 
increases the income threshold for disaffiliation, 
   
  
  , i.e. an increase in the church tax rate 
lowers the threshold level, and 
   
  
  , i.e the lower is the fitting parameter, the lower is the 
critical income. Also note that in the regular solution, when the fitting parameter   approaches 
one, the critical income level approaches infinity. This is because with       church taxes 
and religious voluntary giving are perfect substitutes and the individual does not suffer from a 
loss in utility when church membership becomes more expensive (up to the point where he or 
she enters the corner solution). 
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3.5 The tax assignment system 
In what follows, I incorporate a version of the tax assignment system that closely follows the 
Italian system of “otto per mille” into the theoretical model.
44
 It is similar to the church tax 
system in the sense that taxes for religious causes exist. The main difference is that 
individuals do not decide whether they pay these taxes or not, but who is the beneficiary: 
either some religious organization or the state. This decision has no implications for receiving 
benefits from church membership. As a consequence,     ,      and    all exist separately. 
However, the individual can only decide whether he or she gives the tax to a religious 
community or the state, therefore            . By incorporating these features into the 
basic model, I get the following utility function 
         
   
                     
                    
  
          
(3.35) 
and the budget constraint 
               (3.36) 
The individual has five decision variables:  ,  
   ,  ,   and  .   , the decision to be a 
church member, and     , the decision about the beneficiary of the tax, are again binary 
variables, taking on the values 0 and 1. As in the discussion of the church tax system, secular 
consumption and voluntary charitable contributions must not be negative,     ,    . 
Again I assume that not all the charitable contributions through taxes are used in the way 
preferred by the individual. In this respect,          denotes the share of revenues of the 
church that are used in accordance with the individual’s preferences, while          
measures the same concept for the state as receiver of the tax. The individual is free to make 
additional contributions to both religious organizations and secular charities, such that 
effective religious giving is 
     
           (3.37) 
and effective secular giving is 
                                                 
44
 In contrast to the actual implementation of the tax assignment system in Italy, I assume that the taxpayer 
decides about the amount of assignment tax that he or she pays. In reality, the vote of each taxpayer about the 
use of the tax revenues has the same weight, i.e. each taxpayer decides about the use of an amount equal to the 
average tax amount. 
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             (3.38) 
I solve the decision problem of the individual in three steps. First, I identify the utility-
maximizing values for      and   for each discrete value of  
   . Second, I determine 
the decision on the destination of the tax amount,     , and third, I describe the church 
membership decision. 
3.5.1 The optimal amount of voluntary giving 
Trying to find the optimal amounts of the three inputs       and    it will soon become 
clear that corner solutions are possible, just as in the church tax system. I start with the 
assumption that there is a regular solution and then turn to the corner solutions. 
If the individual decides to assign his or her tax to a religious community,       , then 
maximizing the utility function (3.35) subject to the budget constraint (3.36) with respect to 
      and   yields 
                          (3.39) 
The subscript     denotes the case when the tax is assigned to the church. If       in (3.39) is 
non-negative, the corresponding secular contributions are 
                      (3.40) 
and total charitable contributions are 
                                            (3.41) 
These results are exactly the same as for church members in the church tax system (see 
equations (3.23), (3.24) and (3.27)). Again it turns out that voluntary secular giving and 
additional religious voluntary giving are lower, but total giving is higher than in the 
benchmark case if     and equal to the benchmark if    . 
If people decide that their tax money should benefit the state,       , their secular giving is 
                          (3.42) 
The subscript     denotes the case when the tax is assigned to the state for secular purposes. 
As long as there is no corner solution, i.e.       in (3.42) is larger than or equal to zero, 
religious voluntary contributions are 
97 
                      (3.43) 
and total charitable contributions (including taxes) are 
                                            (3.44) 
Both religious and secular additional voluntary giving are smaller than in the benchmark case, 
but total giving (including the assignment tax) is higher than in the benchmark for    . The 
structure of the results equals that for       . This can easily be seen when comparing the 
total giving of those who assign their tax to the church (equation (3.41)) and those who give it 
to the state (equation (3.44)). The fitting parameter with respect to the church,  , in (3.41) is 
simply replaced by the fitting parameter with respect to the state,  , in order to arrive at 
(3.44). The same logic applies to the amount of secular consumption, which is the residual 
spending after subtracting taxes and voluntary contributions from income: 
                         (3.45) 
with 
    
        
        
  (3.46) 
From examining the amount of voluntary contributions in (3.39) and (3.42) it is obvious that 
corner solutions are possible both when the individual assigns his or her taxes to the church 
and when he or she assigns them to the state. This is because religious as well as secular non-
tax giving is restricted to be non-negative. 
Corner solutions emerge when one of the following set of conditions is fulfilled: 
 
   
  
        
              (3.47) 
 
 
   
  
        
              (3.48) 
When the inequality in (3.47) is fulfilled, and the individual chooses to assign his or her tax to 
a religious community,       , then the following corner solution emerges: 
          (3.49) 
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  (3.50) 
Similarly, when the inequality in (3.48) is fulfilled and the individual gives his or her tax to 
the state,       , the resulting corner solution is: 
          (3.51) 
 
 
         
   
    
  (3.52) 
In both cases religious and secular voluntary giving are lower than in the benchmark. 
It should also be noted that when only one of the two sets of conditions in (3.47) and (3.48) is 
fulfilled, the taxpayer has the possibility to assign his or her tax to the other institution and 
avoid the corner solution. However, as will be shown in the next section, choosing the regular 
over the corner solution is not always the optimal decision. If both sets of conditions are 
fulfilled, one of the two corner solutions outlined above must be chosen. 
3.5.2 The assignment of the tax to a recipient 
The second step of the decision process is the selection of the recipient of the tax. The 
individual chooses the alternative that offers the highest utility. In order to calculate the utility 
level, I insert the optimal amounts of consumption and religious and secular giving that were 
calculated in the previous step into the utility function (3.35). I start again with the regular 
solution (no binding restriction) and go on to examine each of the possible corner solutions in 
turn. 
3.5.2.1 No binding restrictions 
If none of the restrictions concerning   and   is binding, the utility of the taxpayer is 
         
       
          
          
     
                        
                         
(3.53) 
with 
    
        
        
  (3.54) 
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Contrasting this utility level with the benchmark utility (3.14), the factor            in the 
first summand of (3.53) is added. Utility strictly grows in  . If either   equals one, the factor 
disappears and the same amount of utility from charitable giving and secular consumption as 
in the benchmark can be reached. 
In order to decide about     , the individual compares the utility level         
        for     and 
   . The two utility levels differ only in the factors            and           , 
respectively. From examining (3.53) it is clear that        (      ) is chosen if   
    . In other words, the individual chooses the alternative that best fits his or her own 
preferences. If   and   are equal, the individual is indifferent between the choice options. 
Parameters determining the marginal utility of the commodities,    and   , do not play a role 
in the regular solution because by assumption distortions in the amount given are only caused 
by the perceived lack of fitting captured in   and  , not by the amount of taxes paid (which 
are below the amount the individual would give in the benchmark). 
The individual chooses the alternative which is closest to the benchmark solution in terms of 
charitable contributions made and total utility, given the fitting parameters   and  . The 
chosen alternative is the one which minimizes total charitable contributions. This can easily 
be seen when comparing (3.41) and (3.44). 
3.5.2.2 One binding restriction 
If only restriction (3.47) concerning the Cobb-Douglas parameter with respect to religious 
giving,   , is binding and the individual decides to attribute his or her tax to the church, 
      , the resulting level of utility is 
            
       
          
                 
    
   
    
 
    
            
(3.55) 
Since both religious and secular non-tax giving are distorted in comparison to the benchmark, 
the individual arrives at a utility from charitable giving and secular consumption that is lower 
than in the benchmark case. If the individual instead decides to attribute his or her taxes to the 
state, the utility level of the regular solution (3.53) with        is achieved. 
In order to determine the assignment choice of the individual, one has to compare the utility 
from giving to the church in (3.55) to the utility from giving to the state in (3.53). 
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In order to choose the secular alternative, the following inequality must be fulfilled: 
 
 
       
       
 
  
  
                 
   
      (3.56) 
There are feasible values for       and    for which this inequality and the conditions for a 
corner solution in (3.47) are fulfilled and others for which they are not. In other words, both 
the corner solution and the regular solution can be optimal. In general, a low value of  , i.e. a 
low accordance between the use of funds by the church and the individual’s preferences will 
induce the individual to assign his or her money to the state. In a similar fashion, a high value 
of   will also make it more likely that the state is chosen as the receiver of the taxes. The 
marginal utility of secular giving, which manifests itself in   , is of no importance.
45
 In 
contrast, the marginal utility of giving to religion,   , does matter. The lower   , the more 
likely it is that the individual chooses the state. The income has no influence on the decision. 
The total amount of giving is 
         
  
                                     
                    
       
   
   
    
                                                       
                    
       
  
(3.57) 
In contrast to the regular solution above, the chosen alternative is not necessarily the one that 
implies the lower amount of total giving. 
Now I turn to the case where restriction (3.48) on   , the marginal utility of secular giving, is 
binding and the individual decides to attribute his or her taxes to the state,       . The 
resulting utility is 
            
       
          
          
           
   
    
 
    
            
(3.58) 
In order to see whether the individual chooses the corner or the regular solution, this utility 
level must be compared to utility in the unrestricted case (3.53) with       . The resulting 
                                                 
45
 There is one exception: an increase in   will c.p. lead to an increase in the threshold level for   . If the 
threshold is surpassed,    starts to matter, as can be seen below in (3.61). 
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condition for the individual to choose the religious community as the receiver of the 
assignment tax is 
 
 
       
       
 
  
  
                 
   
      (3.59) 
The total amount of giving is 
 
        
  
                                     
                    
       
   
   
    
                                                       
                    
       
  
(3.60) 
One can easily see that the condition for choosing one of the alternatives and the total amount 
of giving for the case with        are symmetric to the solution discussed above for 
      , i.e.    is replaced by    and   is replaced by  . Under these premises the same 
discussion as in the case above applies. 
3.5.2.3 Two binding restrictions 
If the inequalities in (3.47) and (3.48) are both fulfilled for the individual, i.e. he or she 
always ends up in a corner solution independent of who receives the tax, the two possible 
outcomes are the two restriction cases discussed in the previous section. Whether the 
individual attributes the tax to the church or the state can be determined by equating 
           
        and            
       . The result is  
            
                   
        
     
       
       
 
  
  
 
    
      
       
       
 
  
  
 
    
  
(3.61) 
Which of the two alternatives is chosen depends on both the marginal utilities of the two types 
of giving,    and   , and the individual’s opinion about the use of revenues by church and 
state,   and  . If    , the church (the state) will receive the tax if         . A decrease 
in       will ceteris paribus increase the chances that the church (the state) receives the funds. 
One could say that a high marginal utility of religious (secular) giving can be counteracted in 
the giving decision by the state’s (the church’s) use of funds for purposes that the individual 
highly agrees with. 
Total giving in the case where both restrictions are binding is 
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  (3.62) 
This amount is higher than what the individual gives in the benchmark case without the tax, 
        . However, the purpose that is supported by the tax receives a higher amount of 
money than in the benchmark, while the other cause receives less. As an example, imagine 
that an individual decides to attribute his or her tax to the church without making any 
additional voluntary contributions to the church. Total religious contributions equal   , which 
is higher than the benchmark contribution level,    . However, total contributions to secular 
causes amount to   
   
    
 , which is less than benchmark contributions    . 
It should also be noted that choosing the alternative that provides the highest utility for the 
individual is not equivalent to minimizing total charitable contributions and that the total 
giving is independent from the fitting parameters of the two alternatives. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of the tax assignment system. First, if 
the government chooses a tax rate   that is sufficiently high, it is possible to increase the 
overall amount of voluntary contributions. Nevertheless, the government should be aware that 
if the majority of citizens choose one of the two alternatives – say, the church – the church 
might end up with more donations than in the benchmark case, while secular purposes might 
receive even less than the benchmark amount. 
Second, low fitting of the use of revenues with the preferences of individuals can also be used 
to increase the total amount of charitable contributions. Thus, religious organizations and the 
state can direct their tax revenues to causes that they consider important while expecting that 
each taxpayer makes some additional voluntary contributions to the causes that matter most to 
him or her. However, if only the church or the state lowers the fitting with individuals’ 
preferences, while the other institution does not, the institution with the higher fitting 
parameter will receive the bulk of the tax revenues. In other words, the tax assignment system 
encourages competition between church and state for tax revenues. Such competition is 
centered on the fitting parameters   and   (see Meuthen, 1993: 195 and sources therein). 
3.5.3 The church membership decision 
The decision about church membership is straightforward. The utility of membership is 
simply added to the utility from consumption and giving. There is no connection between the 
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decision on giving and the membership choice, just as in the voluntary giving system. 
Therefore all individuals with a non-negative utility from membership are church members: 
 
    
         
         
  (3.63) 
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3.6 Discussion 
3.6.1 Summary of results for religious and secular contributions 
The first set of research questions that this chapter tries to answer is: 
Does the institutional framework affect decisions on religious and secular charitable giving? 
Which are the variables that influence the decision on the amount given and the division of 
contributions between religious and secular beneficiaries? 
The results show that the existence of taxes – church taxes and assignment taxes – can, but 
need not always, bias the amount of voluntary contributions and the distribution to different 
causes. Further, the results suggest that taxes – should they have an influence on voluntary 
contributions – tend to reduce the purely voluntary contributions, but increase total giving, i.e. 
taxes and additional voluntary giving taken together. Two channels are identified through 
which church and assignment taxes can increase total giving. First, the compulsory tax 
amount can be higher than what the individual gives in the benchmark case, i.e. in the absence 
of a tax system. Second, the individual might agree with the amount of taxes he or she has to 
pay, but not with how these taxes are used. If the taxpayer has the impression that the causes 
which are most important to him or her do not benefit enough, he or she might decide to make 
some additional voluntary contributions. 
In the voluntary giving system, the amount given by an individual positively depends on his 
or her income and the marginal utility of giving to each of the two types of organizations, 
captured by    and   . Since purely voluntary contributions represent the case without any 
institutional provisions that restrict individuals in their giving choices, I use this system as a 
benchmark against which I compare the church tax and the tax assignment system. 
I find that in the tax systems, some additional variables affect the amount given and how 
giving is divided between religious and secular causes. First, the use of taxes by the 
organizations which receive them, captured by   and  ; and second, the tax rate  . 
In both tax systems, the benchmark outcome concerning the amount and distribution of 
contributions can be reached. Some preconditions need to be fulfilled. In the church tax 
system, one possibility is that the individual disaffiliates from the church and decides freely 
whether and how much to give. But even as a church member, the benchmark outcome can be 
reached if the individual fully agrees with the use of funds by the church,    . In addition, 
church taxes must be sufficiently low such that the amount paid as church taxes does not 
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exceed the amount that would be giving voluntarily,      . In that case, the individual 
completely substitutes his or her own voluntary giving for the church tax and makes 
additional non-tax contributions until his or her preferred level of giving is reached. Although 
the amount given and the distribution between religious and secular charities is the same as 
for non-members, the individual will prefer the membership alternative if his or her benefits 
from church membership,      , are positive.  
In the tax assignment system the benchmark solution can also be achieved if at least one of 
the fitting parameters is one,     and/or    . In addition, the tax rate must not exceed the 
Cobb-Douglas parameter which refers to the type of giving where the fitting is complete: if 
    (   ) then it must be true that    (  ) is greater than or equal to  . The tax would 
then be assigned to the organization that is perceived as acting in concordance with own 
preferences, and additional giving is distributed such that the benchmark solution without a 
tax system in place is reached. 
In the church tax system, giving is distorted in comparison to the voluntary giving system 
when the individual is a church member and church taxes are too high from the individual’s 
point of view,     , and/or the fitting with respect to the church is not perfect,    . In all 
these cases, total giving is higher than without the tax system in place. However, when 
obligatory contributions are too high or not used in accordance with preferences, additional 
voluntary giving is cut for both religious and secular purposes. Furthermore, the results show 
that in the regular solution total giving negatively depends on the fitting parameter with 
respect to the church,  . In the corner solution, individuals do not make any voluntary 
contributions to the church. Their secular contributions depend on the amount of taxes they 
have to pay, but not on how these are used by the church.
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 The results reveal some similarities, but also some differences with Borgloh (2012) who develops the only 
theoretical model of church taxes and voluntary giving in Germany that I am aware of. Both models find that 
church taxes lead to a reduction in charitable contributions. This is not surprising because in both cases church 
taxes and charitable contributions are modeled as substitutes. However, in Borgloh (2012) the crowding-out is 
complete, while in my model it is not when     because in that case the two types of giving are not perfect 
substitutes. Borgloh also distinguishes between what I call in my paper “regular” and “corner solutions”, i.e. 
cases when the church member does or does not make additional religious contributions. In Borgloh’s paper the 
distinction is simply between individuals who donate and who do not donate because she models only one type 
of donation. Both models assert in their findings that a higher church tax (in my own model: church tax rate) 
increases the probability that individuals are in the corner solution. However, Borgloh also describes a solution 
where non-members do not make any charitable contributions. Such a state is impossible in my own model 
because in the utility function which I use the first euro of giving has infinite utility, while Borgloh assumes that 
the marginal utility of the first euro of giving is finite. If the marginal utility of the first euro of giving is lower 
than the marginal utility of the last euro of consumption, Borgloh’s model predicts non-giving non-members. 
The additional findings from my own model, which cannot be deducted from Borgloh (2012), are grounded in 
the fact that in my model church taxes and charitable giving are not perfect substitutes: first, church taxes and 
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In the tax assignment system, the benchmark is not achieved when the organization that 
receives the tax (the state or the church) does not act completely in accordance with the 
preferences of the individual and/or if the tax is higher than what would be optimal for the 
individual. When tax rates are sufficiently low, such that the tax amount is less than what the 
individual gives voluntarily, the individual chooses the alternative with the better fitting. 
However, when tax rates are high, the option with the best fitting might not be the one that 
maximizes individual utility. Imagine that the fitting parameter with respect to the church is 
high, but the person hardly receives any utility from religious giving, i.e.    is very low. In 
such cases the individual might decide to attribute his or her taxes to the state, even though 
the state uses only a fraction of its revenues on the causes that are important to the individual. 
In addition, the individual will make a voluntary charitable contribution to a secular cause that 
is in line with his or her preferences and a (small) religious contribution. The decision who 
receives the tax is completely independent from the income of the taxpayer. 
In both tax systems the field of charitable activity that eventually receives the tax has higher 
revenues than in the benchmark case, while the other type of organization loses revenues. 
While in the church tax system it is clear that churches profit and secular organizations lose 
revenues, it is a priori unclear which organizations profit and which lose with the tax 
assignment system in place. 
3.6.2 Summary of results for church membership 
The second set of research questions in this chapter addresses the implications of the church 
financing system for church membership. In the voluntary contributions and the tax 
assignment system, giving and church membership are disconnected. The membership 
decisions solely depend on the utility of membership,      . If the individual benefits from 
being a member, he or she will decide to be a member; if membership induces disutility, the 
individual decides against membership. Since church membership does not entail any 
(pecuniary) costs and benefits are disconnected from individual contributions – at least within 
this model – the model predicts that church membership is independent from the individual’s 
income, the tax rate of the assignment tax and the use of revenues by the church. 
In contrast, in the German church tax system church membership and church taxes are tied 
together. One can expect rational individuals to weigh benefits and costs of membership. The 
costs are determined by three different variables: the church tax rate, the individual’s income 
                                                                                                                                                        
voluntary religious contributions are imperfect substitutes when the fitting parameter is below one, and second, 
in my model there are secular contributions which are not a substitute for religious contributions or church taxes.  
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and the fitting parameter with respect to the use of revenues by the church. The model 
suggests that more people disaffiliate when church tax rates rise; that the disaffiliation rate is 
higher (i) among high-income individuals because for them the absolute tax burden is higher 
and (ii) among individuals who do not agree with the priorities and values that determine the 
use of funds by the church.
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The model identifies some key instruments that churches in Germany could consider to retain 
its membership. Concerning the benefits of church membership, they could 
 provide more benefits for members or increase the appreciation of the benefits they 
offer already; 
 rigorously exclude non-members from membership benefits. 
Furthermore, churches could increase the fitting parameter  , e.g. by  
 spending their revenues in the way the church tax payers prefer; 
 informing taxpayers about how funds are used; 
 explaining why it is important to use some share of the taxes for less popular 
activities, e.g. for administration. 
Finally, churches should be aware that the tax system is designed in a way that the incentive 
to disaffiliate is higher for high-income individuals. They could 
 make more use of maximum tax rates and tax rebates for one-time high incomes; 
 increase the public recognition of the large amount of church taxes paid by high-
income individuals. 
3.6.3 Welfare implications 
Church taxes and assignment taxes are helpful instruments to raise revenues for religious 
organizations and also to raise contributions to charitable causes in general above their 
equilibrium level. This can be done by setting the tax rate sufficiently high and by distributing 
the tax revenues to causes that would otherwise be neglected by donors. 
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 Some of the model results concerning church membership coincide with Borgloh’s (2012), while others do 
not. In both models, individuals who have a disutility from being a church member decide against membership. 
Borgloh’s model predicts that individuals who are in a regular solution (i.e. who make additional charitable 
contributions) do not disaffiliate when the church tax increases. In my own model, this is only true when    , 
because only then an increase in church taxes can be compensated perfectly by a decrease in charitable giving. A 
difference between Borgloh’s and my own reasoning exists concerning income: while Borgloh claims that 
individuals with higher income are more likely to be church members, I derive the opposite hypothesis. The 
reason for this difference is that Borgloh models church taxes are independent from income, while in my model 
taxes grow with income. 
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However, within the model framework church taxes and assignment taxes have a negative 
impact on welfare. Since taxes potentially disturb private decisions on the amount of 
contributions and the causes they should benefit, the utility of individuals is reduced 
compared to the benchmark voluntary giving system. Therefore, judging only from the point 
of view of the representative individual in my model, the welfare-maximizing system is the 
voluntary contributions system. 
However, the model completely neglects that there are usually beneficiaries of the higher than 
individually optimal contributions in the tax system. The taxes collected can be used for 
creating private goods for some individuals that are not captured in the model, such as church 
or state employees who are paid through church and assignment taxes; or children, poor 
people and other groups of society who benefit from the charitable activities of the church or 
of secular organizations. Taxes can also be used for producing public goods, such as fighting 
poverty, nurturing of democratic attitudes or conservation of the cultural heritage. Neither 
individuals who receive private benefits from the distribution of taxes nor any public goods 
are part of the model. The reason is that the model is intended to focus on those who pay the 
taxes. Public goods are not included because they do not change individual decisions when 
the number of church members (taxpayers) in society is large. 
In order to evaluate overall welfare in the church tax system, the utility losses of the church 
tax payers must be compared to the increase in utility of beneficiaries and the total benefits 
from public goods created. This is beyond the scope of this model. 
In fact, churches in Germany justify the collection of church taxes at least partly with the 
argument that the money is used to support causes that would otherwise be neglected by 
donors, e.g. organizations helping children receive more funding than organizations helping 
homeless people or drug addicts. In the same vein, church members tend to support their local 
congregations and neglect denominational bodies. If it is true that private donors support a 
limited amount of “popular” causes, while other causes that have an equally high or even 
greater impact on society are not supported, and if the church behaves as a benevolent 
organization that corrects this inefficient distribution, then church taxes can also be justified. 
Still, it is important to keep in mind that church taxes in Germany bias giving towards higher 
revenues for churches and lower revenues for secular organizations. Unless there is 
convincing evidence that the church has an efficiency, knowledge or scale advantage over 
secular institutions, this bias is difficult to justify. The same reasoning applies with respect to 
the state as the receiver of taxes in the tax assignment system, but at least the state has a 
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democratic legitimization for the public goods it provides and the subsidies it concedes, while 
churches do not. 
If one accepts the assumption that voluntary giving is inefficiently low without the tax system 
in place, then the tax assignment system appears to be the alternative that provides the higher 
welfare. First, since nobody can escape from the duty to pay taxes in the tax assignment 
system and free-ride on the contribution of others, the total amount of taxes collected is higher 
and the tax rate can easily be set at the welfare-maximizing level.
48
 Second, since avoiding the 
tax by disaffiliating from the church is not an option, everybody who has a positive benefit 
from being a church member can be a member. In the church tax system, some individuals 
drop out of church even though their membership utility is positive. This can be rational when 
they weigh the individual costs of membership against the benefits, but might be the wrong 
decision when social benefits of paying church or assignment taxes are included in the 
equation. Third, in the church tax system the possible benefit of increasing the level of public 
goods comes at the cost of giving these goods a religious touch. This is because in the church 
tax system above-benchmark revenues pertain to the church, while secular charitable 
organizations even lose revenues. The tax assignment system offers two different choices for 
the individual (assigning taxes to the state or the church), therefore individuals can decide for 
the alternative that offers the best combination of subjective importance of the field of giving 
(captured by    and   ) and the fitting parameters (captured by   and  ). It is a priori unclear 
in the tax assignment system whether religious or secular institutions receive higher revenues 
than in the benchmark. It is even possible that both profit at the same time. 
Finally, there are some more arguments in favor of a tax system compared to a voluntary 
contribution system that are outside the scope of the model. A tax system likely reduces 
transaction costs, because charitable organizations need not spend money on fundraising 
activities and the maintenance of donor relations. The tax system also mitigates the influence 
of high-income donors because they are not free to decide how their money is used. The 
disconnection of the amount given and the distribution of funds is particularly high in Italy 
where individuals cannot earmark the amount of taxes they personally pay for use by the 
government or the church. In fact, the total amount of revenues of the “otto per mille” is 
distributed according to the individual decisions, whereby the vote of each single taxpayer has 
the same weight. 
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 It should be noted that the actual tax rate of the “otto per mille” in Italy is much lower than the church tax rate 
in Germany. 
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3.6.4 Changes to the church financing systems - common suggestions and recent 
developments in the light of the model 
In order to evaluate suggestions for the future development of church financing systems, some 
criteria or objectives need to be defined. Without doubt the perfect church financing system 
differs depending on whom one asks. From the point of view of church tax payers, their 
individual utility matters. For the beneficiaries of the system, such as churches and secular 
charities and their clients, the maximization of revenues is important. For the religious 
communities, maximizing the number of members can also be an aim. These three objectives 
will be considered for each suggestion.
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The following suggestions will be discussed: 
 making the tax assignment system more efficient by letting taxpayers decide how their 
secular contributions are used; 
 separating church membership from the duty to pay church taxes in the church tax 
system; 
 switching from the church tax to the tax assignment system. 
3.6.4.1 Making the tax assignment system more efficient 
Looking at the implementation of the tax assignment system in Italy, one can conclude that 
until the mid-2000s the government used most of its revenues for the conservation of cultural 
heritage and neglected the other purposes listed in the law (Pistolesi, 2006: 170). The Italian 
government even has the possibility to use some of the revenues for non-charitable purposes 
(Pistolesi, 2006: 175; see also Servizio studi del Senato, 2012: 3-4), which it has used 
extensively in recent years. For example, in 2011 it was not possible for charitable 
organizations to get any funding from the state’s revenues of the “otto per mille” since it was 
spent exclusively on firefighting planes for the Office of Civil Protection and the renovation 
of prisons (Governo italiano, 2012). Furthermore, the government does not advertise in order 
to convince citizens that they should assign their taxes to the state, while churches, in 
particular the Catholic Church, do. Judging from the actual implementation of the tax 
assignment system in Italy, it appears as if the government consciously disincentivizes 
citizens to attribute their taxes to the state, possibly in an attempt to favor religious 
communities as receivers of the funds. 
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 For the social planner, maximizing social welfare is the objective. Unfortunately, it is impossible to evaluate 
welfare within the model framework (see Section 3.6.3). 
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There have been various – unsuccessful – initiatives to extend the scope of charitable 
purposes supported and to allow financing of municipal governments, scientific research, a 
foundation for women and families, associations that support the handicapped or large private 
charities (Carmignani Caridi, 2006: 150-156). This again suggests that citizens are not 
satisfied with the way the state uses its revenues from the assignment tax, or in the terms of 
my model, that   is low. As a consequence, more people might attribute their taxes to 
religious organizations at the possible cost of diminished contributions to secular purposes. 
One conclusion from such a strategy by the state is that the state tries to avoid competition 
between church and state for the revenues of taxpayers. Such competition in fitting 
parameters is inherent in the tax assignment system (see Meuthen, 1993: 195 and sources 
therein), but can be avoided if one of the participants consciously uses its revenues in a way 
that is not in line with taxpayers’ preferences.
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A possibility to make the Italian tax assignment system more flexible, foster competition and 
thereby increase the utility of taxpayers is to increase the number of possible choices. The 
state could also take up previous suggestions and broaden the scope of activities that are 
supported by tax revenues – if these activities correspond to the preferences of many Italians. 
This idea could be taken a step further by allowing individuals to name one or more charitable 
organizations on their tax returns which should receive their taxes. In fact, a similar system 
exists in Italy. Apart from the assignment tax or “otto per mille”, there is a separate 
regulation which is called “cinque per mille” (“five per thousand”). Here taxpayers have the 
possibility to assign 0.5 % of their income tax amount to various non-profits, local social 
assistance centers, universities and research institutions that they name on their income tax 
returns (see http://www.cinquepermille.net/). All these measures increase the variable   in the 
model. 
Furthermore, instead of a binary choice between assigning taxes to the church or the state, 
individuals could be given the possibility to split taxes between the two destinations. Again, 
this would adjust the system to the preferences of individuals, because they are no longer 
forced to make higher than individually efficient contributions to just one of the two 
                                                 
50 The tax assignment system was originally introduced to replace the previous system of state financing of the 
Catholic Church with a different system. If the state presented itself as a more attractive beneficiary of the tax 
system than the church, revenues of religious organizations could drop significantly and the target for which the 
“otto per mille” was created would be missed. 
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destinations while for the other cause only the possibility to make voluntary contributions 
remains. 
It is easy to see that such measures increase the individual utility for those who want to give at 
least some of their tax money to the state and leave utility unchanged for those who attribute 
the whole tax amount to the church. 
With the measures discussed above overall charitable giving will decrease, which can easily 
be seen when one remembers that the drivers of above-benchmark giving in tax systems are 
the low perceived fitting with respect to the use of revenues by the institutions receiving the 
tax and higher than individually optimal tax rates. When fitting is increased or taxes can be 
split up between the causes that one would like to support, these drivers of above-benchmark 
giving are reduced. If the state unilaterally increases its fitting parameter, it will increase its 
revenues while the church will lose both taxes and voluntary contributions. When taxes can be 
split up between churches and the state, it is a priori unclear who profits and who loses. 
However, in the end aggregate giving will more closely resemble the distribution of    and    
in society. 
Within the model framework the ideas and suggestions discussed in this section do not have 
any effect on church membership numbers. 
3.6.4.2 Free church membership in the church tax system 
In September 2012 the Federal Administrative Court of Germany decided about the legal 
challenge of a retired professor of church law. He demanded the right to disaffiliate from the 
church as a corporation under public law (“Körperschaft öffentlichen Rechts”), which collects 
church taxes, but at the same time he wanted to remain a member of the Roman Catholic 
Church as a religious community. The court decided that the professor has the right to state 
that he only wants to leave the corporation under public law, but that the consequences 
thereof are a matter of the Church, not of the state. (Schilder, 2012) 
Days before the decision by the Federal Administrative Court, the German Bishops’ 
Conference published a decree stating that the declaration of church disaffiliation in front of a 
state authority is a violation of church members’ “obligation to maintain communion with the 
church” and their “obligation to assist with the needs of the Church so that the Church can 
fulfil its duties” (Deutsche Bischofskonferenz, 2012 [my own translation]). The decree also 
lists the consequences of church disaffiliation: 
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 loss of right to receive sacraments (repentance, Eucharist, confirmation, anointing of 
the sick) 
 loss of right to hold an office in the church 
 loss of right to be godfather or sponsor 
 loss of right to vote in the church 
 loss of right to be in a church council 
 loss of right to be a member of a church association 
 religious weddings only possible under additional provisions 
 religious funeral can be denied 
 consequences for church employees according to specific regulations for church 
employees 
 loss of right to work as religious education teacher or as professor of theology. 
Both the court’s decision and the bishops’ decree made it clear that there will be no separation 
of the duty to pay church taxes and the right to enjoy membership benefits. In the terms of the 
model, a separation of church tax payments and entitlement to membership benefits would 
imply a change from the church tax to the voluntary giving system, since the church tax 
would only be a suggestion for an adequate contribution (such as tithing in parts of US 
churches). For the model church member, such a change would increase his or her utility 
since the individual could decide about his or her optimal level of giving without constraints 
and everybody who has a non-negative utility from membership could be a member. 
The model implies that total contributions to the church decrease and their structure changes 
as well. One would expect to see more voluntary contributions, which are likely to be 
earmarked, and less church tax revenues, since only those individuals who fully agree with 
the use of revenues by the church (   ) would pay church taxes. In contrast, voluntary 
contributions to secular charities would increase.  
Furthermore, there should be an increase in the number of church members, since the costs of 
church membership are zero in the voluntary giving system, but can be considerable in the 
church tax system, while membership benefits remain constant. 
3.6.4.3 Replacing the church tax system with a tax assignment system 
Opponents of the church tax system in Germany often suggest a reform of the church 
financing system and the introduction of church financing through tax assignment or through 
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completely voluntary contributions without any state interference (see Branahl, 1992: 34-42; 
Feldhoff, 1996: 41-48). 
Assuming for a moment that the tax rates in the church tax and the tax assignment systems are 
the same, it is not possible to say which system generates the highest total contributions to 
charitable causes. In the tax assignment system the state can be a highly attractive alternative 
to religious giving that allows individuals to fulfil their demand for charitable giving such that 
additional secular giving will be reduced to a minimum. Consequently, overall giving is lower 
than in the church tax system where all church members are forced to choose the church as 
the receiver of the money, and to make additional voluntary contributions if the perceived 
fitting with respect to the church is low. 
However, if the tax rate is sufficiently high or the fitting parameter with respect to the church 
is low in the church tax system, a significant share of church members, in particular those 
with a high income, will disaffiliate from the church in an attempt to elude the tax. In that 
case, the tax assignment system will generate higher revenues. In the church tax system the 
churches’ ability to raise revenues above the level that would be given completely voluntarily 
critically depends on the benefits that the churches provide. However, in the previous decades 
social pressure to be a church member has diminished and more secular alternatives to 
religious groups, religious counselling or religious festivities exist. All these developments 
diminish the benefits of church membership. At the same time, the number of non-religiously 
affiliated organizations and charities has increased and it is easier nowadays to find an 
organization which supports the charitable activities one prefers. As a result, churches face 
two types of people who drop out: those who turn away from the church completely because 
they do not feel any benefits of membership and those who want to stay close to the church 
but prefer to decide independently which church-related projects they support financially. 
This leads to the second question how a change from the church tax to the tax assignment 
system will affect church membership numbers. In the tax assignment system there is no 
financial incentive to leave the church. All individuals with positive membership benefits are 
members. Consequently, membership numbers are higher than in the church tax system. 
The overall effect on individuals’ utility is unclear. For church members who attribute their 
tax to the church in the tax assignment system, nothing will change.
51
 Church members who 
decide to attribute their money to the state profit since the tax in the assignment system offers 
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 If the tax assignment system induces churches to increase the fitting parameter  , these church members might 
even profit. 
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them an alternative that is more attractive to them than giving to the church. Most non-
members lose, because they are forced to pay taxes and give them to some organization that 
they might perceive as not acting in accordance with their preferences. However, there can 
also be some non-members who profit. Imagine a person has left the church because he or she 
disagrees with the use of revenues by the church, but still he or she has positive membership 
utility. Such a person might profit from the introduction of the tax assignment system because 
it provides the individual with the possibility to be a church member but still attribute the 
taxes to secular institutions, which might have a better fitting than the church. 
3.6.5 Limitations of the model and suggestions for further research 
Although the model is quite extensive and helps shed light on some empirical observations, 
there are still limitations. First, both the church tax and the tax assignment system are 
represented in a simplified way. In the model, I assume a constant tax rate. In reality, in 
Germany as well as Italy the church and assignment taxes, respectively, are progressive. 
Furthermore, these taxes depend on taxable income, which differs from overall income. 
However, since income is completely exogenous in the model, this has no direct implications 
on the model quality. The model also disregards specific German regulations for 
heterogamous couples, where under specific circumstances one spouse who is not a church 
member has to pay church taxes for the other who is a member. Since the model looks only at 
the choice of a single individual, this is neglected. 
For the case of Italy, the model disregards the fact that the individual cannot assign his or her 
personal tax amount to the institution he or she prefers, but only has a vote in the overall 
distribution of the taxes. For a rich individual, this would mean that by earmarking his or her 
taxes for the church, only an amount equal to the average tax payment goes to the church, 
whereas the remainder of this individual’s taxes is distributed according to the overall 
partitioning of “otto per mille” revenues. 
Second, the model is based on a specific utility function with a standard Cobb-Douglas part 
and an additive term for utility from church membership. One could particularly question the 
additivity of the benefits of membership because this assumption implies that membership has 
no influence on the marginal utility of the other commodities. However, including 
membership benefits in a Cobb-Douglas type utility function is difficult because this would 
not allow a discrete choice over the “amount” of membership benefits. The high number of 
non-members in Germany shows that membership benefits of zero are a common choice 
whereas in a Cobb-Douglas function the amount of all commodities consumed is strictly 
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positive. Another possible objection against the Cobb-Douglas utility function is that the 
marginal utility of income is constant. However, it is often argued that the marginal utility of 
income is decreasing in reality, which renders the result that church taxes are a heavier burden 
for the rich than for the poor questionable.
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Third, in the model non-members of the church and even individuals with a disutility from 
membership make voluntary religious contributions. This results from the Cobb-Douglas 
utility function, combined with the assumption that the marginal utility from religious giving, 
captured by   , and the benefits of church membership,      , are independent. In reality, 
one probably finds a correlation between the two variables, although not a perfect one. In 
addition, one might even observe a positive relationship between the preference for secular 
giving,   , and the benefits of church membership. Researchers argue that the correlation of 
religiosity and charitable giving can be explained either by “conviction” or “community” 
(Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011: 944). “Conviction” refers to inherent “values and attitudes” of 
individuals, e.g. how much they care about others (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011: 944). Such 
values can be transmitted during childhood. When someone grows up in a religious 
community and internalizes its (usually very positive) position on charitable behavior, he or 
she will at the same time internalize other values and support the religious community itself, 
in which case the   parameters and the membership benefit are closely connected. The 
“community” explanation refers to the fact that individuals who are involved in religious 
networks might be asked to give more often than others or may experience social pressure to 
give (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011: 944). Again, being active in a religious network induces a 
high membership benefit as well as a high preference for giving. Nevertheless, it is also 
reasonable to assume that the two variables are not perfectly correlated. In Germany, 
individuals who seek purely economic benefits from church membership, such as finding a 
job with a religiously affiliated employer or getting easier access to a church-run 
kindergarten, need not necessarily be very generous. In addition, individuals might disagree 
fundamentally with some parts of the church doctrine, which makes them feel uncomfortable 
with being a church member, but still appreciate some very specific charitable projects of the 
church. Notwithstanding these objections, a possible correlation between membership benefits 
and preferences for giving might explain differences between predictions derived from the 
model and empirical observations. In particular, it could explain why charitable giving of 
church members (exclusive of church taxes) is often higher than that of non-members. 
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Fourth, in the present model benefits from church membership depend neither on the church 
tax rate nor on the share of the population with church membership – thereby neglecting the 
costs of producing these membership benefits as well as possible scale effects in production. 
It is reasonable to assume that some of the benefits are indeed independent from overall 
revenues of churches, in particular afterlife benefits that are tied to membership itself. 
Furthermore, churches currently generate high enough revenues to provide religious festivities 
like weddings, baptisms or funerals without problems. It is therefore unlikely that individuals 
take into account that leaving the church or assigning the tax to the state could reduce the 
availability or quality of these services. Nevertheless, some membership benefits like the 
availability of clerics do depend on the revenue situation of churches. 
Fifth, one could challenge the model on the fact that in the voluntary giving system 
membership does not have any cost. In reality even in these systems (like the US) 
membership benefits do at least partly depend on the amount contributed. However, even if 
this aspect was integrated in the model, the voluntary giving system would still differ 
significantly from the church tax system because the former allows individuals to choose their 
individually optimal level of contributions where the marginal cost of an increase in 
contributions equals the marginal benefit of this increase, while the tax system prescribes the 
amount of taxes without taking into account the benefits. 
Sixth, a comparison of the church disaffiliation decision in Germany and the decision for 
whom to earmark the assignment tax in Italy is more complicated in reality than it is in the 
model. The main reason is that the decision that has to be taken in the Italian context can be 
revised every year, whereas the decision to disaffiliate is usually a long-lasting one which the 
majority of individuals never revise, or if they do, only after several years. These differences 
in planning horizons cannot be adequately represented in my simple one period model. The 
result could be that in Germany people remain church members even if in the current period 
costs exceed benefits, as long as they expect that in the future benefits will dominate costs. 
The model also neglects that in Germany changing the church membership status entails 
transaction costs, both monetary and in terms of time, while this is not the case in Italy. 
Transaction costs can induce individuals to remain in a status even though the costs exceed 
the benefits. A discussion of transaction costs in the context of the church membership 
decision in Germany can be found in Section 4.4.1. 
Seventh, the model postulates a clear distinction between religious and secular non-profit 
organizations, whereas it is sometimes difficult to draw a line between these two in reality. On 
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the one hand, religious communities are expected to use part of their revenues for their 
charitable activities, which often lack a strong relation to religious teachings (see Feldhoff, 
1996: 38). On the other hand, in Italy a large share of the assignment tax earmarked for the 
state is used for financing the conservation of cultural heritage, of which the majority belongs 
to religious communities, in particular the Catholic Church (Pistolesi, 2006: 178). In this vein, 
one can principally question the implicit assumptions made about the substitutability of 
charitable goods in the model. My assumption is that church taxes and religious giving are net 
substitutes – eventually, they buy the same good for the individual. Religious and secular 
giving do not buy the same good. In contrast, Borgloh (2012) assumes that the church tax is a 
perfect substitute for all types of charitable giving. In her model the church tax has a much 
larger effect on secular voluntary giving than in my model.  
Eighth, the model does not include the possibility that the financing of a particular activity 
through the government share of the assignment tax might crowd out funding through regular 
government revenues. In reality, crowding-out is likely to happen (see Pistolesi, 2006: 173-
174). What is more, the Italian government even uses the revenues for non-charitable 
purposes (Pistolesi, 2006: 175; see also Servizio studi del Senato, 2012: 3-4 and Governo 
italiano, 2012). In the terms of the model, such behavior would further reduce the fitting 
parameter of the state and make the church a more attractive alternative for the assignment of 
the tax. 
Finally, the model disregards the fact that different types of voluntary contributions can have 
different prices. As far as donations are tax deductible, the price is defined as one minus the 
marginal tax rate. In Germany, church taxes paid are tax-deductible, thereby reducing the 
amount of income tax that needs to be paid. If voluntary contributions were not tax-
deductible, it would be less costly for the individual to pay church taxes instead of giving the 
same amount of money as a voluntary contribution. However, donations are tax-deductible in 
Germany, therefore price differences between religious and secular donations do not exist.
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In the Italian system, a similar logic applies. Assume that the tax code favored the deduction 
of secular donations, but not of religious giving. If this was true, individuals would have an 
incentive to attribute their tax to the church and make additional contributions to secular 
causes. 
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should be noted that the amount of donations that are tax-deductible in Germany is limited, whereas church taxes 
are fully tax-deductible. 
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3.6.6 Extension of the model 
One possible extension of the model which I discuss in some more detail here is how different 
motivations for voluntary giving affect the outcome of the model. So far it has been assumed 
that the individual is intrinsically motivated to give. Contributions are made because the 
individual receives utility from giving to projects which are in line with his or her preferences. 
This can be seen as a combination of “warm glow” and altruistic giving. On the one hand, the 
individual receives utility from giving itself (not from the good that is produced, which is not 
modeled). On the other hand, the donor cares about how his or her money is used, i.e. he or 
she does not derive utility from giving if the money is not used in line with his or her 
preferences. Another motive for giving which is discussed in some recent scholarly articles, 
but has been neglected in the model so far, is social prestige.
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3.6.6.1 Motivation 
Some previous models concentrate on prestige as the only motivation for making charitable 
contributions, while others incorporate both prestige concerns and warm glow. 
Glazer and Konrad (1996) argue that individuals strive to signal their wealth to other 
individuals, and that wealth can be signaled by the amount an individual donates. The authors 
therefore set up a utility function that depends on private consumption and other’s inferences 
about individuals’ net income, which in turn is a function of individuals’ charitable donations. 
Glazer and Konrad (1996: 1022) note that the utility function can easily be extended to 
include warm glow utility. 
Bénabou and Tirole (2006: 1656) develop a model where individuals receive utility from 
private consumption and intrinsic satisfaction from voluntary contributions to a public good 
(monetary or other), but at the same time care about what others infer about their character 
and preferences from their giving behavior and the social consequences thereof. Bénabou and 
Tirole (2006: 1657) go on to explain that the intrinsic motivation of the individual can be 
grounded both in the concern about the overall level of a public good to which the individual 
contributes and the pure “joy of giving.” 
In a similar fashion, Harbaugh (1998) models individuals as receiving utility from private 
consumption, prestige and warm glow, where warm glow depends on the amount donated and 
prestige depends on the charity’s public reporting of the amount donated. Harbaugh’s model 
coincides with the discussion in Ariely, Bracha and Meier (2009: 544) who state that there are 
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 For a systematic overview of donor motivations see, e.g., von Kotzebue and Wigger (2010). 
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three motives for voluntary giving: “[i]ntrinsic motivation” (e.g. altruism), “[e]xtrinsic 
motivation” (e.g. material rewards) and “[i]mage motivation” (which depends on public 
opinion) (Ariely, Bracha and Meier, 2009: 544 [emphasis in original]). 
Soetevent (2005) shows in a field experiment in 30 churches in the Netherlands that 
individuals give more during services when their contribution is visible to fellow churchgoers 
than when it is not visible. 
I follow the approaches of these authors and model prestige as part of individual’s utility. This 
kind of utility can only be derived from giving that is publicly recognized. In order to leave 
the model simple, I assume that the individual only cares about prestige and does not derive 
any utility from giving itself or the goods which are produced with his or her contributions.  
The crucial question is then how prestige can be gained in the model. Here I argue that 
prestige can only be gained through voluntary giving, while paying church or assignment 
taxes does not entail any prestige. The reason for this assumption is that paying taxes is often 
seen as a duty, something that needs to be done which is not worth any special recognition. 
This is surely true for state income taxes, but I also argue that the same mentality is at work 
with respect to the assignment tax and the church tax. In Germany there is some anecdotal 
evidence that church members who pay a substantial amount of church taxes do not receive 
any public recognition for their contributions. Norbert Feldhoff, who was vicar general of the 
archdiocese of Cologne and responsible for its budget, gives the following example: If a rich 
person in France or Italy donated 600,000 mark to the church he or she “would have a high 
reputation and probably get a papal medal” (Feldhoff, 1996: 59 [my own translation]). If the 
same person lived in Germany, he or she might be obliged to pay 1 million mark of church 
taxes, but nobody would take notice. If the person was not willing to pay 1m mark, the only 
possibility would be to disaffiliate, which would result in an excommunication – even if the 
person still donated 600,000 mark to the church each year. (Feldhoff, 1996: 59) A similar 
view is expressed in a recent article in the well-known Catholic newspaper “Christ und 
Welt”. The author discusses the view of church officials on rich church members, in particular 
rich church tax payers. She cites several people working in the finance departments of 
Catholic dioceses who sustain that there is no – and there should not be – special treatment for 
rich church tax payers. (Prange, 2012) 
Another problem that complicates the extraction of social recognition from church or 
assignment taxes is the fact that they depend on income, but the income of others is usually 
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not publicly known, although one can sometimes make an estimation. In contrast, charitable 
organizations do report the names of their donors and the amount they have contributed. 
All these arguments taken together, I argue that paying church or assignment taxes does not 
provide any prestige for the individual. 
A formal model of charitable giving by individuals who are motivated by social prestige can 
be found in Appendix A.5. Here I give a summary of the results and compare them to the 
findings from my main model. 
3.6.6.2 Results 
I briefly discuss the effects of the prestige model for all three systems of church financing, 
starting with the voluntary giving system. 
In the voluntary giving system, the motive for giving does not affect the amount given and the 
splitting up of giving between religious and secular charitable organizations. The reason is 
that all voluntary giving is visible, i.e. it can always be given to organizations that make the 
amount given known to the public. 
The same logic applies to non-members of the church in Germany. Since all their giving is 
voluntary, they can choose organizations that publish the names of donors. In contrast, for 
church members the motivation to give matters. In the prestige model everyone who cares to 
some extend about public recognition makes an additional (non-tax) charitable contribution 
because only non-tax contributions create prestige. In other words, corner solutions where 
individuals do not give voluntarily are not possible. Therefore, on average, church members’ 
religious giving is larger and secular giving is lower than in the previous framework, which 
implies that the prestige model predicts an even larger bias of giving away from secular 
organizations and directed to churches. However, total voluntary giving is also larger in the 
prestige model. 
In addition, I find that the critical level   , i.e. the income where individuals are indifferent 
between being and not being a church member, is lower in the prestige model. The reason is 
that in the previous framework individuals usually gained at least some utility from paying 
their church taxes (besides membership utility), but in the prestige model they do not. 
Consequently, the model predicts that the more individuals are motivated by gaining social 
recognition with their charitable contributions, and the less they are intrinsically motivated to 
give, the lower will be the church membership rates. 
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Finally looking at the tax assignment system, I find that in the prestige model the amount 
given to charitable causes (including the assignment tax) and the utility of the individual are 
independent of whether the money is given to religious or secular causes. The individual is 
completely indifferent between attributing his or her taxes to the state or to the church. If one 
assumes that the two alternatives are chosen with the same probability, both religious and 
secular organizations can gain in revenues in comparison to the voluntary giving model. The 
prestige model helps to explain why many Italians do not use the opportunity to decide 
whether they want to assign the tax to the church or the state by leaving the relevant part of 
the tax form blank. In the regular solution of the main model individuals made their choice on 
the basis of the fitting parameters   and  . However, if individuals only care about prestige, 
but not about how the money given is used (which is reflected in the fitting parameters), there 
is no meaningful decision criterion left for the individual. 
A possible track for further research could be to integrate both the intrinsic and the presige 
motivation to give into the utility function of the individual. Such a model could help to 
explain different empirical facts about giving in countries where church tax and tax 
assignment systems exist. On the one hand, the reputational considerations help to explain 
why few individuals decide for one of the alternatives in the tax assignment system. On the 
other hand, when the individual only cares about how his or her money is used, non-tax 
giving can be zero when the individual arrives at his or her preferred level of giving by paying 
church or assignment taxes. 
3.6.7 Conclusions 
Despite these limitations, the model gives insights into the economic incentives set by 
different church financing systems. It also provides testable hypotheses regarding the church 
membership and voluntary giving decisions in the countries under investigation. Although the 
model is not dynamic, it allows for the comparison of two individuals who differ in the 
relevant parameters, or one individual at two points in time when there is an exogenous 
change in the model parameters. However, I do not know how the individual moves from one 
state to the next. In the following I summarize the hypotheses derived from the model 
regarding the church tax system in Germany, which will be tested empirically in the 
subsequent chapters: 
 A higher taxable income or a higher church tax rate c.p. increases the probability that 
the individual is not a church member. 
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 Individuals who have the same income and face the same church tax rate can differ in 
their church membership decisions if (i) they have different levels of membership 
benefits,      , (ii) they differ in how much the spending decisions of the church 
reflect their preferences (parameter  ) or (iii) they differ in the marginal utility from 
giving, characterized by    and   .  
 If two church members differ only in membership benefits, both give the same amount 
of money to charity. If they differ only in the fitting parameter  , those with a lower 
level of   give more for religious purposes and less for secular purposes. If they differ 
only in the marginal utility from giving,
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 then religious and/or secular giving of those 
with smaller values of    and    is lower. 
 The obligation to pay church taxes reduces additional (non-tax) charitable giving of 
church members – both for religious and for secular purposes. 
 Assuming that two individuals have the same income, the same fitting parameter  , the 
same marginal utility of giving    and    and face the same church tax rate, but differ 
in church membership status (e.g. because one has a higher membership benefit than 
the other), the non-member gives more to religious purposes than the church member, 
who either makes no additional contribution at all (corner solution) or a comparatively 
small contribution. The non-member also gives more to secular causes. However, the 
overall giving of the church member, including both church taxes and additional 
voluntary giving, is higher than giving of the non-member.  
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 This is only valid for sufficiently low values of    and   . However, it is true if the reasonable assumption 
          is fulfilled. 
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4 CHURCH TAXES AND CHURCH DISAFFILIATION: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY FOR GERMANY, 2001-2006 
4.1 Introduction and research questions 
The model in Chapter 3 has illustrated that the institutional setting, in particular the church 
financing system, can influence the church membership decision. For the case of Germany, 
the model suggests that a higher church tax and a higher income, as well as lower individual 
benefits from membership, increase the probability of an individual’s disaffiliation. While 
there is plenty of rather qualitative research on the effect of the church tax on church 
disaffiliation, which I review in Section 4.3, quantitative research is sparse. So far I am aware 
of only two studies. Lyytikäinen and Santavirta (2013) look at Finland, which has a church 
tax system that is in some regards similar to the German one. For Germany, Borgloh (2012) 
investigates the effect of the church tax on the church membership decision with the Taxpayer 
Panel, a large data set containing information from income tax returns. The same data set is 
also used in the research at hand. 
Against this background, this chapter aims to mitigate the lack of research in the field of 
economics of religion in Germany and contribute to the knowledge about the effects of 
specific institutional regulations on religiosity. Particularly, my first research question is: 
 Is there a statistically significant relationship between a person’s church tax payments 
and his or her decision to formally leave the church? 
In addition, I ask: 
 How and to what extent do demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 
individual influence the decision to leave the church? 
and finally:  
 Are there are regional differences within Germany in the church membership 
decision? 
The chapter is structured as follows: the next section gives a short account of church 
membership change and church disaffiliations in Germany and describes the institutional 
background of church financing in Germany. Section 4.3 reviews the literature on benefits 
and costs of church membership, in particular church taxes. Section 4.4 develops hypotheses 
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both in the framework of a simple model of church membership choice and from a literature 
review. These hypotheses are later tested empirically. The data and the estimation strategy 
will be presented in Sections 4.5 and 4.6. Section 4.7 presents the findings, while Section 4.8 
concludes and discusses questions for further research. 
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4.2 Historical and legal background: Church membership and 
church disaffiliations in Germany 
4.2.1 Historical background 
Church disaffiliation is not a new phenomenon. In fact, people have been leaving the church 
since this was legalized in the late 19
th
 century. High disaffiliation rates have been observed 
during the 1920s and 1930s, which is attributed to anti-religious propaganda of the major 
political parties of these decades (Feige, 1990: 126-134). After the end of the Second World 
War disaffiliation numbers in the Western part of Germany were low again, until they 
increased rapidly beginning in 1968. The numbers never returned to the low levels of the 
post-war period and finally reached unprecedented dimensions after German reunification in 
1990. (Daiber, 1995: 164-165; Pollack, 2001: 1053-1054) 
In East Germany, church disaffiliation levels were incomparably higher. The Communist 
government actively restrained activities of religious organizations, e.g. their opportunities to 
collect church taxes and provide religious education. Church members were faced with 
disadvantages in their educational and professional careers. Religious rituals were replaced 
with secular ones, such as celebrating “Jugendweihe”
56
 instead of confirmation. As a result, 
the church membership rate in East Germany dropped from more than 90 percent in 1950 to 
around 30 percent at the time of German reunification. (Henkys and Schweitzer, 1997; 
Pollack, 2000: 19; Barker, 2004: 168-169; Froese and Pfaff, 2005: 405-407; Pfaff, 2011: 240-
243) After reunification, disaffiliation numbers jumped up again in East Germany; however, 
disaffiliation rates in East and West Germany have been quite similar in recent years. 
The large differences in religiosity and religious membership between the two parts of 
Germany make the country an interesting case study because hypotheses can be tested with 
exactly the same kind of data in two completely different settings. 
As I have already pointed out in the introductory chapter (see Section 1.3), the number of 
church members in Germany is diminishing not only due to church disaffiliations, which are 
part of the “behavioral” component of membership development, but also because of 
“natural” changes (Eicken, 2006: 178). The latter are brought about by demographic change, 
since the number of church members who die is constantly higher than the number of children 
who are born to (Christian) religious parents and are baptized. The “behavioral” and “natural” 
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 “Jugendweihe” is a secular formal celebration of the beginning of adulthood. 
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components are the two major sources for the decline in church membership in Germany 
(Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin, 2010). This research addresses the behavioral component of 
membership change, especially disaffiliations, and seeks to uncover the economic rationale of 
this decision in the current German institutional framework. 
Church disaffiliations have been discussed in the German theological and sociological 
literature since the 1970s (see, for example, Feige, 1976; Birkelbach, 1999; Hoof, 1999; 
Löffler, 2007). A number of studies have also been commissioned by churches themselves 
(see Huber, Friedrich and Steinacker, 2006, for a study on Protestants; Schmidtchen et al., 
1972, and Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1992, 1993, for studies on Catholics). 
Recently the economic dimension of disaffiliations is becoming more and more important. 
Church tax revenues have been declining in real terms since the early 1990s, with some short 
recoveries in times of high economic growth (at the end of the 1990s and between 2006 and 
2008) (Petersen, 2010: 41). The number of future taxpayers is predicted to decline 
significantly. Therefore churches will increasingly face considerable financial strain which 
becomes even more severe with every (potential) taxpayer who decides to disaffiliate 
(Petersen, 2007: 752-753). 
4.2.2 Legal background57 
In Germany, the major Christian churches (the Catholic Church and Evangelical Church in 
Germany) are granted the right to collect taxes from their members (Daiber, 1995: 70-71). All 
baptized individuals are considered members unless they officially disaffiliate. These taxes 
constitute by far the largest source of revenue for the two major Christian denominations. 
Church taxes come in different forms. The most important form that generates the bulk of 
church tax revenues is an additional tax to the federal income tax. In some regions churches 
levy property taxes, but the revenues are negligible. In addition, some churches collect 
(obligatory or voluntary) local church taxes (“Kirchgeld”), which are either fixed or depend 
on the church member’s income.
58
 In most federal states, the revenues generated are 
negligible. Last, there is a special church tax for heterogamous marriages (“besonderes 
Kirchgeld in glaubensverschiedener Ehe”), which is applied when a church member who 
does not have a sufficiently high income and thus does not pay church taxes is married to a 
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Petersen, 2010. 
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 In contrast to church taxes on income, local church taxes are not collected by the state tax office, but by the 
local congregations themselves. Payment is usually not enforced (Petersen, 2010: 73), therefore the obligatory 
character of the tax is questionable.  
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non-member. In this case, the non-member has to pay church taxes for his or her religiously 
affiliated spouse from his or her own income. (Petersen, 2007: 754-755) In what follows, I 
focus attention on the church tax as an additional tax to the income tax, because it is collected 
by state tax offices and individual data is available.
59
 It should be noted that church members 
who do not have taxable income (e.g. most pensioners) are not obliged to pay church taxes 
(Daiber, 1995: 73). 
Church taxes are collected by state tax offices along with income taxes. They are often 
subtracted from a person’s salary by the employer. At the end of the year, people are usually 
obliged to file a tax return and will eventually have to make a subsequent payment or receive 
a tax refund. The church tax then amounts to 8 % or 9 % of income tax liabilities. The sum of 
church taxes paid during a year is tax-deductible. Like the German income tax system in 
general, the church tax is progressive. In most German Länder a maximum church tax rate 
exists (generally around 3.5 % of taxable income). Church tax regulations vary slightly 
between the German Länder, but the tax rate is the same for members of both the Catholic and 
the Protestant Church in the each Land. Detailed information about church tax regulations can 
be found in Appendix B. 
Individuals can disaffiliate from the church during the whole year. Church membership and 
the duty to pay church taxes end either at the end of the month when the person opts out of 
church or the end of the subsequent month. Church taxes are then calculated proportionately 
to the number of months that the person was a church member during the year. The basis for 
taxation is the income of the whole year, which also includes income that was earned after 
disaffiliation. Church disaffiliation has to be declared personally and in written form with a 
public authority – either the civil registry office (“Standesamt”) or the district court 
(“Amtsgericht”). It is not possible to declare disaffiliation only from the church as a public 
body (and avoid church taxes), but to remain a member in the church in its spiritual sense. 
Usually the public authorities charge a fee for church disaffiliation.
60
 The fee usually does not 
vary within a Land but does between different Länder. The average fee is between 20 and 30 
euro, with a maximum of 60 euro.
61
 (Petersen, 2010: 137) For detailed information about the 
regulations concerning church disaffiliation, consult Appendix B. 
                                                 
59
 For the same reason I concentrate on members of the two large denominations in my empirical analysis. 
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 Berlin and Brandenburg are exceptions. 
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 For detailed information about fees, see Petersen (2010: 137) and http://www.kirchenaustritt.de/info/. 
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4.3 Theoretical and empirical perspectives on church 
membership decisions in a cost-benefit framework 
I this chapter I investigate the discrete decision between being and not being a church 
member, and I am specifically interested in the effect of the amount of church tax that has to 
be paid in the case of membership. Discrete decisions are rarely described in microeconomic 
theory. An exception is Maier and Weiss (1990), who provide a comprehensive overview of 
the topic.
62
 In the case of discrete decisions, consumers maximize their utility by holding 
constant the level of consumption of the discrete good. They compare the conditional utility 
levels of all discrete alternatives and decide for the alternative which yields the highest utility. 
This requires taking into account both benefits and costs associated with the different options. 
The benefits of church membership are multifaceted. Stark and Finke (2000: 145-150) 
extensively discuss that “[m]embership in any religious organization involves both religious 
and social-emotional rewards” (pp. 145-146). In general, benefits are created not only for the 
individual itself, but also for the society. Economic models, such as Azzi and Ehrenberg 
(1975) (see also Section 2.2.1) focus on private benefits for church members. In the model of 
Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) the most important benefit provided by religious organizations is 
“afterlife consumption” (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975: 32), which is the sum of utility a person 
receives in life after death. However, in Germany only 37 % of the inhabitants believe in life 
after death while 15 % believe in hell (Köcher, 2009: 803). Therefore “afterlife consumption” 
seems to play only a secondary role in church membership assessment. Unfortunately, to the 
best of my knowledge there is no research about the expectations of (former) church members 
about the consequences of church disaffiliation on their afterlife utility. 
Another private benefit of church membership is “current satisfaction” (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 
1975: 32), which encompasses, among others, meaning in life and entertainment. In fact, 
participation in church festivities like weddings is the single most important reason for church 
membership among Protestants in West Germany (Schloz, 2006: 61). In contrast, attendance 
at regular religious services is low. Only about one in four Protestants attends services at least 
once a month, while about 40 % go to church at best once a year (Schloz, 2006: 54-55). 
However, when a large share of a person’s reference group attends church, “social pressure” 
(Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975: 32) may exist and being a non-member can reduce the private 
utility of an individual (Papyrakis and Selvaretnam, 2011: 441). There is no statistical data on 
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social pressure in church membership decisions, but the general perception is that nowadays 
disaffiliation is widely accepted and does not lead to negative consequences. However, the 
situation might still differ between rural and urban areas and also between Northern and 
Southern Germany as well as East and West Germany because membership rates are largely 
different in these regions. 
Individuals can also derive benefits from public goods and social services provided by 
religious organizations, such as “social rules”, “property rights enforcement”, “preservation of 
knowledge”, education, “income redistribution” (Hull and Bold, 1989: 8), maintenance of 
historically important buildings and provision of social capital (Coleman, 2003). In Germany, 
churches also have a decisive role in the provision of welfare services like kindergartens, care 
for the elderly, the poor and the handicapped, aid to developing countries, etc., which are 
partly financed through church taxes. Many individuals receive direct private benefits from 
using these services, while others may be motivated by altruism or warm glow and derive 
utility from contributing to the provision of these services. In fact, providing care for the 
elderly, sick and handicapped is on top of a list of things which Germans expect from the 
churches – members as well as non-members, East Germans as well as West Germans 
(Pittkowski, 2006: 107). Almost all church members agree that some or even a large share of 
church tax payments should be used for supporting the elderly, the needy and children 
(Köcher, 1993: 24). More than 40 % of church members strongly agree that these activities 
are a reason for their membership (Schloz, 2006: 61). Another potentially important reason 
for church membership lies in the fact that often only church members can be employees of 
church organizations and religious social service providers. Since a large share of hospitals, 
nursing homes and day-care facilities are religiously affiliated (see Section 1.2), church 
membership can have a great influence on the job opportunities of persons working in the 
social sector. 
Many of the benefits provided by churches are not restricted to members, such as participation 
in services. Lyytikäinen and Santavirta (2010: 35-36) name the following benefits that are 
exclusively enjoyed by church members in Finland: church wedding, baptizing, confirmation, 
funeral, godparenthood and free subscription to the church’s magazine. For Germany, the list 
can be supplemented by (easier) access to church kindergartens and religious private schools 
and scholarships for students (Hoyer, 2011). 
In the German context, the most important costs of church membership are church taxes. 
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Researchers broadly agree that the decision to disaffiliate is the consequence of a cost-benefit 
analysis (Dubach, 1993: 138-139; Stark and Finke, 2000: 42-56; McCleary, 2011: 9). 
However, the decision to leave the church is usually characterized as a long-lasting decision 
making process (Feige, 1976: 232; Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1993: 3-4) and 
individuals who disaffiliate usually give more than one reason for this decision (Hoof, 1999: 
200-204). They might gradually reduce their church attendance (Gill and Lundsgaarde, 2004: 
411) or develop values and opinions that differ from those of their denominations (Brañas-
Garza, García-Muñoz and Neuman, 2007: 22). The apparent “inertia” in church membership 
decisions might also be caused by the transaction costs involved (Birkelbach, 1999: 137), 
such as finding out how to formally disaffiliate, going to the civil registry office or district 
court, and paying a fee. Benefits and costs of church membership are often reassessed after 
important (economic) changes in the individual’s life or in society (Feige, 1990: 226; Hoof, 
1999: 242). Significant changes in the costs of church membership occur when people enter 
the labor market (and have to pay church taxes for the first time), when they face significant 
income changes, financial problems or new income tax regulations (Birkelbach, 1999: 138). 
Other instances when people revisit their church membership status include: dissatisfaction 
with (statements of) church representatives, scandals and critical media coverage (Feige, 
1976: 203), arguments with the pastor or congregation members (Hoof, 1999: 205), 
discussions with persons who have already disaffiliated (Feige, 1976: 206) or relocation 
(Feige, 1976: 236). 
Studies differ in the importance that they ascribe to church taxes in the membership decision. 
Some find that the church tax is not seen as a burden or considered too high by the majority of 
church members (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1992: 21; Huber, Friedrich and 
Steinacker, 2006: 460). In fact, most people have only limited knowledge about the amount of 
church tax they pay and how the tax is calculated (Köcher, 1993: 17-20; Huber, Friedrich and 
Steinacker, 2006: 460; Bassler, 2008: 315-319). Surveys among former church members find 
that these people name more than one motive for leaving the church, church taxes are rarely 
cited as a sole motive (Feige, 1976: 158; Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1993: 25). 
Disapproval of the church tax might be easier to express than criticism of the church itself, 
therefore it is a popular and easy argument (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1992: 12; 
Hoof, 1999: 206-207). Some researchers conclude that church taxes are merely a catalyst, but 
not the true motive for disaffiliation (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1992: 17-20; Hoof, 
1999: 202; Ihli, 2011: 194). 
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Still, church taxes rank high in the list of reasons to opt out (Müller-Weißner and Volz, 1991: 
22; Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1993: 21-22; Engelhardt, von Loewenich and 
Steinacker, 1997: 326-327; Pittkowski, 2006: 94-95) and a factor analysis of reasons for 
disaffiliation reveals that church taxes are an independent factor that is uncorrelated with all 
other motives for disaffiliation (Engelhardt, von Loewenich and Steinacker, 1997: 326-330; 
Pickel, 2011: 54-55).
63
 Among those who consider disaffiliating the perception of paying too 
much is stronger than among loyal members and the share of individuals who do not pay any 
church taxes is lower (Hanselmann, Hild and Lohse, 1987: 112; Institut für Demoskopie 
Allensbach, 1992: 21). 
However, even loyal members can be critical of church contributions. Only 39 % of 
Protestants in West Germany believe that it is self-evident that Christians should pay church 
taxes, although only 28 % favor the abolition of church taxes (Huber, Friedrich and 
Steinacker, 2006: 461).
64
 The hypothesis that church taxes do play an important role in church 
membership decisions is also supported by the observations that the highest numbers of 
church disaffiliations in Germany were recorded in years when additional (secular) taxes were 
introduced and that both the Catholic and Evangelical Church in Germany faced almost 
identical waves of membership losses (Birkelbach, 1999: 137; Pollack, 2001: 1053-1054). 
Froese and Pfaff (2005: 413) ascribe the persistent lack of interest in religion in East Germany 
after reunification (which is in contrast to the situation in other former communist countries) 
to the introduction of church taxes in East Germany where church contributions had been 
voluntary since the 1950s. Dubach (1993: 141-142) finds that in Swiss cantons where 
churches collect taxes the propensity to disaffiliate is much higher than in those cantons 
where churches do not raise taxes. He argues that people will seriously consider disaffiliating 
only when being a member entails obligations such as paying church taxes. Donzé (1998: 
105) argues in the same direction as Dubach (1993) when he suggests that without church 
taxes, individuals would leave the church internally, but the tax necessitates the formal act. 
Feige (1976: 236) and Müller-Weißner and Volz (1991: 22) conclude from monthly 
differences in membership cancellations that membership decisions are often taken when 
people are forced to think about taxes, e. g. when they fill in their tax returns. Similarly, 
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 A survey among people who have left the Evangelical Church in Germany (Pittkowski, 2006) finds that in 
West Germany the reason for leaving which most respondents agree to is the perception that people can be 
Christians without being church members. Saving church taxes gets an almost equally high level of support as a 
reason for disaffiliation, followed by statements such as “I find the church untrustworthy” and “I don’t care 
about the church” (Pittkowski, 2006: 94-95 [my own translation]). Many respondents also state that they are not 
religious anymore and have a different value system.  
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 This survey also reveals that support for the church tax system is higher among Protestants in East Germany. 
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Lyytikäinen and Santavirta (2013) find that in Finland people usually drop out of the church 
at the end of the year and explain this finding with the fact that church taxes have to be paid 
for the whole calendar year. Moreover, Birkelbach (1999: 146, 150) finds that church 
membership cancellations peak when individuals start their first paid job and disaffiliation 
rates are higher in years when people are employed than when they are not working. 
The first quantitative research about the effect of church taxes on church membership that I 
am aware of was conducted by Lyytikäinen and Santavirta (2013) on a large panel of Finnish 
tax return data. The authors estimate the influence of the previous year’s church tax and 
income as well as household characteristics on the probability of church membership, using a 
linear probability model. They find a significant negative, but moderate, effect of church taxes 
on the probability of church membership. A one standard deviation increase in church taxes 
reduces the probability of being a church member in the following year by roughly one 
percent. Analysis by household type reveals that singles show the strongest reaction to 
changes in the church tax. Furthermore, the authors find a negative effect of household 
income on membership. 
Borgloh (2012) tests empirically whether individuals’ decisions on church disaffiliation 
depend on the costs of church membership, using a large sample of the German Taxpayer 
Panel, which is also used in this chapter. She starts from the assumptions that church taxes are 
perfect substitutes for other types of voluntary giving. If this assumption is correct, 
individuals who are church members, but do not make any additional donations, do so 
because the church taxes they have to pay equal or exceed the amount they are willing to give 
voluntarily. In other words, the costs of membership tend to be too high. Consequently, these 
members should be more likely to disaffiliate when their church tax liability increases. 
Borgloh’s results confirm the hypothesis: among those individuals whose church tax liability 
has increased, those who do not donate are more likely to disaffiliate. Her research indicates 
that there are indeed some individuals who leave the church because the price of membership 
exceeds the amount they are willing to pay voluntarily. However, she does not directly 
measure the effect of the price of membership on the probability of disaffiliation. In fact, the 
price of membership is not included in her estimation equation. She also restricts the sample 
to individuals who experience an increase in the amount of church tax they have to pay, which 
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prevents her from testing whether increases and decreases in the price of membership have 
symmetric effects on the decision to leave the church.
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The discussion so far suggests that church disaffiliation decisions can be characterized as a 
cost-benefit analysis. When the benefits are large from the point of view of church members, 
the costs are less important (Köcher, 1993: 22), but when the social pressure to be a member 
decreases and competing institutions such as the welfare state or the leisure sector (Stolz, 
2010: 257) provide public goods or can be used for current satisfaction, costs become a 
decisive issue and can be the catalyst for a church disaffiliation. Various empirical 
observations support this view. 
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 Furthermore, my research differs from Borgloh’s in some methodological aspects. First, she looks at 
individually and jointly assessed taxpayers while I restrict my research to individually assessed taxpayers (see 
Section 4.5.2). Second, her independent variables are defined as one year lagged values or as changes between 
the first and the second lag of a variable. In my research, changes in independent variables are calculated over a 
longer time period. 
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4.4 Model and hypotheses 
4.4.1  A model of church membership as a binary choice 
In this section I develop a theoretical model that formalizes the church membership decision 
in a cost-benefit framework, with church taxes as the main type of costs. I adopt the model to 
the German institutional environment and to the specific research questions of this chapter. In 
particular, I model a discrete decision about (formal) church membership and I include the 
German church tax regulations in detail. My theoretical approach to modeling discrete 
consumption choices is “conditional optimization”, i.e. individuals maximize their utility 
given each of the discrete alternatives and then decide for the alternative with the highest 
utility level. This approach was developed by Pollak (1969, 1971) and is thoroughly discussed 
in Maier and Weiss (1990). In fact, the design of the model is based on Maier and Weiss 
(1990).
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The following model also refines the model specified in Chapter 3, but with some significant 
differences. The model in Chapter 3 had various objectives: it was designed to illustrate the 
influence of the church financing system on both the church membership decision and on 
voluntary contributions. At the same time, it was built to enable the comparison of different 
church financing systems. Because of the variety of aims, some simplifications had to be 
made. 
In this chapter I concentrate only on the German church financing system. The sole aim of the 
model is to illustrate the church membership decision. Therefore I completely neglect 
voluntary giving. In the model that follows, individuals only spend money on secular 
consumption and church membership. In this respect, I assume that individuals have a purely 
private benefit from being a church member,      . The individual does not care about how 
the church contribution is used. In addition, I model the German church tax system in more 
detail. In the last chapter I assumed that the church tax has a fixed tax rate which is applied to 
income. In the present model, I account for the fact that the amount of church tax is 
determined by the church tax rate, but also by the income tax scale. Furthermore, I add 
transaction costs of changing church membership status to the model because they can have a 
large effect on the church membership decision. Another difference between the two models 
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 An application of the “conditional optimization” approach is Kotchen and Moore (2007). Here individuals 
choose between contributing a fixed amount of money to a public good or making no contribution at all.  
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is that I no longer assume a specific utility function, such as the Cobb-Douglas function in the 
model in Chapter 3. 
An individual is assumed to maximize utility over a bundle of secular goods, denoted  , and 
church membership, denoted   . Secular goods   can be consumed in continuous quantities, 
whereas    is discrete with         . If     , the individual is a church member; if 
    , the individual decides not to consume the good “church membership”. Utility also 
depends on characteristics of the individual, such as age, gender, civil status, region of 
residence, etc., which I summarize in the vector  . 
The utility function can be summarized as 
             (4.1) 
I assume that the utility function is additively separable, 
                           
                                                  
                                   
  (4.2) 
and that church membership yields an individual-specific fixed (gross) utility  
     ,          .
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 Utility   is increasing in secular consumption   at decreasing 
rates: 
      
  
   
       
   
    Additively separable utility functions have also been used in 
previous models in the economics of religion, such as Durkin and Greeley (1991) and Pyne 
(2010). In my model, as in many previous models, benefits of membership are bought at the 
cost of reduced secular consumption. In many contributions in the economics of religion gross 
benefits of church membership or religiosity are dependent on how much the individual pays. 
However, I decided to model them as fixed, not only because this simplifies the model, but 
also because it represents the actual situation in Germany where the major religious 
communities are anxious not to give privileges to high-income church tax payers. 
The budget constraint is 
 
          
 
 
     
 
                          
 
 
     
 
                
  
(4.3) 
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 In the context of the model,       denotes only those benefits which are exclusively granted to church 
members. The (possible) creation of public goods which can be enjoyed by both church members and non-
members is not part of the model. 
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where   denotes exogenously given income,    is the average income tax rate,    is the price 
of the bundle of secular consumption goods,    is the price of church membership, and      
is the original church membership status, which indicates whether someone is a church 
member when he or she takes the church membership decision,           , where      
  identifies a church member. If the individual decides to change his or her church 
membership status,        , he or she has to pay transaction costs     . Transaction costs 
for leaving the church include the effort to find out where and how to disaffiliate, the time to 
go there and declare disaffiliation and usually a fee that has to be paid. Joining the church 
requires going to a church authority in person, although it is free of charge. Transaction costs 
depend on individual characteristics   since they differ between Länder in Germany and 
sometimes fees are reduced for spouses who disaffiliate together as compared to unmarried 
individuals. 
Formalizing the German church tax system, the price of church membership is largely 
determined by the church tax,
68
 which in turn depends on income, therefore 
       
           (4.4) 
where      describes the church tax scale and    is the church tax rate (which is currently 
8 % or 9 % in Germany, depending on the Land) that the church imposes on the income tax.
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The church tax scale is determined both by church tax laws that are made by the religious 
communities themselves as well as state legislation on the personal income tax. The reason is 
that the tax base of the church tax is not income itself, but the income tax.
70
 Taking the 
income tax as the tax base has several implications: first, the church tax is progressive with 
respect to income – as far as the income tax is progressive, too. Second, changes in the 
income tax scale heavily affect the amount of church tax that needs to be paid and third, all 
changes in the definition of taxable income also influence the amount of church taxes. All 
aspects introduce additional sources of variation in the amount of church tax although they are 
solely determined by state legislation. Even if both income and church tax rates remain 
constant, a change in the state income tax system will affect the tax amount.
71
 In order to 
distinguish the church and state influence on the church tax scale, I write 
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 How the price of church membership is defined in my empirical estimations is discussed in Section 4.5.4. 
69
 I abstract from both minimum church taxes and maximum church tax rates. 
70
 In this respect the German system is similar to the tax assignment system in Italy (“otto per mille”), but differs 
from church taxes in Finland, where the tax base is taxable income. 
71
 In principle, churches have the possibility to adjust tax rates to changes in the income tax system. In practice, 
however, they rarely take advantage of this possibility. In the period 2001 to 2006 income tax laws have been 
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                           (4.5) 
Since the church tax rate is independent from characteristics of the individual such as his or 
her taxable income, I assume 
  
   
   and 
   
     
   . Further,  
       is the average income 
tax rate. It is determined by the income tax legislation, in particular the income tax function 
established in § 32a of the German income tax law and the definition of taxable income 
established in the income tax law.
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 The income tax an individual has to pay depends in part 
on his or her personal characteristics  , e.g. on the age of the taxpayer, the type of income he 
or she earns and whether he or she has children. It is safe to assume that an increase in income 
leads to an increase in taxable income. The income tax function itself is progressive in 
income, therefore 
   
  
  . 
Consumers maximize their net utility given each discrete level of the good “church 
membership”,   , and decide for the alternative which yields the highest net utility. Thus, 
one can rewrite the budget constraint (4.3) such that there is a separate constraint for each 
discrete value of   , 
 
      
                                                                       
                                              
  (4.6) 
where            is the income after income tax and is defined as 
                          (4.7) 
and       and       denote the transaction costs of leaving and joining the church, 
respectively. Transaction costs are only incurred when individuals change their church 
membership status, i.e. when      and    do not coincide. Without loss of generality, I set    
to one. 
I now derive the conditional indirect demand function for the bundle   as 
                                                                                                                                                        
changed significantly (both concerning the definition of taxable income and the tax function), while church tax 
rates remained constant. 
72
 My definition of income   is broader than the definition of taxable income in the German income tax law. In 
my model differences between income and taxable income (e.g. if some parts of income are not taxable) are 
reflected in the average income tax rate   . 
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(4.8) 
Inserting the conditional indirect demand function and the corresponding discrete values of 
   into the utility function yields the conditional indirect utility function 
      
                       
  
                                                                                                      
             
                                                 
  
(4.9) 
The individual now chooses the level of    which maximizes his or her indirect utility 
function       
    . The individual decides against church membership if              
is large enough in comparison to               73 to compensate for the loss of the 
gross benefit of membership      , i.e. if the individual values the greater secular 
consumption opportunities as a non-member higher than the gross benefits from church 
membership. This decision depends on personal characteristics, the utility from church 
membership, the church tax, transaction costs and the income   of the individual. The higher 
the utility of church membership, the less likely it is that individuals are non-members. If 
membership benefits are negative, i.e. when there is a disutility from membership, and 
transaction costs are moderate, individuals will not remain church members. These model 
results are in line with previous models such as Papyrakis and Selvaretnam (2011: 449) and 
with my own model from Chapter 3. Transaction costs always reduce consumption 
opportunities for the individual. Since they are only relevant when the individual changes his 
or her church membership status, they lead individuals to remain in their current church 
membership status. In other words, they increase the gap between benefits and costs of 
membership that is necessary to induce individuals to change their membership status. 
Assuming that personal characteristics and benefits of membership remain constant, I derive 
comparative static results for changes in the church tax rate and in income. I start by looking 
at the effects of an exogenous change in the church tax rate   .74 This variable is determined 
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 In order to ease the discussion, I write    instead of            and    instead of               . 
However, one should keep in mind that transaction costs are only incurred when the church membership status 
changes. 
74
 Churches also have (limited) influence on the definition of the taxable income. The most relevant difference 
between the state’s and the church’s definition of taxable income is the deduction of an allowance for each 
dependent child. In this model I make the simplifying assumption that taxable incomes for the calculation of the 
church tax and the income tax are the same. 
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by church bodies and is mostly independent from state intervention. Differentiating 
      
     with respect to the church tax rate    yields 
         
                       
  
                                                                                                                                                           
       
                                           
               
  
(4.10) 
where subscripts relating to   and   denote the first derivatives. The first derivative of the 
utility function with respect to    is negative. While the utility level of non-members     
   remains constant, the indirect utility of church members        decreases. Therefore an 
increase in the church tax rate reduces the probability that an individual is a church member 
and increases the probability of disaffiliation. 
As I discussed earlier, a change in church taxes can also be caused by a change in the income 
tax scale or the definition of taxable income, which are summarized in the average income tax 
rate        . An exogenous increase in the tax scale or the introduction of a more extensive 
definition of taxable income cause an increase in        . The first derivative of 
      
     with respect to    is 
         
                       
 
 
 
 
 
        
                                                                                    
       
                                                                        
                                                                                                                        
  
(4.11) 
A change in the income tax rate affects church members and non-members differently. While 
non-members only face a higher income tax and the reduced consumption opportunities, 
church members additionally have to pay higher church taxes. On top of that, ceteris paribus 
the after-tax income of church members is always lower than that of non-members (due to the 
church tax payment), which means that under decreasing marginal utility of income a 
decrease in income has a larger negative effect on the utility of church members than on the 
utility of non-members. In sum, an increase in the income tax rate reduces the utility of 
church members more than the utility of non-members. 
Next, I focus on the effect of an income change. Differentiating       
     with respect to 
  yields 
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(4.12) 
An increase in income always implies a higher level of utility for the individual because both 
expressions are greater than zero. However, if the derivative for      is larger than the 
derivative for     , a rise in income will increase the disutility from paying church taxes 
and could eventually induce the individual to become a non-member. 
In a progressive income tax system, a small   usally implies that              and 
    
              
   
  
            are also small. The individual faces low costs of 
membership, so it is beneficial to be a church member when        . If   is significantly 
larger than zero, the individual faces two simultaneous effects, which I will call the “price 
effect” and the “income effect”. I first examine the income effect. In order to see this effect 
more clearly, I assume for a moment that the amount of church tax   is fixed at   and does 
not depend on income.
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 The first derivative of the indirect utility function will then reduce to 
        
                 
 
 
 
 
 
      
                 
   
  
                                   
      
                    
   
  
                       
  
(4.13) 
Given that the marginal utility of income is decreasing, the derivative when      is smaller 
than when     . The disutility from paying church taxes decreases with income and 
church membership becomes more likely as income rises. In simple terms, it “hurts less” to 
pay a given amount of church tax   when income is high compared to when it is low. 
However, the “price effect” indicates that church taxes are not constant, but grow with 
income. Suppressing the “income effect” (   is assumed to be constant) and concentrating 
only on the “price effect” yields 
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 Transaction costs are disregarded in order to simplify the discussion. 
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(4.14) 
The higher someone’s income is, the more expensive it is to be a church member. The price 
effect increases the disutility from paying church taxes and counteracts the income effect. 
This is true for regressive, linear and progressive tax systems, although the price effect is 
strongest in progressive systems.  
Since price effect and income effect operate simultaneously one cannot analytically establish 
which prevails: the decrease in the marginal utility of income or the increase in costs of 
church membership. This question can only be determined empirically because it depends on 
the shapes of the tax scale and the individual’s utility function. 
The model clearly shows that it is necessary to control for both income and the amount of 
church tax when church membership decisions are examined. While an increase in church 
taxes – whether caused by changes in the tax rate or in income – always decreases the utility 
level of church members, an increase in income (not taking into account its effect on church 
taxes) tends to reduce the burden of paying for church membership. 
Empirical research from the US finds that individuals with high income are among the most 
active contributors to religious communities (Donahue, 1994: 154; Brewer, Jozefowicz and 
Stonebraker, 2006: 393), which points towards the existence of the “income effect”. At the 
same time, studies also find that the income elasticity of religious giving lies below one (see, 
for example, Donahue, 1994: 155; Hoge and Yang, 1994: 130-131; Zaleski, Zech and Hoge, 
1994: 202-203; Lunn, Klay and Douglass, 2001; List, 2011: 165; see also the literature review 
in Hoge, 1994: 107). This could indicate that in the German church tax system – where 
church taxes grow progressively with income – an increase in income might result in a higher 
probability of disaffiliation.  Thus: 
H 1: An increase in church tax payments increases the probability that the person 
disaffiliates when the increase is caused by a change in the church tax rate or the state 
income tax. An increase in church tax payments that is caused by a change in income will 
also raise the probability of disaffiliation when income is controlled for. 
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H 2: An increase in income decreases the probability that the person disaffiliates when 
the price of church membership is controlled for. 
The results of the model differ in some respects from the results in Chapter 3. Both models 
agree that an increase in the church tax burden will ceteris paribus induce individuals to 
disaffiliate from the church. In Chapter 3 I identified an increase in the church tax rate as a 
cause of church disaffiliation. The present model makes it clear that there are different 
mechanisms behind increases in the church tax burden. First, the church tax rate itself, i.e. the 
additional tax to the income tax, can be changed. Second, the income tax rate can be changed 
while taxable income is constant and third, the definition of taxable income can be changed 
while income itself is constant. 
In addition to the church tax burden, the model in Chapter 3 predicts that an increase in 
income will increase the probability of disaffiliation. The mechanism there was that a higher 
income leads to a higher church tax liability. Because of the particular form of the utility 
function in the model in Chapter 3, this leads to a reduction in utility. However, the present 
model sheds some doubts on this simple conclusion. I show that there are two effects working 
simultaneously. On the one hand, an increase in income results in higher church taxes, which 
reduces utility. On the other hand, when income increases, the marginal utility of income 
decreases. In other words, paying an additional euro of church tax is less “painful” for a richer 
person than for a poorer one. Which of the two effects prevails depends on the actual form of 
the utility function of the individual, which does not necessarily resemble a Cobb-Douglas 
function. 
The present model also highlights the fact that personal characteristics   heavily influence the 
church membership decision. They have an effect on the benefits of church membership 
     , the form of the utility function, the state income tax scale and the transaction costs of 
leaving and joining the church. 
4.4.2 Demographic, socio-economic and regional variables influencing church 
membership 
In this section I define individual characteristics   as demographic, socio-economic and 
regional variables and review the literature relating these variables to religiosity and church 
membership. 
144 
4.4.2.1 Demographic variables 
One of the most important influences on processes of disaffiliation is age. There is unanimity 
in the literature that more young than old people disaffiliate. One possible explanation is that 
those individuals who have a low membership benefit       drop out at a young age because 
this minimizes the costs and maximizes utility over the lifetime. Thus, the average 
membership benefits of the remaining members gradually increase and the average 
probability of disaffiliation decreases. Apart from this selection process, researchers discuss 
age and cohort effects. Iannaccone (1998: 1481) argues that individuals can accumulate 
“religious human capital” over the life-cycle and therefore become more efficient in 
producing religious goods as they age. A similar argument is brought up by Sandomirsky and 
Wilson (1990: 1218-1219), who state that once individuals have established their religious 
preferences, they are unlikely to change them again. In the terms of my model, this implies 
that the membership benefits of each member increase with age. However, most researchers 
attribute differences in religiosity between young and elderly individuals to cohort, rather than 
age effects (Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers, 2001: 602; Tilley, 2003: 273-274; Crockett and 
Voas, 2006: 569-572; Pollack, 2008: 175; Wolf, 2008: 115). Stolz (2010: 267) argues that in 
recent times individuals have gained more secular alternatives to religious goods. In 
particular, young individuals are used to these secular alternatives. In the context of my 
economic model, younger individuals today have on average a lower utility       from 
church membership than the cohorts before them. 
Empirical studies support these theoretical arguments. Brañas-Garza and Neuman (2004: 15) 
find that church attendance in Spain increases with age, while Schloz (2006: 56-57) reports 
that church commitment among Protestants in Germany steadily increases with age. Dubach 
(1993: 141-142) finds that in Switzerland the percentage of persons who have considered 
disaffiliating from the church steadily decreases with age. In particular, there is a sharp drop 
between the age groups 26 to 35 and 36 to 45. Studies on leaving the religious communitiy in 
Germany (Feige, 1976: 25-30; Eicken, 2006: 180; Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin, 2012: 88-89), 
Austria (Goujon et al., 2007: 255) and the Netherlands (Need and De Graaf, 1996: 96) find 
hump-shaped age profiles of church disaffiliation, which peak around age 19-20 in the 
Netherlands and around age 30 in Germany and Austria.
76
 An exception is Borgloh (2012: 55) 
who finds a steady decline in the probability of disaffiliation with age. Nevertheless, I expect 
to find a hump-shaped profile, therefore my hypothesis is: 
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 The differences between these age spans might be explained by the fact that disaffiliation in the Netherlands 
does not require an official legal act (i.e. cause transaction costs), whereas it does in Germany and Austria.  
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H 3: The age profile of disaffiliations is hump-shaped and peaks around age 30. 
Individuals with children are found to be less likely to leave their religion (Sherkat and 
Wilson, 1995: 1013). Men and women generally feel more committed to the church when 
they are parents (Engelhardt, von Loewenich and Steinacker, 1997: 221-222). Studies for the 
US and Britain show that having children usually has a small positive effect on church 
attendance, at least for women (De Vaus, 1982: 147-148; Sawkins, Seaman and Williams, 
1997: 131; Tilley, 2003: 276). Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy and Waite (1995: 95-96) show that 
having children has a positive effect on the probability of church membership in the US. The 
effect is largest when children are of primary school age. 
H 4: Having children or becoming a parent decreases the probability of disaffiliation. 
Researchers often find that women are less likely to leave their religious communities than 
men (Sherkat and Wilson, 1995: 1013; Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers, 2001: 600-601). Gender 
differences in religiosity might be due to a stricter religious upbringing of girls, their higher 
willingness to conform to social norms or differences in tastes between genders. De Vaus and 
McAllister (1987: 472-473) also put forward the structural location theory as an explanation. 
First, women are usually more involved in child-rearing then men. If they want their children 
to receive religious education, they will automatically get in touch with religious 
organizations (see also Dubach, 1998: 37). Second, females show a lower labor force 
participation rate than males. Because labor participation provides “alternative sources of 
identity, interests, values, legitimations, and commitments” and leaves people with “less time 
to get involved in the church” (De Vaus and McAllister, 1987: 473), working might equally 
reduce religiousness for both genders. Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975: 35) put forward a similar 
argument: females often have lower wages than males, which means their opportunity costs of 
time spent on religious activities are lower. If couples or families make joint decisions about 
time use, it is rational for the husband to engage in the labor market and for the wife to 
produce religious commodities. Lukatis (1991: 126-129) finds that most of the differences in 
church commitment between Protestant men and women in Germany can be explained by 
labor force participation. While housewives, part-time employed and retired women are the 
least likely to give up their membership, there are hardly any differences in the propensity to 
disaffiliate between full-time employed men and women. Highly educated women are also 
found to have a higher propensity to leave the church than women with lower educational 
levels; they are even more prone to disaffiliate than their male counterparts (Engelhardt, von 
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Loewenich and Steinacker, 1997: 216-217; Dubach, 1998: 37-38; Brañas-Garza, García-
Muñoz and Neuman, 2007: 22). 
H 5: There are no significant differences in the probability of leaving the church between 
men and women who do not have children. 
H 6: Having children or becoming a parent has a stronger negative effect on the 
probability of disaffiliation of women than men. 
4.4.2.2 Socio-economic variables 
Sherkat and Wilson (1995: 1004) find that adherents of stricter denominations are less likely 
to disaffiliate from the church. In the German context, the Catholic Church is stricter than the 
Protestant Church with respect to membership and participation rules. Therefore the perceived 
costs of leaving the Catholic Church are higher (Birkelbach, 1999: 139). This is clearly 
reflected in disaffiliation rates of Catholics and Protestants in Germany, which have been 
running parallel, but at a significantly higher level for Protestants (Pollack, 2001: 1053-1054). 
Catholics are often found to hold stronger beliefs and attend church more regularly than 
Protestants (Campiche, 1993: 80-81; Cameron, 1999: 446; Köcher, 2009: 802, 812). They 
also manifest a lower propensity to question their church membership (Institut für 
Demoskopie Allensbach, 1992: 5-7; Dubach, 1993: 139-140). This might be due to the 
different character of these denominations: Catholicism promotes a more church-related form 
of religiousness, while Protestantism stresses individual piety (Dubach, 1998: 29). I therefore 
pose the following hypothesis: 
H 7: Catholics are less likely to leave the church than Protestants. 
Some research suggests that financial considerations such as payment of church taxes are less 
important in the church membership decisions of Catholics than of Protestants (Institut für 
Demoskopie Allensbach, 1992: 24-25; Birkelbach, 1999: 149-150). I therefore test the 
hypothesis:  
H 8: The effect of church taxes on disaffiliation is stronger for Protestants than for 
Catholics. 
A few studies also point towards noticeable differences in the church commitment, church 
membership rates, and propensity to disaffiliate of individuals with different professions (for 
Germany, see Feige, 1976: 74-79; Hanselmann, Hild and Lohse, 1987: 144-145; for research 
147 
on Switzerland, see Campiche, 1993: 74, 80; Dubach, 1998: 48-51). Unfortunately, I cannot 
observe the individual’s profession. However, I try to get a rough estimation by including the 
individual’s main source of income derived from the income tax statement. I distinguish (i) 
income from agriculture and forestry, (ii) income from business activity (including income 
from unincorporated business enterprise and from self-employed activities), (iii) wage 
income, (iv) capital income and (v) other income sources. Earlier research has shown that 
individuals working in high management positions and the self-employed have a comparably 
low membership rate and a high propensity to disaffiliate (Hanselmann, Hild and Lohse, 
1987: 144; Dubach, 1998: 49-51), while people working in agriculture show particularly high 
church membership rates and church commitment and wage earners take an intermediate 
position (Campiche, 1993: 74, 80; Dubach, 1998: 48-49). Possible explanations for the 
connection between profession and church membership are differences in the educational 
level that professions require and differences in the social environment of individuals with 
different professions (Dubach, 1998: 48-49). 
H 9: Individuals receiving income mainly from agriculture have a below average 
probability of disaffiliation, while individuals receiving income from business activity 
have an above average probability of disaffiliation. 
4.4.2.3 Regional variables 
Religiousness differs between regions, especially in Germany. I have already mentioned that 
East Germany is far more unchurched than West Germany. In East Germany in 2009 about 
22 % of the population belonged to one of the two major churches, while the share of church 
members was still around 75 % in West Germany (Köcher, 2009: 814). In West Germany, the 
decision against church membership is perceived as an intentional divergence from the 
tradition whereas it means being in the mainstream in the former GDR (Pittkowski, 2006: 91). 
Although Christians constitute a minority in East Germany, church commitment among the 
remaining church members is not particularly high. In fact, Pollack (2000: 20-24) argues, 
based on data for 1991, that both religious participation and belief are not higher in East 
Germany than in West Germany. Data on church disaffiliation rates in East and West 
Germany show that they have leveled off at rather similar values since the late 1990s. 
However, more recent data for members of the Protestant church show that there are more 
individuals with high and very high church commitment in East Germany than in West 
Germany, although the distribution of commitment in both parts of the country equals a 
normal distribution. Only those individuals who have experienced being a minority in the 
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GDR show an above-average church commitment. (Schloz, 2006: 54-55) Some research 
suggests that among Protestants the acceptance of the church tax in general and of the 
personal tax amount is higher in East Germany than in West Germany (Huber, Friedrich and 
Steinacker, 2006: 460-461). 
Although the existing research is not completely consistent, I pose the following hypotheses: 
H 10: Church membership decisions do not differ significantly between East and West 
Germany. 
H 11: The effect of church taxes on disaffiliation is slightly smaller in East Germany. 
Surveys also suggest that gender differences with respect to church attendance and church 
commitment are small or non-existent in East Germany (Eiben, 1992: 97-98; Engelhardt, von 
Loewenich and Steinacker, 1997: 301-304). However, Kecskes (2000: 98) finds that gender 
does play a significant role in the church membership decision in East Germany. Given the 
limited and contradictory evidence for the effect of gender on the decision to leave the church, 
I will not pose a hypothesis here. 
Another aspect of the regional perspective is differences between rural and urban areas. 
Steckhan (1991: 231-235) shows that church members in large cities are significantly less 
committed to the church, but highlight the role of the church as a provider of help for the 
poor, old and sick, whereas people living in rural areas quote traditional and spiritual reasons 
for church membership more often. Pickel (2011: 59-60) uses recent data from Germany to 
show that in large cities there are significantly more people without church membership than 
in rural areas and small cities – the pattern is found both in East and West Germany. For 
Switzerland, Dubach (1998: 61-63) reports that there are large differences in church 
membership between urban and rural areas and that these differences cannot be fully 
explained by the structure of the population, such as average education or type of 
employment. He concludes that living in a city has an independent effect on the individual 
relation to religious communities. Since opportunities for secular leisure consumption are 
limited in rural areas (Steckhan, 1991: 245-246), people living there can be expected to spend 
more time with religious activities. The social pressure motive of church membership might 
also be more important in rural areas since people are better informed about the private 
matters of their neighbors (Pickel, 2011: 60). In the terms of my model, I expect that the 
benefits of church membership are higher in rural areas and are therefore more likely to 
outweigh the costs. 
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H 12: Individuals living in large cities are more likely to leave the church than persons in 
rural areas.  
A regional aspect that has so far been neglected in the German discussion is the importance of 
mobility, which I define as changing the place of residence. Stark and Finke (2000: 250-251) 
note that in areas in the US where mobility is high, it is difficult for voluntary organizations 
such as churches to maintain their membership. Richter and Francis (1998: 67-70) observe a 
similar phenomenon in the United Kingdom. They argue that changing places means looking 
for a new church or congregation, getting to know other congregation members and 
establishing ties. This is resource and time-consuming, especially if individuals move several 
times. A study for Switzerland (Dubach, 1998: 54-56) reveals that people who moved within 
the last five years are less likely to be church members and the percentage of non-members is 
higher among individuals moving in from abroad or from another canton than for people 
moving within the same canton. Feige (1976: 198-199) discusses the possibility that church 
disaffiliation might coincide with mobility. Since church disaffiliation is a formal act in 
Germany, the hurdle to take action could be lower for people who move because they need to 
contact the local administration anyway. Feige neither finds evidence for nor against the 
hypothesis that mobility increases the propensity to opt out of church. Lois (2011b: 99) 
investigates how events during the life cycle affect participation in church services in 
Germany. He finds that moving from East to West Germany tends to increase participation, 
while moving from West to East has no effect. However, it should be noted that changes in 
participation need not coincide with changes in the propensity to disaffiliate. Despite the 
moderate importance that German research assigns to regional mobility, I pose the following 
hypothesis: 
H 13: Individuals who are mobile have a significantly higher disaffiliation rate than 
individuals who do not move. 
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4.5 Data 
4.5.1 The Taxpayer Panel 
The research questions will be answered empirically, using the Taxpayer Panel, a 5 % 
stratified random sample of all individual tax returns in Germany for the years 2001 to 2006 
provided by the German Federal Statistical Office. The data set includes all information stated 
in the income tax returns, such as personal details, income from different sources (wage 
income, income from business activity and capital income), as well as tax exemptions. For the 
purpose of this chapter, the most important variables are denomination (Roman Catholic, 
Protestant, no denomination, other) as registered by government authorities, church taxes 
paid, gender, civil status, age, number of children, income, taxable income, sources of income 
and federal state of residence. The data set also allows calculating hypothetical church tax 
payments for people who are not church members. 
The data set contains information on about 930,000 taxpayers, of which 23.5 % are single 
males, 18.5 % are single females and 58 % are married couples. Roughly 14.8 % of the 
taxpayers live in East Germany. The sample is representative of high income earners but 
excludes most of the individuals who live on state transfers as well as the majority of retirees 
and a significant proportion of individuals and households that have only wage earnings 
(Bach, Corneo and Steiner, 2009: 308) because the latter often do not file an income tax 
return. 
There are some further drawbacks to this data set. First, it does not include some potentially 
important variables such as the strength of Christian belief, education, religious upbringing, 
rurality of place of residence or citizenship. Second, it only permits the study of Christian 
denominations, because data on other denominational memberships (e.g. Muslim) are not 
recorded. However, it is likely the most accurate and comprehensive account of formal church 
membership and church tax payments available for Germany. 
The Taxpayer Panel data set is a stratified sample of individuals, which means that the 
population is divided into groups, so-called strata, and from each group individuals are 
randomly drawn. In contrast, in a simple random sample the whole population would be one 
stratum from which the sample is drawn. The stratification of the data and the sampling 
weights of each stratum are provided by the Federal Statistical Office. Strata are generated by 
splitting the data set according to federal state (“Bundesland”), tax assessment scheme (single 
or joint assessment), main source of income (income from business or agriculture and 
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forestry; wage income; other types of income), average overall income (seven classes) and 
variation of average overall income. Some strata are collapsed for reasons of data security or 
because the number of observations in the strata is too low. Altogether, there are 2441 strata. 
From each stratum, a random sample is drawn with sampling fractions reaching between 2 % 
and 85 %. (Destatis, 2010) 
4.5.2 The sample 
The regression is not run on the complete sample. There are two large restrictions. First, I 
only use data for unmarried individuals and second, I only look at individuals who were 
church members at the beginning of the period. The first restriction is implemented by 
including only individuals who choose “residual tax assessment” (“übrige Veranlagung”, 
where variable ef18
77
 takes on the value “3”) in both 2001 and 2005. This type of assessment 
is chosen when individuals are not married; it also excludes widows and widowers whose 
spouses died in the previous year. Married individuals are excluded because the calculation of 
church taxes depends on the income and church membership status of both spouses. In 
addition, they have a different choice set than single individuals because one would expect 
that the decision about church membership is, at least to some extent, taken jointly. Church 
disaffiliation of one partner, while the other stays a member, is a feasible and – according to 
anecdotal evidence – attractive choice possibility. I also exclude married individuals who 
choose “separate assessment”. In this case, church taxes are calculated as if the individual was 
single, however, one would still expect that church membership decisions are also influenced 
by the spouse. For the same reason, I exclude individuals who marry in the respective year 
and choose a special form of the single assessment scheme (“besondere Veranlagung im Jahr 
der Eheschließung”). Furthermore, recently widowed individuals are excluded because the 
joint taxation scheme applies to them, which would cause a large effort in calculating their 
church taxes, and in addition their church membership decision might be strongly influenced 
by the recent death of the spouse rather than the variables I control for. However, both 
recently widowed individuals and married individuals who choose individual assessment or 
special assessment make up only a small part of the data set such that the sample is still large. 
The second restriction of the data set – the individual needs to be a church member in 2001 – 
is due to the research question I ask. I am interested in church disaffiliations only, therefore 
my sample consists of individuals who are church members in the first year of observation 
and I look at their decisions over time. 
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 Variable names refer to the variables included in the Taxpayer Panel. 
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Finally, I exclude all taxpayers for which any of the relevant dependent or independent 
variables are missing. This also applies to all taxpayers whose average yearly overall income 
(“Gesamtbetrag der Einkünfte”) for the period 2001-2006 was above 150,000 euro because 
for them the information on the federal state of residence is missing due to data security 
issues. 
Additionally, I check the data for consistency over the years and correct or delete some 
observations. First, in some cases individuals are recorded as changing their gender several 
times during the six year period. In all of these cases, the gender that is stated in the data for 
the year 2005 is assigned to all observations for the respective individual. Second, some 
individuals are recorded as both affiliating and disaffiliating from the church during the six 
years under investigation. This is possible, but rather unlikely. The problem frequently occurs 
for taxpayers living in the city state of Hamburg where – according to information from the 
Federal Statistical Office – there were problems with recording the church membership of 
individuals, which resulted in implausibly high numbers of church affiliations and 
disaffiliations. In order to avoid biased results due to data inconsistencies, all individuals with 
more than one change in church membership status are excluded from the sample. Third, 
some individuals are reported as not being church members, although they have positive 
church tax payments. Examination of the data shows that this problem usually appears in 
years when people disaffiliate from the church. Therefore individuals with positive church tax 
payments are re-coded as church members. Fourth, some tax files include the information that 
individuals are taxed according to the joint taxation scheme (“Splittingtabelle”) although they 
choose the “residual tax assessment” which is applicable exclusively for singles. This is 
obviously an error in the data, therefore I apply the restriction that the taxpayer is taxed 
according to the “single assessment scheme” (variable ef19 takes on the value “1”). 
From the foregoing discussion it should be clear that what I look at is not a random sample of 
the German population, nor is it a random sample of church members. One has to keep in 
mind that I can only consider individuals who have not disaffiliated from the church before 
2001. This subpopulation may not be a random group of all individuals who were at some 
point in time a church member. Such a sample is called “truncated”, i.e. the sample is selected 
based on the variable of interest, in my case church membership (see Greene, 2008: 867-868). 
In addition, I only look at unmarried individuals who might differ from married individuals in 
their behavior concerning church disaffiliation. The regression coefficients can therefore only 
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be interpreted with respect to the sample, i.e. unmarried church members in 2001, but not with 
respect to the general population. 
4.5.3 Dependent variable: Church disaffiliation 
The dependent variable in the estimations is church disaffiliation. Church disaffiliation is a 
binary variable measured as the difference in church membership status between 2001 and 
2006. Since my sample only consists of individuals who were church members in 2001, there 
are two possibilities: either they are church members in 2006, in which case the dependent 
variable is 0, or they leave the church, in which case the dependent variable is 1. 
Church membership is measured with the variable ef13. This variable includes a large list of 
denominations which are combined in 4 groups: Catholic, Protestant, other denomination, no 
denomination. The assignment to these four groups follows a scheme provided by the Federal 
Statistical Office. The “Protestant” group includes all members of all churches who are part of 
the “Evangelical Church of Germany” (“Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland”). The “other 
denomination” category includes denominations which levy church taxes on their members 
and have them collected via state tax authorities. These are the Old Catholic Church 
(“Altkatholische Kirche”), some Religious Humanist communities (“Freireligiöse 
Gemeinden”) and some Jewish communities. All individuals who are in none of the three 
aforementioned groups belong to the “no denomination” group. It is important to notice that 
the separation in these four groups does not reveal anything about the religious convictions of 
the individuals. In particular, it is not valid to assume that individuals in the last group are not 
devout. Muslim and Buddhist communities, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Protestant non-
denominational churches (“Freikirchen”) and many others are either not organized in a way 
that would allow them to confer the collection of taxes from their members on the state or 
they do not utilize this right. 
In my research, I am specifically interested in the members of the two large churches in 
Germany – the Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church in Germany. Therefore I exclude 
from the sample all individuals who are members of the “other denomination” group in 2001 
and/or 2006. However, in order to account for possible inconsistencies in the data, I count all 
individuals as church members who are recorded as “no denomination” but who have to pay a 
154 
positive amount of church tax.
78
 Whether someone pays church taxes is evaluated according 
to the assessed church tax (“festzusetzende Kirchensteuer”, variable c66104).
 
I measure the church membership status in 2006 and contrast it with 2001, even though all 
other variables are measured as differences between 2001 and 2005. The reason is that I can 
only see a church disaffiliation which happened in 2005 in the data set of 2006 because 
individuals who were church members for some part of the year are recorded as church 
members for the whole year and become non-members in the next year. This definition of 
church disaffiliations ensures that the data set includes disaffiliations in the year 2005. 
4.5.4 Price of church membership 
4.5.4.1 Calculation of the price of church membership 
The price of church membership is mainly determined by the amount of church tax a church 
member has to pay. As was already mentioned, the church tax is an additional tax to the 
income tax. That is, in order to calculate the church tax, one has to know the taxable income, 
apply the income tax scale to receive the income tax and then apply the church tax scale to 
calculate the amount of church taxes. 
The actual amount of church taxes paid each year is included in the data set, however, it is 
only available for church members. Since I am also interested in knowing the hypothetical 
church tax that non-members would have to pay if they were members, I need to estimate the 
church tax payments of non-members. In order to guarantee that possible mistakes in the 
calculation do not lead to systematic differences between the reported church tax for members 
and the calculated church tax for non-members, I calculate the tax for both groups and use the 
reported tax amounts as a benchmark to test the quality of the estimations. 
However, the church tax a church member pays (and the amount the religious community 
receives) does not correspond to the actual “price” of church membership which I am 
interested in. The reason is that church taxes paid can be deducted as special expenses and 
reduce the taxable income, the income tax and the solidarity surcharge. Consequently, I define 
the price of church membership as the church tax less reductions in income tax and solidarity 
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 The reason is, first, that the assessed church tax in the data appears to be more reliable than the variable 
indicating denomination, therefore including all taxpayers who pay church tax in a specific year helps to ensure 
that no church members are erroneously excluded from the sample. Second, for the individuals in the final 
sample this approach ensures a conservative measurement of church disaffiliation because both the variable 
indicating the denomination and the variable measuring church tax payments need to indicate that someone is 
not a church member in order to be considered a non-member in my study. 
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surcharge caused by the deductibility of church taxes as special expenses. The deductible 
amount of church tax is not the final church tax liability of the year, instead it is the amount 
actually paid during the year, either as an additional tax to the payroll tax or together with 
advance payments on the income tax. Again, the deductible amount is given for church 
members, but missing for non-members. In line with the above I estimate the deductible 
amount of church tax for all individuals. The procedure for calculating the price of church 
membership is the following: in step 1, I calculate the deductible amount of church taxes; in 
step 2, I calculate the church tax itself; in step 3, I calculate how much a taxpayer saves in 
income tax and solidarity surcharge when he or she deducts the estimated amount of church 
tax paid as special expenses. The price of church membership is the estimated church tax less 
the reduction in income tax and solidarity surcharge. In section C.1 in Appendix C I describe 
the calculation of the price of church membership on the basis of steps one to three in more 
detail. In addition, I discuss factors that prevent the exact calculation of the price. In 
Appendix B I give a detailed overview over church tax regulations in each Land in Germany. 
The Länder differ with respect to the church tax rate (which is 8 % in Bavaria and Baden-
Württemberg and 9 % in all other Länder), the existence and amount of the minimum church 
tax and the existence and amount of the maximum church tax.
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 In the calculation of the price 
of church membership all regulations are accounted for. 
4.5.4.2 Variables measuring the price of church membership included in the estimations 
In the basic estimation I include three measures related to the price of church membership: a 
dummy variable indicating whether the taxpayer has to pay a positive price for church 
membership (“Dummy Price 2001 positive”), the price of church membership in 2001 
(“Price 2001”), and the change in the price of church membership between 2001 and 2005 
(“Δ Price”). The price change is calculated by subtracting the price in 2001 from the price in 
2005. The price of church membership is deflated with the consumer price index for Germany 
with the base year 2005. Data on the consumer price index is taken from the Federal 
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010: 522). The price is measured in units of 100 
euro, i.e. when interpreting regression results the coefficients give the effect of a change in 
price by 100 euro, which is a considerable but conceivable amount. 
As a robustness tests, I also use the church tax in 2001 (“Church tax 2001”), a dummy 
indicating whether the individual pays church tax in 2001 (“Dummy Church tax 2001 
positive”), and the change in church tax between 2001 and 2005 (“Δ Church tax”) in the 
                                                 
79
 In some cases these regulations even differ between denominations or regional churches within a Land. 
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estimations. The church tax is the tax calculated in step 2 above (for details on its calculation, 
see Section C.1.2 in the appendix). 
4.5.4.2.1 Causes for changes in the price of church membership 
I attribute the changes in the price of church membership to different sources, which were 
already discussed in the model in Section 4.4.1: (a) changes in the church tax scale, (b) 
changes in the state income tax scale, (c) changes in the definition of taxable income, (d) 
changes in income itself and (e) changes in the tax-relevant behavior of the individual (e.g. 
making donations and declaring them as special expenses). While (a) is in the sphere of 
influence of religious communities, (b) and (c) are caused by the government and (d) and (e) 
are due to the individual. In what follows, I separate (a) from the other four effects. I start by 
determining the taxable income for the calculation of the church tax in 2005. Then I apply the 
income tax scale of 2005 in order to calculate the income tax, which is in turn the tax base for 
the church tax. Now I calculate the church tax (resp. the price of church membership) twice: 
first, with the church tax laws the individuals faced in 2001 and second, with the church tax 
laws the individuals faced in 2005. The difference between these two numbers is the change 
in the price of church membership that can be attributed to changes in church tax regulations 
(“Δ Price – church”). Since there have been very little changes in the church tax regulations 
of each single Land, most of the non-zero values can be attributed to individuals who move to 
a Land with different church tax regulations.
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 The method of calculation ensures that this 
variable is zero if the person has not moved or converted and there have been no changes in 
the church tax regulations of his or her Land. An overview of church tax regulations in each 
Land and for each year can be found in Appendix B. 
The change in the price of church membership that is caused by changes in state income tax 
regulations and/or individual attributes (“Δ Price – state”) is calculated as a residual, taking 
the difference between the price in 2001 (that has been derived from the income of 2001) and 
the hypothetical price that was calculated with the 2005 income and the 2001 church tax laws. 
There is another possibility to calculate the shares of the changes in the price of church 
membership that can be attributed to church tax laws and income tax laws/individual 
attributes. The second way of calculating the variables and the advantages and disadvantages 
of both approaches are discussed in Section C.2 in Appendix C. However, in my empirical 
estimation I only use the first way of calculating the variables. 
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 Another possible reason for the change in church tax regulations is a religious conversion between Catholicism 
and Protestantism, since regulations sometimes differ between those two religious communities. 
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It would be interesting to see if changes in the price of church membership caused by state 
interventions (income tax scale and definition of taxable income) and changes caused by the 
individual him- or herself (changes in income or behavior) affect the probability of 
disaffiliation differently. However, such research is very hard to implement given the data 
available. Income and taxable income differ substantially and not every change in income 
translates into a change in taxable income (and, in the next step, church taxes) and vice versa. 
In addition, there have been plenty of changes in the definition of taxable income in the time 
period under consideration, which make it almost impossible to determine the taxable income 
a person would have had in 2001 if his or her income had been the income of 2005.
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Sometimes it is also difficult to separate the effects of changes in the definition of taxable 
income and changes in the tax-relevant behavior of individuals, since changes in the former 
are meant to trigger changes in the latter.
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4.5.4.2.2 Positive and negative changes in the price of church membership 
I am also interested in finding out whether individuals react differently to increases and 
decreases in the price of church membership. In line with the theoretical model developed in 
Section 4.4 one would expect that an increase in price raises the probability of disaffiliation. 
In contrast, a decrease in price should have no effect since ceteris paribus it only improves the 
cost-benefit-ratio, but does not cause a reaction of the individual.
83
 In order to test this 
hypothesis, I first introduce a dummy variable which indicates whether the price of church 
membership has increased, with constant and decreasing prices of church membership as the 
reference category (variable “Dummy Price increase”). Second, I create separate variables 
that measure the positive resp. negative change in the price of church membership. The 
variables “Δ Price positive” is equal to the change in the price of church membership 
(variable “Δ Price”) when the price increases (i.e. when the dummy variable “Dummy Price 
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 Consider the following example: The calculation of the taxable share of pensions changed between 2005 and 
2001. In 2001, the share depended on the age when the person first received the pension payment. This share 
was on average around 30 % and is given in the data set. In 2005, 50 % of pension income was taxable. For most 
pensioners, this meant an increase in their taxable income and consequently in their church tax payments. If I 
wanted to separate the effects of an increase in the pension itself (an increase in income) and an increase in the 
taxable share of pension income (a change in the definition of taxable income) on the church tax paid, I would 
have to take the amount of the pension in 2005 and apply the laws of 2001. However, it would then be necessary 
to know the taxable share of the pension according to the old regulations, which is not given in the data set for 
pensions drawn in 2005. 
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 In 2002, the German government introduced a pension reform and now grants a tax allowance to individuals 
who take out a private pension insurance. This allowance reduces the taxable income of the taxpayer and thereby 
the church tax payments. However, these reductions are both due to the change in the definition of taxable 
income (introduction of a new allowance) and the behavior of the individual (taking out a private pension 
insurance). 
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 A possible reaction to a decrease in the price of church membership is church (re)affiliation, which I do not 
observe in my sample that consists of individuals who were church members in 2001. 
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increase” takes on the value one) and zero otherwise. Similarly, the variable “Δ Price 
negative” is equal to the change in the price of church membership when the individual faces 
a constant or decreasing price (i.e. when the dummy variable “Dummy Price increase” takes 
on the value zero) and zero otherwise. As a robustness check I perform the same estimation 
again with the church tax instead of the price of church membership. The corresponding 
variables are called “Dummy Church tax increase”, “Δ Church tax positive” and “Δ Church 
tax negative”. 
4.5.5 Income 
4.5.5.1 Theoretical considerations 
In the income tax law there are various definitions of income, in particular the sum of income 
(“Summe der Einkünfte”), the overall income (“Gesamtbetrag der Einkünfte”) and the 
taxable income (“zu versteuerndes Einkommen”). Such definitions are inspired by the “source 
theory” (“Quellentheorie”) of income taxation which states that only income deriving 
“regularly from permanent sources of income” (Blankart, 2001: 256 [my own translation, 
emphasis in original]) should be taxable. However, in my empirical research I apply an 
“economic income definition” (Merz, 2001: 29 [my own translation]) that is more in 
accordance with the Schanz-Haig-Simons income, which measures the sum of the 
consumption of the period and the change in net wealth (Blankart, 2001: 257). I follow the 
argument of Merz (2001) who states that for economic considerations one should find a 
definition of income that describes the “available income” (Merz, 2001: 29 [my own 
translation]). Given the data available in the Taxpayer Panel, this is possible only to a limited 
extent. In this chapter I apply the definition of economic income given in Merz (2001) and 
Merz and Zwick (2001). I also draw upon Kalusche (2006) who connects the definition of 
Merz with the specific variables given in the Taxpayer Panel data set. A positive side effect of 
the use of an economic concept of income instead of one of the tax-related definitions of 
income is that the correlation of income and price of church membership is weaker, since the 
church tax is highly dependent on the income tax while there are some significant differences 
between economic income and taxable income. This reduces the problem of multicollinearity 
in my regressions.
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Besides the differences between economic income and taxable income there are some further arguments why 
income and price of church membership are not perfectly correlated in my study. First, the church tax grows 
progressively with taxable income; therefore income and church tax are not linearly dependent. Individuals with 
the same taxable income also differ in the amount of church taxes they have to pay when they have a different 
number of children. Furthermore, church tax regulations vary between Länder: the tax rate as well as maximum 
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4.5.5.2 Implementation 
The starting point for the calculation of economic income is the overall income 
(“Gesamtbetrag der Einkünfte”). The economic income is calculated according to the 
schedule in Figure 4.1. 
My approach differs from Merz (2001), Merz and Zwick (2001) and Kalusche (2006) in that I 
start with an aggregate income (in this case, the “overall income”) and then go back to each 
type of income and look at the necessary corrections, while the above authors analyze the 
composition of each type of income, sum up the relevant individual parts of income and arrive 
at the “corrected” aggregate income. 
In Section C.3 in Appendix C I explain each item in Figure 4.1 in detail. In addition, I discuss 
the problems and shortcomings of this definition of economic income. 
 
Figure 4.1: Calculation of economic income 
Overall income (“Gesamtbetrag der Einkünfte”) 
+ Reduction for single parents (“Entlastungsbetrag für Alleinerziehende“, c65319) 
+  Reduction for aged persons (“Altersentlastungsbetrag”, c65321) 
+  Reduction for income from farming (c65336) 
% Income tax due (“Festzusetzende Einkommensteuer”) 
% Solidarity surcharge (“Solidaritätszuschlag”) 
+ Income under the “exemption with progression” rule (“Einkommen unter 
Progressionsvorbehalt”, c66200+c66202+c66204) 
+  Child benefit (“Kindergeld”) 
+  Tax-exempt part of pensions 
+  Tax-exempt capital gains (“steuerfrei bleibende Veräußerungsgewinne”, 
c65112+c65127+c65149) 
                                                                                                                                                        
tax rates and minimum taxes vary, therefore two individuals who have the same taxable income but live in 
different regions sometimes pay a different amount of church taxes. 
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+ Deduction for income from agriculture and forestry (“Freibetrag nach § 14a Abs. 4 
EStG”, c65110) 
+  Deduction for pensions of civil servants (“Freibeträge für Versorgungsbezüge”, 
c65167) 
+  Savings allowance (“Sparerfreibetrag”, c65227) 
+ Deductions for other income (“Versorgungsfreibetrag bei Einn. i.S.d. § 52 Abs. 34c S. 
1 EStG”, c65289, and “Versorgungsfreibetrag zu Abgeordnetenbezügen”, c65295) 
% Alimony to a separated or divorced partner (“Unterhaltsleistungen nach § 10 Abs. 1 
Nr. 1 EStG”, c65401)  
% Extraordinary financial burdens (“Abzugsbetrag § 33 [Außergewöhnliche 
Belastungen]”, c65469) 
%  Extraordinary financial burdens for professional training of own children 
(“Ausbildungskosten (§ 33a Abs. 2 EStG)”, c65472) 
% Extraordinary financial burdens for child support (“Unterhaltsaufwendungen (§ 33a 
Abs. 1 EStG)”, c65475) 
+ Pensions-savings grant (“Altersvorsorgezulage”, c65895) 
% Employee savings premium (“Festgesetzte SPZ [Sparzulage]”, c66515) 
+ Tax-exempt half-income (“Hinzurechnungsbetrag stfr. Halbeinkünfte”, c65885) 
 
=  Economic income 
 
4.5.5.3 Income variables included in the estimations 
In all estimations I use two variables related to income: first, economic income in 2001, and 
second, the change in income between 2001 and 2005. The change in income is calculated by 
subtracting the income in 2001 from the income in 2005. Income is deflated with the 
consumer price index for Germany using the base year 2005. Data on the consumer price 
index are taken from the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010: 522). 
Finally, income is divided by 1,000. 
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4.5.6 Demographic, socio-economic and regional variables 
4.5.6.1 Age 
Respondent’s age is derived from the date of birth given in variable ef43 (“Geburtsdatum      
–A–”).
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 The age of the taxpayer is calculated as the difference between the year of birth and 
the year of the tax return. In the estimations I use the age of the taxpayer in 2001. Instead of 
treating age as a continuous variable, I define six age groups: below 25, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 
to 54, 55 to 64 and above 64. The age groups are chosen such that the number of individuals 
in each group is sufficiently high. It also assists in testing the hypothesis that the probability 
of disaffiliation peaks around the age of 30 and it assures that the oldest age group consists 
mainly of pensioners. 
4.5.6.2 Gender 
The gender of the person filing for tax return is given in variable ef8 and can be either male or 
female. For married couples, the gender is per definition male. Inspection of data for singly 
assessed individuals revealed that there are some data inconsistencies with respect to gender. 
Therefore the gender assigned to the individual in the estimation is the gender given in 2005. 
From the inspection of the data it appears that the information on gender given in 2005 and 
2006 is more reliable than that for earlier years. 
4.5.6.3 Children 
The number of children of the taxpayer is derived from variable c65748 (“Zahl der Kinder 
(ZK+ZHK)”). § 32 ITL defines the term “child”. Both an individual’s own children and foster 
children are counted as children: 
 until they reach age 18 
 until they reach age 21 if they are registered as unemployed 
 until they reach age 27 if they have not yet finished professional training 
 if they are handicapped such that they cannot sustain themselves. 
In each case, children need to have an income below the basic personal allowance 
(“Grundfreibetrag”) in order to be included in the tax return of their parents. 
I account for children by looking at the number of children in 2001 and changes in the number 
of children between 2001 and 2005. The variable “Children” is discrete with 6 mutually 
                                                 
85
 This is usually an 8-digit number from which the last 4 digits are extracted. If the resulting number is larger 
than 2006 or smaller than 1891, I treat the year of birth as missing. 
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exclusive categories. The first category comprises individuals who neither have children in 
2001 nor in 2005. They are termed “childless”. Note that this can either mean that the 
taxpayer does not have children at all or that he or she has children that have surpassed the 
age limits or the income limits listed above. The second category is individuals who are 
parents in 2001 and still have the same number of children in 2005. I assume that in the 
majority of cases the same children are counted in both years, although I cannot exclude the 
possibility that within that period of time one child has surpassed the age or income limits 
while the taxpayer has given birth to another child or has taken in a foster child. In the third 
and fourth category there are individuals whose number of children increases between 2001 
and 2005. In category 3 there are taxpayers who are childless in 2001 but have at least one 
child in 2005, while in category 4 there are taxpayers who are parents already in 2001 and 
whose number of children increased by 2005. The final two categories comprise individuals 
whose family size decreases. In category 5 there are individuals who are parents in both years, 
but the number of children decreases between 2005 and 2001, while in category 6 there are 
individuals who are parents in 2001 but are considered childless with respect to income tax in 
2005. 
4.5.6.4 Main source of income 
The main source of income is a discrete variable with 5 different values. I look at the total 
income from five different sources: income from agriculture and forestry, income from 
business activity, wage income, capital income and other sources of income. 
Income from agriculture and forestry is the sum of income from agriculture and forestry 
(variable c65101) augmented by deductions for income from agriculture and forestry (variable 
c65110) and tax-exempt capital gains. 
Income from business activity is the sum of income from unincorporated business enterprises 
(variable c65121) plus the sum of income from self-employed activities (variable c65141), 
augmented by tax-exempt capital gains (variables c65127 and c65149).  
Wage income is the sum of wage income (variable c65161) plus deductions for pensions of 
civil servants (variable c65167). 
Capital income is the sum of capital income (variable c65221), augmented by the savings 
allowance (variable c65227), plus the sum of income from rent and leasing (variable c65241). 
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Other income comprises the sum of other income (variable c65261) and the tax-exempt part 
of pensions and is augmented by deductions (variables c65289 and c65295). 
I define as the main source of income the income source that is larger than any of the other 
sources. The variable refers to income in 2001. 
4.5.6.5 Denomination 
Denomination is a binary variable with “Protestant” as the reference category 
(“Denomination” takes on the value “0”) and “Catholic” as the second variable value 
(“Denomination” takes on the value “1”). Individuals who have a positive assessed church 
tax, although they have no denomination according to variable ef13 (“Religion –A–“) are also 
included in the reference category (see Section 4.5.3 for the motivation for this decision). 
Denomination is measured in 2001. I do not account for the eventuality that an individual 
changes his or her denomination after 2001 before disaffiliating from the church. 
4.5.6.6 Region of residence and mobility 
Information about the region of residence in each year is taken from variable bl 
(“Bundesland”). From this variable I can derive the Land where the individual lives in each 
year. I include in the estimations both the Land where the individual lives in 2001 and 
mobility between 2001 and 2005. The region of residence is measured by including a dummy 
variable for each Land (with North Rhine-Westphalia as the reference category). In the 
absence of more detailed information
86
 this dummy variable is intended to capture regional 
differences in attitudes towards church membership and church disaffiliation, such as social 
pressure to be a church member, public goods provided by the church or the importance of 
religious organizations in providing private benefits for the members, e.g. in the form of 
social networks. In addition, the dummy variable helps to control for differences in the 
transaction costs of church disaffiliation, such as the authority that accepts declarations of 
church disaffiliations and the fees that need to be paid.  
Since the data set only includes information about the Land of residence, but not the city, I 
can measure mobility only as mobility between Länder. However, this is a minor problem 
since earlier research (Dubach, 1998: 54-56) suggests that inter-regional mobility has a larger 
effect on church disaffiliations than intra-regional mobility. Even if my reference group of 
“stayers” actually involves a considerable percentage of individuals who have moved within a 
Land, the effect of inter-regional migration should still be measurable. Mobility is measured 
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 Such information could be the degree of urbanity/rurality and the religious landscape of the place of residence. 
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by comparing the Land where an individual lives in 2001 with the Land where he or she lives 
in 2005. I build a discrete variable with five different values: individuals who live in the same 
Land in 2001 and 2005, individuals who move within East Germany, individuals who move 
within West Germany, individuals who move from East to West and those who move from 
West to East. West Germany covers the eight West German territorial states as well as the city 
states of Hamburg and Bremen. East Germany comprises the five East German territorial 
states and the city of Berlin.  
4.5.7 Summary statistics 
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for the complete sample and for the two sub-samples of 
males and females. Minimum and maximum values are not reported since this information is 
considered confidential and thus is not provided to the researcher by the Federal Statistical 
Office. Data are weighted with the sampling weights provided by the Federal Statistical 
Office. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics for the complete sample and for males and females separately 
 Complete sample Subsample males Subsample females 
 mean std. dev. mean std. dev. Mean std. dev. 
Church 
disaffiliation 
0.095 0.293 0.105 0.307 0.083 0.276 
Price of church 
membership 
      
Price 2001 (in 
100€) 
1.83 21.68 2.02 22.22 1.64 21.03 
Dummy Price 
2001 positive 
0.704 0.457 0.709 0.454 0.698 0.459 
  Price (in 100€) 0.50 22.79 0.62 24.45 0.37 20.83 
  Price – church 
(in 100€) 
0.0001 0.34 --- --- --- --- 
  Price – state   
(in 100€) 
0.50 22.80 --- --- --- --- 
Dummy Price  
increase 
0.524 0.499 0.535 0.499 0.512 0.500 
  Price positive 
(in 100€) 
1.80 26.13 2.09 29.97 1.49 20.82 
  Price negative 
(in 100€) 
-0.93 16.95 -1.07 14.40 -0.79 19.21 
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Church tax       
Church tax 2001 
(in 100€) 
3.30 30.30 --- --- --- --- 
Dummy Church 
tax 2001 positive  
0.673 0.469 --- --- --- --- 
  Church tax 0.40 30.11 --- --- --- --- 
Dummy Church 
tax increase 
0.511 0.500 --- --- --- --- 
  Church tax 
positive (in 100€) 
2.47 30.46 --- --- --- --- 
  Church tax 
negative (in 100€) 
-1.77 25.92 --- --- --- --- 
Income       
Income 2001 (in 
1,000€) 
21.170 82.503 21.165 86.504 21.176 77.948 
  Income (in 
1,000€) 
1.799 111.881 2.364 126.508 1.217 93.437 
Age       
Below 25 0.193 0.395 0.219 0.414 0.167 0.373 
25 to 34 0.256 0.437 0.308 0.462 0.203 0.403 
35 to 44 0.220 0.414 0.237 0.425 0.202 0.401 
45 to 54 0.139 0.346 0.126 0.332 0.153 0.360 
55 to 64 0.081 0.273 0.064 0.244 0.100 0.300 
65 and above 0.109 0.312 0.046 0.210 0.175 0.380 
Gender       
Male 0.508 0.500     
Female 0.492 0.500     
Children       
No children 0.826 0.379 0.847 0.360 0.805 0.396 
Parent, no change 0.104 0.306 0.085 0.279 0.124 0.330 
Became parent 0.024 0.152 0.030 0.170 0.017 0.130 
More children 0.006 0.080 0.008 0.089 0.005 0.071 
Fewer children 0.014 0.116 0.010 0.101 0.017 0.130 
No longer have 
children 
0.026 0.159 0.020 0.141 0.032 0.176 
Interaction       
Gender*Children 
      
No children 0.805 0.396     
Parent, no change 0.124 0.330     
Became parent 0.017 0.130     
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More children 0.005 0.071     
Fewer children 0.017 0.130     
No longer have 
children 
0.032 0.176     
Main source of 
income 
      
Wage  0.779 0.415 0.798 0.401 0.759 0.427 
Agriculture and 
forestry 
0.008 0.090 0.014 0.117 0.002 0.048 
Business activity 0.081 0.272 0.104 0.305 0.057 0.232 
Capital 0.040 0.196 0.028 0.166 0.052 0.221 
Other 0.092 0.289 0.056 0.230 0.130 0.336 
Denomination       
Protestant 0.476 0.499 0.459 0.498 0.495 0.500 
Catholic 0.524 0.499 0.541 0.498 0.505 0.500 
Land       
North Rhine- 
Westphalia 
0.256 0.436 0.244 0.430 0.268 0.443 
Baden-
Württemberg 
0.154 0.361 0.151 0.358 0.156 0.363 
Bavaria 0.229 0.420 0.237 0.425 0.221 0.415 
Bremen 0.006 0.078 0.005 0.070 0.007 0.086 
Hamburg 0.010 0.099 0.008 0.089 0.012 0.109 
Hesse 0.087 0.282 0.089 0.285 0.085 0.279 
Lower Saxony 0.090 0.286 0.090 0.286 0.090 0.286 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
0.058 0.233 0.062 0.241 0.054 0.225 
Saarland 0.015 0.123 0.015 0.123 0.015 0.122 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
0.028 0.164 0.030 0.171 0.025 0.156 
Berlin 0.021 0.144 0.018 0.131 0.025 0.156 
Brandenburg 0.007 0.086 0.008 0.089 0.007 0.082 
Mecklenburg-    
W. Pomerania 
0.005 0.068 0.005 0.070 0.004 0.066 
Saxony 0.017 0.128 0.018 0.133 0.015 0.123 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.006 0.075 0.006 0.077 0.005 0.074 
Thuringia 0.012 0.108 0.014 0.117 0.010 0.099 
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Mobility       
No mobility 0.957 0.203 0.954 0.210 0.961 0.195 
West-West 0.032 0.175 0.034 0.181 0.029 0.168 
West-East 0.008 0.092 0.010 0.097 0.007 0.085 
East-East 0.001 0.026 0.001 0.027 0.001 0.025 
East-West 0.002 0.048 0.002 0.048 0.002 0.047 
Sample size 165,146  85,779  79,367  
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Data is weighted with sample weights provided by Federal Statistical Office. Areas 
shaded in grey refer to variables that are not available for the particular subsample. 
 
The results in Table 4.1 show that 9.5 % of the individuals in the sample leave the church 
between 2001 and 2005 – 10.5 % of the males and 8.3 % of the females. This number appears 
to be quite high at first sight. However, one has to keep in mind that this sample is not 
representative of the population as the whole. In fact, it is biased towards groups who are 
found to have a higher-than-average probability of leaving the church – young, unmarried 
people with their own income. There is not much data on disaffiliation rates by age or socio-
economic characteristics available. However, in the light of the available research, the 
numbers in my sample seem reasonable. Birkelbach (1999: 143) calculates the average yearly 
disaffiliation rate of a cohort of students of higher secondary school (“Gymnasium”) in North 
Rhine-Westphalia who were born in 1955. Between the ages of 18 and 32 (between 1973 and 
1987) their average yearly disaffiliation rates are above 1 % with significant variance. In some 
years, it even reaches values above 1.5 %. Eicken and Schmitz-Veltin (2012: 87-89) calculate 
the average yearly disaffiliation rates by age for Protestants and Catholics living in the city of 
Stuttgart for the period 1990 to 2009. They report that yearly disaffiliation rates are above 1 % 
for church members between the ages of 22 and 48 (Catholics) and 22 and 54 (Protestants), 
with maximum values of 2 % (Catholics) and 2.5 % (Protestants) occurring around the age of 
30. 
The average income in my sample is 21,000 euro with significant variance. The average 
church tax payment in 2001 amounts to 330 euro, which leads to a price of church 
membership of 183 euro. 50.8 % of the taxpayers in the sample are male, while 49.2 % are 
female. Around one quarter of individuals in the sample are in the age group 25 to 34 and 
roughly 20 % are younger. The age distribution differs significantly between males and 
females. Only 23.6 % of the male individuals are 45 or older, but 42.8 % of the female 
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taxpayers are. About 83 % of the individuals in the sample do not have children – 85 % of the 
men and 81 % of the women. Wage income is the main type of income of three quarters of the 
taxpayers in the sample. In line with the differences in the age distribution between men and 
women, a larger share of women is found to have “other” income (which includes pensions) 
as the main type of income. There are slightly more Catholics than Protestants in the sample. 
According to expectations, most taxpayers live in North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria, 
which are the largest Länder in Germany in terms of inhabitants. The share of individuals 
from all five East German Länder is low, which is mainly due to the the fact that church 
members are a minority in each of these Länder. Concerning mobility, I find that only 4 % of 
the individuals move to a different Land and there are very few moves of individuals 
originally living in East Germany.  
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4.6 Econometric approach 
I employ binary logistic regression. The dependent variable is binary and has the value one if 
the individual disaffiliates from the church in any year between 2001 and 2005, zero 
otherwise. Independent variables are state variables in the year 2001 and changes in a variable 
between 2001 and 2005. Separate regressions for different subsamples as well as shorter time 
periods are estimated. 
Discrete choice methods, such as binary logistic regression
87
, are preferred to linear 
probability models when the variable of interest takes on a small number of discrete values 
(Greene, 2008: 773), in this case two: the individual either disaffiliates from the church or not. 
These values are coded as zero and one. However, in order to decide whether to disaffiliate or 
not, the individual needs to maximize his or her utility both as a church member and as a non-
member and calculate the difference between these two utility levels (see equation (4.9) in the 
model in Section 4.4.1 above). If this difference is positive, the person remains a church 
member; if it is negative, the person disaffiliates. The difference in utility is a continuous 
variable, however, it cannot be observed. All that is observable is the discrete decision of the 
individual whether to disaffiliate or not. 
I denote the utility difference between being a church member and not being a member by   
 . 
As I pointed out in the model section, this utility differential depends on a vector of 
independent variables   , which include the price of church membership for the individual, 
his or her income and some individual characteristics of the church member: 
   
    
      (4.1) 
where    is an error term. The continuous variable   
  is unobservable; instead I observe the 
decision whether to disaffiliate or not,   , which takes on values one (“yes”) if   
  is negative, 
and zero (“no”) otherwise, 
        
     (4.2) 
where      is the indicator function. 
I am interested in the effect of a change in the independent variable    on the probability that 
   is one. Using the relationships established above, I can write 
                
                
           
    (4.3) 
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 The discussion of binary logistic regression in this chapter is based on Wooldridge (2003: 530-533) and 
Greene (2008: 772-777). 
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where      is some continuous function which takes on values between zero and one. Usually 
the distribution function of the standard normal distribution or the logistic distribution are 
chosen. In accordance with previous literature (see, for example, Loveland, 2003; Brañas-
Garza and Neuman, 2004) I have chosen the logistic function. Now the probability of 
individual   to disaffiliate can be calculated as 
 
                  
    
       
    
         
    
 (4.4) 
This expression is equivalent to  
 
   
  
    
    
   (4.5) 
The left hand side of expression (4.5) is often called “logits” or “log-odds”, whereas the 
fraction           is the odds ratio. The parameter   indicates how a change in some 
independent variable    affects the log-odds of the probability to disaffiliate. A change in the 
log-odds is hard to interpret, except for its sign. Exponentiating both sides of equation (4.5) to 
the base of e (Euler’s number) allows the detection of the effect of a change in    on the odds 
ratio. Note that in such a model it is assumed that a change in    has a constant effect on the 
log odds of the probability   , whereas the effect on the probability itself is not constant. In 
fact, the effect of    on    depends on the value of the function     
    and can only be 
calculated for specific values for each of the independent variables   . It is common practice 
to report the average effects for the mean values of all independent variables. 
When reporting partial effects, it is advisable to distinguish between continuous and discrete 
variables (Wooldridge, 2003: 532-533). The partial effect of a change in a continuous variable 
    on the probability    can be calculated as 
    
    
         
    (4.6) 
where       is the probability density function of the logistic function: 
 
      
       
            
 (4.7) 
In contrast, for discrete variables and dummy variables one would simply insert each discrete 
value of the variable into     
    together with the mean values for all remaining variables 
and calculate the resulting differences in probability. 
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In the results section, I present different versions of the estimates. The tables in the results 
section include the original  -coefficients of the logit estimation. In addition, I sometimes 
report changes in the odds ratio, which are simply the exponentiated values of the  -
coefficients, but are easier to interpret. The advantage of the odds ratio is that it is constant 
and does not depend on the specific values of the independent variables   . However, it has 
limited informative value when it comes to the economic interpretation of results. Therefore I 
also report the effects of a change in the    on the probability    at mean values of the 
independent variables. In addition, I create a model individual and discuss how changes in the 
independent variables affect this person’s probability of disaffiliation. The model individual is 
mainly employed in the interpretation of results for the complete sample, while I draw on 
effects at average values when I compare different subsamples (e.g. males and females).  
In order to test all hypotheses, I estimate different settings. First, I run a model for the 
complete sample described in Section 4.5.2. Then I provide results for different 
operationalizations of the variables capturing the price of church membership.  
As a robustness test, I also run regressions for the subsamples of individuals who disaffiliated 
in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. Furthermore, I run regressions where I replace the “price of 
church membership” with the amount of church tax, i.e. I use the amount of money the person 
gives to the church instead of how much that giving costs him or her in terms of the actual 
reduction in available income. I also present results for various subsamples, in particular for 
men and women, for East Germany and West Germany, and for Protestants and Catholics.  
All estimations are carried out in SAS. The stratified sampling design is taken into account by 
using Survey-Procedures in SAS. In such procedures it is necessary to provide information as 
to which stratum the observation belongs to as well as the sampling weights. In addition, all 
information about the sampling is needed, therefore one cannot simply delete the observations 
that are not needed (in my case this would be, e.g., married taxpayers). If one is interested in 
results for subgroups of the sample, a domain analysis needs to be done. All the observations 
of interest would then be in the domain while the others are not. If information about the 
observations outside the domain of interest were missing, variances would not be estimated 
correctly. 
As a goodness of fit measure I report the likelihood ratio test. The likelihood ratio test is 
based on the comparison of the values of the likelihood function under the null hypothesis (in 
my case the null model, i.e. a model only with a constant but without any independent 
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variables) and the alternative model (i.e. a model with independent variables). In particular, I 
report the values of -2 times the log-likelihood of the null and the alternative model, 
respectively. The difference of these two values is the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic, 
which follows a χ
2
-distribution with the number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
independent variables. The number of degrees of freedom of my models is larger than the 
number of independent variables which I report in my results because for discrete variables 
with more than two values each value takes up one degree of freedom, even if this value does 
not appear in the sample (domain) I look at. 
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4.7 Results 
The entire table of estimation results for the complete sample as well as males and females 
separately can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix. In order to facilitate reading I present 
the results for each independent variable separately when the respective variable is discussed. 
4.7.1 Price of church membership  
Table 4.2 shows the results for price of church membership and income in the complete 
sample as well as the subsamples of males and females separately. The findings concerning 
income are discussed in the next section, but are nevertheless reported in Table 4.2 because 
they are closely connected to the results for the price of church membership. The label 
“Model 1a” refers to the standard operationalization of the price of church membership. The 
results for different operationalizations of this variable can be found in Table 4.3. 
There is evidence that the price of church membership has a positive and significant influence 
on the probability to disaffiliate from the church. Looking at the results for the complete 
sample in Table 4.2, both the estimates for the price of church membership in 2001 and the 
change in the price of membership between 2001 and 2005 are highly significant. However, 
the effect is economically moderate. The estimate for a change in the price of church 
membership (“Δ Price”) between 2001 and 2005 is 0.055, which means that the odds of 
disaffiliation (see equation (4.5) in Section 4.6) increase by 5.6 % if church taxes increase by 
100 euro. 
A change in the odds of disaffiliation can also be expressed as a change in the probability of 
disaffiliation. However, in this case the original probability (i.e. without a change in church 
taxes) matters. I calculate the effect of a change in church taxes on the probability of 
disaffiliation for the sample average and for a model individual which I define below. At 
sample average values an individual has an estimated probability of leaving the church of 
6.50 % if he or she does not experience an increase in church taxes. A 100 euro increase in the 
price of membership increases this probability by 0.33 %. 
One can also look at the marginal effect of a price change on a model individual. My model 
individual is male, Catholic, in the age group 30 to 39, has no children, lives in the North 
Rhine-Westphalia and does not move to another Land during the observation period. His 
income in 2001 equals the average income and he does not experience income changes 
between 2001 and 2005. His main source of income is wages. The price of church 
membership in 2001 also corresponds to the sample average. Without a change in the price of 
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church membership his probability of disaffiliation is 9.50 %. The probability increases by 
0.47 % when the price rises by 100 euro. 
 
Table 4.2: Estimation results for price of church membership and income for the complete 
sample and for males and females separately 
 Complete sample Subsample males Subsample females 
 Model 1a Model 1a Model 1a 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
Price       
Price 2001 0.059 125.619 
(0.000) 
0.059 69.621 
(0.000) 
0.061 55.615 
(0.000) 
Dummy Price 
2001 positive 
0.022 0.5388 
(0.463) 
-0.023 0.322 
(0.571) 
0.079 3.134 
(0.077) 
  Price 0.055 164.905 
(0.000) 
0.053 92.799 
(0.000) 
0.060 67.069 
(0.000) 
Income       
Income 2001 
-0.000 0.0261 
(0.872) 
-0.001  0.253 
(0.615) 
0.001 0.126 
(0.723) 
  Income -0.002 8.334 
(0.004) 
-0.003 6.500 
(0.011) 
-0.002 1.692 
(0.193) 
Sample size 165,146  85,779  79,367  
-2 Log L (constant 
only) 
2,769,469  1,513,861  1,249,272  
-2 Log L (constant 
and covariates) 
2,426,852  1,346,487  1,077,929  
Likelihood-Ratio 
χ
2
  
342,617 
(53 df) 
 167,374 
(41 df) 
 171,343 
(41 df) 
 
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: All estimations include intercept, age dummy, dummy for children, main source of 
income, denomination, regional dummies and mobility. The estimation for the complete 
sample also includes a dummy for gender and the interaction of gender and children. Bold 
coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
The results also show that the price of church membership in 2001 (“Price 2001”) has a 
positive and significant effect on the probability to disaffiliate. This finding suggests that 
there is inertia in the church disaffiliation decision because increases in the price of 
membership before 2001 led to a reaction in the period under investigation. A perfectly 
rational individual should immediately react to changes in price and adjust his or her cost-
benefit analysis of church membership. However, previous research suggests that many 
individuals are not aware of the amount of church taxes they have to pay and reconsider their 
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church membership only occasionally, e.g. when they fill out their tax returns. My finding can 
be interpreted as evidence for this observation. The estimated coefficient of 0.059 implies that 
a change of 100 euro in the price of membership in 2001 increases the odds of disaffiliation 
by 6.1 %. The probability of disaffiliation of the model individual (as described above) 
increases by 0.51 %. 
In contrast to the price of membership in 2001, the dummy capturing whether someone paid 
church taxes at all (“Dummy Price 2001 positive”) is not significant and the estimate is close 
to zero, which suggests that it does not matter whether someone pays church tax at all, but 
rather how much. 
With respect to income, I find no significant effect of the amount of income in 2001, but a 
small negative effect of a change in income between 2001 and 2005, indicating that an 
increase in income decreases the probability of disaffiliation. However, the estimated effect is 
economically small. 
These first results lend support to hypothesis H 1 which states that after controlling for 
income an increase in church tax payments leads to an increase in the probability of leaving 
the church. Hyothesis H 2 receives moderate support: An increase in income appears to 
decrease the probability of disaffiliation, however, the effect is very small. 
In order to investigate the influence of the price of church membership on the church 
membership decision more thoroughly, I include different variants of the price variable 
(“Model 1a” to “Model 1d”) in the regressions. The results are shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Estimation results for the complete sample with different definitions of the 
variables measuring the price of church membership and income 
 Complete    
sample 
Complete    
sample 
Complete   
sample 
Complete   
sample 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-
value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-
value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-
value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-
value) 
Price of church 
membership 
        
Price 2001 0.059 125.619 
(0.000) 
0.059 126.491 
(0.000) 
0.010 4.632 
(0.031) 
0.056 138.467 
(0.000) 
Dummy Price 
2001 positive 
0.022 0.539 
(0.463) 
0.021 0.508 
(0.476) 
0.012 0.160 
(0.689) 
0.077 6.949 
(0.008) 
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  Price 0.055 164.905 
(0.000) 
      
  Price – 
church (in 100) 
  0.413 17.001 
(0.000) 
    
  Price – state   
(in 100) 
  0.055 167.054 
(0.000) 
    
Dummy Price 
increase 
    0.095 14.356 
(0.000) 
0.101 14.788 
(0.000) 
  Price positive       0.064 203.766 
(0.000) 
  Price negative       -0.000 0.001 
(0.975) 
Income         
Income 2001 -0.000 0.0261 
(0.872) 
-0.000 0.013 
(0.908) 
0.008 54.138 
(0.000) 
-0.004 10.095 
(0.002) 
  Income -0.002 8.334 
(0.004) 
-0.002 7.771 
(0.005) 
0.005 46.496 
(0.000) 
-0.003 11.819 
(0.001) 
Sample size 165,146 165,146 165,146 165,146 
-2 Log L 
(constant only) 
2,769,469 2,769,469 2,769,469 2,769,469 
-2 Log L 
(constant and 
covariates) 
2,426,852 2,426,583 2,429,263 2,423,400 
Likelihood-
Ratio χ
2
  
342,617 (53 df) 342,886 (54 df) 340,206 (53 df) 346,067 (55df) 
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: All estimations include intercept, age dummy, gender dummy, dummy for children, 
interaction of gender and children, main source of income, denomination, regional dummies 
and mobility. Areas shaded in grey refer to variables that are not included in the estimation of 
the particular model. Bold coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Model 1a in Table 4.3 corresponds to model 1a in Table 4.2 and is only reported in order to 
facilitate the comparison of results. Summary statistics for all variables are reported in Table 
4.1. Only the results of the variables capturing the price of church membership and income 
are reported in Table 4.3. However, the original regressions include all variables reported in 
Table A.3. Since the results of the demographic, socio-economic and regional variables are 
virtually unchanged in comparison to model 1a, they are not reported again. 
In model 1b the change in the price of church membership is captured by two variables: one 
measuring the change in the price caused by changes in the church tax regulations (“Δ Price – 
church”), and another one that captures all other sources of changes in the church tax, in 
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particular income tax regulations and individual characteristics (“Δ Price – state”). The idea 
here is to test whether individuals react differently to changes in their church tax payments 
that can directly be attributed to church tax regulations in comparison to changes that are due 
to the fact that the church tax uses the income tax as the tax basis. The coefficient of 0.413 for 
the variable “Δ Price – church” shows that changes in the price of membership caused by 
modifications of church tax laws have a sizeable and significant positive effect on the 
probability of disaffiliation. At the same time, the effect of changes in the price of 
membership caused by other reasons is comparable in its size and significance to the overall 
effect of a change in church tax found in model 1a (the estimated coefficients of the variable 
“Δ Price – state” in model 1b and of the variable “Δ Price” in model 1a are both 0.055). 
Applied to the reference individual, the estimations suggest that the marginal effect on the 
probability of disaffiliation of an increase in the price of church membership by 100 euro 
caused by changes in church tax regulations is 3.55 %, while an additional cost of 100 euro 
that cannot be attributed to the church has a marginal effect on the probability of 0.47 %. Both 
estimates must be compared to a probability of 9.5 % for those who do not experience an 
increase in the price of being a church member. 
In model 1c in Table 4.3 I replace the change in price between 2001 and 2005 measured in 
euro with a dummy variable that signals whether the church tax has increased during that 
period of time (“Dummy Price increase”), compared to the reference category of unchanged 
or decreased church tax. The idea behind this specification of the estimation is to test whether 
it is sufficient to use only a dummy variable that indicates an increase in church taxes and 
disregard the amount of this increase. Summary statistics reveal that in the sample the church 
tax increases for 52.4 % of the taxpayers. The positive and significant coefficient of the 
variable “Dummy Price increase” in model 1c shows that an increase in price significantly 
raises the probability of disaffiliation compared to those whose price of membership remains 
unchanged or decreases. The model individual is estimated to have a probability of 
disaffiliation of 9.4 %
88
 if his church tax falls or does not change and 10.3 % if the church tax 
increases. What is more, the coefficient of the variable “Price 2001”, which measures the 
price of membership in 2001, is considerably smaller and loses significance in comparison to 
model 1a. Another interesting result in model 1c is that both income variables are now 
significant and positive. The reason might be that the income variable takes up some of the 
effects of the variable measuring the amount of change in the price of membership, since both 
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 This probability differs slightly from the probability of disaffiliation of the model individual of 9.5 % which 
was calculated on the basis of models 1a and 1b. The reason is that the probability depends on the coefficients of 
all variables in the estimation, which differ between the models. 
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are positively correlated. When comparing the Likelihood-Ratio χ
2
-value of model 1c with 
model 1a, one can see that the value has decreased (while the degrees of freedom are the 
same). This indicates a decline in model fit in comparison to models 1a. The results of 1a and 
1c taken together strongly suggest that individuals do not only react to the fact that they have 
to pay more for their church membership, but that the amount of this increase in price has 
explanatory power. Furthermore, the results underline that it is important to include both the 
price of church membership and the income in the estimations, otherwise one variable will 
pick up the effect of the other variable and results are biased. 
Based on the conclusions from model 1c I include the amount of change in the price of 
membership again in model 1d, however, I measure the effect of an increase and a decrease in 
price separately. The plan is to test whether individuals react symmetrically to increases and 
decrases in the price of church membership. The estimation includes both a dummy variable 
indicating whether the individual experiences an increase in the price of church membership 
at all (“Dummy Price increase”) and the amount of the increase or decrease in the price (“Δ 
Price positive” or “Δ Price negative”, respectively). Results are reported in Table 4.3 in the 
two columns on the right. The results show that the dummy variable indicating an increase in 
price is still significant and the estimated coefficient of 0.101 is close to the estimate in model 
1c. In addition, the variable measuring the amount of the increase in the price of church 
membership is also positive and significant, while a decrease in the price of membership 
appears to have no effect on the disaffiliation decision. The variable “Dummy Price increase” 
and “Δ Price positive” taken together imply that an increase in price increases the probability 
of disaffiliation per se, but the larger the increase, the higher the probability. The estimated 
size of the effect of a 100 euro increase in the price of church membership is even larger than 
before. The coefficient of 0.064 implies that the marginal effect of an increase in price by 100 
euro is estimated at 0.52 % for the model individual. At the same time, a decrease in price 
does not noticeably lower the probability of disaffiliation which can be seen from the 
estimated coefficient of -0.000 for the variable “Δ Price negative”. Comparing the 
Likelihood-Ratio statistic for model 1d with model 1a, there is a considerable difference in the 
χ
2
-value, which hints at the fact that a separate inclusion of increases and decreases in the 
price of membership improves the model fit. The asymmetric reaction to increases and 
decreases in price is in line with my theoretical considerations. I assume that an individual is a 
church member because his or her benefits of church membership exceed the costs. When the 
individual experiences an increase in the costs, these can eventually be larger than the benefits 
and the individual then decides against church membership. However, when the individual 
179 
experiences a decrease in costs, the cost-benefit-ratio improves, but ceteris paribus the binary 
membership decision is not affected, since being a church member is beneficial for the 
individual before and after the decrease in the costs of membership. 
Table A.4 in Appendix D.2 shows the estimation results when the amount of church tax is 
used instead of the price of church membership. The findings based on the variables 
measuring the church tax and resp. the price of church membership are substantially the same. 
Both the amount of church tax paid in 2001 (“Church tax 2001”) and the change in church 
tax between 2001 and 2005 (“Δ Church tax”) significantly increase the probability of 
disaffiliation. I also find that an increase in church tax has a larger effect on the probability of 
leaving the church than a decrease in church tax. A detailed discussion of the results can be 
found in Appendix D.2. 
In order to make better use of the panel structure of the data and to see if results are constant 
over time, I present separate estimations for church disaffiliations that happen in each year 
between 2002 and 2005. The results can be found in Table A.5 in Appendix D.2. The findings 
confirm the overall conclusion from the estimations for the period between 2001 and 2005: 
both the price of church membership in the original year and the change in price have a 
positive and significant effect on the probability to disaffiliate. For a more in-depth discussion 
consult Appendix D.2. 
Looking at the separate results for males and females in Table 4.2 also reinforces the results 
for the complete sample: for males as well as females, both the price of church membership in 
2001 and the change in price between 2001 and 2005 significantly affect the probability of 
leaving the church and the estimates are in line with the numbers presented for the combined 
sample. The estimated coefficients are marginally larger for women; however, these 
differences are small. When model 1d includes separate variables for positive and negative 
changes in the price of membership and is estimated for males and females separately (results 
not reported), the results for both genders are virtually identical with the results for the 
complete sample in Table 4.2, both with respect to the size and the significance of the effects. 
The only difference exists with respect to the dummy variable indicating whether someone 
pays a positive price for church membership in 2001 (“Dummy Price 2001 positive”). This 
variable is insignificant for males, but significant and positive for females. A possible 
explanation for this difference could be structural differences between genders in the set of 
individuals whose price of membership is zero. In the sample of females, there are more 
individuals above the age of 65 and more individuals with children, both of which are less 
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likely to pay church taxes, as well as being groups with a comparatively low propensity to 
disaffiliate (as will be discussed below). 
To summarize, all the results produced with different definitions of the price variable (models 
1a to 1d) as well as with the amount of church tax (models 2a and 2d) support hypothesis H 1 
which states that an increase in the price of church membership increases the probability of 
disaffiliation.  
4.7.2 Income 
From the results in Table 4.3 above and Table A.4 in the appendix it is difficult to arrive at a 
consistent interpretation of the income effect, since the estimates both for the level of income 
in 2001 (“Income 2001”) and the change between 2001 and 2005 (“Δ Income”) show 
different signs and also vary in their level of significance. However, the income variables are 
only positive in model 1c when the amount of change in the price of church membership is 
not included in the estimation. Since income and price of church membership are positively 
correlated, it is highly likely that the income variables pick up the effect of the price of 
membership. As I pointed out before, this result underlines the necessity to include both 
income and the price of church membership in the regression. In estimation 1d, when the 
price of membership is adequately controlled for, the income variables lose some of their 
significance and the sign changes, i.e. they become negative. This is in line with hypothesis H 
2, which states that an increase in income leads to a reduction in the probability of 
disaffiliation. The results show that the same applies to a higher initial income. Nevertheless, 
the economic effect is small. For the model individual (who has an income that corresponds to 
the sample average), the estimated probability of disaffiliation is 8.8 % in model 1d. If his 
income in 2001 is twice the sample average, the estimated probability decreases to 8.1 %. 
4.7.3 Demographic variables 
4.7.3.1 Age 
Table 4.4 shows the estimation results for the dummy variable age. In accordance with 
hypothesis H 3 I expect to find a hump-shaped age profile of church disaffiliation which 
peaks around age 30. 
The results in Table 4.4 suggest that individuals’ age has a large effect on the probability of 
church disaffiliation. The probability is highest in the two youngest age cohorts and increases 
slightly from the cohort below 25 years of age to the cohort aged 25 to 34. Consequently, 
there seems to be some support that there is a peak close to age 30. However, the difference in 
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the estimated coefficients for the age groups 25 and 34 and below 25 is small and 
insignificant. What is more, the estimations for various two-year periods in Table A.5 in the 
appendix suggest that the probability of leaving the church is highest in the youngest age 
group and drops afterwards. The difference between the estimates for the two youngest age 
groups is small and insignificant for disaffiliations in 2002 and 2003 and somewhat larger and 
significant for disaffiliations in 2004 and 2005. All estimations consistently show that in older 
age groups the probability to disaffiliate decreases rapidly. In fact, the odds of disaffiliating 
are roughly 13 times higher in the age group 25 to 34 compared to the oldest age group above 
65.  
 
Table 4.4: Estimation results for age for the complete sample and for males and females 
separately 
 Complete sample Subsample males Subsample females 
 Model 1a Model 1a Model 1a 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
Age       
Below 25 ref. --- ref. --- ref. --- 
25 to 34 0.049 2.459 
(0.117) 
0.056 1.910 
(0.167) 
0.042 0.721 
(0.396) 
35 to 44 -0.361 99.527 
(0.000) 
-0.395 70.363 
(0.000) 
-0.307 29.363 
(0.000) 
45 to 54 -0.857 368.981 
(0.000) 
-0.941 231.648 
(0.000) 
-0.772 140.876 
(0.000) 
55 to 64 -1.527 572.462 
(0.000) 
-1.674 303.089 
(0.000) 
-1.415 262.806 
(0.000) 
65 and above -2.588 991.511 
(0.000) 
-2.531 248.244 
(0.000) 
-2.573 653.652 
(0.000) 
Sample size 165,146  85,779  79,367  
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: All estimations include intercept, price of church membership, income, dummy for 
children, main source of income, denomination, regional dummies and mobility. The 
estimation for the complete sample also includes a dummy for gender and the interaction of 
gender and children. Bold coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
The results with respect to age are very similar for males and females. The age profile of the 
probability to leave the church for both genders can be seen in Figure 4.2. The graph is 
developed from the results of the separate estimation for males and females with model 1a 
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reported in Table 4.4. Age dummies are set at each discrete value while keeping all other 
variables at their sample averages, taking into account that sample averages differ between 
males and females. The estimated probability of disaffiliation starts off at 11.0 % for females 
and 11.8 % for males, then increases slightly from the youngest age group to the second 
youngest group and declines steadily and rapidly afterwards until it reaches a probability of 
only around 1 % in the oldest age group.
89
 
 
Figure 4.2: Age profile of the probability of church disaffiliation for males and females 
 
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
 
The results confirm earlier studies showing that church disaffiliation usually happens at a 
young age. There is mixed evidence concerning hypothesis H 3, which states that there is a 
peak in the probability of disaffiliation around age 30. While the estimates in Table 4.4 seem 
to support the hypothesis, the results for individual years in Table A.5 suggest that the peak 
may occur even earlier. However, one has to keep in mind that my data set includes only 
those individuals who file a tax return. These are usually the ones who have some kind of 
income (and potentially pay church taxes), while most young people who are still in the 
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 The similarity of the graphs for males and females might at first sight be inconsistent with the fact that in my 
sample 10.5 % of males leave the church between 2001 and 2005, but only 8.3 % of females. However, the 
difference can be explained by the different age compositions of the two samples. While only 4.6 % of males are 
in the age group above 65 years – which has by far the lowest probability of disaffiliation – the same is true for 
17.5 % of females. However, when comparing men and women in the same age group gender differences are 
smaller. 
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educational system are not included. Consequently, I might overestimate the propensity to 
drop out of church for the youngest age group. 
Whether the age profile of disaffiliation is due to age or cohort effects cannot be answered 
with the available data. Data covering a longer time period would be necessary for such 
research. However, previous research with survey data suggests that in Germany both age and 
cohort effects exist (Lois, 2011a). 
4.7.3.2 Gender and children 
The results for the two variables “Gender” and “Children” and their interaction can be found 
in Table 4.5. The hypotheses to be tested are H 4 to H 6. I expect that being or becoming a 
parent decreases the probability of disaffiliation, whereby the effect is expected to be stronger 
among women than men. In contrast, there should be no difference in the probability of 
leaving the church between males and females without children. 
 
Table 4.5: Estimation results for gender, children and the interaction of gender and children 
for the complete sample and for males and females separately 
 Complete sample Subsample males Subsample females 
 Model 1a Model 1a Model 1a 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
Gender       
Male ref. ---     
Female 0.020 0.646 
(0.422) 
    
Children       
No children ref. --- ref. --- ref. --- 
Parent, no change 0.1881 12.606 
(0.000) 
0.219 16.314 
(0.000) 
-0.291 23.987 
(0.000) 
Became parent -0.072 0.850 
(0.357) 
-0.068 0.749 
(0.387) 
-0.217 4.180 
(0.041) 
More children -0.382 4.408 
(0.036) 
-0.370 4.075 
(0.044) 
-0.991 10.693 
(0.001) 
Fewer children 0.083 0.251 
(0.616) 
0.141 0.711 
(0.399) 
-0.100 0.465 
(0.495) 
No longer have 
children 
0.299 8.244 
(0.004) 
0.348 10.855 
(0.001) 
0.321 11.466 
(0.001) 
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Interaction 
Gender*Children 
      
No children ref. ---     
Parent, no change -0.460 36.799 
(0.000) 
    
Became parent -0.161 1.510 
(0.219) 
    
More children -0.605 2.938 
(0.087) 
    
Fewer children -0.143 0.429 
(0.512) 
    
No longer have 
children 
0.073 0.279 
(0.597) 
    
Sample size 165,146  85,779  79,367  
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: All estimations include intercept, price of church membership, income, age dummy, 
main source of income, denomination, regional dummies and mobility. Areas shaded in grey 
refer to variables that are not included in the estimation for the particular subsample. Bold 
coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Estimates must be interpreted in the following way: The variable “Gender” indicates 
differences in the propensity to disaffiliate between men and women for childless individuals, 
i.e. in the reference category of the variable “Children”. The variable “Children” indicates 
the effects of having children in the reference category for gender, which is “Male”. In other 
words, this variable shows how having children affects a man’s probability to disaffiliate in 
comparison to a childless male person. The interaction term “Interaction Gender*Children” 
shows whether the coefficients of the children variable differ for males and females. In order 
to compare the effect of being a mother with the reference category of a childless women, the 
values for “Children” and “Interaction Gender*Children” need to be added together. If a 
woman with children is to be compared with a childless man, the coefficients for “Gender”, 
“Children” and “Interaction Gender*Children” need to be added. 
If one looks at the separate estimation results for males and females in Table 4.5, it is only 
possible to compare individuals of the same gender with different values of the “Children” 
variable, but it is not possible to compare males and females. However, one would expect that 
the estimates of the “Children” variable in the estimation for the complete sample correspond 
to the estimates of the “Children” variable in the estimation for males only and that the sum 
of the estimates of the “Children” variable and the interaction term “Interaction 
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Gender*Children” in the combined estimation is similar to the estimates of the “Children” 
variable in the equation for females only. It can easily be seen in Table 4.5 that the estimation 
results for the complete sample and the two sub-samples are indeed very similar. 
I find that children have a stronger influence on the church membership decisions of women 
than that of men. This can be seen from the Wald-χ
2
 test statistic of the “Children” variable. 
The χ
2
-values of the first three values of the “Children” variable are larger for women than 
for men. 
The dummy variable “Gender” is not significant, which suggests that there is no significant 
difference in the odds of disaffiliating from the church between childless men and women, 
thereby lending support to hypothesis H 5. This finding can be repeated when one uses the 
variables measuring the church tax instead of the price of church membership (results are not 
reported) and in the estimation results for each single year of church disaffiliations (see Table 
A.5 in the appendix). 
However, the estimation results suggest that there are differences between men and women 
when children are present. For men I find that those who are fathers have higher odds of 
disaffiliation than men without children, but becoming a parent, in particular if children are 
already present, reduces the odds. While the effect for being a parent is significant, the effect 
of having (another) child is not. 
For women, the situation is different. Being a mother significantly reduces the odds of 
disaffiliation in comparison to both fathers and childless women. The effect of having the first 
child is also negative compared to not having children, but only marginally significant. In 
contrast, having an additional child decreases the odds of disaffiliation significantly, even 
stronger than for men. 
These findings suggest that it is enlightening not only to look at differences between men and 
women, but to interact gender with the family situation. By doing so, hypothesis H 4 is partly 
supported: the effect of having an (additional) child seems to be negative for both genders, 
while being a parent reduces the odds of disaffiliating only for women but increases them for 
men. Hypothesis H 6 is backed empirically: The size of the effect of children on church 
disaffiliation is greater for women than for men.
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 When looking at the results for disaffiliation in a single year in Table A.5 in the appendix, the estimates are 
more heterogeneous. There is some support that being a parent decreases the odds of disaffiliation for mothers, 
while the estimates for fathers change sign. For the other cases (have more or fewer children in the household) 
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4.7.4 Socio-economic variables 
Table 4.6 shows the estimation results for the two socio-economic variables “Main source of 
income” and “Denomination”. Concerning the main source of income, I expect that 
individuals working in agriculture are the least likely to leave the church, while taxpayers who 
receive income from business activity profess a comparably high probability to leave the 
church. With respect to denomination the hypothesis is that Catholics are less likely to 
disaffiliate than Protestants. 
 
Table 4.6: Estimation results for main source of income and denomination for the complete 
sample and for males and females separately 
 Complete sample Subsample males Subsample females 
 Model 1a Model 1a Model 1a 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
Main source of 
income 
      
Wage  ref. --- ref. --- ref. --- 
Agriculture and 
forestry 
-1.866 87.249 
(0.000) 
-2.050 112.402 
(0.000) 
-0.771 1.868 
(0.172) 
Business activity 0.220 57.466 
(0.000) 
0.196 29.669 
(0.000) 
0.262 27.211 
(0.000) 
Capital -0.214 11.754 
(0.001) 
-0.241 7.670 
(0.006) 
-0.197 4.822 
(0.028) 
Other -0.074 1.982 
(0.159) 
-0.060 0.651 
(0.420) 
-0.093 1.543 
(0.214) 
Denomination       
Protestant ref. --- ref. --- ref. --- 
Catholic -0.357 220.105 
(0.000) 
-0.401 160.926 
(0.000) 
-0.297 64.017 
(0.000) 
Sample size 165,146  85,779  79,367  
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: All estimations include intercept, price of church membership, income, age dummy, 
dummy for children, regional dummies and mobility. The estimation for the complete sample 
also includes a dummy for gender and the interaction of gender and children. Bold 
coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
there is also a diverse picture, which might be due to the fact that the estimations for one year only take into 
account changes in the number of children in the household that happen in the year of disaffiliation, while the 
estimations in Table 4.5 cover changes over the whole period from 2001 to 2005. This suggests that having more 
or less children in the household does not necessarily have an immediate effect on church membership. 
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4.7.4.1 Main source of income 
I find that I can fully support hypothesis H 9 concerning the effect of different sources of 
income. There are sizable differences in the probability to disaffiliate between individuals 
generating income from agriculture and forestry and those whose main source of income is 
business activity. The estimated coefficient of -1.866 for “Agriculture and forestry” means 
that the odds of disaffiliation of persons whose main source of income is from agriculture and 
forestry are reduced by a factor of 6.5 (or 84.5 %) compared to wage earners, while the 
estimate of 0.220 for “Business activity” implies that the odds are 24.7 % higher compared to 
wage earners if the main income source is business activity. Translated to the model 
individual, the probability of disaffiliation is around 1.6 % if he works in agriculture and 
forestry and 11.6 % if he mainly has income from business activity. In addition, I find a 
significantly reduced probability of disaffiliation for individuals whose main source of income 
is capital or rent and leasing. Their odds of disaffiliation are reduced by 19.2 % in comparison 
to wage earners. 
Direction and size of the effect of capital income and income from business activity as the 
main income sources are the substantially the same for males and females. However, the 
effect of income from agriculture and forestry as the main income source is smaller for 
women – although still negative compared to wage earners – and insignificant, while it is 
highly significant for males.  
The results appear to be very robust both when estimations are performed with the church tax 
variables instead of the price of church membership (results not shown) and in the estimations 
for each single year of church disaffiliations (see Table A.5 in Appendix D.2). 
4.7.4.2 Denomination 
Catholics are found to be significantly less likely to leave the church than Protestants, thereby 
supporting hypothesis H 7. The effect of the dummy variable for “Denomination” is very 
stable over different variants of the estimation and is of considerable size. The coefficient 
of -0.357 implies that being Catholic decreases the odds of disaffiliation by around 30.0 %. 
For the example of the model individual this means that his probability of disaffiliation is on 
average 9.5 % as a Catholic but 13.0 % as a Protestant. 
The difference between denominations seems to be a bit larger for men than for women. 
While for men being Catholic reduces the odds of disaffiliation by 33.1 %, it reduces them by 
only 25.7 % for women. This finding is contrary to expectations. However, it might be due to 
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the choice of the sample: probably unmarried women with their own income find themselves 
in some conflict with traditional church teachings, even more so when they are Catholic as 
compared to Protestant. 
4.7.5 Regional variables 
The results concerning the federal state of residence and mobility can be found in Table 4.7. 
Concerning the “Land” I expect that individuals living in more urban areas, especially in 
large cities, are more likely to leave the church than people in rural areas (hypothesis H 12). 
With respect to “Mobility”, I have formulated hypothesis H 13 that individuals who are 
mobile are more likely to disaffiliate than those who do not change the federal state of 
residence. 
 
Table 4.7: Estimation results for federal state of residence and mobility for the complete 
sample and for males and females separately 
 Complete sample Subsample males Subsample females 
 Model 1a Model 1a Model 1a 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
Land       
North Rhine- 
Westphalia 
ref. --- ref. --- ref. --- 
Baden-
Württemberg 
-0.160 17.257 
(0.000) 
-0.079 2.456 
(0.117) 
-0.277 20.849 
(0.000) 
Bavaria -0.082 5.715 
(0.017) 
-0.138 8.970 
(0.003) 
-0.006 0.015 
(0.902) 
Bremen 0.725 125.448 
(0.000) 
0.736 67.026 
(0.000) 
0.717 58.689 
(0.000) 
Hamburg 1.013 289.150 
(0.000) 
1.068 166.642 
(0.000) 
0.965 125.965 
(0.000) 
Hesse 0.102 5.609 
(0.018) 
0.062 1.177 
(0.278) 
0.156 5.640 
(0.018) 
Lower Saxony 0.068 2.410 
(0.121) 
0.037 0.396 
(0.529) 
0.114 2.885 
(0.089) 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
-0.203 14.958 
(0.000) 
-0.134 4.057 
(0.044) 
-0.312 13.111 
(0.000) 
Saarland -0.323 19.538 
(0.000) 
-0.301 10.329 
(0.001) 
-0.345 8.803 
(0.003) 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
0.305 27.928 
(0.000) 
0.389 28.353 
(0.000) 
0.198 4.385 
(0.036) 
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Berlin 1.256 651.065 
(0.000) 
1.344 384.555 
(0.000) 
1.175 268.604 
(0.000) 
Brandenburg 0.099 1.020 
(0.313) 
0.017 0.017 
(0.895) 
0.207 1.803 
(0.179) 
Mecklenburg-  
W. Pomerania 
0.141 1.706 
(0.192) 
0.050 0.149 
(0.700) 
0.236 2.204 
(0.138) 
Saxony 0.147 4.270 
(0.039) 
0.074 0.610 
(0.435) 
0.252 5.460 
(0.020) 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.285 8.471 
(0.004) 
0.245 3.580 
(0.059) 
0.342 5.189 
(0.023) 
Thuringia -0.399 21.583 
(0.000) 
-0.476 18.206 
(0.000) 
-0.283 4.342 
(0.037) 
Mobility       
No mobility ref. --- ref. --- ref. --- 
West-West 1.461 1208.793 
(0.000) 
1.447 677.611 
(0.000) 
1.484 528.827 
(0.000) 
West-East 3.505 1676.500 
(0.000) 
3.487 983.255 
(0.000) 
3.533 689.637 
(0.000) 
East-East 2.454 115.804 
(0.000) 
2.542 71.311 
(0.000) 
2.356 45.726 
(0.000) 
East-West 0.919 55.246 
(0.000) 
1.036 38.019 
(0.000) 
0.814 20.139 
(0.000) 
Sample size 165,146  85,779  79,367  
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: All estimations include intercept, price of church membership, income, age dummy, 
dummy for children, main source of income and denomination. The estimation for the 
complete sample also includes a dummy for gender and the interaction of gender and 
children. Bold coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
4.7.5.1 Federal state of residence 
There are strong and highly significant differences in the propensity to leave the church 
between the German Länder, even after controlling for a battery of individual-level variables, 
most notably denomination. Results for each Land in Table 4.7 need to be interpreted as 
differences in the propensity to renounce church membership in comparison to the reference 
Land North Rhine-Westphalia. North Rhine-Westphalia was chosen as a reference because it 
is the largest Land in terms of inhabitants. The highest propensity to disaffiliate is found for 
people living in Berlin, followed by the two city states Hamburg and Bremen. The results also 
show that in West Germany the odds of disaffiliating are particularly high in the Northern 
German Land Schleswig-Holstein and take on medium values in the Northern German Land 
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Lower Saxony as well as the central German Länder Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia. In 
contrast, disaffiliation rates are comparably low in the South-West of Germany (Saarland and 
Rhineland-Palatinate) as well as in the South (Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria). 
Turning now to the East German Länder, I find that all of them but one show higher odds of 
disaffiliation than North Rhine-Westphalia, although the differences are only significant for 
Saxony-Anhalt. The estimated coefficients of the dummy variables for the East German 
Länder lie between those for Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein. An exception within East 
Germany is the Land Thuringia, where the odds of opting out of church are low, comparable 
to those of the Länder in the South-West of Germany.
91
 
The general pattern of results also appears in the estimations for males and females separately 
(see Table 4.7) and in all estimations for individual years (see Table A.5 in the appendix), 
with only few divergent results. The results by gender in Table 4.7 suggest that East German 
women are somewhat more likely to leave the church than West German women (while 
controlling for all other variables) while East German men have a probability of disaffiliation 
which is comparable to that of men from the Länder in the northern and central parts of West 
Germany. 
The finding from Table 4.7, in particular the highly significant and sizable effects for the city 
states, lend some support to hypothesis H 12 that people living in large cities have a higher 
propensity to disaffiliate than people living in more rural areas. Looking at the model 
individual, I pointed out already that his probability of church disaffiliation is 9.5 % when the 
dummy for the Land is in the reference category North Rhine-Westphalia. This probability 
increases to 26.9 % if he instead lives in Berlin. In other words, the odds of disaffiliation 
increase by 251 %. Since the same pattern is also found in the sub-samples of males and 
females and for individual years, the support for high disaffiliation rates in city states is 
strong. 
However, if only the non-city states are considered, the influence of urbanization is hard to 
detect. It is not possible to include urbanization directly in the estimation. In order to check if 
there is a correlation between urbanization and the propensity to leave the church, I compare 
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 When interpreting the Länder dummy variables one should keep in mind that the effect of being Catholic is 
already measured separately. As I discussed earlier, being Catholic significantly decreases the odds of 
disaffiliation. The regional differences in disaffiliation cannot simply be attributed to the higher share of 
Catholics in regions where disaffiliation rates are low. Since in the Länder in the South and South-West of 
Germany the majority of church members are Catholic, while in the North and East of Germany the majority are 
Protestant, the actual differences in average disaffiliation rates will be even larger than what the results for the 
single Länder suggest.  
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the estimation results for the different Länder with data on the urbanization of each Land. I 
take into consideration the percentage of the population in each Land that lives in cities with 
more than 50,000 inhabitants as well as the percentage of the population living in 
municipalities with less than 3,000 inhabitants. Data are reported in Table 4.8.
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 In order to 
ease the comparison with the regression results, I repeat the estimation coefficients of the 
Länder dummies for the complete sample in the second column of Table 4.8. 
On the one hand, some Länder with low urbanization rates such as Saarland and Rhineland-
Palatinate do indeed show the lowest disaffiliation rates. On the other hand, the odds of 
disaffiliation are high for people living in Schleswig-Holstein, although this Land is also 
rather rural; and in North Rhine-Westphalia the estimated probability of disaffiliation is 
smaller than one would expect given the high density of agglomerations. For East Germany, 
urbanization does not help to explain the exceptionality of Thuringia, which has an average 
level of rurality among East German Länder. In sum, there is at best mixed evidence that 
people living in rural regions have a lower probability of church disaffiliation. 
However, it might also be the case that the social pressure does not depend primarily on the 
rurality of the region of residence, but on the average church membership rates in the area. 
Therefore I compare the estimation results with the share of Catholics, Protestants and both 
denominations together in each Land.
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 Data for this model are reported in Table 4.8. 
The results unambiguously show that there is a strong relationship between the share of 
church members in 2001 (Catholic and Protestant taken together) and the estimated effect of 
the Länder on the propensity to disaffiliate. For West Germany, the correlation between the 
share of church members and the regression coefficients for the Länder dummy variables is    
-.98 – in other words, there is almost perfect negative correlation between the share of church 
members and the propensity to leave the church. The result is also stable with respect to the 
inclusion and exclusion of Berlin. Furthermore, the result is strongly driven by the share of 
Catholics, while it is substantially unrelated to the share of Protestants. This is because the 
total percentage of church members is highly correlated with the share of Catholics (r=.82 in 
West Germany when Berlin is included), but unrelated to the share of Protestants (r=-.07 in 
West Germany when Berlin is included). In sum, it appears that a high share of Catholics in 
the region prevents individuals from disaffiliating. 
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 Data are taken from the Federal Statistical Office and refer to December 31st, 2004 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2006: 40-41). 
93
 Data are taken from the statistical department of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD, 2003a: 8) and 
refer to December 31st, 2001. 
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Table 4.8: Regression coefficients (taken from model 1a for the complete sample), share of 
urban and rural population, religious composition, and regulations for church disaffiliation by 
Land 
Land 
regres-
sion 
coeffi-
cient 
inhabi-
tants 
city   
(> 
50,000) 
inhabi-
tants 
rural 
(< 
3,000) 
% 
Protes-
tant 
% 
Catho-
lic 
% 
church 
mem-
bers 
autho-
rity for 
disaffi-
liation  
fee for 
disaffi-
liation 
in 2002 
(euro) 
Thuringia -0.399 20.1 27.6 26.1 8.1 34.3 DC 0 
Saarland -0.323 17.1 0 20.0 65.3 85.3 DC 
/CRO 
30.70 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
-0.203 22.4 37.1 31.9 46.9 78.8 CRO 20.45 
Baden-
Württemberg 
-0.160 27.1 5.8 34.0 38.0 72.1 CRO differs 
by city 
Bavaria -0.082 25.3 15.2 21.7 58.0 79.7 CRO 31 
North Rhine- 
Westphalia 
0 63.4 0.0 28.6 43.0 71.6 DC 0 
Lower Saxony 0.068 28.5 10.1 52.0 17.9 69.8 CRO 24 
Brandenburg 0.099 15.3 11.4 19.2 3.1 22.3 DC 0 
Hesse 0.102 30.3 1.3 41.3 25.6 67.0 DC 20 
Mecklenburg-
W. Pomerania 
0.131 27.7 34.1 18.4 3.4 21.8 CRO 10 
Saxony 0.147 34.0 9.6 21.6 3.7 25.2 CRO 20.45 
Saxony-     
Anhalt 
0.285 21.8 30.5 15.7 4.1 19.7 CRO 20.45 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
0.305 24.0 26.7 56.3 6.1 62.3 CRO 10 
Bremen 0.725 100.0 0.0 44.1 12.2 56.4 CRO 0 
Hamburg 1.013 100.0 0.0 32.2 10.1 42.3 CRO 20 
Berlin 1.256 100.0 0.0 22.0 9.2 31.2 DC 0 
Data sources: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006; EKD (2003a); Statistisches Bundesamt (2006); 
own calculations. 
Note: DC=district court, CRO=civil registry office. 
 
The low average share of church adherents and the very low share of Catholics might also be 
reasons for the above-average church disaffiliation rates in East Germany. Church 
disaffiliations are usually not rejected by society and do not entail significant social 
disadvantages in East Germany. However, this pattern of explanation reaches its limits when 
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it comes to the exceptionality of Thuringia. In fact, Thuringia has the highest share of church 
members and the highest share of Catholics of all East German Länder, which might serve as 
an explanation why the propensity to renounce church membership is below the East German 
average; however, it does not explain why Thuringians have the lowest estimated probability 
of disaffiliation of all Länder in Germany, because in comparison to Länder in the South and 
South-West of Germany church membership in Thuringia is exceptionally low – church 
members are a minority here. 
I discussed earlier that the dummy variables for the Länder are also intended to capture the 
transaction costs for church disaffiliation, which consist of the time necessary to go to the 
state authority that accepts declarations of church disaffiliation (district courts or civil registry 
offices) and the fees for disaffiliation. Information on the responsible state authorities as well 
as fees in the year 2002 can be found in the last two columns of Table 4.8. Information on 
changes over time between 2001 and 2006 can be found in Appendix B. 
The reason why the authority that accepts declarations of church disaffiliation matters is that 
usually there are more civil registry offices than district courts in a certain area, i.e. the 
distance to the civil registry office is often shorter than to the district court. In addition, civil 
registry offices are usually on the same premises as other offices run by the municipality, such 
as the registration office (“Einwohnermeldeamt”) or the administration of (small) 
municipalities. Therefore it seems likely that individuals have more opportunities to go to the 
civil registry office than to the district court. However, when looking at the connection 
between the estimated coefficients of the Länder dummies and the authorities responsible for 
declarations of church disaffiliations, there appears to be very little correlation. District courts 
are responsible in Saarland, which has very low disaffiliation rates, but also in North Rhine-
Westphalia and Hesse, which have rather high disaffiliation rates compared to other West 
German Länder and even in Berlin, where disaffiliation rates are very high. For East 
Germany, the estimated coefficients of Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
differ only minimally, although in the former the district court and in the latter the civil 
registry office is responsible. In sum, there is hardly any evidence that going to the district 
court entails higher transaction costs than going to the civil registry office. 
There appears to be a moderate negative correlation between the estimation coefficients and 
the fees in the West German Länder, indicating that the propensity to disaffiliate is low where 
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fees are high. The costs are comparably high in Saarland, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg
94
, 
while they are lower in Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen and Berlin. In contrast to that, there is – 
if anything – a positive correlation in East Germany and some Länder stand out as exceptions: 
Hamburg, which has a high disaffiliation rate despite the comparably high costs and 
Thuringia, which has the lowest rate although there are no fees. As a result, I cannot find 
enough evidence to show that the costs of disaffiliation are prohibitively high in some Länder. 
However, the results do not contradict this hypothesis either. 
4.7.5.2 Mobility 
The effects of mobility between German Länder are all found to be positive, very sizable and 
highly significant. Thereby the results lend support to hypothesis H 13, which states that 
mobility increases the probability of disaffiliation. 
The highest odds of disaffiliation are found for individuals moving from West Germany to 
East Germany. The size of the effect is exceptional; in fact, the coefficient of 3.505 for the 
dummy variable “West-East” in Table 4.7 suggests that the odds of disaffiliation are 32 times 
higher for someone who moves than for someone who stays. The probability to disaffiliate of 
the model individual is estimated at almost 78 % if he moves from West Germany to East 
Germany, in contrast to 9.5 % if he does not move. Moving within East Germany also 
significantly increases the probability of disaffiliation; the odds ratio is over 10 times higher 
than for someone who stays. 
The effect of interregional mobility within West Germany is smaller, but still sizable. The 
odds increase by a factor of 3.3. For the model individual this implies an increase in the 
probability of disaffiliation from 9.5 % to 31 %. The smallest effect of mobility is found for 
those individuals who move from East Germany to West Germany. Here the odds of opting 
out of church increase by the factor 1.5. 
Looking at the results for males and females separately, the results for the mobility dummies 
are very similar to the results for the complete sample.  
In general, the findings imply that mobility is a decisive factor in church membership 
decisions. The high relevance is not only due to the exceptional size of the effects, but also the 
fact that in modern society mobility is steadily increasing. As far as I am aware, mobility is up 
to now largely neglected in research on church disaffiliations in Germany or the effects are 
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 Baden-Württemberg is the only Land where fees vary between cities. They are also comparably high. Petersen 
(2010: 137) reports that they are in the range of 15 to 60 euro. 
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negated as in Feige (1976). Although I agree with Feige (1976) that mobility itself is not the 
reason for leaving the church, it seems to be an important trigger. 
A possible reason why mobility and church disaffiliation often coincide is that church 
disaffiliation requires some paperwork, such as going to the civil registry office or the district 
court. When individuals move, they have to register their new residence at the registration 
office (“Einwohnermeldeamt”). The registration office is run by the city, as is the civil 
registry office (“Standesamt”). In some cities, the two authorities are in the same building, so 
it might be easy to go to the civil registry office if one has to go to the registration office 
anyway. This might be a good opportunity to disaffiliate from the church if this has been on 
the individual’s mind already. However, it needs to be mentioned that the two state authorities 
are not the same, i.e. one cannot register the new residence and disaffiliate from the church 
during the same appointment. In some cities, the two authorities are also located in different 
places. 
Since the regulations concerning where to carry out the church disaffiliation differ between 
the Länder, I use this difference and test whether more people disaffiliate when they move to 
a Land where church disaffiliation can be carried out in the civil registry office (as compared 
to the district court). Which regulation applies in which Land can be found in Appendix B. I 
create a dummy variable capturing whether an individual who moves needs to disaffiliate at 
the civil registry office or the district court, which is intended to capture how easy it is to 
disaffiliate while moving.
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 The results can be found in Table 4.9. 
The dummy variable for the authority responsible for disaffiliation is significant and shows 
the expected sign, i.e. individuals are more likely to disaffiliate if they move to a place where 
they can disaffiliate at the civil registry office instead of going to the district court. However, 
the size of the effect is moderate, increasing the odds by 21 %, while the effects for mobility 
are slightly reduced, but are still very large and significant. 
Another possible explanation for the large likelihood of disaffiliations in connection with 
mobility is that church membership is not correctly registered when individuals move. 
However, whether this is the case cannot be tested with the Taxpayer Panel data set. 
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 An exception is the Land Bremen where disaffiliation is declared at the civil registry office, but must also be 
declared to the religious community. Since this regulation prevents individuals from disaffiliating when they 
register their new residence, I treat Bremen as if the disaffiliation takes place at the district court. 
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Table 4.9: Estimation results for the complete sample with and without a dummy variable 
indicating the public authority responsible for declarations of church disaffiliation (extract of 
results for mobility) 
 Complete sample Complete sample 
 Model 1a Model 1a - extension 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
Mobility     
No mobility ref. --- ref. --- 
West-West 1.461 1208.793 
(0.000) 
1.335 465.895 
(0.000) 
West-East 3.505 1676.500 
(0.000) 
3.410 1378.529 
(0.000) 
East-East 2.454 115.804 
(0.000) 
2.392 109.340 
(0.000) 
East-West 0.919 55.246 
(0.000) 
0.804 37.673 
(0.000) 
Responsible authority for church 
disaffiliation 
    
District court   ref. --- 
Civil registry office   0.193 7.946 
(0.005) 
Sample size 165,146  165,146  
-2 Log L (constant only) 2,769,469  2,769,469  
-2 Log L (constant and covariates) 2,426,852  2,426,521  
Likelihood-Ratio χ
2
  342,617  
(53 df) 
 342,948  
(54 df) 
 
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: All estimations include intercept, price of church membership, income, age dummy, 
dummy for children, dummy for gender, the interaction of gender and children, main source 
of income, denomination and regional dummies. Areas shaded in grey refer to variables that 
are not included in the estimation for the particular model. Bold coefficients are significant at 
the 1 percent level. 
 
The estimation results show that moving within or into East Germany has a larger effect on 
the decision to leave the church then moving within or into West Germany. I can only 
speculate about the reasons. First, it should be noted that inhabitants of Berlin, who exhibit 
the highest odds of disaffiliation, are counted as East Germans. Consequently, some part of 
the effect of migration to East Germany could be driven by individuals moving from (possibly 
more rural) areas to the city of Berlin. Second, it might be true that both the social pressure 
and the benefits of church membership are perceived to be lower in East Germany, such that 
the new living situation implies a re-consideration of benefits and costs of membership. This 
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could explain why moving in the opposite direction, from East to West Germany, has a 
smaller estimated effect, and is even smaller than moving within West Germany: maybe 
individuals are aware that church membership is important in some regions of West Germany 
for integration into the community, for finding a kindergarten or getting a job. 
4.7.6 Estimation results for West and East Germany separately 
In Table 4.10 I report separate results for my main variables (the price of church membership 
and income) for the subsamples of West Germany and East Germany, both estimated with the 
standard operationalization of the price of church membership (“Model 1a”). Based on the 
complete sample as described in Section 4.5.2, all individuals who lived in one of the West 
(East) German Länder in 2001 are included in the estimation for West (East) Germany. The 
results for the complete sample are reported again in order to facilitate comparisons. 
Summary statistics for the subsamples of West and East Germany are reported in Table A.1 in 
Appendix D.1. The complete table of results including all demographic, socio-economic and 
regional variables can be found in Table A.6 in Appendix D.3. The main hypotheses to be 
tested in this section are that the effect of church taxes on the decision to leave the church is 
smaller in East Germany than in West Germany (hypothesis H 11), and that there are no 
significant differences with respect to demographic, socio-economic and regional variables 
(hypothesis H 10). 
 
Table 4.10: Estimation results for price of church membership and income for the complete 
sample and for the subsamples of West Germany and East Germany separately 
 Complete sample West Germany East Germany 
 Model 1a Model 1a Model 1a 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
Intercept -2.072 2535.800 
(0.000) 
-2.119 2373.874 
(0.000) 
-1.373 220.953 
(0.000) 
Price of church 
membership 
      
Price 2001 0.059 125.619 
(0.000) 
0.061 111.981 
(0.000) 
0.029 6.927 
(0.009) 
Dummy Price 
2001 positive 
0.022 0.5388 
(0.463) 
0.047 2.107 
(0.147) 
-0.187 7.206 
(0.007) 
  Price 0.055 164.905 
(0.000) 
0.057 155.832 
(0.000) 
0.026 6.456 
(0.011) 
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Income       
Income 2001 -0.000 0.0261 
(0.872) 
-0.000 0.090 
(0.764) 
0.001 0.329 
(0.566) 
  Income -0.002 8.334 
(0.004) 
-0.002 6.521 
(0.011) 
-0.003 2.739 
(0.098) 
Sample size 165,146  144,675  20,471  
-2 Log L       
(constant only) 
2,769,469  2,518,574  243,573  
-2 Log L       
(constant and 
covariates) 
2,426,852  2,205,089  216,683  
Likelihood-Ratio 
χ
2
  
342,617 
(53 df) 
 313,485 
(51 df) 
 26,890 
(51 df) 
 
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: All estimations include intercept, age dummy, dummy for gender, dummy for children, 
interaction of gender and children, main source of income, denomination, regional dummies 
and mobility. Bold coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
4.7.6.1 Price of church membership and income 
For the sample of individuals living in West Germany, I find that the previous results 
concerning the price of church membership are confirmed. Both the price of membership in 
2001 and the change between 2001 and 2005 have a significant positive effect on the 
probability of disaffiliation, thereby lending further support to hypothesis H 1. I also find an 
economically small negative effect of an increase in income between 2001 and 2005, in 
particular when I apply model 1d which differentiates between positive and negative changes 
in the price of church membership (results not shown), which is in line with hypothesis H 2. 
For East Germany, the picture is somewhat different. I still find a significant positive effect of 
the price of church membership in 2001 and a marginally significant effect of a change in 
price on the probability to disaffiliate, but the sizes of the effects are smaller than in West 
Germany. In addition, the dummy variable indicating whether someone has to pay for his or 
her church membership in 2001 (“Dummy Price 2001 positive”) is significant and negative, 
suggesting that it is rather the people who do not have to pay for their membership who leave. 
Only if the church tax is very high, the effect of the amount paid exceeds the effect of the 
dummy variables and a high cost of membership increases the probability of leaving the 
church. To summarize, hypothesis H 1 receives mixed support in East Germany: a high price 
of membership does not necessarily increase the probability of disaffiliation. In turn, this 
means that hypothesis H 11 is supported, which states that the effect of the price of church 
membership on disaffiliation is smaller in East Germany. 
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The income and the change in income are insignificant for the sample of East Germans, but 
like in West Germany the estimate for a change in income is negative. However, the evidence 
is not convincing enough to support hypothesis H 2 for East Germany. 
4.7.6.2 Demographic variables 
The age profiles of disaffiliation are quite similar in both parts of the country, with one 
significant difference: while in West Germany I find a small and insignificant increase in the 
probability of disaffiliation from the youngest to the second youngest age group, there is a 
sizeable and highly significant decrease in the odds of disaffiliation for East Germany. For the 
other age groups, the developments in East and West Germany proceed similarly. The age 
effects can be seen in Figure 4.3. This figure was developed by setting the age dummy at each 
discrete value while keeping all other variables constant at their respective sample averages. 
 
Figure 4.3: Age profile of the probability of church disaffiliation for East Germans and West 
Germans 
 
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
 
Figure 4.3 clearly shows differences between the two parts of Germany when moving from 
the youngest to the second youngest cohort. The two graphs also make clear that the 
probability of disaffiliation in East Germany is above the probability in West Germany in all 
age groups – always assuming that all other variables are at their respective mean values.  
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The results suggest that church disaffiliations in East Germany take place at an earlier stage of 
the individual’s life than in West Germany. Hypothesis H 3, which states that the age profile 
of disaffiliations peaks around age 30, receives some support with respect to West Germany, 
but not with respect to East Germany. 
The gender and children variables and their interaction require a detailed discussion. 
Hypothesis H 5, which states that men and women without children have the same probability 
of disaffiliation, is supported for both parts of the country. In contrast, hypothesis H 4, which 
states that being or becoming a parent decreases the probability of disaffiliation, receives 
mixed support. The estimated coefficients for men and women in East Germany and women 
in West Germany are in line with hypothesis H 4, although only some coefficients are 
significant at conventional levels. However, for West German men H 4 can be rejected. 
Hypothesis H 6 receives support in West Germany only: being or becoming a parent has a 
larger negative effect on the probability of disaffiliation for women than for men. This can be 
seen from the negative interaction term “Interaction Gender*Children” (although it has to be 
noted that this interaction is significant only in the case of being a parent and having no 
additional children). However, for East Germany the interaction terms are never significant, 
indicating no difference in the probability of disaffiliation between men and women when 
children are present. 
To sum up, one can say that having children seems to reduce the odds of leaving the church 
for most individuals, with the exception of men in West Germany. Gender differences cannot 
be found for individuals without children. When children are present, gender differences 
appear to exist in West Germany, but not in East Germany. 
4.7.6.3 Socio-economic variables 
Another interesting finding is that in East Germany there is no significant difference in the 
inclination to leave the church between Protestants and Catholics, thereby refuting hypothesis 
H 7. The estimate for the dummy variable for Catholics is small and even positive, indicating 
a slightly higher probability of disaffiliation for Catholics in East Germany, but far from any 
relevant level of significance. In contrast, in line with hypothesis H 7 there is a large and 
highly significant difference in the probability of disaffiliation between Protestants and 
Catholics in West Germany. 
For West Germany, my findings from the complete sample concerning the main source of 
income are confirmed: individuals who receive mainly income from agriculture and forestry 
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or capital income have a low inclination to leave the church, whereas those whose main 
source of income is from business activity profess the highest probability of dropping out of 
church. The results reinforce the support for hypothesis H 9. For East Germany, the evidence 
is mixed. I find that individuals receiving mainly income from agriculture and forestry are 
least likely to disaffiliate, however, there is no evidence that individuals whose main source of 
income is business activity are particularly likely to leave the church. 
4.7.6.4 Regional variables 
Concerning the effects of the region of residence and mobility, the separate regressions repeat 
the results of the model for Germany as a whole.
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 Interregional mobility is again found to 
have a significant and positive effect on the probability of disaffiliation. This sustains the 
support for hypothesis H 13. 
To sum up, I find some similarities, but also differences in the variables affecting the church 
disaffiliation decision in East and West Germany. In particular, I find the price of church 
membership to be less important for the membership decision in East Germany, which 
supports hypothesis H 11. In addition, I find that in East Germany the probability of 
disaffiliation peaks at a younger age and I cannot detect the typical gender roles in the church 
membership decision when children are in the household, which seem to exist in West 
Germany. Therefore, hypothesis H 10, which states that church membership decisions do not 
differ between East and West Germany, is not supported. 
4.7.7 Estimation results for Protestants and Catholics separately 
The results so far have revealed that Protestants and Catholics differ significantly in the 
probability of disaffiliation from church – at least in West Germany. However, the results do 
not reveal whether they differ in their reaction to changes in the price of church membership 
and income and in the effects of socio-economic and regional variables. Therefore I present 
separate results for the subsamples of Protestants and Catholics in Table 4.11. Summary 
statistics can be found in Table A.2 in Appendix D.1. The complete table of results including 
all demographic, socio-economic and regional variables can be found in Table A.7 in 
Appendix D.3. 
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 When comparing East and West Germany, one has to keep in mind that at the reference values (which are 
“North Rhine-Westphalia” and “Saxony” for the variable “Land”) the estimated probability of disaffiliation is 
higher for East Germans compared to West Germans, which can be seen from the difference in the intercepts. 
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The results in Table 4.11 confirm hypothesis H 7, which states that on average the probability 
of disaffiliation is lower for Catholics than for Protestants. This can be seen from the 
difference in the intercepts. 
 
Table 4.11: Estimation results for price of church membership and income for the complete 
sample and for the subsamples of Protestants and Catholics separately 
 Complete sample Protestants Catholics 
 Model 1a Model 1a Model 1a 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
Intercept -2.072 2535.800 
(0.000) 
-1.906 1342.749 
(0.000) 
-2.588 1940.707 
(0.000) 
Price of church 
membership 
      
Price 2001 0.059 125.619 
(0.000) 
0.055 64.995 
(0.000) 
0.063 56.868 
(0.000) 
Dummy Price 
2001 positive 
0.022 0.5388 
(0.463) 
0.058 2.232 
(0.135) 
-0.020 0.185 
(0.667) 
  Price 0.055 164.905 
(0.000) 
0.051 85.550 
(0.000) 
0.059 63.916 
(0.000) 
Income       
Income 2001 -0.000 0.0261 
(0.872) 
0.002 1.669 
(0.196) 
-0.003 1.632 
(0.201) 
  Income -0.002 8.334 
(0.004) 
-0.001 1.383 
(0.240) 
-0.004 5.529 
(0.019) 
Sample size 165,146  86,575  78,571  
-2 Log L 
(constant only) 
2,769,469  1,480,215  1,274,641  
-2 Log L 
(constant and 
covariates) 
2,426,852  1,310,355  1,108,689  
Likelihood-Ratio 
χ
2
  
342,617 
(53 df) 
 169,860 
(52 df) 
 165,951 
(52 df) 
 
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: All estimations include intercept, age dummy, dummy for gender, dummy for children, 
interaction of gender and children, main source of income, regional dummies and mobility. 
Bold coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
4.7.7.1 Price of church membership and income 
Both the price in 2001 and the change in price have a positive and significant effect on the 
probability to leave the church for Protestants as well as Catholics, which supports hypothesis 
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H 1 and confirms the results for the complete sample. I find that both estimates are somewhat 
larger for Catholics than Protestants, but the differences between denominations are not 
substantial. The estimated coefficients for the variable “Δ Price” imply than an increase in 
the price of membership by 100 euro raises the odds of disaffiliation by 5.2 % for Protestants 
and 6.1 % for Catholics. However, the marginal effect on the probability of disaffiliation at 
sample means is 0.37 % for Protestants and 0.30 % for Catholics, pointing towards a 
somewhat smaller price effect for Catholics. The reason for these divergent results from the 
odds ratio and the probability is that at sample average values the probability of disaffiliation 
for Catholics are lower.
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 These findings suggest that hypothesis H 8, claiming that the effect 
of (a change in) the price of church membership is stronger for Protestants than Catholics, 
cannot be unambiguously supported. The conclusion depends on which indicators are used to 
report the results. In addition, the size of the effect is not substantially different, independent 
from which indicator is used. 
I find that the level of income in 2001 and the change in income between 2001 and 2005 
negatively affect the probability of disaffiliation, but the effect is economically small and 
usually insignificant, thereby repeating earlier findings for the complete sample. Concerning 
the main type of income, the results for Catholics and Protestants are rather similar and in line 
with the findings for the complete sample. 
4.7.7.2 Demographic variables 
The age profiles of church disaffiliations for Protestants and Catholics can be seen in Figure 
4.4. The profiles are produced by setting all variables at their respective sample means, and 
varying only the age group dummies.  
The results clearly show that the probability to leave the church is higher for Protestants than 
Catholics in all age groups. The estimates indicate that on average disaffiliation from the 
Catholic Church takes place at a slightly higher age than from the Protestant Church. This can 
be seen from the moderate increase in the probability of disaffiliation between the youngest 
and second youngest age group for Catholics, while there is a small and insignificant decrease 
for Protestants. In sum, there is some evidence for a hump-shaped age profile (hypothesis H 
3) for Catholics, but not for Protestants. 
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 Remember that the change in the odds ratio is directly calculated from the estimated coefficient of the 
respective variable, while the change in the probability also depends on the coefficients and average values of all 
other variables in the regression. 
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Figure 4.4: Age profile of the probability of church disaffiliation of Protestants and Catholics 
 
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
 
Concerning gender and children, the overall pattern is similar for the two denominations, but 
some differences remain. For individuals without children I do not find any gender 
differences for Protestants, which is in line with hypothesis H 5, and I find that Catholic 
women without children even have moderately, but significantly higher odds of leaving the 
church than their male counterparts. Results suggest that fathers have higher odds of 
disaffiliation than men without children, which contradicts hypothesis H 4. Among Catholics 
the estimate is highly significant, but for the subsample of Protestants it is only significant at 
the 5 % level. In both denominations mothers have lower odds of leaving the church than both 
fathers and women without children, thereby lending support to hypothesis H 6. 
4.7.7.3 Regional variables 
For both Catholics and Protestants I find that the probability of disaffiliation is highest in the 
three city states, thereby lending further support to hypothesis H 12. The lowest likelihood of 
disaffiliation of members of both confessions is found in Thuringia, Saarland, Baden-
Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate. The relative position of North Rhine-Westphalia (the 
reference Land) varies according to which denomination one looks at. For Protestants, it 
shows average disaffiliation rates. For Catholics, the probability of disaffiliation is 
comparably low in North Rhine-Westphalia, but rather high in East Germany. Despite these 
differences, the estimates for the Länder dummy variables in the estimations for both 
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Catholics and Protestants are highly correlated with the percentage of church members and 
the percentage of Catholics in a Land, but unrelated to the percentage of Protestants (see the 
data in Table 4.8). 
The estimates for mobility are large and highly significant for both denominations, thereby 
lending support to hypothesis H 13, but all estimates except one are somewhat higher for 
Catholics than Protestants. This might reflect Catholics’ stronger ties to the local parish, 
which makes interregional mobility a good opportunity to disaffiliate.  
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4.8 Discussion 
4.8.1 Background 
The research in this chapter is among the first attempts to evaluate the influence of the 
monetary costs of church membership on the membership decision, while earlier research has 
mainly relied on interviews or surveys of either church members or individuals who have left 
the church. I am aware of only one paper that tries to answer a related research question with 
the German Taxpayer Panel (Borgloh, 2012), and of one paper that uses a similar data set for 
Finland to answer this question (Lyytikäinen and Santavirta, 2013). 
I motivate my research with a small theoretical model of church membership that accounts for 
the specific institutional arrangements in Germany – a system where churches mainly rely on 
taxes for their financing. In particular, I model church membership as a binary decision and 
account for the fact that church contributions depend on income. The model thereby 
highlights the importance of controlling for changes in income and the price of church 
membership simultaneously in order to separate the two effects. My model is more 
appropriate to explain church membership decisions in an institutional environment with 
church taxes than previous models such as Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), where individuals 
make a discretionary decision on the amount of church contributions, and religiosity is 
modeled through the time spent with religious activities. As a result, my research also differs 
from previous studies of church leaving in other countries such as the UK or Australia 
(Richter and Francis, 1998; Dixon et al., 2007) because most of them look at dropping out of 
participation rather than official disaffiliation. However, church membership and regular 
participation cannot be equated, since there is a large number of people in Germany who 
attend church only sporadically but still do not renounce their membership. In fact, on average 
only 3.6 % of Protestant church members (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, 2011b: 20) 
and around 13 % of Catholic church members (Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, 
2011: 17) regularly participated in a “normal” Sunday service in 2010. 
The precise definition of church membership in Germany, together with the fact that the 
church membership status is an obligatory statement on the income tax return, facilitates my 
research. I use the Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, a large panel data set of German taxpayers. 
The data set contains information on the church membership status for a large number of 
German taxpayers for each year, as well as income, church taxes paid and a set of socio-
demographic variables. Unfortunately, it lacks data on the education of individuals, which is 
an important characteristic that is often discussed in studies on religiosity and church 
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membership (see Engelhardt, von Loewenich and Steinacker, 1997; Te Grotenhuis and 
Scheepers, 2001; McCleary and Barro, 2006b; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2008). Because of the 
large size of the data set, I can research church disaffiliation decisions in some detail, even 
though it is a rather rare event. Results might also be interesting for other countries such as 
Denmark, parts of Switzerland or Austria where similar church financing systems are in place. 
Research on Germany is also instructive because it has a rather heterogeneous religious 
landscape. On the one hand, there are two major denominations – Catholic and Protestant – 
which face the same church tax system and have roughly similar membership numbers, but 
population shares that vary within Germany. On the other hand, there are large regional 
differences in religiosity and church membership numbers within Germany. In the area of the 
former German Democratic Republic church members are a minority, while they form the 
majority of the population in the former Federal Republic of Germany. 
4.8.2 Discussion of main findings 
My main result in the empirical component is that there is a significant positive, but moderate 
effect of an increase in the price of church membership on the probability of disaffiliation. 
Although the result cannot be directly compared to the Finnish study by Lyytikäinen and 
Santavirta (2013) due to methodological differences, the conclusions are similar: the higher 
the amount of church taxes someone has to pay, the lower the probability of being a church 
member. Furthermore, the result that the price of membership is positively correlated to the 
probability of disaffiliation coincides with the findings of Borgloh (2012) who also uses data 
from the German Taxpayer Panel. Borgloh (2012) does not measure the price directly; instead 
she develops an indicator for a price that is too high from the individual’s point of view. She 
argues that church taxes are perfect substitutes for donations. If the exogenously determined 
amount of an individual’s church taxes is too high, i.e. it exceeds the amount an individual 
would give voluntarily, then he or she will not make any donations. If church taxes increase 
further, individuals who do not donate will be more likely to drop out of church than 
individuals who make donations. Borgloh (2012) finds empirical evidence for this hypothesis 
in the Taxpayer Panel data. 
As a robustness test I present a considerable number of different regressions for subsamples. I 
can show that the effect of the price of church membership on the disaffiliation decision exists 
with similar magnitude in the subsamples of males and females and Catholics and Protestants. 
The effect also shows when one looks at church disaffiliations in a single year, however, its 
magnitude is smaller. 
208 
The moderate size of the effect of church taxes on disaffiliation sheds some doubts on earlier 
research, in particular surveys of individuals who disaffiliated from the church, which often 
ascribe a very high importance to the costs of membership. However, I cannot test if the mere 
existence of church taxes induces individuals to disaffiliate, i.e. people leave the church 
because they disagree in principle with tax financing of religious communities, independent 
from their personal tax burden. Some earlier research points in this direction. A general 
resistance against church taxes is considered one of the reasons for the high disaffiliation rates 
in East Germany when the church tax system was re-established after the German unification 
(Froese and Pfaff, 2005: 413). Birkelbach (1999: 146) finds that disaffiliation numbers peak 
when individuals start their first paid job and pay church taxes for the first time. This can, but 
need not necessarily, be due to the amount they have to pay. It can also be due to the mere 
fact that church membership is no longer for free. 
The smaller estimated coefficients of the church tax variable in the regressions for single 
years, together with the fact that the level of the price before disaffiliation is always 
significant, suggests that there is some inertia in the church membership decision. If 
individuals were perfectly rational, they would immediately react to changes in the price of 
membership. The price level, which reflects past price changes, should be insignificant. 
However, the results suggest that individuals react to a change in price with a lag. This is in 
line with the reasoning of other authors, such as Dubach (1993: 138 [my own translation]): 
“The [church] member will tolerate a certain amount of disappointments and burdens before 
he or she decides to disaffiliate”. Several explanations for inertia are possible. Maybe there is 
a lack of information about the calculation of church taxes and individuals are not aware how 
a change in their income or the income and church tax regulations affects the tax amount. 
Such a hypothesis is supported by earlier research showing that individuals in Germany only 
have a limited knowledge about church tax regulations and are often not aware how much 
they pay in taxes (Köcher, 1993: 17-20; Huber, Friedrich and Steinacker, 2006: 460; Bassler, 
2008: 315-319). Another possible explanation is that individuals do not evaluate the costs and 
benefits of church membership regularly, but only for special occasions, e.g. when they move, 
start a job or when there is media coverage of religious organizations. 
My results concerning income are in line with findings by Lyytikäinen and Santavirta (2013) 
in that both studies find only a very small effect of income on the church membership 
decision. However, while my results suggest that individuals with high income are somewhat 
less likely to disaffiliate, the data for Finland points in the opposite direction. The low 
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importance of changes in income, but significant effects for changes in the cost of 
membership, contradict the hypotheses that individuals leave the church when they move 
upward socially (which often coincides with a higher income), and that the change in the price 
of church membership which accompanies an increase in income is not the true reason for the 
disaffiliation. This conclusion is reinforced by one of my regressions which includes different 
causes for the change in price (“Model 1b”). I show that a change in the price of membership 
that is caused by a change in church tax rates has a considerably larger influence on the 
probability of disaffiliation than an increase in price for other reasons, such as a higher 
income. 
I have also tested the effects of a battery of demographic, socio-economic and regional 
variables on church membership. In line with the hypotheses derived from previous research, 
I find strong age effects. The likelihood of disaffiliation is highest in the two youngest age 
groups (below 35 years of age), and then decreases steeply and significantly up to the oldest 
group. This result is in line with Borgloh (2012) and earlier research on church disaffiliation 
in various European countries. 
Concerning gender, I cannot confirm that women generally have a lower propensity to 
disaffiliate. In my sample of unmarried individuals who mainly earn their own income, I find 
that women are as likely to drop out of church as men if they do not have children. This is in 
line with Lukatis (1991: 126-129) who reports that gender differences in church membership 
are non-existent or even reversed when one looks at working women. 
However, my research points towards traditional gender patterns when children are present in 
the household. While having children slightly decreases the propensity to disaffiliate for 
women, it increases the odds for men. This finding parallels the results of a study by Ahrens 
(2000: 105-106) who finds that having children increases the church commitment of 
Protestant women in Germany, but slightly (although not significantly) decreases the church 
commitment of men. Still, in my study the confirmation of Ahrens’ (2000) result is quite 
surprising since the sample only consists of unmarried persons who do not live according to 
the model of the family proposed by church teachings. Fathers’ higher propensity to 
disaffiliate could also be due to the fact that if parents do not live together, usually children 
live with the mothers and having children might not play a significant role when unmarried 
fathers compare the benefits and costs of church membership. 
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I also find significant and sizable regional differences in the propensity to leave the church. 
Individuals living in the three city states Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen have the highest 
probability to opt out of church. This finding lends some support to the hypothesis that even 
today there are differences in church membership decisions between rural and urban areas. 
Furthermore, I find a drop in the probability of disaffiliation between the North-East and the 
South-West of Germany. I also show that in West Germany the estimated odds of leaving the 
church for both Catholics and Protestants are highly negatively correlated with the share of 
church members and the share of Catholics in the respective Land, while it is unrelated to the 
share of Protestants. A similar result has been described by Dubach (1998: 28-29) for 
Switzerland. He shows that in a community with a large majority of Catholics, the share of 
non-members is exceptionally low compared to predominantly Protestant or mixed regions. 
Unfortunately, his study does not allow the detection of whether these differences are due to a 
low propensity to renounce church membership by Catholics, or to the high share of Catholics 
that affects members of all denominations. My own research suggests that both channels are 
important. Catholics have a lower probability to disaffiliate than Protestants, but regional 
differences remain after controlling for the denomination of the individual. These differences 
are closely related to the average share of Catholics in the region. The present study does not 
allow for the detection of how exactly the religious composition of society affects the 
individual. It might be that this connection is due to cultural traditions (Dubach, 1998: 29), or 
that in devout regions there is still a lot of social pressure exerted on people who decide to 
disaffiliate. It might also be the case that the church plays a major role in the everyday social 
life of individuals and disaffiliation entails significant restrictions in leisure activities, 
education opportunities for children and job opportunities. 
Particularly strong and positive effects on the probability of disaffiliation are measured for 
people who move between different Länder. The strongest effects are found for individuals 
who move from West to East Germany. Such a decisive role of mobility in the church 
disaffiliation process has so far not been described for Germany. However, although the size 
of the effect is surprising, the finding is in line with research from Switzerland. Dubach 
(1998: 54-56) reveals that people who have moved within the last five years are less likely to 
be church members than individuals who have stayed in the same place. The high estimated 
coefficient of the mobility variables in my research might also be due to the fact that I can 
only observe mobility between Länder, but not within one Land. Dubach (1998: 54-56) shows 
that in Switzerland individuals who have moved from one canton to another are less likely to 
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be church members than individuals who have moved within one canton or who have not 
moved at all.
98
 
The estimated increase in the odds of disaffiliation of individuals living in West Germany and 
moving to East Germany is higher than for the opposite direction. In addition, the effect is 
larger for Catholics than for Protestants. This finding could point to the importance of social 
pressure and role that religious organizations play in the everyday life of individuals. When 
people move to a different region, they lose the connection to their local parish and possibly 
also to groups of people or activities that connect them to their local church. Integrating into a 
new religious community in a different place requires some effort. When individuals move 
from West to East Germany, they might find that the church plays a minor role in the 
everyday life in East Germany and there is no social pressure to be a member in large parts of 
the East German society – thereby reducing the benefits of membership. The higher estimates 
for Catholics compared to Protestants might be explained through higher social pressure to be 
a member in predominantly Catholic regions, which makes interregional mobility a 
particularly attractive opportunity for Catholics to opt out of church. 
Furthermore, the data contradict the hypothesis of “slimming” (“Gesundschrumpfen”) of 
churches. It has sometimes been argued that when the least committed members disaffiliate, 
the remaining members have a higher church commitment and the propensity to opt out of 
church abates. However, in those regions where church membership is low – East Germany 
and the city states – the estimated probabilities of disaffiliation are high. The odds of leaving 
the church are highly negatively correlated with the share of the population that is a member 
of the church. And even though the share of church members in East Germany is among the 
lowest worldwide, it does not appear as if church disaffiliations have come to a halt - quite the 
contrary seems to be true. Catholics have the same probability of disaffiliation as Protestants 
in East Germany, although they are a small minority, even among church members. Hence, 
the present study is in line with previous research (see, for example, Pollack, 2000: 23-24; 
Schloz, 2006: 54-55) which also shows that – at least in Germany – “slim” churches are not 
those with the most loyal members. 
However, I do find that the price of church membership is less important in East Germany 
than in West Germany. Although my results show that in East Germany an increase in price 
has a small positive effect on the odds of disaffiliation, individuals who pay church taxes are 
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 Dubach (1998) only observes church membership, not church disaffiliation. Therefore it is not clear whether 
individuals leave the church after they have moved; or whether individuals who have left the church at some 
point are more likely to move later. 
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found to be less likely to leave the church than those who do not. Consequently, there is some 
indication that the sensitivity towards church taxes can vary between regions, e.g. if they 
differ significantly in the conditions of religious life. 
In my study I also considered the importance of transaction costs in the church membership 
decision. In Germany, there are two types of transaction costs. The first is the effort one has to 
make to declare church disaffiliation, i.e. one has to find out how declaring church 
disaffiliation works, where to go (civil registry office or district court) and what to bring and 
then go there during opening times. The second type of costs are the fees one has to pay for 
disaffiliation. 
In order to find out whether going to the state authority in order to declare disaffiliation is a 
significant type of transaction cost, I used the fact that in some Länder disaffiliation has to be 
declared at the civil registry office, in others at the district court. When individuals move, they 
have to register at the registration office, which is – at least in small cities – usually at the 
same premises as the civil registry office, therefore transaction costs of declaring church 
disaffiliation are low. In contrast, going to the district court is an additional effort, irrespective 
of whether someone moves. Therefore I include a dummy variable in my estimations that 
indicates for all individuals who move whether they move to a Land where church 
disaffiliation must be declared at the civil registry office or the district court. I find that the 
dummy variable is significant, indicating that individuals who can more easily declare 
disaffiliation when moving have a higher probability of disaffiliation. However, the size of the 
effect is moderate, especially when compared to the large effects of mobility in general. In 
addition, when looking at individuals who do not move one cannot see that the estimated 
coefficients for the Länder are correlated with the responsible authority, although going to the 
civil registry office should be less costly (in terms of time) than going to the district court. 
I also investigate whether the fee for disaffiliation prevents individuals from opting out of 
church. This is done by correlating the fees in each Land with the estimated regression 
coefficients for the Länder dummies. There is a moderate negative correlation for West 
German Länder, i.e. disaffiliation rates are low where the fee is high. For East Germany I do 
not find any evidence that fees prevent individuals from disaffiliating. In sum, there is at best 
moderate evidence that transaction costs, in particular fees, matter. However, the fees are 
comparably low, especially if they are contrasted with the average amount of church tax per 
year. The mild negative correlation of fees and the odds of disaffiliation might also reflect the 
213 
religiosity of the average citizen or the regional government, in that fees are fixed at a higher 
level where church disaffiliations are socially less acceptable. 
While I find moderate evidence for the importance of transaction costs, results for Finland by 
Lyytikäinen and Santavirta (2013) imply that transaction costs can have a large influence on 
church disaffiliation rates. The authors investigate the implications of a change in the Finnish 
law which made church disaffiliations easier. Before the new law was introduced in 2003, 
individuals had to declare their church disaffiliation in person and had to face people working 
for the church. After the change, disaffiliation could be declared via email or even via a 
website. The authors find that after the introduction of the website the probability of 
disaffiliation of church members increased by 730 %. 
Even in Germany there is some discussion that transaction costs matter for the church 
membership decision. Since it is in the interest of the church to have as many people as 
possible who rejoin the church, the Protestant Church has come up with some ideas how to 
make this as easy as possible. They have founded centers for re-affiliation 
(“Wiedereintrittsstellen”) where individuals can go to (instead of going to their local parish). 
Re-affiliation in those centers requires little time and church personnel are encouraged to be 
positive about people who have found their way back to the church instead of blaming them 
for disaffiliating. The evaluation of the centers for re-affiliation is generally positive. 
(Kirchenamt der EKD, 2009) Statistics show that there are far more people who re-affiliate in 
the Protestant Church compared to the Catholic Church, although I am not aware of any 
research that investigates whether this difference is due to transaction costs. 
4.8.3 Suggestions for further research 
Further research could attempt to use data sets similar to the German Taxpayer Panel or the 
data used by Lyytikäinen and Santavirta (2013) in other countries with church tax systems, 
such as Sweden or Switzerland, in order to produce internationally comparable results and to 
investigate whether there are country differences in the attitudes towards church taxes.  
It is also possible to apply different estimation strategies. While I have chosen a logit model 
and Borgloh (2012) employs a probit model (which is quite similar to a logit model in various 
ways), the authors of the Finish study use a fixed effects linear probability panel model. The 
estimation strategy used in the Finnish paper could be applied to the German data set to 
enable the comparison of results. 
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It might also be fruitful to do research on the price sensitivity of church membership with the 
help of a natural experiment, such as an increase in the church tax rate in one federal state. In 
recent times, there were only smaller changes in the tax regulations, such as adjustments of 
the maximum tax rate. The only increase in the church tax rate which I am aware of took 
place in Hamburg where the church tax rate was raised from 8 % to 9 % in the beginning of 
2001, such that I do not have data for the years when the tax rate was still 8 %. It might also 
be interesting to find out if the new tax treatment of pensions causes more elderly people to 
leave the church. Many pensioners did not have to pay income tax (and church tax) until 
2004, but since 2005 their pensions are subject to income tax (and church tax). However, the 
Taxpayer Panel is not suitable to investigate this question since individuals who did not pay 
taxes before 2005 are not included in the data set. 
In addition, the research of church membership ideally lends itself to a duration analysis. Such 
an analysis asks for how long it takes until an event (church disaffiliation) occurs and why it 
occurs earlier with some people, and later or not at all with others. The main reason why this 
type of analysis is not carried out here is that my data is heavily left-censored, i.e. I do not 
know what happened to the individuals before 2001, how long they had been church 
members, how high their income was, how much tax they had to pay, etc. Without such 
information, estimation of duration models makes little sense. However, if a dataset were 
available that allowed following people from childhood or church affiliation through their 
lives, duration models should be applied. 
Furthermore, the German data set allows investigating church membership decisions for 
married individuals. I have refrained from doing so because church membership choices of 
married couples arguably tend to be collective decisions of the partners and depend of the 
characteristics of both spouses, such as their incomes and labor force participation. While the 
partner with the higher income (usually the husband) leaves the church to save church taxes, 
the wife keeps in touch with the religious community (Daiber, 1995: 168) and therefore 
provides the opportunity for the children to become involved with the church as well 
(Birkelbach, 1999: 141). Consequently, the choice opportunities for married couples cannot 
be compared to those of single individuals. Research on married couples could for example 
ask if married couples do actually choose arrangements that maximize benefits of 
membership and minimize the costs for the family. It could also investigate whether gender 
differences in the propensity to disaffiliate do exist when individuals are married and it could 
test whether married individuals are less sensitive towards changes in the price of church 
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membership than singles, as appears to be the case in Finland (Lyytikäinen and Santavirta, 
2013). 
Apart from the contrast between singles and married individuals, the Finnish study has also 
revealed that younger people react more strongly to a change in church tax than older 
individuals and that there are differences in the price sensitivity of church membership 
between the capital region and more rural areas. My own research has shown that there are 
differences in the effect of the price of church membership on disaffiliation between East and 
West Germany. However, it might also be interesting to compare rural and urban areas. I also 
looked at Protestants and Catholics separately, but - surprisingly - could not find sizeable 
differences in the price sensitivity. The data set would also allow investigating the church 
disaffiliation decisions of different age groups. Such research could help religious 
organizations when they consider changes to the church tax regulations in order to increase 
revenues. If the Finnish finding of a very low price sensitivity of elderly church members 
could be repeated for Germany, a heavier taxation of elderly individuals would be a viable 
option. 
The data set could also prove useful to investigate the effect of significant life events such as 
marriage or divorce on church membership, since data on both church membership and civil 
status is available for all taxpayers in the sample, i.e. for a very large sample. Such a study 
could complement earlier research on the effects of these life events on religious participation 
(see, for instance, Lois, 2011b). 
Another fruitful path for further research is the focus on transaction costs. Unfortunately, in 
Germany there is not much variation in transaction costs that could be exploited, neither 
between Länder, nor over time. However, there is some variation in the fees for disaffiliation: 
North Rhine-Westphalia introduced a fee of 30 euro in 2006, Bremen introduced a fee of 5 
euro in 2009 and Thuringia introduced a fee of 30 euro in 2009 – all three Länder did not have 
a fee before. If one is interested in the effects the introduction of such a fee has on 
disaffiliation rates, one should also look at parts of the population which are underrepresented 
in my sample, such as students or individuals with low income. This is particularly interesting 
since one would expect them to be more likely to find the monetary costs of disaffiliations 
prohibitively high. In addition, it could be instructive to look in more detail at individuals who 
move (not only between Länder) and investigate whether moving and the associated 
paperwork reduces transaction costs or if there are other aspects of mobility that explain the 
extraordinarily large effects on the odds of disaffiliation that I find in my sample. 
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Finally, future research could investigate the consequences of church disaffiliation for 
individual behavior, such as donating money, volunteering or the accumulation of social 
capital. Up to now, researchers have only compared members and non-members, e.g. with 
respect to their giving behavior. However, it is unclear if this behavior changes during the 
process of disaffiliation. 
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5 VOLUNTARY GIVING IN GERMANY – THE ROLE OF CHURCH TAXES AND 
CHURCH DISAFFILIATION 
5.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter I have tested the hypothesis – derived from the model in the Chapter 
3 – that the price of church membership has an effect on the church membership decision. 
This hypothesis was supported, although the effect is moderate. 
In this chapter I go a step further and test the second set of hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical model in Chapter 3, which concern voluntary giving behavior as one example of a 
behavior that might be affected by the design of the church tax system and the church 
membership decision. The theory in Chapter 3 as well as the empirical estimations in the 
current chapter are based on the assumption that the amount paid as church taxes and 
voluntary donations are (probably imperfect) substitutes. This assumption draws upon various 
studies from Germany which reveal that the social services the church provides (for example 
for the poor, the elderly and the sick) are one of the most important reasons for being a church 
member and are expected by church members (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1993: 40; 
Schloz, 2006: 60-61; Leis-Peters, 2010: 105-108).
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Against this background, one expects that church members and non-members differ in their 
giving behavior since the former are forced to make a charitable contribution in the form of 
the church tax. In addition, church disaffiliation should affect the giving behavior since 
individuals are no longer forced to pay church taxes, which leaves them with a higher 
available income, but also with the responsibility to actively make a donation if they are 
motivated by altruistic or “warm glow” considerations. Furthermore, the discussion in 
Chapter 3 suggests that voluntary giving to religious organizations and to secular 
organizations could be affected differently by church membership and church disaffiliation. 
In order to answer the research questions I use the same data set as in the previous chapter – 
the Taxpayer Panel for the years 2001 to 2006. I apply estimation equations that are often 
used in the literature on voluntary giving, but pay special attention to measuring the influence 
of church membership and disaffiliation. 
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 However, even church-related publications (Hermelink, 2008: 113; Resing, 2011: 3) point out that the share of 
these services that is financed through church taxes might actually be over-estimated by church members. 
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: in Section 5.2 I state my research 
questions and develop the hypotheses and in Section 5.3 I review the existing literature on 
voluntary giving with a focus on church membership. The data set and the definitions of 
variables are discussed in Section 5.4 and the estimation methods are introduced in Section 
5.5. The results are presented in Section 5.6 and discussed in Section 5.7. 
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5.2 Research questions and hypotheses 
My research questions all concern the interrelation of voluntary giving (where voluntary 
giving is giving exclusive of church taxes) and church membership. The hypotheses are 
mainly derived from the model in Chapter 3. 
My first research question is:  
Do church members and non-members differ in their giving behavior, i.e. their 
probability to give and the amount given? 
From the considerations in Chapter 3 one can derive the following hypothesis: After 
controlling for income, church members are both less likely to give and they give less than 
non-members. The reason is that church members who pay church taxes (i) face reductions in 
the available income that they can freely allocate to voluntary giving and (ii) they already 
make a contribution to a (religious) charitable cause if the assumption is true that church taxes 
are (at least partly) perceived as a charitable contribution. The effect at the extensive margin, 
i.e. whether someone makes a contribution at all, is predicated on the observation that for 
some church members church taxes can be so high that they exceed the amount which they 
would give voluntarily, such that individuals are in a corner solution where they do not make 
any additional charitable contributions. Even when they are in a regular solution, one would 
expect the amount given to be lower for church members. When one considers religious and 
secular giving separately, then all individuals should be equally likely to give to secular 
causes, irrespective of their church membership status, but non-members are expected to give 
more. The reason is that the church tax is not a substitute for contributions to secular 
charitable causes, but it reduces the freely available income of the individual. Looking at 
religious causes, the model in Chapter 3 predicts that non-members are more likely to give 
and give more than church members. 
However, the hypothesis crucially depends on an assumption made in the model. I assume 
that church members and non-members have on average the same marginal utility from 
giving, characterized by    and   . In other words, they are equally altruistic or derive the 
same utility from their contributions, both religious and secular. However, this assumption 
need not be valid. The group of non-members in my sample consists of individuals who have 
never been church members and of individuals who have left the church before 2001. Those 
who have not been raised religiously may not have been exposed to religious doctrine, which 
is often very favorable of charitable acts, and have never been part of a religious community 
220 
which exerts social pressure to give to charitable causes. Furthermore, even among those who 
have been a church member at a young age, the preferences with respect to voluntary giving 
might differ from current church members. The model in Chapter 3 predicts that ceteris 
paribus those individuals who derive very little utiliy from (religious) giving and thus from 
paying chuch taxes have the highest probability to leave the church. Therefore the group of 
non-members might be biased toward individuals with a low preference for giving.
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 In turn, 
current church members might have systematically higher preference parameters   than non-
members, which implies that their probability to give and the amount given could be equally 
high or even higher than that of non-members. 
To sum up, the first research question is geared toward examining differences between 
individuals. The hypothesis is that church members and non-members differ in their voluntary 
giving because the former are obliged to make charitable contributions in the form of church 
taxes. However, systematic differences in the preferences for charitable giving might dilute 
the expected effects of church membership. 
Therefore the second research question refers to changes within individuals over time. If 
church membership and paying church taxes affect giving, one might suspect that the giving 
behavior changes during the process of disaffiliation, i.e. from the time (shortly) before to 
after disaffiliation. Thus, research question number two is: 
Does voluntary giving behavior change during the process of disaffiliation? 
The hypothesis is that individuals are both more likely to give and to give more after they 
have left the church and are no longer obliged to pay church taxes. The reasoning is the same 
as with respect to the first research question. The longitudinal view might be interesting since 
within individuals preferences (captured in    and   ) can be assumed to be more or less 
stable, while they may differ between individuals. When looking at religious and secular 
giving separately, one expects individuals to start giving to religious causes (if they were in a 
corner solution as a church member, i.e. they did not make any contributions) or to increase 
their religious giving. Concerning secular contributions the model in Chapter 3 predicts an 
increase in giving.
101
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 This argument is further explored in the discussion concerning the third research question below. 
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 In the model in Chapter 3 church taxes are by assumption a substitute for religious voluntary contributions, 
but not for secular giving. Therefore individuals can be in a corner solution with respect to religious giving, i.e. 
the amount of church tax they pay exceeds the amount they would give voluntarily. Without the obligation to 
pay church taxes, these individuals may start making voluntary religious contributions. With respect to secular 
giving, no corner solution exists; therefore individuals do not have an incentive to start giving after disaffiliation.  
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Research question number three is geared toward the motivation for church disaffiliation: 
Do individuals who drop out of church differ in their giving behavior from “regular” 
church members, i.e. from church members who do not disaffiliate in the near future? 
From the model in Chapter 3 it is not possible to derive a hypothesis. Whether individuals 
who disaffiliate differ in their giving behavior from those who stay, and in which way they 
differ, depends on the reason why they opt out of church. In the model, I identify three 
possible motives. The first motive is that they have a lower membership benefit. If this is the 
case, one can expect them to be as generous as “regular” church members, with respect to 
both religious and secular causes.
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 Second, they might have a lower fitting parameter  , i.e. 
they agree less to the use of tax revenues by the church than “regular” church members do. In 
that case, they should give even more in total than members who do not leave, since they 
would try to make up for the church tax money that is “wasted” from their point of view with 
additional voluntary giving. When looking at religious and secular giving separately, the 
hypotheses are that they give more to religious causes, but somewhat less to secular causes 
than “regular” members. Third, if individuals who disaffiliate have a lower average marginal 
utility from giving, i.e. lower levels of    and   , then the hypothesis is that they are less 
likely to give and give less than “regular” members. Such individuals disaffiliate because 
church taxes are simply too high for them, not primarily because they do not like how they are 
spent. Although in the model framework low levels of    and/or    can induce individuals to 
leave the church, one would rather expect those who drop out of church to have a small 
marginal utility from religious giving, i.e. a low   , which would in turn imply that those 
individuals are less likely to give and give less to religious causes. 
The fourth and last research question refers to the general differences between religious and 
secular giving and goes beyond questions of church membership and disaffiliation. I ask: 
What are the price and income elasticities of the two types of giving, and do they differ 
systematically? 
This question is beyond the scope of the considerations in Chapter 3. However, there is one 
hypothesis which can be derived from the model: The income elasticity of religious giving 
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 In the model in Chapter 3 membership benefits and the preference parameters    and    are independent. 
Furthermore, membership benefits do affect the church membership decision, but not the giving decision. If 
individuals who leave the church and those who stay only differ in membership benefits, they should be equally 
likely to give and give the same amount.  
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should be smaller than that of secular giving, since rising income leads to higher church tax 
payments, which are a (possibly imperfect) substitute for voluntary religious giving.  
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5.3 Literature review 
The main focus of this chapter is the interplay of religion and voluntary giving. However, the 
research methods in this sub-field of the voluntary giving literature are the same as in the 
general research on voluntary giving. Therefore I will briefly review the empirical literature 
on voluntary giving, which is mainly focused on the price and income elasticities of charitable 
contributions. However, I will not provide a theoretical discussion of why individuals make 
donations. For an overview of the topic, the reader is referred to Schokkaert (2006) and von 
Kotzebue and Wigger (2010). After a short introduction to empirical research on voluntary 
giving, I will discuss results on the connection between religion and giving. 
5.3.1 Empirical research on voluntary giving 
Empirical research on voluntary giving using tax data was introduced in the economic 
literature by Taussig (1967) (Andreoni, 2006: 1235). Taussig (1967) still influences today’s 
research since he was the first to use the log-log specification in voluntary giving research: he 
regressed the log of the amount of donations on the log of the price, the log of income and a 
set of demographic variables, 
                              (5.1) 
where    is the donation of individual  ,    is the price of giving,    is the income of the 
individual,    is a set of demographic variables and    is an error term. The advantage of this 
specification is that    and    can be interpreted as the price and income elasticity, 
respectively. (Andreoni, 2006: 1235) 
Most of the literature on voluntary giving is concerned with estimating the price elasticity of 
voluntary giving. The price of giving is defined as one minus the marginal tax rate, because in 
many countries, including the US and Germany, donations are tax-deductible, i.e. the taxable 
income is reduced by the amount donated, which in turn reduces the tax burden of the 
individual. In other words, the state subsidizes voluntary donations by renouncing a part of its 
tax revenues. Of course, such a policy is only efficient if the increase in donations fostered by 
the tax deductibility of donations exceeds the shortfall in tax revenues by the state (Peloza and 
Steel, 2005: 261; List, 2011: 170). Therefore efficiency requires giving to be elastic, which is 
equivalent to saying that the absolute value of the (negative) price elasticity is greater than 
one (Peloza and Steel, 2005: 261; List, 2011: 170). 
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Subsequent research has extended knowledge on the empirics of voluntary giving in various 
directions (Schokkaert, 2006: 145). Researchers have used different data sets and a large 
variety of estimation techniques. Both cross-sectional and panel data have been used. Panel 
data is to be preferred to cross-sectional data, especially if there have been exogenous changes 
in the tax treatment of donations, since it allows the disentangling of the reaction to a change 
in price from the effects of other (possibly unobservable) variables such as income and 
marital status, which also influence the price of giving (Barrett, 1991: 366; Peloza and Steel, 
2005: 261-262). Researchers often use OLS estimation techniques; however, the problem is 
that there is usually a large share of individuals who have zero donations. Such a quality of 
the dependent variable asks for estimation techniques for limited dependent variables, e.g. 
Tobit estimation (Andreoni, 2006: 1235). However, Tobit analysis also has some drawbacks: 
first, one has to make the assumption that exogenous regressors have the same influence on 
the decision to give at all and the amount given; second, panel data methods, most notably 
fixed effects estimation, is not readily available. 
Recent contributions to the literature are also concerned with obtaining a more detailed 
picture of income and price elasticities: researchers try to disentangle transitory and 
permanent income and price effects. 
Results, which are heavily based on US data, suggest that the income elasticity of giving is 
positive, but appears to be below one (see literature reviews in Schokkaert, 2006: 146-152; 
Bekkers and Wiepking, 2007: 9). Peloza and Steel (2005) conduct a meta-analysis of 
estimates of the price elasticity of voluntary giving and find that the mean elasticity is -1.44; 
or -1.11 when data is corrected for outliers (Peloza and Steel, 2005: 265). In other words, 
giving is price-elastic. While Peloza and Steel (2005: 267) cannot find significant differences 
between transitory and permanent price elasticities, Andreoni (2006: 1236-1240) reviews two 
influential studies that do find these differences: while Randolph (1995) finds an inelastic 
reaction to permanent price changes and an elastic reaction to transitory changes in price, 
which is in line with expectations, Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter (2002) come to the opposite 
conclusion – using the same data set. Both papers suggest that the permanent exceeds the 
transitory income elasticity. A recent paper by Bakija and Heim (2011) supports the findings 
of Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter (2002), i.e. permanent changes in price lead to an elastic 
reaction, while transitory changes do not. 
A possible shortcoming of most of the literature is that the dependent variable in empirical 
estimations is the sum of all donations. Different causes of giving are not considered 
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(Schokkaert, 2006: 144), which reveals the implicit assumption that the price and income 
elasticities of all types of giving are the same. There is a small, but growing literature that 
looks at different kinds of giving separately. In the majority of these studies, considerable 
interest is given to religious giving, probably because giving to religious organizations makes 
up by far the largest share of giving in the US (see List, 2011: 162-163). 
In what follows, I will briefly review the empirical literature on religiosity and voluntary 
giving. 
5.3.2 Religiosity and voluntary giving 
The literature on religiosity and voluntary giving deals with different, though associated 
questions. The first question is whether religious individuals are more or less generous than 
non-religious individuals. Such literature often finds that religious people give more. In the 
next step, researchers are interested in whether religious individuals are equally generous with 
respect to different kinds of giving, or if they only give to religion but neglect charitable and 
secular causes. In this regard, the main research question is whether religious and non-
religious giving can be considered substitutes or complements. In addition, some authors try 
to characterize religious and secular giving, i.e. they try to estimate and compare price and 
income elasticities of different kinds of voluntary contributions. To sum up, the focus of the 
research can either be on the person who gives and his or her religiosity, or on the 
organization that receives the contribution and whether it serves religious or non-religious 
causes. In some parts of the research, the two perspectives overlap. 
5.3.2.1 Joint determination of religious and secular giving 
A large empirical literature, especially from the US, explores how religiosity influences 
voluntary giving of time and money. Researchers consistently find that more religiously 
involved people are more prone to give, for secular as well as religious causes (Hodgkinson, 
Weitzman and Kirsch, 1990; Regnerus, Smith and Sikkink, 1998; Lam, 2002; Brooks, 2003; 
Bekkers and Schuyt, 2008). There are two main mechanisms that cause the higher altruism of 
religious persons: “conviction” and “community” (Bekkers and Schuyt, 2008: 76-80; Bekkers 
and Wiepking, 2011: 944, see also Nemeth and Luidens, 2003: 108). The “conviction” 
explanation emphasizes that altruism is an important element in the teachings of most 
religions and helping others is considered as an integral part of living one’s faith. Reading the 
bible, experiencing altruism from (members of) religious institutions or feeling the need to 
spread the self-experienced love of God might result in high intrinsic preferences for altruism 
(Pessi, 2011: 8-11). At the same time, religious people might be pressured by the 
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“community” to profess a high level of altruism because they are asked to contribute more 
often and only achieve a high reputation and acceptance in the religious community if they 
give freely. In the terms of the model in Chapter 3, both explanations amount to the fact that 
religious individuals have a higher marginal utility of giving, expressed through  , than non-
religious individuals. 
Researchers usually find evidence for the “community” explanation. Denomination and 
attendance at services lose their significance for secular giving and volunteering and may 
even have a negative influence when giving or volunteering for church-related activities is 
added as an explanatory variable (Jackson et al., 1995; Lam, 2002; de Hart and Dekker, 
2005). In contrast, Bekkers and Schuyt (2008) find that secular giving is also strongly related 
to altruistic values, which supports the “conviction” theory. 
However, both explanations require that individuals are religiously involved in one way or 
another. It is therefore not surprising that differences in giving between the non-affiliated and 
nominal members hardly exist after controlling for church attendance (Regnerus, Smith and 
Sikkink, 1998; Scheepers and Te Grotenhuis, 2005; Lyons and Nivison-Smith, 2006). 
Results for Germany confirm that on average church members give more to charity than non-
members (Borgloh, 2008; Bönke, Massarrat-Mashhadi and Sielaff, 2013). A more thorough 
investigation reveals that the percentage of giving households among church members is 
significantly higher than among non-members. For example, only 20 % of jointly assessed 
couples who are not members declared donations in their income tax returns in 2001, in 
contrast to 48 % of couples consisting of two church members. However, the average amount 
of donation declared by taxpayers who reported a positive amount of giving is significantly 
higher for non-members than church members. (Buschle, 2009: 99-102)
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 A major 
shortcoming of some German studies is that they rely on tax return data, but do not account 
for itemization status. Because church taxes are itemized deductions in Germany, almost all 
church members are itemizers, while most non-members are not. However, itemizers have an 
incentive to declare all donations, while non-itemizers have no incentive to declare small 
donations. Therefore one would expect the percentage of households giving to be higher and 
the average amount of giving declared to be lower for (itemizing) church members – 
irrespective of their actual giving. 
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 The study by Buschle (2009) reports only frequency cross tabulations. It is therefore unclear how much of the 
differences in giving between members and non-members can be explained by income and other socio-economic 
or demographic variables. 
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If religious and secular giving were indeed determined by the same underlying motivation 
(high altruism or social pressure), then they should also be positively correlated. In several 
empirical studies, both from the US (Clain and Zech, 1999; Lam, 2002) and other developed 
countries (Carroll, McCarthy and Newman, 2005; Chang, 2005; de Hart and Dekker, 2005) 
religious giving or volunteering is used as an explanatory variable for secular 
giving/volunteering, or vice versa. Researchers usually find a positive and significant effect. 
There are also some contradictory results from the US, which suggest that for low-income 
households, religious and secular giving are negatively correlated, at least at the extensive 
margin. Showers et al. (2011) show that households that give to religion give a higher amount 
to charities and vice versa, but they also find that giving to religious organizations (charity) 
decreases the probability of giving to charities (religion) for low and medium income 
households. James and Sharpe (2007) find that individuals with a low income are more likely 
to give only to religious causes, while individuals are more likely to give to secular causes or 
both when they have a higher income. They argue that there is a “sect effect” in religious 
giving, i.e. individuals with below average income and education, who are usually less 
generous givers, contribute disproportionally to religious causes. 
Putting the overall finding of the literature in relation to my hypotheses, the research results 
suggest that on average church members may have a higher marginal utility of giving than 
non-members. This contradicts the assumptions which underlie my theoretical model in 
Chapter 3 and casts doubts on the hypotheses derived from the model, in particular with 
respect to research question one in Section 5.2. If church members on average have a higher 
utility from giving than non-members, the former may be more likely to give or make higher 
voluntary contributions even though they already make a charitable contribution by paying 
church taxes. 
However, it is difficult to transfer the conclusions from the literature to my second research 
question, i.e. how giving changes during the process of disaffiliation. The reason is that the 
research designs differ. In the literature cited above, individuals can freely determine the 
amount they give to religious and secular causes. The predominantly positive empirical 
correlation between the two types of giving is most likely due to the fact that preferences for 
giving differ between individuals and people who have a high preference for religious giving 
also have a high preference for secular giving. In my research individuals who leave the 
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church experience an exogenous variation in religious giving (reduction in church taxes)
104
 
while preferences can be assumed to be more or less stable. Therefore I expect to see an 
increase (rather than a decrease) in voluntary giving when the obligation to pay church taxes 
no longer applies. 
The only research I am aware of which makes use of the fact that in church tax systems 
church taxes are exogenously determined in order to test whether they are substitutes for other 
charitable donations is Borgloh (2009, 2012). She uses the same data set that I use, the 
German Taxpayer Panel. She employs the standard estimation equation for voluntary giving 
(see equation (5.1)), but restricts the sample to church members and adds the amount of 
church taxes they pay as an independent variable in the estimation equation. Borgloh (2012) 
finds that an increase in church taxes significantly increases the probability and amount of 
charitable giving, i.e. church taxes and donations are complementary. However, she also 
exploits differences in church tax rates between the Länder in Germany. Her results indicate 
that individuals living in a Land where the church tax rate is lower make higher donations, 
which implies that church taxes and voluntary charitable contributions might be substitutes. 
My own research in this chapter is similar to Borgloh (2012) in some respects since the 
research design was established and most of the empirical estimations conducted before 
Borgloh’s (2012) work was published. However, my research also differs in many respects. 
First, I do not include the amount paid as church taxes in the estimations of voluntary giving; 
instead, I use the fact that there is a largly exogenous change in the church tax payment when 
individuals disaffiliate from the church. Second, my research interest is also in the giving 
behavior of marginal church members, i.e. those who will leave the church in the following 
years. Third, I provide a more comprehensive overview over different estimation methods 
than Borgloh (2012). Fourth, I look at two types of giving that I can distinguish in the data 
set, one purely secular and the other including religious contributions, while Borgloh (2012) 
only looks at the sum of donations. 
5.3.2.2 Income and price elasticities of religious and secular giving 
The income of the donor and the price of giving are important determinants of religious and 
secular charitable contributions. If various kinds of giving have different underlying 
motivations of donors, this could cause differences in price and income elasticities (see List, 
2011: 165). List (2011: 165) argues that religious giving might be driven by afterlife 
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consumption motives or that religious contributions could be seen as social insurance. One 
could claim that in order to maintain the insurance and to ensure afterlife consumption, 
regular religious contributions need to be made. As a result, religious giving might be less 
price and income elastic than secular giving, which is usually motivated by altruism (concern 
for the welfare of others), warm glow or social prestige considerations. 
Feldstein (1975) was among the first to estimate the income and price elasticities of different 
types of giving. He finds that giving to religious organizations is inelastic in price, while 
donations to all other types of charity (educational institutions, hospitals, health and welfare 
organizations) are highly elastic. The income elasticity of religious giving is also at the lower 
end of the range of estimates. 
Kitchen and Dalton (1990) use Canadian data and a Tobit analysis. They find that overall 
giving has a price elasticity that is slightly below -1, but religious giving is highly price 
elastic. In contrast, total giving is estimated to be income elastic, while religious giving is not. 
Using another data set from Canada, Kitchen (1992) contradicts the results of Kitchen and 
Dalton (1990). He finds a higher price elasticity of overall giving, but the price elasticity of 
religious giving is not significantly different from zero. Recent research from Canada 
(Hossain and Lamb, 2012) suggests that religious giving in inelastic to changes in price, while 
other types of giving (total giving, health, social services) are price-elastic. 
Brooks (2007) uses data on a cross-section of households in the US for the year 2001. He 
finds that different types of charitable giving differ in income and price elasticities. Religious 
giving has lower income and price elasticities than combination charities and giving to the 
poor, but is more elastic than giving to health or education. While all price elasticities are 
significant, the income elasticity of religious giving (and some other types of giving) is not. 
Helms and Thornton (2012) use the same data source as Brooks (2007), but look at a panel 
with waves from 2001, 2003 and 2005. They separate giving into religious and secular giving, 
where religious giving only includes giving directly to religious organizations and excludes 
giving to charities run by religious organizations. The authors use fixed effects estimation and 
find that both the income and price elasticities of religious giving are smaller than those of 
secular giving. The authors also research the extensive and the intensive margin separately, 
i.e. the decision to give at all and the amount given, and find that at the extensive margin 
results are in line with expectations, but at the intensive margin religious giving appears to be 
more price elastic than secular giving (but less income elastic). The results of a higher price 
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and income elasticity of secular giving are confirmed when one compares religious giving of 
religious households and secular giving of nonreligious households. However, the picture is 
less clear when one looks at secular giving of religious households and religious giving of 
nonreligious households. For example, the results show that nonreligious households do not 
react to changes in price and income when they decide about whether to give to religious 
organizations. Helms and Thornton (2012) also show that the largest difference in the price 
elasticity of religious and secular giving can be found for donors who give amounts between 
100 and 500 dollars, while it is small or non-existent for households making very small or 
very large contributions. 
List (2011: 165) looks at aggregated giving and regresses percentage changes in voluntary 
giving in the US on changes in the S&P 500 index of the previous year. He finds that religious 
giving is nearly unaffected by the economic situation, while other types of giving vary 
significantly in accordance with the S&P 500 index. 
Hrung (2004) uses nationally representative survey data from the US from 1999. He looks at 
religious and secular giving separately and finds that both types of giving increase in income 
(he uses dummy variables for 5 income groups), but the effect is larger for secular than 
religious giving. This coincides with another of Hrung’s findings, namely that the share of 
religious giving in total giving decreases when income rises. 
Yen (2002) provides more detailed results, both because he looks at more detailed types of 
giving and because he can actually estimate price elasticities. The author uses cross-sectional 
data from the 1995 Consumer Expenditure Survey in the US and separates giving into 
religious giving, giving to charity and other giving. He finds that the overall income elasticity 
of religious giving is above one and about the same as that for other giving, but somewhat 
smaller than that for charitable giving. At the extensive margin, religious giving has the 
lowest income elasticity. Another study based on the US Consumer Expenditure Survey, but 
with data from the year 2004, is Showers et al. (2011). The authors agree with Yen’s (2002) 
results in that religious giving has the lowest income elasticity of all types of giving at the 
extensive margin and that the overall income elasticity of religious giving is lower than that of 
charitable giving. In contrast to Yen (2002) they estimate the overall income elasticity of 
religious giving to be far below one. Charitable giving is income elastic for medium and high 
incomes, but inelastic for low incomes. 
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Lunn, Klay and Douglass (2001) support the hypothesis that religious giving is less income 
elastic than non-religious giving with a data set restricted to members of the Presbyterian 
Church in the USA. The authors look at four types of religious giving: “regular giving to the 
local congregation, giving to special campaigns at the local congregation, giving to 
denominational appeals, giving to religious groups or causes outside the Presbyterian Church” 
(Lunn, Klay and Douglass, 2001: 766). All types of religious giving have an income elasticity 
of close to one, while non-religious giving is more income-elastic. 
To sum up, there is a consensus in the literature on voluntary giving that price and income 
elasticities differ between contributions to various causes. The majority of studies find that 
religious giving is less elastic, in particular at the extensive margin.  
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5.4 Data 
The research questions will be answered empirically using the Taxpayer Panel, a 5 % 
stratified random sample of all individual tax returns in Germany for the years 2001 to 2006 
provided by the German Federal Statistical Office. The data set includes all information stated 
in income tax returns, most importantly declared donations and different definitions of 
income. It also contains personal details, such as church membership and denomination, 
gender, civil status, age, number and age of children, and federal state of residence. The data 
set is balanced, i.e. it includes only data for those taxpayers who filled out their tax returns in 
all six years and can be tracked over the years. The data is available in SAS format. 
The data set is the same that is used in the investigation of church disaffiliations in Chapter 4. 
For more information on the data set see Section 4.5.1. 
Below I describe the definition of the variables used in the empirical part of this chapter. In 
order to answer my research questions, I estimate equations similar to the one in equation 
(5.1) with voluntary giving on the left hand side and income, price of giving and socio-
demographic variables as explanatory variables. I extend this equation by adding a variable 
measuring church membership resp. church disaffiliation. 
5.4.1 Donations 
Since this study is based on tax data, definitions of donations are based on the income tax law. 
Donations are tax-deductible as special expenses, i.e. they reduce the taxable income of the 
taxpayer. § 10b of the German income tax law distinguishes between five types of donations. 
The first type comprises donations to “benevolent, parochial, religious, scientific or especially 
eligible charitable purposes” (translation taken from Borgloh, 2008: 7). These donations are 
tax deductible up to an amount of 5 % of overall income. Second, for donations to 
“benevolent, scientific and especially eligible cultural purposes” (ibid.) the income tax law 
provides the possibility to deduct an additional 5 % of overall income.
105
 Third, an additional 
amount up to 20,450 euro can be deducted for donations to foundations. Fourth, there is an 
additional maximum deduction for the creation of charitable foundations. Fifth, donations to 
political parties and voters’ associations are tax-deductible under certain conditions. 
In what follows, I disregard donations for the creation of a charitable foundation, because 
these are rare and on average much higher than donations in the other categories and it is 
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donations are no longer treated separately; all giving is deductible up to 20 % of overall income. 
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expected that the decision process leading to the creation of a charitable foundation differs 
from that of making a charitable contribution to some existing organization. I also abstain 
from including donations to political parties and voters’ associations since I do not consider 
them to be charitable and therefore do not expect the hypotheses derived from my theoretical 
model to apply. Disregarding donations for the creation of a charitable foundation and 
donations to political parties and voters’ associations corresponds to the approach chosen in 
previous papers on voluntary giving in Germany (e.g. von Auer und Kalusche, 2007). 
The remaining three categories of giving are analyzed jointly (and will henceforth be called 
“total donations”), the first and second category are also analyzed separately. It should be 
noted that, although I use the terms “donations” or “charitable giving”, both the donations to 
“benevolent, parochial, religious, scientific or especially eligible charitable purposes” and the 
donations to “benevolent, scientific and especially eligible cultural purposes” also include 
membership fees. It is not possible to distinguish between charitable contributions and 
membership fees in the data set. However, membership fees to associations which mainly 
provide leisure activities for their members
106
 cannot be deducted as special expenses and are 
therefore not included in the data. 
In addition to “total donations” I also look donations to “benevolent, parochial, religious, 
scientific or especially eligible charitable purposes” and donations to “benevolent, scientific 
and especially eligible cultural purposes” separately. There are two main reasons for this 
approach. The first reason is that in the model in Chapter 3, from which I derive my 
hypotheses, I distinguish between religious and non-religious giving. Unfortunately, the data 
does not allow separating religious from secular giving, since the donations that are tax 
deductible up to 5 % of overall income include contributions to religious as well as secular 
purposes. However, the second category of donations, which are tax deductible up to 10 % of 
overall income, does not include any religious giving. To be more precise, the first category 
includes donations and membership fees to a wide range of benevolent purposes, such as 
education, public health, welfare organizations, tolerance and democracy, development aid, 
animal protection, sports and many more.
107
 In addition, the first category of giving also 
includes giving to religious communities, e.g. for training and maintenance of the clergy, 
construction and maintenance of buildings, religious education and holding services. In 
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contrast, the second category of donations, i.e. donations to “benevolent, scientific and 
especially eligible cultural purposes”, comprises the selfless support of individuals with 
physical or mental impairment and/or in a difficult economic situation (“benevolent 
purposes”), support for research and training in the sciences (“scientific purposes”) and giving 
for the support of art, maintenance of objects of artistic or cultural value and the preservation 
of cultural heritage (“cultural purposes”). The differences in the nature of theses two types of 
giving will be accounted for in the interpretation of the results. When I look at the effects of 
church membership or church disaffiliation on donations which are deductible up to 10 % of 
overall income, I compare them to the hypotheses derived for secular giving. The results for 
donations which are deductible up to 5 % of overall income are evaluated against the 
hypotheses for both religious and non-religious giving. 
The second reason for separating the two categories of giving is that donations which are 
deductible up to 5 % of overall income also include local church taxes. Local church taxes are 
a special form of collection of church taxes that are meant to benefit the local parish. They 
exist only in some parts of Germany and are sometimes voluntary and other times obligatory 
(i.e. taxes in a legal sense) (Petersen, 2010: 73). Their quantitative importance differs between 
regions. There is some debate as to whether local church taxes are perceived as voluntary or 
obligatory contributions, since payment is usually not enforced even when they are obligatory 
(Petersen, 2010: 73). As far as church members see these local church taxes as an obligatory 
contribution to their church, the declaration of them as charitable contributions in their tax 
returns, may result in an overestimation of their true voluntary giving. When these individuals 
leave the church and they do not feel obliged to pay local church taxes any more, their 
declared amount of donation might decrease although their true voluntary giving has not 
changed or has even increased. Therefore the second category of giving, which includes only 
secular donations, is examined separately, since a bias caused by local church taxes is not 
expected to occur in this case. 
The two categories of giving described above are measured using variable c65454 (“Spenden 
bis 5 % GdE abzugsfähig”) for donations which are tax deductible up to an amount of 5 % of 
overall income, and variable c65455 (“Spenden bis 10 % abzugsfähig”) for donations which 
are tax deductible up to an amount of 10 % of overall income. In order to arrive at the amount 
of “total donations” I also add the additional amount given to charitable foundations (“zusätzl. 
Höchstbetrag Spenden an Stiftungen”, variable c65452) and – for businesses – donations up 
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to 0.2 % of the sum of total revenues and wages (“Spenden bis 2 vT GdE abzugsfähig”, 
variable c65456).
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The amounts are deflated with the consumer price index for Germany with the base year 
2005. Data on the consumer price index is taken from the Federal Statistical Office 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010: 522). Afterwards, one euro is added to the sum of donations 
of each taxpayer before I take the logarithm. Logarithmic values are chosen because the 
distribution of voluntary giving is skewed with a lot of observations of low levels of giving 
and a long tail on the upper end of the distribution. Taking the logarithm ensures that the 
distribution is closer to a normal Gaussian distribution. One euro is added for each taxpayer 
because the logarithm of zero is not defined.
109
 I also choose the value of one euro because 
after taking the logarithm the result is zero, which provides a natural lower bound for giving. 
Besides the amount given I also investigate whether someone makes a charitable contribution 
at all, i.e. the extensive margin of the giving decision. I define dummy variables indicating 
whether someone is a donor for the categories of total giving, giving to “benevolent, 
parochial, religious, scientific or especially eligible charitable purposes” and giving to 
“benevolent, scientific and especially eligible cultural purposes” separately. The individual is 
defined to be a donor if the variables in the tax return data pertaining to the respective 
category of giving indicate any positive amount of contribution. 
5.4.2 Income 
Unfortunately tax return data for estimating price and income elasticities of voluntary giving 
includes only tax-related definitions of the income variable. These are sum of income 
(“Summe der Einkünfte”), overall income (“Gesamtbetrag der Einkünfte”), income 
(“Einkommen”) and taxable income (“zu versteuerndes Einkommen”). It would be preferable 
to have an income definition which reflects “the actual spending power of a tax unit” (Bönke, 
Massarrat-Mashhadi and Sielaff, 2013: 46). This is not entirely the case for tax definitions of 
income because they include various tax exemptions and tax reliefs. For example, a large 
share of pensions as well as capital income below a certain threshold are tax-exempt and 
therefore not reported. Unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, payment during parental 
leave and similar benefits are not included, as well as social security contributions and child 
benefits. In addition, changes in the value of property are usually missing. 
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 There is some debate in the literature which amount should be added. This discussion is relevant because the 
amount added has an influence on the results. 
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There have been various attempts to adjust tax-related income definitions in order to reflect 
the “actual spending power” of an individual, e.g. Merz, Hirschel and Zwick (2005), Bönke, 
Neher and Schröder (2007), von Auer and Kalusche (2007), Bach, Corneo and Steiner (2009). 
For studies on voluntary giving in Germany both adjusted income (e.g. von Auer and 
Kalusche, 2007; Bönke, Massarrat-Mashhadi and Sielaff, 2013) and unadjusted tax definitions 
(e.g. Paqué, 1986; Borgloh, 2008) have been used. 
Von Auer and Kalusche (2007: 50-51) propose to use the overall income and taxable income 
as the upper and lower bounds of income and estimate equations with both of these 
definitions. Another possibility is to argue that the income definition chosen has a negligible 
effect on estimated elasticities and therefore one of the measures, preferably the overall 
income, can be chosen (Borgloh, 2008: 11). 
The approach chosen in this chapter is to calculate an adjusted overall income (which I will 
also call economic income) that resembles the “actual spending power” of the individual as 
closely as possible, thereby following the approaches of von Auer and Kalusche (2007) and 
Bönke, Massarrat-Mashhadi and Sielaff (2013). The overall income is taken as a starting 
point. 
In the following I outline the calculation of the economic income used in this chapter only 
briefly since the definition of economic income is substantially the same as in Chapter 4. 
There are two main differences: first, this chapter also looks at individuals who choose the 
joint marital assessment, while Chapter 4 does not. As a consequence, whenever a relevant 
variable is separately reported for each spouse, I add up the two values. Second, in order to 
avoid endogeneity problems I calculate the income for each taxpayer as if he or she had not 
made donations. This is similar to Section C.3.2 where I calculate the income as if the 
individual had not paid church taxes. The approaches in the two chapters resemble each other 
since both donations and church taxes paid are treated as special expenses. 
In the first step, the income tax liability of the tax payer is subtracted from overall income. 
The tax liability depends on the amount of charitable contributions an individual makes; 
therefore adjusted income also depends on the amount of contributions. In order to avoid 
endogeneity, the tax liability of each taxpayer is calculated under the assumption that no 
donations are made. The income tax is calculated applying the tax function of § 32a ITL to 
the taxable income plus donations. The sum is not rounded. The type of assessment (single 
assessment or joint marital assessment), income under the “exemption with progression” rule 
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(“Einkommen unter Progressionsvorbehalt”, § 32b ITL) and extraordinary income 
(“Außerordentliche Einkünfte”, § 34 ITL)
110
 are taken into account. However, special tax 
rates for taxpayers who have extraordinary income according to § 34b ITL (extraordinary 
income from forestry) have not been taken into account. Similarly, for taxpayers who have 
extraordinary income according to both § 34(1) ITL and § 34(2) ITL, only the special tax rate 
for the latter type of extraordinary income has been calculated, while the former type of 
income is treated as if it was regular income. Those simplifications are made because only a 
small number of taxpayers are affected and substantial changes of the empirical results are not 
to be expected. 
In the second step, the solidarity surcharge is subtracted. The solidarity surcharge amounts to 
5.5 % of the income tax liability (or less than 5.5 % when the income tax liability is below a 
certain threshold income). Since the solidarity surcharge that was actually paid depends again 
on the donations made, the solidarity surcharge is also re-calculated under the assumption that 
no donations are declared. The income tax liability as the calculation base for the solidarity 
surcharge is mostly calculated as described in the previous paragraph, but child allowances 
are subtracted when assessing the taxable income. Income under the “exemption with 
progression” rule is taken into account, however, the income tax rate on income under the 
“exemption with progression” rule is not adjusted for the changes in the computation of 
taxable income (in particular, the inclusion of child allowances). Simplifications regarding 
extraordinary income are made as described above. In addition, taxes on extraordinary income 
are adopted from the calculation of income taxes (instead of re-calculating them for the 
income less child allowance) when the taxpayer reports both extraordinary income and 
income under the exemption with progression” rule. Furthermore, tax reductions are 
subtracted from the income tax thus calculated. Tax reductions are defined as the difference 
between collective income tax (“tarifliche Einkommensteuer”) and income tax due 
(“festzusetzende Einkommensteuer”) in the original data.  
In the third step of calculating economic income, I add income under the “exemption with 
progression” rule. 
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extraordinary income. 
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Fourth, reductions for income from farming (“Freibetrag für Land- und Forstwirtschaft”, § 
13(3) ITL), reductions for aged persons (“Altersentlastungsbetrag”, § 24a ITL) and 
reductions for single parents (“Entlastungsbetrag für Alleinerziehende”, § 24b ITL) are 
added. These tax allowances are subtracted from the total income when calculating the overall 
income, but are now added again. 
Fifth, extraordinary financial burdens (“Außergewöhnliche Belastungen”, § 33 ITL), alimony 
payments to a separated or divorced partner (“Unterhaltsleistungen”, § 10(1)(1) ITL), 
extraordinary financial burdens for child support (“Unterhaltsaufwendungen”, § 33(1) ITL) 
and expenses for own children’s education (“Ausbildungskosten”, § 33(2) ITL) are 
subtracted. 
Sixth, child benefits are added to overall income. The amount of child benefits a taxpayer 
receives is not included in the data set. Instead, it is estimated from the amount of child 
allowance. Note that taxpayers who are assessed individually usually receive 50 % of the tax 
allowance for each of their children. The calculation is the same as in Section C.3.3 in the 
appendix. 
Seventh, the tax-exempt part of pensions is added to the income. Before 2005, the share of 
pension payments that was taxed depended on the age of the taxpayer when he or she first 
received the pension. The full amount of pensions is calculated taking into account the taxable 
share as reported in the data set. Starting in 2005, 50 % of pension payments were taxable. 
Therefore, the total amount of pensions is calculated by doubling the taxable pension 
payments reported in the tax returns. 
Eighth, capital income below the savings allowance is added whenever it is reported in the tax 
return. Unfortunately, this income need not be reported and is presumably missing in many 
cases. 
Ninth, tax-exempt income and deductions that refer to a specific type of income are added. 
They comprise tax-exempt capital gains (“steuerfrei bleibende Veräußerungsgewinne”), the 
deduction for income from agriculture and forestry (“Freibetrag nach § 14a Abs. 4 EStG”), 
deductions for pensions of civil servants (“Freibeträge für Versorgungsbezüge”) and 
deductions for other income (“Versorgungsfreibetrag bei Einn. i.S.d. § 52 Abs. 34c S. 1 
EStG” and “Versorgungsfreibetrag zu Abgeordnetenbezügen”). 
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Tenth, the received amount of the pensions-savings grant (“Altersvorsorgezulage”) and the 
employee’s savings premium (“Arbeitnehmersparzulage”) are added. 
Eleventh, an important type of tax-exempt income, the so-called “half-income” 
(“Halbeinkommen”) is added. 
Twelfth, the difference between the collective income tax (“tarifliche Einkommensteuer”) 
and the final income tax (“festzusetzende Einkommensteuer”) is added to the overall income. 
That amount consists of tax reductions (§ 34c – 35a ITL), i.e. they reduce the amount of 
income tax the individual actually needs to pay. 
Finally, I deflate the amount of income with the consumer price index for Germany provided 
by the Federal Statistical Office (see Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010: 522). If the amount of 
income calculated in the steps I have outlined in this section is below one euro, I set it to one 
euro. Finally, I take the natural logarithm. In all estimations, I use the logarithm of economic 
income instead of economic income itself. 
5.4.3 Price of giving 
Donations are treated as special expenses in the German income tax law and as such reduce 
the taxable income and thus the tax liability of the giver. Higher taxable income leads to 
higher marginal tax rates, therefore earners of high incomes can save more money by using 
tax deductions for voluntary giving. The relevant price in this respect is the marginal price, 
i.e. how much one can save (in taxes) by giving an additional euro. Since this measure is 
endogenous with respect to the amount given, it is common practice in the literature to 
calculate the tax price of giving as one minus the marginal tax rate for the first euro of giving 
(Bönke, Massarrat-Mashhadi and Sielaff, 2013: 44-45). In this research I calculate the 
marginal tax rate in the following way: first, income tax liability and solidarity surcharge are 
calculated as described earlier, i.e. under the assumption that the taxpayer does not declare 
any donations while taking into account the basic and joint marital tax scheme, extraordinary 
income and income under the “exemption from progression” rule. Second, income tax 
liability and the solidarity surcharge are re-calculated under the assumption that a donation of 
one euro is declared – in other words, that the taxable income is reduced by one euro. The 
difference between those two tax liabilities is then subtracted from one in order to calculate 
the price of giving.
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 For non-itemizers (for a definition, see Section 5.4.4 below), I simply 
set the price of giving to one. These taxpayers use their blanket allowance for special 
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expenses, therefore a marginal increase (e.g. by one euro) in their donations would not change 
their income tax liability. 
5.4.4 Itemization status 
Identifying the itemization status of the taxpayer is important when estimating the 
determinants of voluntary giving since it affects the price of giving of the individual. The 
price of giving is usually less than one when the taxpayer deducts the donation as a special 
expense and taxable income is reduced by the amount of the donation. However, each 
taxpayer has a blanket allowance for special expenses, which means that he or she can deduct 
a certain amount even if he or she does not declare any special expenses. The blanket 
allowance is 36 euro for individually assessed taxpayers and 72 euro for jointly assessed 
married couples. Take the example of a taxpayer who does not declare any special expenses 
besides donations. If that person makes a small donation (smaller than the blanket allowance), 
he or she will still use the blanket allowance and the donation does not reduce the taxable 
income. Therefore, the price of giving is one. Such a person is called a non-itemizer. If the 
same person made a donation that exceeds the blanket allowance, the donation would be 
deducted. However, without the donation the individual would have used the blanket 
allowance and would have also been able to deduct a certain amount. Consequently, the 
individual can only reduce the taxable income by the amount that the donation exceeds the 
blanket allowance. That means that the tax price of the first euro of the donation is one, but 
for any euro that the donation exceeds the blanket allowance the price is usually below one. 
Such a person is called a borderline itemizer.  
In short, non-itemizers are those individuals who use the blanket allowance for special 
expenses, while borderline itemizers are those taxpayers who exceed the blanket allowance 
only because of their donations. The third group of taxpayers are those who have some other 
kind of special expenses except donations, such that they would not use the blanket allowance 
even if they did not make a donation. I shall call this group “regular itemizers”. 
The literature on voluntary giving agrees that borderline itemizers need to be excluded from 
the sample. They are excluded in all German studies that I am aware of. They have a first euro 
tax price of one, which overestimates the price they face once they exceed the amount of the 
blanket allowance. Therefore the price of the first euro of giving cannot be taken as an 
instrument for the marginal price, which is actually the relevant price. The problem is even 
more severe since taxpayers only belong to the category of borderline itemizers because they 
make a contribution that is large enough to make itemization attractive. In sum, their fiscal 
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incentive to make a contribution is not captured correctly. The case for excluding borderline 
itemizers was first made by Clotfelter (1980: 325-328). 
Including non-itemizers in the sample also raises some difficulties since these taxpayers have 
no incentive to report their voluntary giving. They might well make a (small) donation, but as 
long as the sum of their special expenses (including the donation) does not exceed the blanket 
allowance, reporting it will not reduce their taxable income.  
In the results section I will present estimations both on the sample of regular itemizers only 
and on regular itemizers and non-itemizers jointly. How this approach helps to answer my 
research questions is discussed in detail in Section 5.4.8. 
5.4.5 Socio-demographic variables 
Socio-demographic variables include the type of assessment and gender, age, number of 
children and region of residence of the taxpayer. 
The “type of assessment and gender” variable differentiates between single males, single 
females and married couples. The gender is identified with variable ef8 (“Geschlecht”), 
which refers to the gender of the person who files the tax return. When married couples 
choose the joint marital assessment, the person filing the tax return is by definition the 
husband. Married couples are identified in the data set with variable ef18 
(“Veranlagungsart”). Only when variable ef18 is equal to 2 (which stands for “joint marital 
assessment”), the gender variable takes on the value for married couples. That means that 
individuals who are married, but individually assessed, fall into the “single male” and “single 
female” categories. Examination of the raw data has shown that there is a certain degree of 
misreporting of gender, since there is a small but not negligible number of changes in the 
gender reported for single individuals. Therefore I assign to each individual the gender 
reported for the year 2005 for each year when he or she was not assessed with a spouse. If the 
individual was assessed with his or her spouse in 2005, but not in 2006, I assign the gender of 
2006. These two years are chosen because the gender reported in the later years included in 
the data set appears to be more reliable than that for earlier years. However, the approach 
bears the possibility that the incorrect gender is assigned to some individuals. Furthermore, if 
individuals were assessed as a married couple in 2005 and 2006, but as a single individual in 
earlier years, changes in the reported gender are not accounted for. 
Age is measured with a dummy variable for each ten year age group (below 30; 30 to 39; 40 
to 49; 50 to 59; 60 to 69; 70 and above – whereby the first and the last group do not have a 
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defined lower and upper limit, respectively). Age is calculated using the date of birth given in 
variables ef43 (“Geburtsdatum –A–”) and ef44 (“Geburtsdatum –B–”). The last four digits of 
the date of birth are the year of birth. Age is calculated as the difference between the year that 
the data point refers to (2001, 2002, . . . 2006) and the year of birth. For taxpayers who chose 
the joint marital assessment the age of the husband constitutes the age of the taxpayer. If the 
year of birth is not in the range between 1891 and 2006, a missing value is assigned. The 
number of missing values for year of birth is then reduced by assigning to the individual the 
year of birth given in the tax return of the year closest to the year when the data is missing – 
provided the year of birth is not missing then and the reported gender is the same. 
The region of residence is measured by dummy variables for East and West Germany. The 
information is taken from the variable bl (“Bundesland”) – the Land where the individual 
lives. West Germany comprises the West German area states as well as all city states 
including Berlin. East Germany comprises the five East German area states. The assignment 
of Berlin as a West German Land is debatable; however, I follow the classification given by 
the Federal Statistical Office. For individuals who have an average yearly overall income 
above 150,000 euro, the Land is not included in the data set, instead, one only knows whether 
the individual lives in East or West Germany, where Berlin is treated as part of West 
Germany. This anonymization of data is implemented for reasons of data security. 
The number of children is covered by four dummy variables: no children, one child, two 
children, and three or more children. The information about the number of children is derived 
from variable c65748 (“Zahl der Kinder (ZK+ZHK)”). 
5.4.6 Church membership and disaffiliation 
The church membership variable divides individuals into three general groups: church 
members, non-members and church members who disaffiliate from the church during the 
study period. In accordance with the definitions in Chapter 4 I define only Catholics and 
Protestants as church members. Non-members are those without religious affiliation as well as 
“others”, i.e. members of the Old Catholic Church (“Altkatholische Kirche”), some Religious 
Humanist communities (“Freireligiöse Gemeinden”) and some Jewish communities. 
An examination of the data set showed that there are some inexplicable changes in church 
membership, e.g. where the church membership status changes more than once in the six 
years under investigation. In particular, high rates of disaffiliation and re-affiliation can be 
found in the city-state of Hamburg. A consultation with the responsible person in the Federal 
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Statistical Office showed that there were coding problems in Hamburg. In order to circumvent 
these problems, I create a very cautious measure of church disaffiliation. First, I measure 
changes in church membership from year to year. If the church membership status of the 
individual changes once between 2001 and 2006, I count that as an affiliation or disaffiliation. 
If membership status changes more than once, I do not recognize this as a church 
disaffiliation and instead assign the membership status of the year 2001 for all years. Such a 
definition of church disaffiliation is rather conservative because it only recognizes cases 
where there are no doubts about the change in membership. However, the possibility exists 
that some individuals who do disaffiliate are mistakenly counted as members. All individuals 
who actually disaffiliate and then re-affiliate are also put in the “member” category. 
Individuals who join the church (with the affiliation being the only change in membership) 
are counted as non-members as long as they are non-members and as members beginning in 
the year of affiliation. 
Individuals who do not affiliate or disaffiliate are either classified as members or as non-
members. For individually assessed taxpayers the membership status is defined as described 
in the previous paragraph. For married couples, the church membership status is assessed 
individually. A married couple is counted as a member if at least one spouse is a church 
member according to the above criteria. If individuals are married (and assessed according to 
the joint marital assessment) in some, but not all sample years, I only consider the church 
membership status of the individual for which I have information for all six years. 
In the case that the taxpayer disaffiliates in any of the years between 2001 and 2005,
112
 I 
determine the exact year when he or she leaves. If an observation belongs to a year that lies 
before the year of disaffiliation, the dummy variable “before disaffiliation” is assigned the 
value one. Similarly, I account for the “year of disaffiliation” and the years “after 
disaffiliation”. If the taxpayer is a jointly assessed married couple in all panel years, the 
disaffiliation of either of the two partners is counted as a disaffiliation. If both partners 
disaffiliate at different points in time, only the first disaffiliation is taken into account. If the 
individual is married (and chooses joint marital assessment) in only some of the sample years, 
but unmarried or individually assessed in others, I only look at the church membership change 
of the individual for which I have data in all years. 
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 Disaffiliations in 2006 are not visible in the data. 
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5.4.7 Exclusion of observations 
Some observations need to be excluded for various reasons. First, I exclude all observations 
that have missing data for any of the relevant variables. Second, I exclude borderline 
itemizers for the reasons discussed in Section 5.4.4. Third, individuals with a negative price of 
giving are also left out of the sample. The price of giving can be negative in some exceptional 
cases where the taxpayer has extraordinary income according to § 34(1) ITL. The highest 
marginal tax rates on extraordinary income are equal to five times the maximum marginal tax 
rate on “regular” income (currently 42 % or 45 %). In other words, an increase in income by 
one euro can lead to an increase in income tax by up to 2.10 euro (see Jahndorf and 
Lorscheider, 2000, for an extensive discussion). This means that the price of giving is -1.10 
euro. Such extreme cases are rare, but they exist in the data set. Two problems arise when the 
price of giving is negative. The first problem is that the estimations include logged values of 
prices. However, taking the log of a negative number is not possible. The second problem is 
that preliminary estimations have shown that the estimated price elasticity is very sensitive to 
the inclusion and exclusion of extreme values of the price of giving. Still, I want to retain as 
many observations as possible. Therefore I decided to exclude all observations where the 
price of giving is negative. This also means that cases in which the price of giving is positive, 
but close to zero, are still included. 
5.4.8 Limitations of the data 
The research questions and hypotheses necessitate looking at the data from two different 
perspectives. The first perspective is a cross-sectional one. I want to compare the voluntary 
giving of church members and non-members. The second perspective is longitudinal, i.e. I 
want to compare the behavior of the same individual before and after church disaffiliation. 
Both approaches face some difficulties when applied to the data. 
In the cross-sectional perspective, there would be no challenges if I could use information 
about all individuals and the data for all individuals had the same quality. I could for example 
use pooled estimation or any other estimation technique which does not eliminate between-
person variation. Unfortunately, data on charitable contributions is not available for church 
members and non-members in the same quality. The reason is the regulation concerning 
itemization for special expenses. Taxpayers can itemize their special expenses, i.e. they can 
deduct special expenses from their taxable income, which in turn reduces their income tax 
liability. Non-itemizers, i.e. individuals whose charitable contributions are below the blanket 
allowance for special expenses and who do not have any other special expenses, have no 
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incentive to report their charitable contributions.
113
 There will be an under-reporting of small 
charitable contributions in this group. When individuals make donations that exceed the 
blanket allowance, they fall into the category of borderline itemizers. They have an incentive 
to report their donation, but only because the donation is large. If it were smaller, they would 
probably not report it. 
In contrast, regular itemizers have special expenses that exceed the blanket allowance, even if 
they do not make any charitable contributions. Their price of giving is equal to one minus the 
marginal tax rate, which is usually below one. For those individuals it makes sense to report 
each euro of charitable contributions, since it further reduces their taxable income. 
To sum up, one can expect regular itemizers and borderline itemizers to report all charitable 
contributions, while there is probably an underreporting of contributions of non-itemizers. 
This fact would be a minor problem for my research if church members and non-members 
were equally likely to be in any of the three itemizer categories. However, this is not the case. 
The reason is that church taxes are special expenses, just like charitable contributions. Since 
the church tax liability usually exceeds the blanket allowance, almost all church members are 
regular itemizers, while the share of regular itemizers among non-members is much lower. 
Those non-members who do itemize usually have a higher income than non-itemizers. 
This means that for church members data on voluntary giving should be almost complete, 
while for non-members small contributions are likely to be missing. As a result, in the data set 
the share of givers among non-members might be underestimated, while the amount given 
conditional on making a contribution might be overestimated. This is because some non-
members who make a small contribution are counted as non-givers because of their missing 
data. 
There are two ways to approach the data. The first option is to use the data for regular 
itemizers and non-itemizers and accept that the quality of the data on giving likely differs. In 
German research on voluntary giving, data on both itemizers and non-itemizers is used by 
Bönke, Massarrat-Mashhadi and Sielaff (2013). I can also follow the reasoning of von Auer 
and Kalusche (2007) and exclude all non-itemizers. Then only a few non-members remain in 
the data set, which might not be a representative sample of the population of non-members, 
e.g. with respect to their income. Income is controlled for in the regression; however, one 
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 The same situation arises when the individual has some kind of special expense (other than donations) which 
is below the blanket allowance and makes a charitable contribution which is low enough such that the sum of 
donations and other special expenses does not exceed the blanket allowance. 
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cannot fully exclude the possibility that the probability of giving of non-members and the 
amount given are over-estimated when only regular itemizers are included. Therefore I 
present results for both a sample where non-itemizers are included and a sample of regular 
itemizers only and discuss the issues that I brought up in this paragraph when interpreting the 
results. 
Itemization also causes some problems in answering the second research question as to how 
voluntary giving changes during the process of disaffiliation. Such research should rely on 
within-individual variation in giving; ideally, one would use fixed effects. Although I will 
apply some fixed effects estimation, I also use a different approach that applies cross-
sectional and longitudinal aspects. I pool the data, but look at when individuals disaffiliate 
from the church and then assign dummies for the years before, during and after disaffiliation. 
This way I can assure that an individual who disaffiliates is in all three categories in the 
pooled estimation. Excluding taxpayers based on their itemization status can potentially 
undermine the effort to have the same individuals in the “before disaffiliation” and “after 
disaffiliation” group. The reason is that individuals are usually regular itemizers before they 
leave the church, but become borderline itemizers or non-itemizers when they do not have to 
pay church taxes any longer. As before, I have to exclude borderline itemizers from the 
sample. If I use the sample consisting of regular itemizers and non-itemizers, then I probably 
underestimate giving after church disaffiliation. The reason is that I systematically exclude 
those individuals who are in the borderline itemizer category because they make a 
considerable contribution and only keep those individuals in the sample that are non-itemizers 
because they decide to make no or only a small contribution. However, if I should 
nevertheless find that giving increases after disaffiliation, then this can be seen as convincing 
evidence. 
A second possibility is to reduce the sample to regular itemizers only. Here the problem is that 
before disaffiliation almost all individuals are in the sample, but after disaffiliation only those 
are left that remain itemizers, which is only a small (and probably not representative) share. 
Thus, I  cannot compare the same individuals before and after disaffiliation. Therefore I 
decided to create a balanced sample of itemizers, i.e. I only look at those individuals who 
itemize in all six years (from 2001 to 2006) and compare giving before and after disaffiliation 
of people in this group who drop out of church. The advantage is that I do in fact compare the 
same individuals over time. On the downside I only look at a small sample of individuals with 
a high income and the results for this sample cannot easily be transferred to all taxpayers. 
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5.4.9 Summary Statistics 
Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics. I use three different subsamples: individuals who are 
either regular itemizers or non-itemizers, i.e. only borderline itemizers are excluded; 
individuals who are regular itemizers; and individuals who are regular itemizers in all sample 
years. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary statistics 
 Itemizers and non-
itemizers 
Regular itemizers Itemizers in all 
sample years 
Variable Mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev. 
Total donations       
Share of donors 0.310 0.463 0.482 0.500 0.525 0.499 
Donation 115.54 19892.42 190.83 24533.53 224.50 27738.35 
Donations to 
religious and 
charitable  purposes 
(deductible up to 
5 % of overall 
income) 
      
Share of donors 0.250 0.433 0.391 0.488 0.430 0.495 
Donation 80.09 6575.89 132.26 8104.02 155.76 10390.73 
Donations to 
benevolent, 
scientific and 
cultural purposes 
(deductible up to 
10 % of overall 
income) 
      
Share of donors 0.091 0.287 0.141 0.348 0.155 0.361 
Donation 31.65 16915.88 52.27 20866.65 61.94 22218.8 
Price 0.820 0.768 0.700 0.480 0.668 0.360 
Price (log) -0.222 0.977 -0.368 0.669 -0.410 0.535 
Income 38,217.00 932,997.1 44,789.65 1,142,632.8 49,155.96 1,311,474.7 
Income (log) 10.207 5.796 10.455 4.024 10.601 2.933 
Type of assessment 
and gender 
      
Single male 0.240 0.427 0.225 0.417 0.224 0.417 
Single female 0.183 0.387 0.184 0.388 0.184 0.387 
Married couple 0.577 0.494 0.591 0.492 0.592 0.491 
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Number of children       
None 0.572 0.495 0.575 0.494 0.576 0.494 
One 0.195 0.396 0.189 0.391 0.188 0.391 
Two 0.177 0.382 0.182 0.385 0.184 0.387 
Three or more 0.056 0.230 0.055 0.228 0.052 0.221 
Age       
70 and above 0.056 0.229 0.064 0.246 0.060 0.238 
60-69 0.112 0.315 0.111 0.314 0.090 0.286 
50-59 0.212 0.408 0.223 0.416 0.242 0.428 
40-49 0.277 0.448 0.281 0.449 0.305 0.460 
30-39 0.230 0.421 0.221 0.415 0.222 0.415 
Below 30 0.114 0.318 0.100 0.300 0.081 0.273 
Region       
East Germany 0.152 0.359 0.070 0.255 0.037 0.189 
West Germany 0.848 0.359 0.930 0.255 0.963 0.189 
Membership       
Church member 0.664 0.472 0.861 0.346 0.969 0.173 
Non-member 0.292 0.455 0.099 0.299 0.018 0.131 
Before disaffiliation 0.015 0.121 0.019 0.136 0.006 0.074 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
0.008 0.087 0.009 0.096 0.002 0.047 
After disaffiliation 0.021 0.144 0.011 0.106 0.006 0.075 
Year       
2001 0.169 0.374 0.167 0.373 0.167 0.373 
2002 0.166 0.372 0.175 0.380 0.167 0.373 
2003 0.167 0.373 0.175 0.380 0.167 0.373 
2004 0.165 0.371 0.171 0.376 0.167 0.373 
2005 0.174 0.379 0.169 0.375 0.167 0.373 
2006 0.159 0.366 0.144 0.351 0.167 0.373 
Sample size 5,014,594  3,295,334  1,879,806  
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
 
Not surprisingly, the sample size is largest in the sample consisting of both itemizers and non-
itemizers and smallest in the sample of individuals who are itemizers in all years. The share of 
taxpayers who make a contribution and the average amount of the donation are highest in the 
smallest sample. In the sample consisting of regular itemizers and non-itemizers 31 % of the 
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taxpayers make a contribution and the average contribution is 115 euro.
114
 In contrast, in the 
sample restricted to regular itemizers in all years, 53 % donate and the average contribution is 
224 euro. In all three samples donations to “benevolent, parochial, religious, scientific or 
especially eligible charitable purposes” are more frequent and are on average higher than 
donations to “benevolent, scientific and especially eligible cultural purposes”. 
Some differences in the compositions of the samples are evident. Probably the most important 
difference is the share of non-members of the church. While it is close to 30 % in the sample 
comprising regular itemizers and non-itemizers, it is only 1.8 % in the sample of individuals 
who are regular itemizers in all years. This reflects the fact that church taxes are the most 
important type of special expenses and those who do not pay church taxes often fall in the 
category of non-itemizers (when, as is the case here, donations are also not counted as special 
expenses to avoid endogeneity problems). The small share of non-members among the regular 
itemizers in all years suggests that one should be careful in comparing church members and 
non-members in this sample because non-members might not be representative of the 
population of individuals who do not belong to the church. For example, one could speculate 
that those non-members who remain in the sample have a higher income since the sample 
average income is roughly 38,000 euro in the large sample (consisting of itemizers and non-
itemizers) but 49,000 euro in the restricted sample.  
Since church membership is low in East Germany, the share of non-itemizers is significantly 
higher there. Consequently, East German taxpayers make up 15 % of taxpayers in the large 
sample, but less than 4 % in the small sample consisting only of regular itemizers in all years. 
Less significant declines can also be seen in the share of males and the share of taxpayers 
below the age of 30. 
Another point to note is that I observe roughly the same number of taxpayers in each sample 
year except 2006. By definition, in the sample of taxpayers who are regular itemizers in all 
sample years I have the same number of observations for each sample year. 
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 Again, I want to point out that the giving in this sample might also be so low because non-itemizers do not 
have an incentive to report (small) contributions that do not exceed the blanket allowance for special expenses. 
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5.5 Estimation methods 
Data on voluntary giving, and the data available in the Taxpayer Panel in particular, provide 
some methodological challenges for the researcher. First, the dependent variable in an 
estimation of voluntary giving is left-censored, i.e. there is usually a large share of 
observations with zero giving because giving cannot be negative. Such a distribution makes 
the applicability of least squares methods questionable. Second, the data is panel data, which 
requires the application of panel data methods and the utilization of within-individual 
variation, i.e. changes in behavior of individuals over time. It would be desirable to look at 
changes in giving caused by church disaffiliation controlling for all constant characteristics of 
the individual. Third, the data set is stratified, which requires accounting for the sample 
selection method. 
5.5.1 The Tobit model  
Since least squares estimation is problematic in samples with a large share of zero values for 
the dependent variable, researchers began to apply an estimation strategy that was specifically 
developed for censored data: the Tobit model. It corrects the estimates for the bias introduced 
by the censoring. Tobit models are used in many studies on voluntary giving (see, e.g., Choe 
and Jeong, 1993; Auten and Joulfaian, 1996; von Auer and Kalusche, 2007). 
When using a Tobit regression model, interpreting the results is not straightforward. In order 
to understand the results, one has to know how the regression method works. 
The basic model is the following: 
          
                 
             
(5.2) 
The model assumes that there is an underlying variable    that has normally distributed 
errors, is not censored and is linearly related to the regressors  . Applied to my data set, this 
would mean that    is the desired level of giving, which can also take on negative values. Of 
course, in reality the minimum giving level is zero. What one actually observes is the variable 
  which is the maximum of the minimum giving level of zero and some positive value   . In 
other words, there is a distribution with a positive probability mass on a discrete value, in the 
present case zero. Such a case is called “corner solution outcome” (Wooldridge, 2002: 518-
519; Greene, 2008: 869-871). 
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I decided to use log giving, because giving is heavily skewed and taking the log makes the 
assumption of normally distributed error terms more plausible. Since the log of 0 is not 
defined, one euro is added to the amount given by each taxpayer, such that the dependent 
variable is zero when giving is zero. The model I estimate is therefore 
 
              
                 
                       
(5.3) 
where – in contrast to (5.2) –   now denotes the amount given plus one euro. 
The density function is  
            
      
   
 
  
          
  
 
     
      
            
   
   
          
 
(5.4) 
where      is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution and      is the 
indicator function which is one when the condition in brackets is fulfilled, zero otherwise (see 
Burke, 2009: 585). The first part of the equation for          gives the probability that the 
dependent variable is zero (the person does not make a donation) in a probit model. The 
second part of the density function for          is the density function of the normal 
distribution. From this formula it can be seen that the Tobit model incorporates the 
assumptions that (a) the decision whether to give or not is a binary decision that follows a 
probit distribution, (b) the amount given follows a normal distribution with mean     and 
standard deviation   and (c) both decisions are influenced by the same set of explanatory 
variables   and explanatory variables have the same impact on the decisions at the extensive 
and the intensive margin, expressed through  . 
If interest lies in        , the parameter vector   can easily be interpreted, since 
                 (Wooldridge, 2002: 520). A marginal increase in some regressor    
increases            by the quantity   . In the present case the continuous exogenous 
variables (income and price) are also logs. Since both the left-hand side and right-hand side of 
the equation are in logs, the  s can interpreted as elasticities.  
However, the interpretation of the effect of a discrete regressor    is more difficult.    can be 
interpreted as the increase in log giving when some regressor    changes from zero to one:  
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          (5.5) 
Unfortunately, for discrete regressors there is no such convenient interpretation of    as the 
notion of “elasticity” for continuous regressors. Nevertheless one can compare the sizes of the 
effects of two discrete variables    and    on  
 . Since the logarithm is a continuous function, 
one can state that if some    is larger than   , the effect of    on giving is larger than the 
effect of   . 
Apart from the problems in interpreting the estimated vector of   for discrete variables, it is 
not very helpful to look only at the estimates for        . They describe a hypothetical 
distribution that would prevail if         was not forced to be equal to or greater than zero. In 
corner solution outcomes such as the present one, it is more instructive to look at the 
unconditional expected value            , i.e. the expected values of “real” (log) giving, and 
the conditional expected value                     , that is the expected values of “real” 
(log) giving for those who actually give a positive amount. (Wooldridge, 2002: 520) 
Starting with conditional expected giving, i.e. the giving of those who decide to make a 
contribution, we have 
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where      is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. The ratio 
          is called the inverse Mills ratio and abbreviated     . It is easy to see that the 
expected value of       does not grow linearly with  , because the estimated  s also appear 
in the inverse Mills ratio, which depends on   in a non-linear way. (Wooldridge, 2002: 521-
522) 
The partial effects of a change in a continuous variable    can be calculated with the 
following formula: 
                    
   
         
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
    (5.7) 
(Wooldridge, 2002: 522). It can easily be seen that the partial effect of a change in    depends 
both on all elements of the estimated coefficient vector   and on the specific values that are 
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chosen for the vector  . In accordance with previous literature and suggestions by Wooldridge 
(2002: 524) I use the vector of mean values  .115 
Wooldridge (2002: 523) suggests calculating the effect of a change in a binary variable as the 
difference between the estimated values when the variable of interest has the values zero and 
one, 
                                                
        
      
 
      
      
 
  
(5.8) 
where      is a vector of values for each variable   with the value of    set to zero (or to the 
reference value) and      is the same vector, but with the value for    set to one. In short, 
               and                  .  
Again, this figure grows with   , so one can say that for two discrete regressors    and   , 
      implies that the effect of    on log giving by those who actually give is greater than 
the effect of   . Again, since the logarithm is a continuously increasing function, one can also 
infer that the effect on giving in levels (instead of logs) must be larger for    than for   .  
The second interesting interpretation of   is an estimate of the unconditional (log) giving, 
          . This estimate is frequently reported in the relevant literature because the 
marginal effects of the    for price and income are the relevant price and income elasticities 
(Andreoni, 2006: 1235).  
The measure is closely related to the measure I presented in the last paragraphs, since 
                                             (5.9) 
where              is the probability that log giving is greater than zero, given  . 
             can be calculated as         and is therefore strictly increasing in  .116 At 
this point it is easy to see one critical restraint of the Tobit model that might not withstand 
reality: it is assumed that a change in some exogenous variable    has the same effect both on 
the probability to give and the amount given.  
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 For discrete variables, the sample share of each discrete value is taken instead of the mean. 
116
 Again, for a binary regressor    I calculate the difference in the probability of giving when the variable takes 
on the values zero and one. 
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Plugging in the formulas for the two factors on the right hand side of equation (5.9) yields 
 
             
   
 
          
   
 
  (5.10) 
The partial derivative for a continuous variable is simply 
            
   
      
   
 
  (5.11) 
i.e. the    times the probability that giving is greater than zero. (Wooldridge, 2002: 523-524). 
Again, the convention is to estimate the probability of positive giving at mean values of  . For 
discrete variables, one can estimate                                   by plugging 
in the estimate of the coefficient vector  , the mean values of   for all variables except   , as 
well as      and     , respectively. Again, one can conclude that if      , it must be 
true that    has a greater effect on            than    has. This is because both factors on the 
right hand side of equation (5.10) grow in  . 
As can be seen in equation (5.9) the Tobit model also allows calculating the probability that 
someone makes a donation,             . This probability can simply be expressed as 
 
               
   
 
  (5.12) 
The marginal effect on the probability of a change in an exogenous variable   is given as 
              
   
 
  
 
   
   
 
  (5.13) 
(Wooldridge, 2002: 523). When the variable is discrete, the marginal effect is 
 
                
    
  
 
    
    
  
 
  (5.14) 
5.5.2 Two-part models 
Estimating a model that relaxes the Tobit assumption that the two decisions whether to give at 
all and how much to give are generated by the same processes can provide more insights 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2010: 553). Such models are called “two-part” (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2010: 553), “two-tiered” or “hurdle models” (Wooldridge, 2002: 536). Different forms of the 
hurdle model have been proposed (Wooldridge, 2002: 536-538; Greene, 2008: 878-880). 
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Cameron and Trivedi (2010: 553-556) suggest a two-part model where the decision to give is 
estimated with a probit model and a separate linear regression is run for those individuals who 
have a positive response in the first part. An application of such a two-part model is Borgloh 
(2012). The advantage of the model is that the decision at the intensive margin (how much to 
give) can easily be estimated with panel models, especially fixed effects. Helms and Thornton 
(2012) also use this two-step procedure. They even estimate the decision at the extensive 
margin with fixed effects. However, this is only possible because they use a linear probability 
model, not a probit model. 
Cragg (1971) proposes a different double hurdle model. As in the model discussed in the 
previous paragraph, the decision whether to give is estimated with a probit model, but the 
amount given is estimated with a truncated regression model. Applications of Cragg’s hurdle 
model to voluntary giving are James and Sharpe (2007) and Showers et al. (2011). All two-
tiered models share the advantage that they are more flexible than the Tobit model, but at the 
same time Cragg’s model incorporates the Tobit model, i.e. if the decisions at the extensive 
and intensive margin are indeed influenced by the same regressors and with the same strength, 
the Tobit model emerges (Burke, 2009: 586). 
I will call the exogenous variables that influence the decision whether to make a donation or 
not   and let   describe the regressors in the second-stage decision (how much to give). The 
density function in Cragg’s model is 
               
(5.15) 
                     
 
 
 
 
       
 
     
      
            
   
 
  
   
   
 
 
          
 
(Wooldridge, 2002: 538; Burke, 2009: 586). From comparing equation (5.15) with (5.4) it can 
easily be seen that Cragg’s model is identical to the Tobit model for     and   
 
 
. In 
addition, the density function can be split in two multiplicative parts. The first part is 
                                        (5.16) 
where    
          
          
 . This is simply the density function of  given   where   follows 
a Bernoulli distribution. The probit model implies that the probability to observe     can 
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be described by the distribution function of the normal distribution. The second multiplicative 
part in (5.15) is the fraction within the second set of brackets. This is the likelihood function 
of the truncated normal distribution for all          with zero as the truncation point. It 
consists of the density function of the normal distribution with mean     and standard 
deviation  , divided by the probability that the dependent variable is larger than zero. The 
term in the denominator ensures that the density integrates to one (Greene, 2008: 864). Since 
there are two multiplicative terms, Cragg’s model can be estimated in two steps. First, one 
estimates the probit model, and second, the truncated regression model. Both are estimated 
with the maximum likelihood method. 
From Cragg’s model one can also derive expected values and marginal effects of exogenous 
variables.
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 The structure is similar to the Tobit model. 
First, one can calculate the probability that someone makes a positive contribution. This 
probability is now derived from the estimation of the probit model with the set of explanatory 
variables  : 
                     (5.17) 
Consequently, the marginal effect of a change in variable    on the probability of giving is 
              
   
           (5.18) 
When the variable    is a discrete variable, the marginal effect on the probability of giving can 
be calculated as the difference between the estimated probability when the variable is set to 
one and the probability when it is set to zero (or to the reference value), while all other 
variables remain at their average values, 
                     
          
    (5.19) 
(Wooldridge, 2003: 533) where      is a vector of values for each variable   with the value of 
   set to zero (resp. to the reference value) and      is the same vector, but with the value for 
   set to one. 
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 The formulas that follow are taken from Burke (2009: 586-587). 
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The conditional expected value of (log) giving, i.e. the expected value conditional on 
        is the same as in the Tobit model: 
 
                          
  
   
  
  
   
 
 
  (5.20) 
The marginal effect of a change in    is also calculated in the same way as in the Tobit model 
(see equation (5.7)). 
The unconditional expected value of       depends both on the results of the probit and the 
truncated regression: 
 
                            
  
   
  
  
   
  
   (5.21) 
The marginal effect of a variable    on unconditional (log) giving is 
              
   
                    
   
 
  
                
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
    
(5.22) 
if         .
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 If    is only among the regressors explaining the amount given, but not 
whether to give at all, then    is zero. If one is interested in the partial effect of a variable   , 
which is not part of  , then equation (5.22) can be used under the condition that     . One 
simply substitutes    by    in the left-hand side of equation (5.22). 
5.5.2.1 Panel data applications 
The two-part model also lends itself to the application of panel data methods such as fixed 
effects estimation. As a robustness check for my main results, which are produced using a 
pooled panel, I will also present the results of a fixed effects least-squares estimation for the 
second part of the two-part model. That is, I restrict the sample to those individuals who make 
a positive charitable contribution and then regress the deviations from the means of the 
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 The second factor of the second summand is the marginal effect of a change in    on conditional (log) giving. 
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dependent variable on the deviations from the mean of independent variables. Standard errors 
are corrected for the resulting loss of degrees of freedom. 
However, fixed effects estimation has some disadvantages. First, the effects of time-constant 
variables cannot be measured. This is because an independent variable that is constant over 
time for all individuals shows no deviations from the mean and no variance, therefore it 
cannot explain changes in the dependent variable. Consequently, I cannot distinguish between 
single males and single females, but only between single individuals and married couples. The 
results are then based on individuals who marry and couples who get divorced or choose 
separate assessment in some years. Similarly, results for East and West Germany are based on 
those individuals who move during the period under investigation. Most importantly, results 
for church membership are based on those individuals who disaffiliate from the church.
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Results show the difference in giving before and after disaffiliation of the same individual.  
Second, fixed effects estimation is also a within-estimation, i.e. only changes over time for the 
same individual are considered, not differences between individuals. This is in contrast to 
other estimation methods I apply where observations are pooled across individuals and time 
and the estimated coefficients reflect both differences between individuals and within 
individuals over time. For example, one would expect that the substantial difference in giving 
between church members and non-members is in part of cross-sectional nature, i.e. church 
membership is a proxy variable that also controls for other attributes of the individual such as 
upbringing or altruism. Instead, when applying within-estimation, all those constant, 
individual-specific variables (such as upbringing) cancel out and the “pure” effect of 
membership is measured.  
5.5.3 Heckman’s sample selection model 
Another possibility to estimate the voluntary giving model is the Heckman sample selection 
model (for applications to voluntary giving, see Smith, Kehoe, and Cremer (1995), Bekkers 
and Schuyt (2008) and Borgloh (2008)). The Heckman model is somewhat similar to the 
double-hurdle models discussed above in that there are two steps which can be estimated 
separately: the decision to give at all and the amount given. Different regressors for estimating 
the participation decision on the one hand and the decision how much to give on the other 
hand can be used, whereas in the Tobit model the regressors and the estimated coefficients are 
assumed to be the same for both decisions (Heckman, 1979: 155). However, while in two-
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 Individuals who affiliate during the study period are not considered in the estimation, since my main focus is 
on the change of giving caused by disaffiliation. 
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tiered models the underlying assumption is that those two decisions are separate processes and 
that the individuals who make a positive contribution are randomly selected from the 
population when all regressors are controlled for, the Heckman model acknowledges the 
possibility that the errors in both estimations can be correlated (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010: 
556). 
In more formal terms, the Heckman model assumes that there is a selection mechanism with a 
latent variable   , 
           (5.23) 
where    is a normally distributed error term. Instead of the latent variable  
  one can only 
observe a binary outcome  , in my case whether someone makes a contribution or not:  
 
   
      
      
  (5.24) 
As in Cragg’s model, this part can be estimated with probit. From the results, one can estimate 
the Mills ratio    
       
       
 for each observation i. (Greene, 2008: 886) The second part of the 
Heckman model is a regression 
               (5.25) 
for all observations where    . What is different now in comparison to two-part models 
such as Cragg’s model is that there are two processes modeled, one which determines whether 
one can observe the level of giving, and one which defines the amount given. In other words, 
in the Heckman model it is assumed that for the censored cases the dependent variable cannot 
be observed, whereas in the hurdle model the dependent variable is known to be at the 
censoring point (Lin and Schmidt, 1984: 175). However, the two processes represented in the 
Heckman model are not independent. The error terms    and    are assumed to have a 
bivariate normal distribution 
 
 
  
  
          
 
 
   
    
     
    (5.26) 
where     is the covariance of the errors. In order to acknowledge the correlation of the error 
terms,        is regressed on   and the inverse Mills ratio  . (Greene, 2008: 886; Cameron 
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and Trivedi, 2010: 557) The Heckman model can be estimated by a two-step procedure or by 
maximum likelihood. I use PROC QLIM in SAS which does the latter.  
In the Heckman model, it is advisable to use an exclusion restriction, i.e. to include one 
variable in the selection equation which is then excluded in the outcome equation. It is 
required that the variable has a substantial influence on the decision whether to make a 
donation, but no influence on the amount given. Since there is no variable available in the 
data set for which this requirement is fulfilled, I estimate the Heckman model without the 
exclusion restrictions. However, in this case identification of the parameter estimates in the 
outcome equation might be difficult. (Wooldridge, 2002: 564; Cameron and Trivedi, 2010: 
558-561) 
The first part of the Heckman model is a normal probit model, therefore the probability of 
giving can be calculated as in equation (5.17) and the marginal effect of a variable    on the 
probability of giving is given in (5.18) and (5.19). As in the Tobit and the two-part model, it is 
also possible to estimate conditional and unconditional expected values. The conditional 
expected value, i.e. the expected (log) giving conditional on making a contribution is 
 
                           
      
      
 (5.27) 
(Greene, 2008: 884-885).   is the error correlation in the two equations, therefore 
          (5.28) 
Both    and   are given in the outputs produced by SAS. In order to find out if the two parts 
of the giving decision are indeed correlated, one can test the significance of the correlation 
coefficient   (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010: 561). 
The marginal effect of a variable    on the conditional expected value is 
                   
   
            
      
      
  
      
      
      (5.29) 
(Greene, 2008: 885).  
If    is a binary variable, the conditional marginal effect can be calculated as 
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  (5.30) 
(Hoffmann and Kassouf, 2005: 1305) where      (    ) is a vector of values for each variable 
with the value of    set to zero (one). If    is a discrete variable with more than one category, 
     always characterizes the vector with the value of the reference category set to zero, while 
the values for each of the remaining categories is set to one separately. 
The unconditional expected value is  
 
                              
      
      
  (5.31) 
and the corresponding marginal effect is 
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(Hoffman and Kassouf, 2005: 1310-1311) when the variable is continuous and  
              
      
         
         
         
           
      
         
         
         
            
(5.33) 
(Hoffman and Kassouf, 2005: 1311) when the variable is discrete. 
5.5.4 Pooling the sample 
In my main estimations of the Tobit, the two-part and the Heckman model I pool the 
observations over all sample years. Pooled estimation gives correct estimates of parameters; 
however, I should have also used a robust variance estimator that accounts for serial 
dependence of the error terms. Serial dependence (or autocorrelation) emerges when the 
errors of the same individual are correlated over time. When non-robust standard errors are 
applied, one assumes that each new observation contributes the same amount of additional 
information as the last one. However, when autocorrelation is present, one can usually infer 
something about next year’s giving of an individual when one knows about the individual’s 
giving in previous years. Therefore adding the information for another year provides less and 
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less new information about the individual. The problem gets worse as the panel length (i.e. the 
number of observations for the same individual) or the degree of autocorrelation increases. 
(Petersen, 2009: 440-442) 
I do not report autocorrelation-consistent standard errors for the Tobit, the Heckman and the 
second part of the two-tiered estimation. However, as a robustness test I report results for a 
single year where serial correlation is not an issue. I choose the year 2003, since this allows 
me to use the church membership variable that I have described above and to compare 
individuals who have left the church and those who are about to leave the church in one of the 
following years. 
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5.6 Results  
5.6.1 The effect of church membership on giving 
In this section the focus is on comparing the voluntary contributions of church members and 
non-members. As I have discussed in Section 5.4.8, church members and non-members face 
different incentives to report their charitable giving because of regulations concerning 
itemization of special expenses. Therefore I present results for the sample of regular itemizers 
where non-members might be under-represented, and for the sample of regular itemizers and 
non-itemizers where the amount given by non-members might by systematically under-
reported. 
Results are estimated with the Heckman method, Cragg’s two-part model and the Tobit 
model. The reason for this variety of methods is that all estimation methods have certain 
methodological prerequisites that cannot be completely fulfilled. Therefore the application of 
different estimation methods is used as a robustness test. 
5.6.1.1 Results of Heckman estimation 
Table 5.2 shows the results of the Heckman estimation for the sample consisting of regular 
itemizers only. The advantage of the Heckman approach is that the decision to give at all 
(extensive margin) and the amount given (intensive margin) can be examined separately. The 
first column of Table 5.2 shows the results of the probit estimation of the binary decision 
whether to give at all, in the second column I report results on the outcome, i.e. the amount 
given, and in the remaining three columns I report the marginal effects on the probability to 
give and the conditional and unconditional amount given. 
The highly significant parameter   signifies that the hypothesis of independence of the two 
parts of the Heckman estimation can be rejected (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2010: 559). The 
role of   can easily be seen in equation (5.28) where   determines the covariance of the errors 
in the two equations,    . If    , the covariance would also be zero and the two decisions 
would be unrelated. However, in my data the decision to give at all and how much to give are 
closely related. This implies that estimation methods such as the Heckman method which 
account for the correlation between the two decisions should be used. 
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Table 5.2: Estimation results and marginal effects of Heckman estimation for total donations 
of regular itemizers 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation Outcome On pro-
bability 
Con-
ditional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -5.599 0.025 
(0.000) 
-6.025 0.037 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) -0.246 0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.760 0.011 
(0.000) 
-0.098 -0.541 -0.718 
Income (log) 0.493 0.002 
(0.000) 
0.881 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.196 0.443 1.135 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male  -0.048 0.002 
(0.000) 
0.057 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.019 0.100 -0.044 
Single female 0.117 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.217 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.047 0.115 0.278 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of 
children 
       
None -0.291 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.528 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.116 -0.278 -0.704 
One -0.297 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.599 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.118 -0.345 -0.745 
Two  -0.159 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.382 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.063 -0.249 -0.442 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 1.096 0.004 
(0.000) 
1.789 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.414 0.883 2.523 
60-69 0.833 0.004 
(0.000) 
1.304 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.323 0.578 1.834 
50-59 0.441 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.632 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.170 0.223 0.880 
40-49 0.274 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.387 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.104 0.127 0.525 
30-39 0.146 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.197 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.055 0.055 0.267 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
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Region        
East Germany -0.153 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.232 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.060 -0.094 -0.325 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Member 0.137 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.054 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.054 -0.177 0.179 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
-0.136 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.457 0.010 
(0.000) 
-0.053 -0.330 -0.381 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
-0.142 0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.463 0.014 
(0.000) 
-0.055 -0.330 -0.391 
After 
disaffiliation 
-0.052 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.313 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.020 -0.265 -0.208 
N 3,295,334     
  0.846 0.001 
(0.000) 
     
   1.614    
Log Likelihood -4,616,915     
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of regular itemizers only; borderline itemizers and non-itemizers are 
excluded. Estimation also includes year dummies (results not shown). P-values are given in 
parentheses. 
 
Table 5.3 presents the Heckman estimation results for the sample consisting of regular 
itemizers and non-itemizers. Again, the hypothesis that the two parts of the giving decision 
are unrelated can be rejected. However, in this sample the correlation is negative, although it 
is not as strong as in the sample of regular itemizers only. 
In the sample of regular itemizers in Table 5.2 most of the exogenous regressors exert the 
same direction of influence both on the decision to give and how much to give. The two 
central regressors price and income show the expected signs at the extensive as well as 
intensive margin and in both samples. An increase in price (income) decreases (increases) 
both the probability to give and the amount given. For regular itemizers, the unconditional 
income elasticity is estimated to be around 1.1, i.e. giving is income-elastic. In contrast, I find 
that donations react inelastically to changes in price, with an estimated price elasticity of 
unconditional giving of -0.7. In the sample consisting of itemizers and non-itemizers in Table 
5.3, the estimated elasticities are pronouncedly different. The income elasticity is very low 
while the price elasticity is much higher – above 4 in absolute terms for unconditional giving. 
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This result is not surprising, since the large group of non-itemizers faces a price of giving of 
one, and at the same time most individuals do not make a contribution. 
 
Table 5.3: Estimation results and marginal effects of Heckman estimation for total donations 
of regular itemizers and non-itemizers 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation Outcome On pro-
bability 
Con-
ditional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -2.799 0.014 
(0.000) 
2.575 0.034 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) -2.628 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.987 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.828 -2.134 -4.121 
Income (log) 0.122 0.001 
(0.000) 
0.253 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.039 0.306 0.243 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male  -0.301 0.002 
(0.000) 
0.102 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.091 -0.031 -0.401 
Single female -0.111 0.002 
(0.000) 
0.038 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.047 -0.010 -0.158 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of 
children 
       
None -0.276 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.266 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.092 -0.384 -0.519 
One -0.239 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.324 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.081 -0.426 -0.481 
Two  -0.116 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.255 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.040 -0.304 -0.276 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 1.122 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.554 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.384 1.019 2.140 
60-69 0.840 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.297 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.272 0.657 1.408 
50-59 0.431 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.002 0.006 
(0.737) 
0.123 0.194 0.562 
40-49 0.260 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.054 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.069 0.064 0.300 
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30-39 0.131 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.073 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.033 -0.013 0.133 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Region        
East Germany -0.378 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.195 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.108 0.026 -0.463 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Member 0.344 0.002 
(0.000) 
-0.194 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.104 -0.042 0.443 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
0.030 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.263 0.010 
(0.000) 
0.008 -0.249 -0.012 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
0.015 0.008 
(0.049) 
-0.256 0.013 
(0.000) 
0.004 -0.249 -0.028 
After 
disaffiliation 
0.051 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.236 0.010 
(0.000) 
0.014 -0.213 0.018 
N 5,014,594     
  -0.443 0.004 
(0.000) 
     
   1.295    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of regular itemizers and non-itemizers. Taxpayers are excluded in 
those years when they are borderline itemizers. Estimation also includes year dummies 
(results not shown). P-values of t-tests are given in parentheses. 
 
Turning the attention to the effect of type of assessment and gender I find that among regular 
itemizers females are more likely to give and give more than both married couples and 
individually assessed males. Looking at conditional giving, i.e. the contribution someone 
makes given that he or she makes a contribution at all, males give roughly 10 % more and 
females give 12 % more than married couples. The comparably low unconditional giving of 
male taxpayers is mainly due to their small probability to make a contribution, while 
individually assessed female taxpayers are found to be the most generous group since they are 
both most likely to give and give the most once they make a contribution. The picture changes 
somewhat when non-itemizers are included in the estimation (see Table 5.3). Now married 
couples appear to be the most generous group. Individually assessed men have by far the 
lowest unconditional giving. It is interesting to notice that the estimated differences between 
men and women remain substantially the same in both estimations, with men showing a lower 
probability to give than women but more or less the same conditional giving, resulting in 
268 
considerably lower unconditional giving. However, the relative position of married couples 
has changed. As the summary statistics show, the share of married couples is lower when the 
sample consists of itemizers and non-itemizers then when I consider only itemizers. This 
suggests that more individually assessed taxpayers are in the non-itemizer group who largely 
do not declare any donations. 
Individuals with more than one child are found to be more generous than taxpayers without 
children or with only one child. From Table 5.2 it can be seen that the estimates for taxpayers 
without children and those with one child are quite similar. Both groups are about 12 % less 
likely to make a contribution than the reference group of taxpayers with three and more 
children. The conditional amount given by the childless and those with one child is also 
remarkably lower than that of the reference group, which results in the finding that the 
unconditional giving of taxpayers without children is 51 % lower than that of taxpayers with 
three or more children and individuals with one child give 53 % less.
120
 However, as the 
number of children increases to two or three and more, the probability to give as well as 
conditional and unconditional giving increase. Taxpayers with two children give 36 % less 
than the reference group. The overall result that differences between individuals without 
children and those with one child are small, but giving increases when there is more than one 
child, also holds when one looks at the results for the sample consisting of itemizers and non-
itemizers (see Table 5.3). 
Concerning age, I find that voluntary giving increases steadily with age. This applies both to 
the probability to make a contribution and the amount given. Those in the oldest age group 
have a 41 percentage points higher probability to give than those in the youngest age group, 
and those in the oldest group who give make a 1.4 times larger contribution than the youngest 
age group. The results also show that there is a very large difference in giving between the 
age groups 50 to 59 and 60 to 69, which is mainly due to a significant jump in the probability 
of giving. Again, the results remain substantially the same when one considers the sample 
consisting of itemizers and non-itemizers in Table 5.3. In this sample there is also an 
impressive jump in conditional giving, i.e. in the amount given provided that someone makes 
a donation, between the age groups 50 to 59 and 60 to 69. 
The results, both concerning the sample of itemizers in Table 5.2 and the sample of itemizers 
and non-itemizers in Table 5.3 suggest that East Germans give considerably less than West 
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 The percentage difference in the amount given can be calculated with the formula:                   
                         (Hoffmann and Kassouf, 2005: 1305). 
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Germans. The main reason for this difference is the lower propensity to make a contribution 
in East Germany. Looking at the sample of itemizers, where the estimated average probability 
of giving is 47 %, the probability to give is 6 % lower in East Germany compared to West 
Germany. Turning to the joint sample of itemizers and non-itemizers, the differences are even 
larger. I estimate a 10 % lower probability of giving in East Germany; however, in this 
sample only 25 % of taxpayers are estimated to make a contribution. The obvious reason for 
this result is that the share of itemizers among the taxpayers is much lower in East Germany, 
probably because the share of church tax payers is significantly smaller. However, the results 
suggest that even when only itemizers are considered, i.e. when I compare individuals from 
the two parts of Germany who have the same incentives to make a contribution, giving in East 
Germany is still lower. The large discrepancy in the likelihood of charitable giving eventually 
translates to large differences in unconditional giving. 
The results in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 also allow looking at the effect of church membership 
on giving. In accordance with expectations, I find that non-members have a significantly 
lower probability of giving than church members. Although this finding is repeated in both 
samples, the size of the effect is larger in the sample consisting of both itemizers and non-
itemizers. While in the sample of itemizers I only estimate a 6 % difference in the probability 
of giving, the difference is almost 11 % in the joint sample, although the average estimated 
probability to give is significantly lower in the latter sample. Again, I suspect that the reason 
for this observation lies in the fact that most non-members are non-itemizers and therefore 
have a lower incentive to report giving, or are excluded from the sample if they make a 
contribution and fall into the category of borderline itemizers. Therefore the finding that non-
members are less likely to give even when they are itemizers suggests that there actually 
exists a lower propensity to give among non-members. 
However, in both samples I find that the conditional giving of church members is lower than 
that of non-members. In other words, on the occasion that non-members make a contribution, 
they actually give more than church members.  
These results help to answer my first research question. From the model in Chapter 3 I have 
derived the hypothesis that church members might be in a “corner solution” where their 
church taxes exceed the amount of charitable contributions they would like to make and 
therefore abstain from making voluntary contributions. I cannot confirm this hypothesis. 
However, my result is in accordance with the overwhelming majority of previous research 
discussed in Section 5.3.2 that repeatedly found that religious people are more generous than 
270 
the non-religious. However, with respect to the amount given, church members do not appear 
to be more generous than non-members, which is broadly in line with the hypothesis from the 
model in Chapter 3 that church members might perceive their church taxes as a substitute for 
donations.  
In addition, the results in Table 5.2 help to answer research question three which asks if 
“regular” church members differ from those who decide to disaffiliate from the church with 
respect to their giving behavior. The answer is unambiguous: individuals before disaffiliation 
are less likely to give and give a smaller amount, conditional on making a contribution, than 
regular church members. The differences are substantial: according to Table 5.2, regular 
church members are 11 percentage points more likely to give than those who will disaffiliate 
in the following years. The unconditional giving of those who are about to leave the church is 
estimated to be 43 % lower compared to regular church members’ unconditional giving. In the 
sample consisting of itemizers and non-itemizers in Table 5.3, the general pattern is the same. 
These findings concur with the view that individuals who leave the church have a lower 
marginal utility of giving than “regular” church members. 
The charitable contributions of individuals who disaffiliate from the church can also be 
compared to the contributions of non-members. In the sample of regular itemizers in Table 
5.2 I find that individuals “before disaffiliation” and “after disaffiliation” are less likely to 
give and give a smaller amount than non-members. When one considers the sample including 
itemizers and non-itemizers (see Table 5.3) the unconditional giving of those who will leave 
the church soon is roughly the same as that of non-members. Even after disaffiliation, their 
unconditional giving is only marginally higher than that of non-members. On top of that, the 
summary statistics show that the share of itemizers among individuals “after disaffiliation” is 
much higher than among non-members. Consequently, they have a higher incentive to state 
their voluntary giving. From this I conclude that individuals who have left the church give the 
same or even less than non-members, provided they face the same incentives. To sum up, all 
evidence suggests that people who leave the church do not only give less than regular church 
members, they are in all likelihood even less generous than (or at best as generous as) non-
members. 
5.6.1.2 Results of Cragg’s two-part estimation 
As I have discussed in Section 5.5.3, the Heckman estimation results have the disadvantage 
that they do not fully account for the stratified sampling design. In addition, since I do not use 
an exclusion restriction when estimating the Heckman model (see also Section 5.5.3), the 
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results might be estimated imprecisely. Therefore I re-estimate the results with a two-part 
model. In Table 5.4 I report results for the sample consisting of regular itemizers.
121
 The first 
part of the two-part model is a normal probit model, in which I account for the sampling 
design, i.e. I apply a SAS procedure that was developed for stratified samples.
122
 The results 
of the probit estimation in the two-part model in Table 5.4 should be similar to those in the 
first step of the Heckman model in Table 5.2. Differences in the estimated coefficients do not 
result from accounting for the sampling design, but from diverse estimation techniques. The 
results of the two-part model below are produced with a simple probit regression, while the 
Heckman model in Table 5.2 is estimated with the maximum likelihood technique, i.e. the 
coefficients of the participation and the outcome equation are estimated simultaneously (see 
Cameron and Trivedi, 2010: 556-561). The second part of the results below – the outcome 
equation – is estimated with a truncated regression model on the pooled sample of those 
individuals who have made a donation. 
 
Table 5.4: Estimation results and marginal effects of Cragg’s two-part model for total 
donations of regular itemizers 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable 
Participation – 
Probit estimation 
Outcome – 
Truncated 
regression 
On pro-
bability 
Con-
ditional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -4.865 0.095 
(0.000) 
-1.575 0.029 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) -0.308 0.025 
(0.000) 
-0.450 0.009 
(0.000) 
-0.123 -0.450 -0.794 
Income (log) 0.418 0.010 
(0.000) 
0.610 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.166 0.609 1.076 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male -0.088 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.185 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.035 0.184 -0.082 
Single female 0.082 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.182 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.033 0.182 0.245 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
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 I also produced results for the sample consisting of regular itemizers and non-itemizers. Since they do not 
differ substantially from the results reported for the Heckman model, I do not report them here. 
122
 When the sample is stratified but one applies techniques which are developed for simple random samples and 
uses sampling weights, the resulting point estimates of coefficients are correct, but their standard errors are not. 
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Number of 
children 
       
None -0.278 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.303 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.111 -0.303 -0.695 
One -0.279 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.381 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.111 -0.381 -0.732 
Two -0.143 0005 
(0.000) 
-0.279 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.057 -0.279 -0.429 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 1.102 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.856 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.416 0.855 2.531 
60-69 0.839 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.554 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.325 0.554 1.840 
50-59 0.451 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.181 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.174 0.181 0.884 
40-49 0.285 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.076 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.108 0.076 0.525 
30-39 0.157 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.004 0.005 
(0.388) 
0.059 0.004 0.269 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Region        
East Germany -0.169 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.061 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.067 -0.061 -0.340 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Church member 0.163 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.220 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.064 -0.220 0.211 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
-0.109 0.009 
(0.000) 
-0.383 0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.042 -0.383 -0.353 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
-0.115 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.386 0.011 
(0.000) 
-0.044 -0.385 -0.363 
After 
disaffiliation 
-0.032 0.010 
(0.002) 
-0.309 0.009 
(0.000) 
-0.013 -0.309 -0.188 
N 3,295,334 2,014,276    
   1.222    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of regular itemizers only; borderline itemizers and non-itemizers are 
excluded. Estimation also includes year dummies (results not shown). P-values for Wald’s 
Chi-Square test (probit estimation) and t-test (truncated regression) are given in parentheses. 
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The estimated coefficients of the participation equation in the two-part model are quite similar 
to those of the participation equation in the Heckman model, but the estimated standard errors 
are somewhat larger in the two-part model, resulting in higher p-values. However, even after 
accounting for the sampling design, the estimated coefficients of all independen variables are 
highly significant.
123
 
In the probit estimation I find that the marginal effect of the price of giving is somewhat 
larger in absolute terms and the effect of income somewhat smaller than in the first part of the 
Heckman estimation. Nevertheless, the sign of the estimates accord in both estimations, and 
the sizes of the effects are still comparable. The significance level of the estimates in the 
probit model is lower, although both variables are still highly significant. The unconditional 
marginal effects in the Heckman and Cragg’s two-part model are qualitatively similar. Both 
models predict an income elasticity of roughly 1.1. The price elasticity is estimated to be -0.8 
in Cragg’s model and -0.7 in the Heckman model. 
The estimated marginal effects with respect to type of assessment and gender, number of 
children, age and region are very close in both estimations. This is true both for the marginal 
effects on probability and on unconditional giving. There are some small differences in the 
conditional marginal effects, e.g. in the two-tier model I do not find differences in conditional 
giving between individuals in the age groups below 30 and 30 to 39. 
Cragg’s two-part model also largely supports the conclusions drawn from the Heckman model 
concerning the probability of giving of church members and individuals in the process of 
disaffiliation. Church members are significantly more likely to give than non-members. In the 
model at hand, the estimated difference in the probability of giving is 6.4 percentage points 
and thus even larger than in the Heckman model where it was only 5.4 percentage points. 
Cragg’s model predicts that church members give 23 % more than non-members, while the 
corresponding number is 20 % in the Heckman model. Both models indicate that the 
conditional giving, i.e. the amount given conditional on making a contribution, is lower for 
church members than non-members. 
Individuals who disaffiliate from the church are shown to be less likely to give and to give 
less conditional on making a contribution than both members and non-members. However, 
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 With respect to the probit estimation in Table 5.4 I report p-values which refer to a Wald Chi-Square test, 
while in the Heckman model I report p-values of a t-test. The p-values reported with respect to the t-test refer to 
a two-sided test, while the p-values associated with the Chi-squares describe a one-sided test. 
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the results of both models suggest that they are roughly three percentage points more likely to 
give after disaffiliation than before. 
5.6.1.3 Results of Tobit estimation 
Table 5.5 shows the Tobit estimation results for the sample of regular itemizers. Data are 
pooled for the years 2001 to 2006.  
The marginal effects on probability and on unconditional giving in the Tobit model 
qualitatively support the findings of the Heckman model and Cragg’s model with respect to 
all relevant explanatory variables, although in some cases there are minor differences in the 
sizes of the effects. There are some differences in the estimated effects on conditional giving. 
 
 
Table 5.5: Estimation results and marginal effects of the Tobit model for total donations of 
regular itemizers 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable  On pro-
bability 
Condi-
tional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -20.920 0.089 (0.000)    
Price (log) -1.324 0.028 (0.000) -0.121 -0.509 -0.712 
Income (log) 1.877 0.009 (0.000) 0.171 0.722 1.009 
Type of assessment 
and gender 
     
Single male -0.281 0.009 (0.000) -0.026 -0.106 -0.147 
Single female 0.410 0.010 (0.000) 0.037 0.162 0.227 
Married couple ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of children      
None -1.191 0.013 (0.000) -0.106 -0.487 -0.688 
One  -1.237 0.013 (0.000) -0.111 -0.504 -0.712 
Two -0.668 0.013 (0.000) -0.059 -0.282 -0.401 
Three or more ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age      
70 and above 4.554 0.015 (0.000) 0.389 1.920 2.675 
60-69 3.555 0.014 (0.000) 0.314 1.396 1.938 
50-59 2.004 0.012 (0.000) 0.181 0.704 0.953 
40-49 1.332 0.012 (0.000) 0.120 0.446 0.593 
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30-39 0.777 0.012 (0.000) 0.070 0.250 0.326 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Region      
East Germany -0.723 0.012 (0.000) -0.066 -0.267 -0.368 
West Germany ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership      
Church member 0.494 0.010 (0.000) 0.045 0.186 0.259 
Non-member ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before disaffiliation -0.672 0.023 (0.000) -0.061 -0.233 -0.316 
Year of disaffiliation -0.685 0.031 (0.000) -0.062 -0.238 -0.321 
After disaffiliation -0.295 0.027 (0.000) -0.027 -0.105 -0.144 
N 3,295,334    
  4.364    
Log Likelihood -5,743,006    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of regular itemizers only; borderline itemizers and non-itemizers are 
excluded. Estimation also includes year dummies (results not shown). P-values are given in 
parentheses. 
 
The estimated price elasticities for unconditional giving are the same in the Tobit and 
Heckman model; they are roughly -0.7. The income elasticity of unconditional giving is 
estimated to be 1.0 in the Tobit model and thus marginally lower than in the Heckman and 
Cragg’s model, where it is 1.1. The Tobit and the probit model (i.e., the first part of Cragg’s 
model) both estimate that a one percentage point increase in income results in a 0.17 % 
increase in the probability of giving, while the Heckman model predicts an increase by 
0.20 %. 
All three models predict that single males give somewhat less and single females somewhat 
more than married couples, although the exact estimates vary. The previous finding that 
individuals without children and those with one child give about the same, but are 
substantially less generous than taxpayers with two or more children is also supported by the 
Tobit model. East Germans are found to be less likely to give and give a smaller amount when 
they make a contribution in comparison to West Germans. Again, this result appears in all 
three estimations; estimates for unconditional giving suggest that East Germans give between 
28 % (Heckman) and 31 % (Tobit) less than West Germans. Concerning age, the Tobit results 
also coincide with previous findings. In particular, in the results of all three models one finds 
a large increase in giving between the age groups 50 to 59 and 60 to 69. 
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All models predict that church members have a higher propensity to give and give more 
(unconditionally) than non-members. The estimated unconditional giving of church members 
(in comparison to non-members) is largest in the Tobit model (30 % higher than giviving of 
non-members) and somewhat smaller, but still substantial (20 %), in the Heckman model. 
However, while the Heckman model and Cragg’s model predict that the conditional giving of 
church members is lower than that of non-members, conditional giving of members has a 
positive sign in the Tobit model. Taxpayers who are about to leave the church give 
significantly less than non-members (and church members), i.e. both the share of donors and 
the amount of the contribution are lower, estimates range between 27 % and 32 %. All three 
models suggest that taxpayers are more likely to give and give more after disaffiliation than 
before, although their giving is still below the level of non-members and far below the level of 
members. 
5.6.2 The effect of church disaffiliation on giving 
5.6.2.1 Results of Heckman estimation 
In order to answer my second research question, i.e. whether and how disaffiliation from the 
church affects voluntary giving, the estimations in the previous subsection have to be 
interpreted cautiously because there could be a sample selection problem. The sample 
consisting of itemizers only is unbalanced, since individuals are included in years when they 
are itemizers and are excluded when they are non-itemizers or borderline itemizers. However, 
itemization status is connected to church membership, since many individuals who pay church 
taxes exceed the basic allowance for special expenses with their church taxes, but they do not 
have sufficiently high special expenses when they stop paying church taxes and are therefore 
excluded from the sample. As a consequence, the “before disaffiliation” group is not 
congruent with the “after disaffiliation” group. If, for whatever reason, the individuals who 
remain in the sample have on average a different inclination to give than those who leave, the 
disaffiliation effects discussed above might occur as the result of sample selection. Therefore, 
I re-estimate the equations with a balanced panel, i.e. one that only includes those individuals 
who are itemizers in all six panel years. 
In Table 5.6 I report the results of the Heckman estimation of the sample consisting of 
individuals who are itemizers in all sample years. This leads to a large reduction in sample 
size as well as to a change in the composition of the sample. As one would expect, the share 
of church members in the sample is large and the share of non-members very small, compared 
to the shares of these groups in the total population. In addition, the average income in the 
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“balanced” sample is significantly higher, which suggests that individuals with a high income 
are more likely to itemize their deductions. Consequently, the estimates concerning price and 
income elasticity and socio-demographic variables should not be given much attention, since 
they cannot be transferred to the majority of taxpayers or taken as a good estimate for the 
population as a whole. Still, it is interesting to see that in this “balanced” sample that mainly 
consists of church members and a few non-members with high income, the price elasticity of 
giving is much lower than in the larger samples. In fact, I find almost no effect of the price on 
the probability of giving, while there is a small negative effect on the amount given, provided 
the taxpayers makes a donation. The unconditional price elasticity at the mean is estimated to 
be roughly -0.15. In addition, I find that the income elasticity is 1.5, which is larger in the 
“balanced” sample than in the unbalanced samples. 
 
Table 5.6: Estimation results and marginal effects of Heckman estimation for total donations 
of regular itemizers in all sample years 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation Outcome On pro-
bability 
Condi-
tional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -6.642 0.042 
(0.000) 
-7.269 0.056 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) 0.078 0.014 
(0.000) 
-0.498 0.019 
(0.000) 
0.031 -0.562 -0.148 
Income (log) 0.626 0.004 
(0.000) 
1.050 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.249 0.539 1.477 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male  0.016 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.159 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.006 0.146 0.105 
Single female 0.180 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.316 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.071 0.172 0.437 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of 
children 
       
None -0.332 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.520 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.129 -0.262 -0.786 
One -0.342 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.612 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.133 -0.346 -0.848 
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Two -0.183 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.372 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.070 -0.234 -0.489 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 1.144 0.006 
(0.000) 
1.886 0.009 
(0.000) 
0.416 1.040 2.738 
60-69 0.868 0.005 
(0.000) 
1.378 0.008 
(0.000) 
0.332 0.696 2.017 
50-59 0.412 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.601 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.163 0.248 0.879 
40-49 0.250 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.365 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.098 0.145 0.519 
30-39 0.123 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.159 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.048 0.049 0.239 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Region        
East Germany -0.062 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.027 0.008 
(0.001) 
-0.025 0.024 -0.106 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Member -0.044 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.487 0.011 
(0.000) 
-0.017 -0.452 -0.194 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
-0.291 0.014 
(0.000) 
-0.835 0.023 
(0.000) 
-0.116 -0.590 -0.859 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
-0.288 0.021 
(0.000) 
-0.876 0.033 
(0.000) 
-0.114 -0.634 -0.872 
After 
disaffiliation 
-0.225 0.014 
(0.000) 
-0.777 0.022 
(0.000) 
-0.090 -0.589 -0.738 
N 1,879,806     
  0.836 0.002 
(0.000) 
     
    1.573     
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of taxpayers who are regular itemizers in all sample years. Taxpayers 
who are non-itemizers or borderline itemizers in any year are excluded. Estimation also 
includes year dummies (results not shown). P-values of t-tests are given in parentheses. 
 
Turning attention to the effect of church membership, I find that – in contrast to the results in 
the previous section – church members give less than non-members, both at the extensive and 
the intensive margin, amounting to an 18 % lower unconditional giving compared to non-
members. However, as I have pointed out, this result might be driven by the fact that a 
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majority of church members, but a small and not representative minority of non-members, are 
included in the sample. 
Those individuals who disaffiliate from the church are found to give significantly less often 
and give a lower amount than regular members. The effects are large. An individual who will 
disaffiliate in the following years is found to be almost 10 percentage points less likely to give 
than a member and has a 41 % lower unconditional giving compared to taxpayers who are 
members of the church in all year between 2001 and 2006. This reinforces the results in 
Section 5.6.1, which have already pointed towards a distinctively lower level of generosity 
among individuals in the process of church disaffiliation.
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Looking at the effects of church disaffiliation, I find that the probability to give is lowest in 
the years before disaffiliation and increases moderately when the individual has left the 
church. Looking at conditional giving, I do not find any difference between individuals before 
and after disaffiliation. In sum, this results in a very moderate increase in giving from before 
to after disaffiliation. While taxpayers who are about to leave the church give 58 % less than 
non-members, those who have left recently give only 52 % less. As I have pointed out, the 
increase in giving can be traced back to the higher probability of giving. The differences 
between the groups before and after disaffiliation are also statistically significant. Both 
dummy variables have a standard error of 0.014; consequently, the estimated coefficients do 
not lie in a range of less than two standard deviations from each other. In the year when the 
disaffiliation actually takes place, unconditional giving resembles that of the years before 
disaffiliation. 
Relating these findings to the hypotheses derived for research question two, i.e. how giving 
changes from before to after disaffiliation, I conclude that there is some evidence for the 
hypothesis that individuals start giving after they have disaffiliated. The results suggest that 
there is a small group of church members who are in a corner solution, i.e. their church taxes 
are so high that they do not make any additional voluntary contributions. After they have 
disaffiliated, they start giving. However, I do not find evidence for the hypothesis that the 
conditional giving of those who make a contribution increases. 
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 The results in Table 5.6 also support the finding of the previous section that individuals who leave the church 
give less than non-members. The estimated differences in the probability to give and the amount given are even 
larger in the balanced sample than in the unbalanced sample of Section 5.6.1. However, this result should be 
interpreted cautiously since non-members in the balanced sample are probably not representative of the 
population of non-members. 
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5.6.2.2 Results of Cragg’s two-part and Tobit estimations 
In order to see if the results are robust with respect to changes in the estimation method I 
present the results of Cragg’s two-part model and the Tobit model in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8, 
respectively.  
 
Table 5.7: Estimation results and marginal effects of Cragg’s two-part model for total 
donations of regular itemizers in all sample years 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation – 
Probit estimation 
Outcome – 
Truncated 
regression 
On pro-
bability 
Condi-
tional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -5.876 0.155 
(0.000) 
-2.877 0.043 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) 0.004 0.041 
(0.930) 
-0.310 0.014 
(0.000) 
0.001 -0.310 -0.172 
Income (log) 0.546 0.015 
(0.000) 
0.756 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.217 0.756 1.465 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male -0.030 0.010 
(0.004) 
0.270 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.012 0.270 0.096 
Single female 0.141 0.011 
(0.000) 
0.274 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.056 0.274 0.427 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of 
children 
       
None -0.328 0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.258 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.128 -0.258 -0.775 
One -0.330 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.363 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.129 -0.363 -0.837 
Two -0.173 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.252 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.067 -0.252 -0.481 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 1.149 0.010 
(0.000) 
0.981 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.418 0.981 2.679 
60-69 0.864 0.009 
(0.000) 
0.658 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.331 0.658 1.991 
50-59 0.414 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.202 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.163 0.202 0.878 
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40-49 0.253 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.094 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.099 0.094 0.515 
30-39 0.129 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.003 0.006 
(0.676) 
0.050 -0.003 0.235 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Region        
East Germany -0.077 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.048 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.031 0.048 -0.119 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Member 0.015 0.010 
(0.143) 
-0.540 0.008 
(0.000) 
0.006 -0.540 -0.282 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
-0.236 0.021 
(0.000) 
-0.691 0.018 
(0.000) 
-0.094 -0.690 -0.831 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
-0.228 0.030 
(0.000) 
-0.746 0.025 
(0.000) 
-0.091 -0.746 -0.845 
After 
disaffiliation 
-0.173 0.020 
(0.000) 
-0.685 0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.069 -0.685 -0.713 
N 1,879,806 1,286,567    
   1.218    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of taxpayers who are regular itemizers in all sample years. Taxpayers 
who are non-itemizers or borderline itemizers in any year are excluded. Estimation also 
includes year dummies (results not shown). P-values for Wald’s Chi-Square test (probit 
estimation) and t-test (truncated regression) are given in parentheses. 
 
Cragg’s model and the Heckman model produce virtually the same results. There is a minor 
difference in the estimated price elasticity, which is -0.17 in the two-tier model (compared to  
-0.15 in the Heckman model). The difference is mainly caused by the fact that in Cragg’s 
model there is no effect of the price of giving on the probability to make donation, while there 
is a small but significant positive effect in the Heckman model. 
Concerning church membership, both models indicate that church members give less than 
non-members, although the estimated difference between members and non-members in 
unconditional giving is larger in the two-part model than in the Heckman model. In addition, 
the Heckman model confirms the finding that individuals are least generous in the years 
before disaffiliation and unconditional giving increases moderately from before to after 
disaffiliation. There are some minor differences in the estimates how much the two decisions 
– whether to give and how much to give – contribute to the low level of giving of individuals 
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who leave the church. While the two-part model predicts that the probability to give of 
individuals before disaffiliation is 9 percentage points lower than that of non-members, the 
difference is 12 percentage points in the Heckman model. In turn, the conditional giving of 
people who leave the church is estimated to be slightly lower in Cragg’s model compared to 
the Heckman model. Nevertheless, both models agree that the probability of giving increases 
by 2.5 percentage points from before to after disaffiliation, while the conditional giving is 
virtually unchanged. 
The conclusions concerning church membership and church disaffiliation are also supported 
by the results of the Tobit model shown in Table 5.8. As I have discussed earlier, some of the 
Tobit results can diverge from the results of the two-tier and the Heckman model because the 
Tobit model does not permit the effect of a variable at the extensive and the intensive margin 
to differ. This happens in the case of the price elasticity, where the other two models find no 
or even a small positive effect on the probability to give, while the amount given is negatively 
affected. In sum, the price elasticity in the Tobit model is somewhat larger and the income 
elasticity is slightly smaller than in the other models, although the general conclusion that 
giving is inelastic in price and elastic in income is still maintained. 
 
Table 5.8: Estimation results and marginal effects of the Tobit model for total donations of 
regular itemizers in all sample years 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable  On pro-
bability 
Condi-
tional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -22.236 0.135 (0.000)    
Price (log) -0.506 0.046 (0.000) -0.047 -0.214 -0.303 
Income (log) 2.138 0.013 (0.000) 0.199 0.903 1.282 
Type of assessment 
and gender 
     
Single male -0.113 0.013 (0.000) -0.011 -0.047 -0.066 
Single female 0.540 0.013 (0.000) 0.050 0.234 0.334 
Married couple ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of children      
None -1.287 0.016 (0.000) -0.115 -0.581 -0.828 
One -1.331 0.016 (0.000) -0.119 -0.599 -0.853 
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Two -0.702 0.016 (0.000) -0.061 -0.330 -0.470 
Three or more ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age      
70 and above 4.544 0.020 (0.000) 0.383 2.145 2.994 
60-69 3.529 0.018 (0.000) 0.315 1.549 2.179 
50-59 1.813 0.016 (0.000) 0.172 0.701 0.979 
40-49 1.189 0.016 (0.000) 0.114 0.439 0.607 
30-39 0.646 0.016 (0.000) 0.062 0.229 0.313 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Region      
East Germany -0.251 0.019 (0.000) -0.023 -0.104 -0.148 
West Germany ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership      
Church member -0.293 0.025 (0.000) -0.027 -0.126 -0.180 
Non-member ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before disaffiliation -1.276 0.052 (0.000) -0.120 -0.514 -0.724 
Year of disaffiliation -1.246 0.075 (0.000) -0.118 -0.503 -0.709 
After disaffiliation -1.002 0.051 (0.000) -0.094 -0.411 -0.582 
N 1,879,806     
  4.148     
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of taxpayers who are regular itemizers in all sample years. Taxpayers 
who are non-itemizers or borderline itemizers in any year are excluded. Estimation also 
includes year dummies (results not shown). 
 
5.6.2.3 Robustness check I: Estimation for only one year 
As I have pointed out earlier, the estimated standard errors in the above estimations may be 
too high and the associated p-values too low, since I use a pooled sample but do not cluster 
the standard errors. As a result, each observation is treated as if it was a new observation that 
is independent from all other observations, when in reality the observations of one individual 
over time can be expected to be correlated and adding another cross-section does not provide 
a large information value. In order to check if estimates are still significant when there are no 
clusters in the data, I provide the results of estimations for a single cross-section (where every 
observation is actually independent) in Table A.8 through Table A.11 in the appendix. I chose 
the year 2003, because this allows me to compare individuals who have left the church in 
2001 and 2002 with those who will leave in 2004 and 2005. I take the mean values of the 
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pooled cross-sections (instead of the mean values of 2003 only) to calculate the marginal 
effects because that way possible differences in marginal effects can be traced back solely to 
differences in the estimated coefficients. 
The results in Table A.8 can be compared with those in Table 5.2 since both show the results 
of a Heckman estimation which is based on a sample that includes only itemizers. Similarly, 
Table A.9 can be compared to Table 5.4 which both include results of Cragg’s two-part 
model. Comparing the estimated coefficients and the calculated marginal effects shows that 
there are no substantial differences between the results of the pooled cross-sections and the 
single cross-section for 2003. In particular, all estimations are consistent with the conclusion 
that church members are more likely to give, but give a smaller amount provided they make a 
contribution. However, there are some small but noticeable differences in the price and 
income elasticities. Compared to the results for the pooled cross-sections, the estimated price 
elasticity in 2003 is somewhat larger (in absolute value) and the income elasticity is reduced. 
The conclusion that giving is inelastic in price persists in all four estimations, but Cragg’s 
model for the cross-section of 2003 predicts an income elasticity of below one while all other 
estimations suggest that the income elasticity is close to but above one. Not surprisingly, the t-
statistics are smaller in the cross-section of 2003. Nevertheless, all variables are still highly 
significant; therefore one can conclude that pooling the observations does not lead to false 
implications regarding the effect of the relevant variables on charitable giving. 
In Table A.10 and Table A.11 in the appendix I show the estimation results for the sample 
that is restricted to those individuals who are regular itemizers in all sample years. These two 
tables can be compared to Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 above, respectively. Again, in the single 
cross-section for 2003 the income elasticity is lower and the price elasticity is higher than in 
the pooled cross-sections. Regarding the effect of church disaffiliation on voluntary giving, 
the results based on the cross-section of 2003 point in the same direction as my earlier 
findings for the pooled cross-sections: individuals who disaffiliate from the church give 
significantly less than members and non-members, but their probability of giving is 
moderately higher after disaffiliation than before, while the conditional amount given remains 
unchanged. Taken together the individuals give somewhat more after they have left the 
church than before, but still far less than members and non-members. However, the earlier 
findings concerning the significance of the difference between before and after church 
disaffiliation cannot be confirmed. In the single cross-section for 2003 the estimates for those 
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who disaffiliate in the coming years and those who have disaffiliated are not statistically 
significantly different. 
Although the results of the single cross-section for 2003 are in general quite close to those for 
the pooled cross-sections, they have a significant disadvantage when I want to compare 
individuals before and after disaffiliation. When I have data for only one year, all I can look at 
is differences between individuals, i.e. between those who have left the church in 2001 or 
2002 and those who are about to leave in 2004 or 2005. However, the original research 
question is targeted towards changes within individuals over time. Such changes can be 
captured by fixed-effects estimation. 
5.6.2.4 Robustness check II: Fixed-effects panel estimation 
In Table 5.9 I show the results of fixed effects estimations. The estimations are executed by 
conditioning out the means, i.e. the dependent and independent variables are the deviations 
from the means of the respective variable. Standard errors are corrected for the reduction in 
degrees of freedom which are caused by subtracting the mean. I restrict the sample to those 
taxpayers and sample years when the taxpayer actually makes a contribution. Therefore the 
coefficients only capture the decision how much to give, not the decision whether to make a 
charitable contribution at all. Consequently, results should be compared to the conditional 
marginal effects presented above. 
The results show that in both samples the price and income elasticities have the expected 
signs and are significant, but are much smaller in absolute value than in the pooled cross-
sections estimations. This suggests that – at least in the short run – individuals react 
inelastically to changes in the price of giving and income. It also suggests that the larger 
effects found in the pooled samples might be due to variation between individuals rather than 
within individuals. The results imply that married couples give significantly more than 
singles. This is mildly surprising, since in the pooled samples individually assessed taxpayers, 
especially females, were usually found to be more generous than married couples. As in the 
pooled cross-sections, individuals with three or more children are found to be most generous, 
and individuals with one child give less than those with two children or without children. This 
is in accordance with earlier results where conditional giving of individuals with one child 
was found to be lowest. The results of the fixed effects estimation also show that giving 
increases continuously with age, although the size of the effect is much smaller than in the 
pooled sample. Contrary to earlier findings, there are no significant differences between East 
and West Germany. In fixed effects approaches the estimation of regional differences is based 
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on individuals who are mobile between regions. My results imply that the differences in 
giving between East and West Germany are of a purely cross-sectional nature, probably 
caused by differences in upbringing or values, which do not change immediately when 
individuals move.  
 
Table 5.9: Estimation results of fixed effects estimation on the sample of regular itemizers 
and regular itemizers in all sample years (donors only) 
 Regular itemizers Regular itemizers in all years 
Variable Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. 
Price (log) -0.201 0.007 (0.000) -0.144 0.011 (0.000) 
Income (log) 0.140 0.002 (0.000) 0.174 0.003 (0.000) 
Type of assessment     
Married couple 0.159 0.004 (0.000) 0.158 0.006 (0.000) 
Single ref. --- ref. --- 
Number of children     
None -0.038 0.007 (0.000) -0.034 0.008 (0.000) 
One -0.053 0.006 (0.000) -0.052 0.008 (0.000) 
Two -0.037 0.006 (0.000) -0.032 0.007 (0.000) 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- 
Age     
70 and above 0.140 0.011 (0.000) 0.150 0.013 (0.000) 
60-69 0.102 0.009 (0.000) 0.099 0.010 (0.000) 
50-59 0.081 0.008 (0.000) 0.076 0.009 (0.000) 
40-49 0.074 0.007 (0.000) 0.066 0.008 (0.000) 
30-39 0.033 0.006 (0.000) 0.022 0.007 (0.002) 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- 
Region     
West Germany 0.039 0.038 (0.307) -0.009 0.050 (0.863) 
East Germany ref. --- ref. --- 
Church membership     
No 0.072 0.008 (0.000) 0.083 0.012 (0.000) 
Yes ref. --- ref. --- 
N 2,014,276  1,286,567  
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: The sample is restricted to those taxpayers who make a positive contribution in the 
respective year and thus unbalanced. Estimation also includes year dummies (results not 
shown). P-values for t-test are given in parentheses. 
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Both fixed effects estimations show that church members give significantly less than non-
members. Since results of fixed effects estimations are based on those individuals that 
experience a change in an independent variable and the variable is defined in such a way that 
a change in church membership is only registered when individuals disaffiliate from the 
church, this result suggests that giving increases after disaffiliation. For the sample of regular 
itemizers, this supports the cross-sectional results. For the sample of regular itemizers in all 
years the finding is a bit surprising, since my previous results (see Table 5.6) suggest that 
conditional giving is virtually the same before and after disaffiliation, only the probability to 
give increases. One explanation for the finding in Table 5.9 could be that the year of 
disaffiliation is counted as a year when the individual is still a church member. In that year 
conditional giving was found to be below the level after disaffiliation. 
5.6.3 Different types of giving 
I now turn to the results for the two types of giving which were introduced in Section 5.4.1, 
donations to “benevolent, parochial, religious, scientific or especially eligible charitable 
purposes” and donations to “benevolent, scientific and especially eligible cultural purposes”. I 
have produced results with Cragg’s two-part model, Heckman’s approach and the Tobit 
model. Below I will mainly discuss the findings from Cragg’s model, although some results 
which are produced with the Heckman approach can be found in the appendix. Heckman’s 
method and Cragg’s approach provide very similar results concerning all marginal effects. In 
order to improve the readability I will refer to the first type of giving as giving to “religious 
and charitable purposes” or “donations which are tax deductible up to an amount of 5 % of 
overall income”; the second type of giving will be called “giving to benevolent, scientific and 
cultural purposes”, “donations which are tax deductible up to an amount of 10 % of overall 
income”, or simply secular giving. 
5.6.3.1 Price, income, socio-demographic variables and church membership 
As before, I present results for different samples. In this section the focus is on the effect of 
church membership on the two types of giving, therefore I look at the results derived from the 
sample of regular itemizers only and of regular itemizers and non-itemizers. 
The main results are based on estimations on the sample of regular itemizers carried out with 
Cragg’s method. The findings for giving to religious and charitable purposes can be found in 
Table 5.10. Results on the same sample, but estimated with Heckman’s method, are reported 
in Table A.12 in the appendix. Since they are similar to the results produced with Cragg’s 
approach, I will not comment on them further. The results for giving to benevolent, scientific 
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and cultural purposes are reported in Table 5.11.
125
 In addition, I present findings for both 
types of giving for the sample of regular itemizers and non-itemizers combined in Table A.13 
and Table A.14 in the appendix. 
 
Table 5.10: Estimation results and marginal effects of Cragg’s two-part model for regular 
itemizers and for donations which are tax deductible up to an amount of 5 % of overall 
income 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation – 
Probit estimation 
Outcome – 
Truncated 
regression 
On pro-
bability 
Con-
ditional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -4.681 0.070 
(0.000) 
-1.772 0.033 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) -0.069 0.018 
(0.000) 
-0.325 0.010 
(0.000) 
-0.026 -0.325 -0.245 
Income (log) 0.382 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.631 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.145 0.630 0.916 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male -0.059 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.202 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.022 0.202 -0.030 
Single female 0.073 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.193 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.028 0.193 0.206 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of 
children 
       
None -0.248 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.284 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.096 -0.284 -0.580 
One  -0.253 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.357 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.098 -0.357 -0.615 
Two  -0.136 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.264 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.054 -0.264 -0.372 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 0.946 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.772 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.359 0.772 2.100 
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 I do not report results for giving to benevolent, scientific and cultural purposes estimated with Heckman’s 
method because the estimation did not converge. However, the available results appear to support the findings 
from Cragg’s model. 
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60-69 0.715 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.491 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.269 0.490 1.474 
50-59 0.406 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.150 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.146 0.150 0.722 
40-49 0.257 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.050 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.089 0.050 0.422 
30-39 0.133 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.020 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.045 -0.020 0.197 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Region        
East Germany -0.253 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.085 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.092 -0.084 -0.455 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Church member  0.212 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.273 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.078 -0.273 0.280 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
-0.079 0.009 
(0.000) 
-0.431 0.009 
(0.000) 
-0.027 -0.431 -0.257 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
-0.093 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.431 0.013 
(0.000) 
-0.032 -0.430 -0.278 
After 
disaffiliation 
-0.039 0.010 
(0.000) 
-0.332 0.011 
(0.000) 
-0.014 -0.331 -0.166 
N 3,295,334 1,622,645    
   1.210    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Estimation also includes year dummies (results not shown). P-values for Wald’s Chi-
Square test (probit estimation) and t-test (truncated regression) are given in parentheses. 
 
Concerning price elasticity, no coherent picture emerges. In the sample of regular itemizers 
giving to religious and charitable purposes has a low price elasticity, both at the extensive and 
the intensive margin. The unconditional price elasticity is only around -0.25 and thus much 
lower than the price elasticity of total giving which is roughly -0.8. For donations to secular 
causes the price elasticity is also low, however, it is quite significant in the decision whether 
to give at all, but plays a minor role for the amount given. In the sample of regular itemizers 
and non-itemizers the price elasticity is substantial and even larger for religious and charitable 
giving than for secular giving. 
An interesting observation is that income appears to have the same effect on the conditional 
amount given for both types of giving, which is also similar to the estimate for the marginal 
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effect on total conditional giving. All estimates are close to 0.6 in the sample for regular 
itemizers only and roughly 0.36 in the sample of regular itemizers and non-itemizers. For the 
decision whether to give at all, income appears to be rather important in the sample of regular 
itemizers when they make a donation to benevolent, scientific and cultural purposes. In the 
other cases, income has only a moderate effect on the decision on making a contribution. 
Concerning the age structure of giving and the number of children, the same structures as for 
total giving are also found in the separate estimations of the two types of donations. 
Region has a decisive effect on which type of donation is made. The large differences 
between East and West Germany in the probability to give and the amount given that were 
reported for total giving are even more pronounced when one only considers religious and 
charitable giving. For total giving I reported earlier that the probability to make a contribution 
is 7 percentage points lower in East Germany (estimated probability: 41 %) compared to West 
Germany (estimated probability: 48 %) for the sample of regular itemizers. When one looks at 
religious and charitable giving only, the difference is 9 percentage points (29 % in East 
Germany compared to 38 % in West Germany). In contrast, for the purely secular giving one 
finds that East Germans are even more likely to make a contribution than West Germans 
(16 % in East Germany versus 13 % in West Germany). The conditional amount given is 
always lower in East Germany, but the size of the difference is smaller for donations to 
benevolent, scientific and cultural purposes than for donations to religious and charitable 
purposes. When one looks at the sample consisting of regular itemizers and non-itemizers, the 
higher propensity to give for secular purposes in East Germany cannot be maintained. This is 
probably because the share of non-itemizers who do not have an incentive to report their 
giving is much higher in East Germany than in West Germany. Nevertheless, the finding that 
East Germans are more prone towards secular giving and West Germans tend towards 
religious and charitable giving remains. 
A similar pattern as for East Germans and West Germans can also be found for church 
members and non-members. Church members are much more likely to give to religious and 
charitable causes (39 % of church members, but only 31 % of non-members make a 
contribution in the sample of regular itemizers), while I find no differences at all in the 
propensity to give to secular causes. The conditional amount given by church members is 
below that of non-members for both types of giving. As a consequence, the unconditional 
giving with respect to benevolent, scientific and cultural purposes of church members is even 
slightly below that of non-members. 
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I also find differences in the probability to give between church members in the years before 
disaffiliation and non-members for both types of giving. Individuals who leave the church are 
less likely to make a donation than non-members and regular church members. The 
conditional amount given is also far below the giving of non-members and even below that of 
church members. 
 
Table 5.11: Estimation results and marginal effects of Cragg’s two-part model for regular 
itemizers and for donations which are tax deductible up to an amount of 10 % of overall 
income 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation – 
Probit estimation 
Outcome – 
Truncated 
regression 
On pro-
bability 
Con-
ditional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -4.328 0.060 
(0.000) 
-2.002 0.048 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) -0.412 0.018 
(0.000) 
-0.239 0.016 
(0.000) 
-0.086 -0.238 -0.420 
Income (log) 0.278 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.621 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.058 0.620 0.342 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male -0.057 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.284 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.012 0.283 -0.018 
Single female 0.085 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.293 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.019 0.292 0.125 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of 
children 
       
None -0.139 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.190 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.031 -0.189 -0.170 
One -0.154 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.282 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.034 -0.282 -0.194 
Two  -0.079 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.210 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.018 -0.210 -0.114 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 0.658 0.008 
(0.000) 
0.793 0.009 
(0.000) 
0.147 0.792 0.813 
60-69 0.543  0.007 
(0.000) 
0.507 0.009 
(0.000) 
0.114 0.506 0.589 
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50-59 0.303 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.177 0.009 
(0.000) 
0.055 0.176 0.261 
40-49 0.234 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.093 0.009 
(0.000) 
0.040 0.093 0.186 
30-39 0.181 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.050 0.009 
(0.000) 
0.030 0.050 0.136 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Region        
East Germany 0.158 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.024 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.036 -0.024 0.157 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Church member 0.000 0.004 
(0.984) 
-0.177 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.000 -0.177 -0.023 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
-0.065 0.011 
(0.000) 
-0.306 0.014 
(0.000) 
-0.013 -0.305 -0.097 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
-0.058 0.015 
(0.000) 
-0.287 0.019 
(0.000) 
-0.012 -0.286 -0.088 
After 
disaffiliation 
-0.002 0.012 
(0.893) 
-0.261 0.015 
(0.000) 
0.000 -0.261 -0.035 
N 3,295,334 660,578    
   1.246    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Estimation also includes year dummies (results not shown). P-values for Wald’s Chi-
Square test (probit estimation) and t-test (truncated regression) are given in parentheses. 
 
5.6.3.2 Church disaffiliation 
In Table 5.12 and Table 5.13 I present the results for the balanced sample of regular itemizers 
in all sample years, which gives the best indication about what happens to charitable giving 
when individuals disaffiliate from the church. 
With respect to price elasticity, the two types of giving differ strongly. While the price has a 
large negative effect on the probability of giving to benevolent, scientific and cultural 
purposes, I find a positive effect on the probability to give to religious and charitable 
purposes. It appears that the result for total giving (where the price has no significant effect on 
the probability to make a contribution) is a combination of the opposite effects of the two 
types of giving. In contrast, the conditional amount of giving is moderately negatively 
affected by the price for both types of contributions. Income has a positive effect on the 
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probability to give, the conditional and the unconditional amount given, no matter if one looks 
at contributions to religious and charitable or to secular purposes. However, the picture from 
the sample of regular itemizers is reinforced: the effect of income on the extensive margin is 
larger for contributions to religious and charitable purposes, while the effect on the 
conditional amount given is similar for both types of contributions. 
 
Table 5.12: Estimation results and marginal effects of Cragg’s two-part model for regular 
itemizers in all sample years and for donations which are tax deductible up to an amount of 
5 % of overall income 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation – 
Probit estimation 
Outcome – 
Truncated 
regression 
On pro-
bability 
Condi-
tional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -5.041 0.110 
(0.000) 
-2.672 0.047 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) 0.196 0.031 
(0.000) 
-0.249 0.016 
(0.000) 
0.077 -0.249 0.260 
Income (log) 0.448 0.011 
(0.000) 
0.736 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.175 0.735 1.145 
Membership        
Church member 0.041 0.010 
(0.000) 
-0.575 0.009 
(0.000) 
0.016 -0.575 -0.160 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
-0.222 0.020 
(0.000) 
-0.726 0.020 
(0.000) 
-0.083 -0.725 -0.680 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
-0.224 0.030 
(0.000) 
-0.782 0.029 
(0.000) 
-0.084 -0.782 -0.702 
After 
disaffiliation 
-0.212 0.020 
(0.000) 
-0.713 0.019 
(0.000) 
-0.080 -0.713 -0.660 
N 1,879,806 1,054,292    
   1.212    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Estimation also includes year dummies and dummy variables for type of assessment 
and gender, number of children, age and region (results not shown). P-values for Wald’s Chi-
Square test (probit estimation) and t-test (truncated regression) are given in parentheses. 
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When looking at church disaffiliation, the two types of giving show divergent results. With 
respect to religious and charitable giving I do not find any significant differences in the 
probability to give or the conditional amount given between individuals before and after 
church disaffiliation. 
 
Table 5.13: Estimation results and marginal effects of Cragg’s two-part model for regular 
itemizers in all sample years and for donations which are tax deductible up to an amount of 
10 % of overall income 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation – 
Probit estimation 
Outcome – 
Truncated 
regression 
On pro-
bability 
Con-
ditional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -4.144 0.063 
(0.000) 
-3.207 0.069 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) -0.508 0.023 
(0.000) 
-0.208 0.024 
(0.000) 
-0.115 -0.208 -0.556 
Income (log) 0.271 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.740 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.061 0.739 0.386 
Membership        
Church member -0.101 0.011 
(0.000) 
-0.345 0.013 
(0.000) 
-0.024 -0.345 -0.167 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
-0.140 0.024 
(0.000) 
-0.481 0.030 
(0.000) 
-0.033 -0.481 -0.225 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
-0.136 0.034 
(0.000) 
-0.515 0.042 
(0.000) 
-0.032 -0.514 -0.226 
After 
disaffiliation 
-0.063 0.023 
(0.005) 
-0.435 0.026 
(0.000) 
-0.015 -0.435 -0.141 
N 1,879,806 421,072    
   1.246    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Estimation also includes year dummies and dummy variables for type of assessment 
and gender, number of children, age and region (results not shown). P-values for Wald’s Chi-
Square test (probit estimation) and t-test (truncated regression) are given in parentheses. 
 
In contrast, giving to benevolent, scientific and cultural purposes increases moderately, both 
at the extensive and the intensive margin. Obviously the small increase in the probability to 
give that I found with respect to total giving is only caused by changes in secular giving. This 
largely contradicts my hypotheses derived from the model in Chapter 3, which suggest that 
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the probability of religious giving should increase, while the propensity to give to secular 
causes should not be affected. In addition, I expected the amount given to both causes to 
increase. In the year of disaffiliation the probability to give is virtually the same as in the 
years before, but the amount given appears to be slightly lower. 
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5.7 Discussion 
5.7.1 Summary of main findings 
This chapter has produced ample results with respect to voluntary giving in Germany – with a 
focus on the role of church membership and church disaffiliation in the giving decision. I 
have incorporated different samples based on itemization status, employed various estimation 
methods and looked at two different types of voluntary contributions separately. The 
discussion has revealed that the choice of the sample (itemizers and non-itemizers; itemizers 
only) has a considerable impact on the results, e.g. on the estimated price and income 
elasticities and the effect of church membership. In contrast, the three estimation methods 
(Heckman’s approach, Tobit model and Cragg’s two-part model) produce remarkably similar 
results. However, the results of the fixed effects approach differ.  
With respect to total giving in the sample of regular itemizers only, I find that giving is elastic 
in income, but inelastic in price. Church members are considerably more likely to make a 
donation than non-members, but their amount given is lower. Individuals who will disaffiliate 
in the years to come make significantly smaller contributions – both at the extensive and the 
intensive margin – than members and non-members. Single females give more than both men 
and married couples, taxpayers with two or more children are more generous than those with 
one child or without children, giving increases strongly in age, and East Germans give less 
than West Germans. 
When one looks at the sample consisting of itemizers and non-itemizers, the estimated price 
elasticity is considerably higher and giving is estimated to be very elastic in price, while the 
income elasticity is low. Individuals who leave the church are estimated to have roughly the 
same level of generosity as non-members, but are found to be notably less generous than 
church members. The conclusions concerning type of assessment, gender, age and region are 
unchanged. 
When individuals leave the church, there is evidence for a moderate increase in giving, 
coming both from cross-section and fixed effects estimations. However, the two estimation 
approaches differ in that the cross-section results imply that the higher donations after 
disaffiliation are due to an increase in the probability to give, while the fixed effects 
estimations additionally suggest that the amount given increases. When looking separately at 
the two types of giving which I can distinguish in my data, the incresase in giving appears to 
be caused by an increase in contributions to “benevolent, scientific and cultural” purposes, 
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while contributions to “religious and charitable” purposes remain constant. Nevertheless, all 
evidence points to the fact that even after disaffiliation the former church members are less 
generous than those who have been non-members in all sample years and sizeably less 
generous than church members. 
The findings also indicate that there are indeed good reasons to look at different categories of 
giving separately. “Benevolent, scientific and cultural” giving reacts more strongly to changes 
in the price of giving than “religious and charitable” giving. In addition, when one only 
considers giving to benevolent, scientific and cultural purposes there are no or only small 
differences in the propensity to give between East Germans and West Germans as well as 
church members and non-members. 
5.7.2 Results on voluntary giving in light of previous research 
Previous research based on German income tax data has used different methods, different 
definitions of variables and also diverse samples. In particular, previous studies have 
sometimes excluded and at other times included non-itemizers in the sample, which – 
according to my findings – has a large influence on the results, most notably on the income 
and price elasticities. 
Comparing the estimated price elasticity in my own work with that of previous research, I 
find that in the sample including itemizers and non-itemizers the elasticity is higher than 
previous estimates (in absolute terms), while in the sample of regular itemizers only it is 
lower. In the sample of itemizers and non-itemizers, Borgloh (2012) estimates an 
unconditional price elasticity of -1.7 in a random effects Tobit model and Bönke, Massarrat-
Mashhadi and Sielaff (2013) estimate a price elasticity of -1.1 with a pooled OLS and -1.2 
with a pooled Tobit estimation. These estimates are much lower (in absolute terms) than my 
own estimates of -4. However, my estimates of the first tier of the giving decision are similar 
to Borgloh’s (2012). She estimates a marginal effect in a random effects probit model of -0.9, 
while my estimate is -0.8 in a pooled probit model. 
Turning the attention to the sample of regular itemizers, von Auer and Kalusche (2007) 
estimate a price elasticity of roughly -1.1 with a Tobit model, while my own estimate is -0.7. 
Still, the quantile regression by Bönke, Massarrat-Mashhadi and Sielaff (2013) shows that for 
average amounts of giving, the conditional amount given is inelastic in price, which 
corresponds to my own findings.  
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A possible explanation for the low price elasticity in the sample of regular itemizers could be 
the inclusion of taxpayers with extraordinary income. As I have explained in Section 5.4.7, 
these taxpayers often face a very low price of giving. If they make only average charitable 
contributions despite the exceptionally low price they face, the estimated elasticity can be 
depressed. My own tentative estimates (results not shown) suggest that including taxpayers 
with extraordinary income significantly depresses the price elasticity. 
Previous findings in the literature concerning the income elasticity are heterogeneous. 
Borgloh (2012) and Bönke, Massarrat-Mashhadi and Sielaff (2013) both use a sample 
consisting of itemizers and non-itemizers. While the former reports income elasticities 
ranging from 0.1 (fixed effects) to 0.3 (random effects and random effects Tobit), the latter 
find income elasticities between 0.8 (OLS) and 1.1 (pooled Tobit). Von Auer and Kalusche 
(2007) report an income elasticity of 0.7 in a sample consisting of regular itemizers. My own 
results suggest that the income elasticity is rather low in the sample consisting of itemizers 
and non-itemizers: the estimates of 0.2 to 0.3 are close to Borgloh’s (2012) results. In 
contrast, I find a rather high income elasticity of 1.1 in the sample consisting of regular 
itemizers, which is above the estimate of von Auer and Kalusche (2007) and resembles the 
results of Bönke, Massarrat-Mashhadi and Sielaff (2013). 
My findings concerning the type of assessment and gender show that in the sample of regular 
itemizers single male taxpayers give slightly less, while single female taxpayers give more 
than jointly assessed married couples. In the sample consisting of itemizers and non-itemizers, 
individually assessed taxpayers give less than jointly assessed taxpayers, but females are still 
more generous than males. Both von Auer and Kalusche (2007) and Borgloh (2012) report the 
same results that I find for the sample of itemizers and non-itemizers. So far, my research is 
the first to suggest that females might even be more generous than married couples. However, 
Bönke, Massarrat-Mashhadi and Sielaff (2013) produced diverging results as to whether 
individually or jointly assessed taxpayers give more. The reason for their inconsistent findings 
could be that they do not distinguish between male and female taxpayers. 
Concerning the presence of dependent children, all my results support the findings of earlier 
research by von Auer and Kalusche (2007) and Borgloh (2013). As well, my results showing 
that taxpayers living in West Germany give significantly more than East Germans and that 
giving increases with the age of the taxpayer are also in line with all existing research I am 
aware of. 
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Finally, shifting the attention to the effect of church membership, I find that church members 
give significantly more than non-members, thereby confirming the results reported by 
Borgloh (2012) and Bönke, Massarrat-Mashhadi and Sielaff (2013). In my own research, the 
effect of being a church member is larger in the sample consisting of itemizers and non-
itemizers and is comparable to the size of the effect found by the two studies mentioned. 
My findings concerning the differential effect of church membership on the probability to 
give and the amount given complement Buschle’s (2009) results. She uses German tax return 
data of the year 2001 to show that the share of givers is higher among church members than 
non-members, but the average conditional amount given is higher for non-members than 
members. My own findings are an advancement to Buschle’s results because I control for 
itemization status, income, price of giving and socio-demographic characteristics, while 
Buschle reports only cross-tabulations for individually and jointly assessed taxpayers. 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no previous research that compares the charitable 
giving of members, non-members and individuals briefly before their disaffiliation from the 
church. However, Sommerfeld and Sommerfeld (2010: 56-57) use data from a German survey 
(the “Freiwilligensurvey”) of the years 2004 and 2009 to show that the probability of making 
a donation strongly increases with church commitment and that the least committed have 
roughly the same probability to give as non-members. My research points in the same 
direction; I even find that those who disaffiliate are less generous than non-members. 
To sum up, my research suggests that the choice of the sample has a very large influence on 
the effect of decisive exogenous variables, e.g. on the income and price elasticity. Looking at 
itemizers and non-itemizers jointly is interesting because a large majority of all taxpayers are 
covered. However, the share of givers and the amount given by non-itemizers might be 
underestimated. Looking at regular itemizers only also has substantial disadvantages. The 
sample size is not only reduced, there is also a bias in the sample. This is because taxpayers 
with a high income are more likely to be regular itemizers; the same is true for married 
couples and for church members (who pay church taxes). Presumably as a consequence of the 
bias towards taxpayers with high income and church members, East Germans are significantly 
underrepresented. Hence it is challenging to estimate how large the difference in giving is 
between jointly and individually assessed taxpayers, between church members and non-
members and between West Germans and East Germans, because these groups systematically 
face different incentives to report their true giving in their income tax returns. 
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In addition, the results of my own study as well as those of von Auer and Kalusche (2007) 
indicate that it is advisable to distinguish between single male and female taxpayers (instead 
of putting individually assessed taxpayers of both genders in one group and contrasting them 
with married couples) because they differ significantly in their propensity to make a 
contribution. In line with von Auer and Kalusche (2007), I find that the number of children 
exerts a larger influence on the giving behavior than the simple fact of having a dependent 
child. Therefore it is advisable to operationalize the family size with the number of children 
instead of a dummy variable that only indicates the presence of children in the family. 
5.7.3 Conclusions regarding the effect of church membership on voluntary giving 
The first research question in this chapter is whether church members and non-members differ 
in their giving behavior. The hypotheses derived from the model in Chapter 3 are that church 
members are less likely to give (to religious causes) than non-members and that the amount 
given both to religious and secular causes is lower. However, my discussion of the literature 
has revealed that the hypotheses derived from the model are questionable. Almost all previous 
research shows that religious people are more generous than non-religious individuals. 
Starting with a look at total giving, my own results are mixed. I find that church members are 
significantly and in a quantitatively substantial way more likely to make a voluntary 
contribution – which is perfectly in line with previous research for Germany and many other 
countries, and refutes my first hypothesis. There appear to be systematic differences in the 
preferences for giving or incentives to give between church members and non-members. 
However, with respect to the amount given my hypothesis that church members give less than 
non-members can be confirmed. I find significant differences in conditional contributions 
between those who belong to the church and those who do not. This could be interpreted in a 
way that church taxes and voluntary contributions are substitutes. 
When one looks at the two types of giving separately, the findings are more heterogeneous. 
With respect to religious and charitable donations the results equal those for the total giving. 
In contrast, concerning giving to benevolent, scientific and cultural purposes I find there are 
no or small differences in the probability to give (depending on the exclusion or inclusion of 
non-itemizers, respectively) between those who belong to the church and those who do not. 
When looking at religious and charitable giving, one should keep in mind that these include 
local church taxes, which are compulsory in some parts of Germany. Unfortunately, the data 
does not allow for the detection of how many church members report local church taxes as the 
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only kind of contribution in the “religious and charitable” category and whether the gap in the 
probability to give would diminish if local church taxes were controlled for. 
Another research question in this chapter is whether those individuals who disaffiliate differ 
in their giving from church members who do not leave the church. The model in Chapter 3 
does not provide an unambiguous answer since the behavior of the individual depends on his 
or her reason for disaffiliation. If membership benefits are too low there should be no 
differences in giving. If individuals leave because they disagree with how the church tax is 
used, they should actually give more than “regular” members. Finally, if they have a lower 
preference for giving (expressed by    and   ) they can be expected to give less. 
The results clearly show that those who leave the church are significantly less likely to give 
than church members who stay and the conditional amount given is also lower. The size of the 
difference in the probability of giving is very persistent in all estimations and is estimated to 
be roughly 10 percentage points for total giving. The broad gap in giving is also found for 
donations to religious and charitable causes, but much smaller for donations to benevolent, 
scientific and cultural purposes. These findings suggest that the third explanation for leaving 
the church – those who leave have a lower intrinsic or extrinsic inclination to give – might be 
the predominant one. This finding does not exclude the possibility that people also leave the 
church because their personal benefits from membership are low. However, I do not find 
evidence that the majority of those who leave the church disagree with how the church tax is 
used. 
The next question is whether and how voluntary giving changes during the process of 
disaffiliation, i.e. whether individuals make a larger (or smaller) voluntary contribution after 
they have left the church than before. The hypotheses are that the probability of (religious) 
giving and the amount of all types of contributions increase. 
The results derived from the estimations for total giving suggest that there is a moderate 
increase in giving from before to after disaffiliation. The results of the pooled sample are very 
consistent in showing that there is an increase in the probability of giving, which could 
indicate that some church tax payers are in a corner solution before they leave. The difference 
in the estimated probability is significant in the pooled sample where standard errors might be 
too small (and significance levels too high) because the errors are not clustered. In the cross-
section for the year 2003 the difference is not significant. The results of the cross-section 
estimations consistently show that the conditional amount given is not affected by 
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disaffiliation. When the two types of giving are considered separately, I only find an increase 
in the probability to give to benevolent, scientific and cultural purposes. This result is not in 
line with my hypothesis which predicts an increase in giving to religious purposes. 
All fixed effects estimations, which are solely based on the variation between individuals, 
indicate that total giving increases after disaffiliation. The effect is found when only those 
who make a contribution are included in the sample, but also when non-givers are added. In 
the latter case, the difference from before to after disaffiliation is even larger, which might 
imply that the probability to give also increases. 
The results again suggest that church taxes and voluntary giving might be substitutes, 
although not perfect ones. This result contradicts Borgloh’s (2012) finding that the amount of 
church taxes someone pays significantly increases voluntary contributions, i.e. church taxes 
and voluntary contributions are complementary. Somewhat surprisingly, it seems that giving 
to benevolent, scientific and cultural purposes is an (imperfect) substitute for church taxes, 
while giving to religious and charitable causes is not. A possible explanation could be that 
individuals (in particular marginal church members) do not primarily perceive their church 
taxes as a religious contribution, but as a benevolent one, i.e. one that benefits people in need. 
Nevertheless, my results suggest that the increase in giving after leaving the church is only 
moderate and the former members are not very generous, probably even less generous than 
“regular” non-members. With respect to the probability to give the results are inconclusive, 
but concerning the amount given, all estimations consistently show that those who have 
recently disaffiliated give less than non-members. 
5.7.4 Conclusions concerning different types of giving 
In my literature review I cite a bulk of studies that indicate that the price and income elasticity 
of voluntary giving depend on which causes benefit from the donation. Therefore I decided to 
look at the two types of giving which I can distinguish in the Taxpayer Panel data separately. 
My expectation was that giving to “benevolent, parochial, religious, scientific and especially 
eligible charitable purposes” was less elastic in income and price than giving to “benevolent, 
scientific and especially eligible cultural purposes”. Indeed I find some evidence that the 
former reacts less elastically to changes in price than the latter. This could imply that 
“religious and charitable” giving is either more routinely done or seen as a kind of obligation 
that does not react strongly to incentives. The finding is also in line with what one would 
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expect given that “religious and charitable” giving includes not only local church taxes, but 
also the majority of membership fees to charitable associations.  
My findings do not confirm the results of much of the previous literature (mainly from the 
US) that religious giving is less elastic in income than secular giving. One reason could be 
that the two types of giving I distinguish are very heterogeneous and that the “religious and 
charitable” category contains more than only religious giving. However, it could also be the 
case that due to the existence of the church tax in Germany the remaining religious giving 
serves different purposes than religious giving in the US. If one assumes that church members 
need to achieve a certain level of contributions to religion (e.g. to ensure afterlife 
consumption), then the church tax in Germany might constitute such a minimum contribution, 
while the additional religious donations might be driven by this-worldly considerations such 
as altruism, warm glow or social approval. 
I find that both the region and the church membership status affect the two categories of 
giving very differently. While East Germans are significantly less likely than West Germans 
to give to religious and charitable purposes, they profess roughly the same inclination to give 
to benevolent, scientific and cultural purposes as West Germans. The higher religious and 
charitable giving in West Germany is far from surprising, since not only the significance of 
religious institutions in society is higher than in East Germany, but also membership rates in 
associations. However, I am not aware of any research that elaborates on the remarkably high 
inclination of East Germans to give to benevolent, scientific and cultural purposes. 
The results further suggest that there is no strict separation between causes that are preferred 
by church members and those that are preferred by non-members, at least not in the very 
rough classification with only two types of giving. The propensity to give to benevolent, 
scientific and cultural purposes appears to be largely independent from church membership 
status. In contrast, church members are much more likely to make a contribution to religious 
and charitable causes. With respect to both types of giving I can conclude that the conditional 
amount given is higher for non-members than for church members. 
5.7.5 Conclusions concerning estimation methods 
In order to test the robustness of results, I executed the pooled estimations with three different 
estimation methods: the Tobit, the Heckman and Cragg’s two-part model. All three methods 
produced remarkably similar results when it comes to the marginal effect of the independent 
variables on the probability of giving and the unconditional amount of giving. With respect to 
304 
conditional giving, the estimates of the Heckman model and Cragg’s model have the same 
sign and are generally broadly of the same size (with the exception of the price and income 
elasticity, where differences in the estimates are notable in some estimations). The estimated 
marginal effects on conditional giving in the Tobit model do differ sometimes from the 
Heckman and the two-part results. In addition, the Tobit model is not able to reveal when 
marginal effects at the extensive and intensive margin do not coincide. For example, the Tobit 
model does not reveal that church members are more likely to give than non-members while 
at the same time their conditional giving is lower than that of non-members. This deficiency 
of the Tobit model is caused by its construction, which forces the effects on the probability of 
giving and the amount given to be the same. As a result, the Tobit model performs worse in 
fitting the data than the models that consider the two parts of the giving decision separately. 
This can be seen by comparing the log likelihoods of the models. The log likelihood value of 
the Heckman model for total giving of regular itemizers (see Table 5.2) is -4,616,915, while it 
is -5,743,006 in the Tobit model on the same sample (see Table 5.5). A higher log likelihood 
value indicates a better fit since the idea behind the maximum likelihood estimation is to 
maximize the likelihood value. 
In general, it is advisable to use estimation techniques that allow modeling the giving decision 
both at the extensive and the intensive margin, since these are obviously two different 
decisions. For the focus of this chapter – the effect of church membership and church 
disaffiliation on giving – the separation of the two steps of the giving decision provides 
valuable insights which would not appear in Tobit or simple OLS estimations. 
Furthermore, the remarkably similar estimation results from the Heckman and Cragg’s two-
step method suggest that using the same exogenous variables in both parts of the Heckman 
method is possible in this data set, despite the theoretical issues concerning this approach 
expressed by Wooldridge (2002: 564) and Cameron and Trivedi (2010: 558-561). 
In addition to the pooled cross-sections I also apply fixed effects estimation. This technique is 
particularly interesting in answering the question how giving changes from before to after 
church disaffiliation, because such a change is within individuals. If taxpayers who disaffiliate 
in 2001 or 2002 differ systematically from those who leave the church in 2004 or 2005, then 
the results based on pooled cross-sections could be biased since they are strongly driven by 
between-individual variance. As I have discussed earlier, the results from the various pooled 
cross-sections and from the fixed effects estimation both indicate that there is a moderate 
increase in giving from before to after disaffiliation, but the cross-section results imply that 
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the cause for this increase is a rising probability to contribute, while the fixed effects results 
also point towards an increase in the amount given. Concerning income and price elasticity, 
the fixed effects estimation suggests that both elasticities are much lower than what one finds 
in the cross-sections. Borgloh (2012), who also conducted a fixed effects estimation, reports 
similar results. The reason for the lower estimates could be that in the fixed effects estimation 
I incorporate only transitory changes in income and price because I do not control for the 
effects of past and future changes in income and price or for permanent income. According to 
recent findings by Bakija and Heim (2011), transitory changes in income and price of giving 
lead to less elastic reactions than permanent changes. 
5.7.6 Open questions and suggestions for further research 
A starting point for further research could be to interact type of assessment, gender and 
church membership and to discriminate between married couples consisting of one or two 
church members. In my research, a married couple is treated as a church member when at 
least one spouse is a church member. However, previous research by Buschle (2009: 99-100) 
shows that there are significant differences in the propensity to give between couples 
consisting of two church members and those where only one partner is a member of the 
church. My own tentative estimations (results not shown) also suggest that it may be 
necessary to distinguish between couples where the husband is in the church and those where 
the wife is a church member. Couples where only the wife is religious appear to give 
significantly less than couples where only the husband is a church member. Such a result is 
not too surprising because anecdotal evidence suggests that couples where only the wife is a 
church member often make their church membership decision from an economic point of 
view. The wife, who usually earns less than her husband, is a church member in order to 
benefit from services provided by the church, such as child care, while the husband 
disaffiliates and reduces the church tax liability of the couple. If the church membership 
decision is guided by such economic cost-benefit-calculations, these couples might also be 
less generous towards (non-religious) charitable organizations. Another possible explanation 
is that in the majority of married couples the husband is responsible for making financial 
decisions such as making charitable contributions; therefore his church membership status has 
a larger effect on the couple’s giving than the wife’s church membership. 
In a similar vein it would be possible to interact the church membership variable with the 
region. Here preliminary results (not shown) suggest that church members in West and East 
Germany do not differ much in their probability to give, but non-members in East Germany 
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are far less generous than non-members in West Germany, resulting in a much more 
pronounced difference in giving between members and non-members in East Germany as 
compared to West Germany. Furthermore, one could ask whether Protestants and Catholics 
differ systematically in their giving behavior and in the adjustment of their giving behavior to 
church disaffiliation. 
Another interesting avenue for further research could be the distinction between transitory and 
permanent effects of changes in variables. First results on permanent and transitory price and 
income elasticities for Germany are provided by Borgloh (2012). I abstain from doing these 
estimations since my focus in this chapter is on the effect of church membership, not in 
estimating the reactions of giving to income and price. However, permanent and transitory 
changes need not only play a role when one looks at income and price, they could also be 
relevant with respect to church disaffiliation. Different hypotheses are possible: individuals 
might increase their giving immediately when they leave the church in order to reach their 
preferred level of giving. However, they might also increase their giving gradually because 
they need to find organizations that they want to support, which was not necessary when they 
only made a contribution in the form of the church tax. From a theoretical point of view my 
results include both transitory (short-run) and medium-run effects since I treat all years before 
disaffiliation and after disaffiliation as the same. 
My research has also provided some evidence that giving behavior depends on the purposes 
for which the contribution is made. More research could be done here. In particular, it would 
be helpful to have access to more detailed information on the purposes of giving in order to 
develop more homogeneous and comprehensive categories of giving. It might also be 
illuminating to use different estimation techniques that allow for the simultaneous 
determination of different kinds of contributions. 
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The aim of this research is to investigate the economic causes and consequences of church 
disaffiliation, both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. I elaborate on the 
importance of the institutional framework of (formal) church membership and the design of 
the church financing system. While I compare three different institutional frameworks of 
church membership in the theoretical part of the dissertation, I focus on the case of Germany 
in my empirical research. 
The literature survey on religious consumption choices in Chapter 2 has shown that there is a 
wide range of aspects that have already been covered comprehensively by previous research. 
Models take into account that being religious entails both current and afterlife utility, that 
time, money, or both can be necessary inputs in the production of religiosity and that 
uncertainty may influence individuals’ choices. In addition, models with one, two or multiple 
periods have been presented and choices have been modeled as either continuous or discrete. 
However, I conclude that most of the previous work does not pay sufficient attention to the 
institutional framework in which religious communities operate. Often the implicit 
institutional background appears to be the liberal system in the US where citizens are 
completely free to determine the amount of time and money they want to spend on religious 
consumption and can freely choose their preferred level of religiosity. However, such models 
are not well suited to describe the situation in many European countries where the religious 
market is more regulated (often by the state) and individuals are forced to make discrete 
choices concerning their church membership. 
The outstanding characteristic of the German institutional framework is that church 
membership is officially registered and entails the duty to pay church taxes that are strictly 
dependent on taxable income. In Italy, church membership is at the discretion of the 
individual, but all citizens have to assign a fixed part of their income tax either to a religious 
community or to the state. In both Germany and Italy individuals cannot earmark the church 
or assignment tax for a specific cause. Nevertheless, they are free to make additional 
charitable contributions to both religious and secular causes. 
Since institutional settings differ, individuals face completely different optimization problems. 
In the US, they equate the marginal pecuniary and time costs of membership with the 
marginal benefits from an increase in their level of religiosity. In Germany, individuals need 
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to make a discrete decision about membership in which they compare the total costs of 
membership (which mainly consist of the church tax) with membership benefits. Some of the 
discrete choice models that I have discussed in Chapter 2 prove to be helpful; however they 
disregard the quite significant fact that in Germany monetary inputs into religiosity are 
exogenously determined and depend on a secular variable such as income, not on the 
preferred level of religious consumption. In Italy, financial concerns should not influence 
church membership or church involvement, but individuals have to decide whether they want 
to assign their tax to the church or to the state. The existing models which I have reviewed in 
Chapter 2 do not contribute to explaining the Italian case, since all models start with the 
assumption that monetary inputs in religion entail some kind of religious benefits.  
In Chapter 3 I proposed a theoretical model that addresses the gaps in research that were 
discussed in the previous paragraphs and incorporates an important part of the institutional 
framework, namely the church financing system, into the decision-making process concerning 
religious consumption. I present a general framework which I adjust to the specific 
institutional settings in a voluntary contribution, a church tax and a tax assignment system. I 
focus on two different phenomena which then become the basis for the two empirical 
chapters: church disaffiliation and voluntary giving. 
In my simple model with only one time period individuals possess monetary resources which 
they can spend on consumption, and religious and secular charitable activities. Depending on 
the specific church financing system, religious and secular contributions can be either 
voluntary or obligatory, i.e. raised in the form of taxes on income. While voluntary 
contributions can be earmarked, taxes cannot.  
The first overall research question in this model framework is whether the institutional setting 
has an influence on the church membership decision. The model shows that the institutional 
setting can indeed affect the church membership decision, e.g. when membership is 
contingent upon requirements such as paying an externally fixed amount of church taxes. 
Consequently, the institutional framework will only affect church membership in a church tax 
system such as the German one, whereas it should have no effect in a voluntary giving system 
where each individual can determine his or her contribution independently, or in the Italian 
tax assignment system, where taxes are decoupled from membership. In Italy or the US 
spiritual considerations (captured in the model by the membership benefits) should prevail, 
whereas an economic cost-benefit analysis should take place in Germany. The cost-benefit 
aspect is aggravated by the fact that church taxes in Germany are completely independent 
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from religious benefits, but depend on the secular variable income, which is not correlated 
with religious benefits in my model. In other words, the model predicts that in Germany 
individuals with a higher income and those who have to pay a higher church tax rate, are more 
likely to disaffiliate from the church and/or be non-members. In addition, individuals are 
expected to leave the church when church tax revenues are not used according to their 
preferences. In Italy, by contrast, one should not find a correlation between church 
membership and income
126
 and individuals are expected to pay less attention to the use of the 
assignment tax by the church when they make their membership decision. The model predicts 
that dependent on the church financing system religious communities need to consider 
different variables when they want to maximize their membership or their revenues. 
The second research question in the context of the model is if the institutional framework 
regarding church membership and church financing also affects religious and secular 
voluntary giving. I find that in a church tax and a tax assignment systems the institutional 
framework can bias the giving decision in comparison to a voluntary giving system, which I 
define as a benchmark. The bias occurs when at least one of the following two conditions is 
fulfilled: (1) the (church or assignment) tax exceeds the amount which would be given on a 
voluntary basis and/or (2) the tax is not used in accordance with the preferences of the 
taxpayers. 
In general, the model predicts that in tax systems total giving, i.e. the sum of taxes and 
voluntary contributions, is higher than without the tax in place, but that taxes crowd out 
donations. In the church tax system, all taxes belong to the church, therefore the church tax 
system boosts the total revenues of the church and depresses the revenues of secular 
organizations. Church members are expected to make a smaller amount of charitable 
contributions than non-members, but when they disaffiliate from the church they should 
adjust their giving behavior to that of non-members. In the case of the tax assignment system, 
the relevant question is whether the tax is assigned to the church or the state. The model 
predicts that there should be competition between church and state for the assignment of the 
tax, with the fitting parameter being the relevant variable for the two institutions. If such 
competition is in place, the use of the money will more closely resemble the preferences of 
the taxpayers than in a church tax system. This poses a lot of interesting research questions for 
countries with a tax assignment system: Is there competition between religious communities 
and the state for these taxes? Is there competition between different religious communities? 
                                                 
126
 This hypothesis is derived under the assumption that benefits from church membership are independent from 
income or social status. 
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Which instruments are used in this competition? Can one observe rent-seeking behavior? If 
there is no competition, why not? The model also produces some testable hypotheses on the 
tax assignment system: for example, the decision as to who receives the tax assignment 
should depend on the individual’s approval of the use of revenues by the church or the state, 
but should be independent from the taxpayer’s income and the tax rate. 
The model also touches the question of social welfare, but cannot answer it, since it focuses 
only on the individuals who make voluntary and/or obligatory contributions to charitable 
organizations, but disregards how these contributions are used. The model shows that the 
church tax system and the tax assignment system can raise the revenues of religious and 
secular charitable organizations above their benchmark level, i.e. the level without a tax 
system in place. If the organizations receiving the contributions with the tax system in place 
had some efficiency, knowledge or scale advantage over those who benefit in the voluntary 
giving system, or if the taxes contributed to the creation of a public good which is 
underprovided otherwise, then tax systems might increase total welfare. Answering this 
question is a possible road for future research. 
In Chapter 4 I focus on the case of Germany. I review the hypotheses concerning church 
disaffiliation which I derive from my theoretical model and then test them using the Taxpayer 
Panel for the years 2001 to 2006. The main research question is whether the institutional 
framework in the form of the existing church tax regulations has a statistically significant 
effect on the decision to leave the church. My main hypothesis is that ceteris paribus an 
increase in the price of church membership increases the probability that an individual 
disaffiliates from the church. A challenge in the data set is that the main source of variation in 
individuals’ church tax payments are changes in income. While the financial burden of being 
religious increases, it is not clear a priori if the individual’s disutility from paying church 
taxes also increases, since a higher level of income can result in a lower marginal utility of 
income. This problem is solved by taking into account all the existing regional variation in 
church tax regulations and by including in the estimations a measure of economic income 
which is not perfectly correlated with taxable income and the church tax.  
The results show that the price of church membership has a significantly positive effect on the 
probability of church disaffiliation in my sample of individually assessed, unmarried 
taxpayers. The same effect is found for the subsamples of men and women and Protestants 
and Catholics. However, the magnitude of the effect is rather moderate, i.e. the price elasticity 
is low, and church taxes explain the considerable number of church disaffiliations in Germany 
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only in part. In addition, there is some evidence that church disaffiliation decisions are 
characterized by inertia. 
The second and third research questions in Chapter 4 investigate which demographic, socio-
economic and regional variables affect the church membership decision. In my theoretical 
model from Chapter 3 such characteristics affect the benefits from church membership, but 
also how the individual judges the use of church tax revenues by the church and his or her 
preferences for charitable giving. According to expectations I find that individuals are far 
more likely to disaffiliate when they are young. A traditional gender pattern can only be found 
to a limited extend when individuals have children, whereas there are no gender differences in 
the probability of leaving the church among childless taxpayers. My results suggest that 
income has almost no effect on church disaffiliations. I find that there are sizable regional 
differences and that interregional mobility is connected to a substantial increase in the 
propensity to disaffiliate. 
There are various starting points for further research. Since the literature on church taxes and 
church disaffiliation is still scarce – I am aware of only two previous studies which research 
this topic with comprehensive tax data – future research could be conducted in other countries 
where church tax systems exist and different econometric methodologies could be used. For 
Germany, it would be illuminating to see how married couples make church membership 
decisions. In addition, it would be interesting to discuss the role of transaction costs in more 
depth than what I can provide in the present research, and to look at the effect of mobility in 
the church membership decision since this topic has not received much attention in the 
literature to the best of my knowledge. Finally, it might be interesting to see if church 
disaffiliation has any consequences for individual behavior. 
This last aspect is the starting point of my second empirical chapter in this dissertation. Based 
on the model in Chapter 3 I ask (1) if church members and non-members differ in their 
voluntary giving (excluding church taxes) and (2) if the giving behavior changes from before 
to after disaffiliation. In accordance with my theoretical model, but also with current literature 
on voluntary giving, I distinguish between two steps in the giving decision: first, whether to 
make a contribution at all (the extensive margin) and second, how much to give (the intensive 
margin). The reasoning is the same with respect to both research questions: when individuals 
are church members, they are forced to make a contribution in the form of church taxes. 
Paying church taxes reduces the available income and is an (imperfect) substitute for 
(religious) voluntary contributions. If the amount of taxes exceeds individuals’ preferred level 
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of giving, they will find themselves in a corner solution and make no additional voluntary 
contributions at all. When they leave the church and paying church taxes is no longer 
obligatory, they leave the corner solution and can be expected to start giving. In addition, 
church members can be expected to give a smaller amount of money, but increase their 
contributions when they leave the church. The difference between the two research questions 
(comparing church members and non-members and comparing the contributions before and 
after disaffiliation) is the perspective. The former is cross-sectional, i.e. different individuals 
are compared. The latter is longitudinal, i.e. individuals are observed over time. I account for 
these two perspectives by defining different samples and using diverging estimation methods. 
The results imply that church members are not less, but rather more likely to make a 
charitable contribution than non-members. This contradicts my hypothesis and suggests that 
one of the assumptions in my theoretical model may be wrong. A possible explanation for this 
observation, which is also in line with previous literature on religion and voluntary giving, is 
that church members have a higher marginal utility from giving, either because they are more 
altruistic or because giving is highly rewarded by their social environment. However, I do 
find that the average amount given by church members is below the amount given by non-
members. This finding suggests that church taxes and additional voluntary donations are 
substitutes. With respect to church disaffiliation, I find evidence that giving is higher after 
individuals have left the church than before. However, results are inconsistent in whether the 
increase is due to a higher inclination to give, a higher amount given by those who make a 
contribution, or both. There is some evidence that a few of those who leave the church are in a 
corner solution and start making voluntary contributions after they leave, but also some 
indication that they increase the amount given, which would point to a substitution between 
church taxes and voluntary contributions. In any way, I find that the increase in giving from 
before to after church disaffiliation is moderate and it appears highly unlikely that it fully 
compensates the reduction in revenues of the charitable sector when individuals do not pay 
church taxes anymore. 
Another research question in Chapter 5 is whether those individuals who leave the church 
differ in their giving behavior from church members who stay. Since some individuals leave 
the church, while others do not, there must be a difference between the two groups. If they 
differ in their benefits from membership only, there will not be any differences in giving. If 
those who leave disagree with how the church tax they pay is used, they can be expected to 
make higher additional contributions than church members who stay in the church. Finally, if 
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one assumes that some people receive a higher marginal utility from giving than others, then 
those who leave the church might not have a high intrinsic motivation or extrinsic incentives 
to give. In that case, they would give less than church members and behave more like non-
members. My results imply that the last explanation applies:  individuals who disaffiliate have 
a lower probability to give and make lower conditional contributions than “regular” church 
members.
127
 
I also provide – to the best of my knowledge – the first set of separate estimations for the two 
categories of giving which can be distinguished in the German income tax law:  donations to 
“benevolent, parochial, religious, scientific or especially eligible charitable purposes” and 
donations to “benevolent, scientific and especially eligible cultural purposes”. From my 
results no comprehensive picture emerges as to whether income and price affect the two types 
of giving separately. However, I find some indication that the price elasticity of giving to the 
purely secular causes might be higher than to other causes. The results very clearly show that 
church members and West Germans are over-represented among those who give to religious 
and charitable purposes, but not among those who give to benevolent, scientific and cultural 
purposes. This finding contradicts my model in Chapter 3 which predicts that church tax 
payers give less to religious causes than people who are not church members because the 
church tax and donations to religious causes are substitutes. In addition, further results imply 
that after church disaffiliation giving to religious and charitable causes remains constant, 
while giving to benevolent, scientific and cultural purposes increases. This finding does not 
support my hypothesis that the probability of giving to religious causes increases when 
individuals disaffiliate. Different explanations are possible. First, the categories may be too 
broad and the results emerge because the effects of the non-religious giving in the religious 
and charitable category dominate the results. Second, religious giving also includes local 
church taxes, which are obligatory in some regions of Germany. Third, “regular” church 
members might prefer religious over secular giving, i.e. they derive very little utility from 
secular giving, causing them to make charitable contributions only to religious organizations, 
even though church taxes and (religious) voluntary contributions are substitutes at the margin. 
Although more research in this field is necessary to expand and deepen the results in this 
chapter, the finding that the price elasticity of voluntary giving might depend on the type of 
organization which is supported by the donation also has political implications. In order to 
increase the efficiency of the support for voluntary giving in the tax system those categories 
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 This does not rule out the possibility that they also have a lower membership benefit on average, which seems 
likely given the findings in Chapter 4 that demographic, socio-economic and regional variables, which are likely 
to affect the benefits of church membership, have a strong influence on the membership decision. 
314 
of giving with the highest price elasticity should see the most comprehensive possibilities for 
tax deductions. Until 2006 donations to “benevolent, parochial, religious, scientific or 
especially eligible charitable purposes” were deductible up to 5 % of overall income, while 
donations to “benevolent, scientific and especially eligible cultural purposes” were deductible 
up to 10 % of overall income. In other words, when the donations was considerably large (in 
relation to overall income), the price reduction was higher for the type of giving that appears 
to be more price elastic. Since 2007, the deductibility of both types of giving is identical 
(although much higher than before).  
Relating the results of the two empirical chapters back to the theoretical discussion of church 
financing systems, I find only some theoretical predictions confirmed. On the one hand, my 
research has provided evidence that at least some individuals actually leave the church in 
Germany because of the church tax. On the other hand, the very moderate increase in giving 
after church disaffiliation suggests that people do not completely substitute the church taxes 
they save after leaving the church by voluntary contributions.
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 Taken together, the results 
imply that total charitable contributions (including both church taxes and voluntary 
contributions) might decrease when Germany becomes more and more secularized.  
If a tax assignment system was introduced in Germany instead, both church membership 
decisions and charitable choices should be different. First, since the tax assignment system 
does not provide any incentives to leave the church, church membership rates will be higher 
and disaffiliation rates lower. Second, nobody would be able to free-ride on the contribution 
of others, since every taxpayer is forced to assign a part of his or her taxes to a charitable 
cause, be it religious or secular. An economic evaluation of the efficiency of church financing 
systems hinges on the welfare effects that can be attained. If individuals value the goods 
produced by charitable organizations, but free-ride on the contributions of others (especially 
in the form of church taxes), introducing an assignment tax appears efficient. However, if 
voluntary charitable contributions are low because there are no charitable causes which 
individuals prefer to support or because they think that the church and/or secular charities are 
less efficient in providing services for the needy than other institutions (e.g. the state via 
general taxes), then the assignment tax would reduce welfare.  While this research illuminates 
the mechanisms at work, an empirical evaluation of welfare effects is beyond its scope.  
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 The present research does not provide an estimate how large the substitution of church taxes by voluntary 
contributions is, but given the very moderate increase in the probability of giving of 2.5 percentage points which 
I find in my pooled cross-section estimations (with no increase in the amount given) it is safe to assume that not 
everyone who formerly paid church taxes begins making voluntary contributions. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Extensions of the models in Chapters 2 and 3 
A.1 A life-cycle model of religiosity with afterlife and current religious 
consumption 
This section presents the model which was briefly verbally discussed in Section 2.2.3.3. It 
combines the models in Section 2.2.3.1 where individuals derive utility from afterlife 
consumption and in Section 2.2.3.2 where individuals have current religious consumption. 
The utility function now includes both current religious consumption in each period   and 
afterlife consumption: 
                                               (A.1) 
All three commodities are produced by inputs of money and time: 
                (A.2) 
 
                (A.3) 
 
                                    (A.4) 
The budget constraint remains the same as in the two basic models in Sections 2.2.3.1 and 
2.2.3.2. Maximization of the Lagrangian function yields the following first order conditions: 
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 (A.6) 
It is easy to see that the results are a combination of the results of the two basic models and 
that they can be traced back to previous findings if the individual does not include one of the 
two types of religious consumption in his or her utility function, e.g. because he or she does 
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not believe in the existence of an afterlife.
129
 Including both types of religious commodities in 
the utility function makes it even more difficult to predict an age profile of religiosity. In 
general, one would expect to see religious contributions of time and money increase over the 
life-cycle. This effect is more pronounced if learning effects exist, i.e. inputs in religion 
during childhood and youth increase the productivity of inputs in later stages of life. In 
contrast, a steep increase in wages mitigates the age effects. In addition, inputs into religion 
can vary according to the need for current religious consumption, which influences the 
marginal utility of religiosity. 
Looking at the decision making of the individual in a specific period  , I find that the 
individual simultaneously takes into account the marginal effects of an increase in religious 
inputs on current utility from religion and afterlife utility: 
                                              (A.7) 
 
                                              (A.8) 
where      is the marginal utility of the commodity in brackets and       is the marginal 
productivity of the respective input. Both high current benefits from religiosity and high 
utility from afterlife consumption induce individuals to engage in religion. Tao and Yeh 
(2007) use this framework to analyze different religious convictions in Taiwan. They argue 
that Christians have the highest afterlife utility because in their belief system eternal life is 
promised. In contrast, Buddhists have lower afterlife benefits because all they can gain is a 
better starting position in their next life. Finally, folk religionists cannot influence their 
afterlife through religious inputs during their lifetime. Assuming that all religious groups have 
similar current benefits from religion, one would expect Christians to choose a higher level of 
religious inputs than Buddhists, and members of folk religions to have the lowest religious 
inputs. 
A.2 Joint household production of religiosity 
The following model is adopted from Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975). The authors assume that 
husband and wife jointly produce current religious consumption in each period 
          
      
      
      
    (A.9) 
as well as the secular consumption good  
                                                 
129
 For a more detailed analysis of believes in the afterlife, see Section 2.2.7.2. 
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where the superscripts    and   identify husband and wife, respectively. The spouses also 
have a joint budget constraint 
       
      
      
      
       
 
   
 
          
         
      
      
         
      
        
 
   
 
(A.11) 
where   
   and  
   are the wage rates of husband and wife, respectively. 
The spouses now determine their optimal combination of monetary and time inputs into 
religiosity. Looking at time spent with religious activities in period   yields 
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Dividing (A.12) by (A.13) yields 
  
  
   
  
   
    
   
 
  
   
  
   
    
   
   
    
  
    
  
 
    
 
   
   
 (A.14) 
 
A.3 Religion in an insurance framework 
In Section 2.2.7.2.1 I develop a simple model with uncertainty about the existence of an 
afterlife. Such a model can also be discussed in an insurance framework where individuals 
insure themselves against the existence of an afterlife. Durkin and Greeley (1991) present this 
type of model. Again, I need to make the assumption that there is insecurity about the 
existence of an afterlife. The following simplifications are introduced: (i) there is only one 
input – money – in the production of commodities, (ii) income is exogenously determined and 
does not depend on the consumption choices of the individual, and (iii) there are only two 
periods: this life and the afterlife. 
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The individual has an exogenous income   which he or she can use for religious giving    
and secular spending  : 
         (A.15) 
Religious inputs produce both current religiosity        and afterlife consumption       , 
while secular spending produces secular consumption commodities      . The first 
derivatives of all commodities with respect to their respective inputs are always positive, the 
second derivative is negative. I further assume that the utility in a certain state of the world is 
the sum of the three commodities: 
                       (A.16) 
In the insurance model, two states of the world exist: either there is an afterlife or there is not. 
The individual ascribes a (subjective) probability of      to the former state and a probability 
of        to the latter. If the afterlife exists, the individual has a payoff 
                        (A.17) 
If there is no afterlife, there is no afterlife consumption: 
                 (A.18) 
If the individual decides to take out a high afterlife insurance, he or she has to bear costs in 
the form of foregone secular consumption, but receives high current utility from religiosity, 
and also afterlife utility
130
 with probability     . If the individual decides to consume few 
religious commodities, he or she can use almost all of his or her income for secular 
consumption, however, in case the afterlife exists, he or she might face hell.
131
 In short, the 
trade-off is between higher secular consumption, but a (possibly) more unpleasant afterlife, 
and lower secular consumption, while having a more pleasant afterlife. 
As in Durkin and Greeley (1991) the individual chooses a level of    which maximizes his 
or her expected utility. 
The expected utility is:  
                                                 
130
 It is assumed that afterlife utility is finite. If afterlife utility were infinite, a rational individual would always 
engage in religious activities, no matter how small the subjective probability that the afterlife exists. This 
reasoning is known as “Pascal’s wager” (see Melkonyan and Pingle, 2009: 4-5, 7). 
131
 At least in the Christian tradition a very low (maybe even negative) afterlife utility is connected to the image 
of hell. 
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                            (A.19) 
This equation is differentiated with respect to   and set to zero. The result is: 
 
   
   
       
  
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
            
  
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
(A.20) 
From (A.15) it can easily be seen that  
   
   
 
 
   . Rearranging (A.20) yields 
      
   
   
 
   
   
 
  
   
 (A.21) 
These are exactly the same results as in Section 2.2.7.2.1, since (A.21) mirrors (2.50). As 
resources devoted to religion increase, the marginal utility of current religious consumption 
decreases and the marginal utility loss from renouncing secular consumption increases. At the 
same time, the probability-weighted marginal afterlife benefit decreases. With well-behaved 
utility functions there should be an optimal level of   characterized by (A.21). To conclude, 
individuals with high (marginal) benefits from secular consumption or a low subjective 
probability of afterlife existence invest little in religion, while people who have high this-
worldly or other-worldly religious benefits invest more. 
A.4 Religious choice under total ambiguity 
Even in the case of total ambiguity individuals must make a decision about religion. Possible 
decision criteria are: max-max criterion, max-min criterion, Hurwicz criterion, min-max 
regret criterion and principle of insufficient reason. The discussion that follows is taken from 
Melkonyan and Pingle (2009: 8-9). 
There are two states of the world: the afterlife exists, or it does not. The individual can decide 
to be religious or to be atheist. The payoff matrix is the same as in Section 2.2.7.2.2 with the 
additional (reasonable) assumptions 
   
    
  (A.22) 
and 
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  (A.23) 
Inequality (A.22) says that if the afterlife exists, it is better for the individual to choose to be 
religious than to be non-religious because afterlife benefits are sufficiently high. However, if 
the afterlife does not exist, (A.23) says that it preferable not to be religious because the 
secular costs exceed possible current benefits from religion. This represents a dilemma for the 
individual, because the best choice depends on which state of the world is true, which is 
unknown to the individual. (Melkonyan and Pingle, 2009: 8) 
If the individual is an optimist, he or she will apply the max-max criterion and choose the 
alternative which yields that highest utility of all four, hoping that the corresponding state of 
the world is the true one. If  
   
    
  (A.24) 
he or she will choose to be religious and vice versa. 
If the individual is a pessimist, he or she might apply the max-min criterion, i.e. the individual 
tries to avoid the situation with the lowest utility. Comparing the two less fortunate outcomes 
in each state of the world, the individual will be religious if 
   
    
  (A.25) 
and vice versa. 
The Hurwicz criterion combines the two previous approaches by weighing the two outcomes 
of each choice with a optimism parameter. 
Applying the min-max regret rule makes the individual choose the alternative where he or she 
has less to lose. Being religious is chosen if 
   
    
    
    
  (A.26) 
Finally, the criterion of insufficient reason presumes that in the case of total ambiguity all 
states of the world are equally likely, 
                 (A.27) 
With these probabilities given, the individual can then form the expected utility. (Melkonyan 
and Pingle, 2009: 8-9) 
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Without knowing the exact utility levels of all alternatives, none of these criteria gives a clear 
prediction which action to choose. In fact, they might lead to the same or completely different 
decisions. Which decision criterion is chosen depends, among others, on the degree of 
optimism or pessimism the individual professes (Melkonyan and Pingle, 2009: 16). 
A.5 Extension of the model in Chapter 3 
Incorporating the prestige motive in the general model framework of Chapter 3, the utility 
function of the individual is 
                  (A.28) 
where   is secular consumption,   are voluntary religious contributions,   are voluntary 
contributions to secular charities and    is the church membership status. 
More specifically, I assume that the utility function is  
     
          
     
             (A.29) 
where    and    are Cobb-Douglas parameters with            and        . 
The budget constraint is 
                            (A.30) 
It is easy to see that this maximization problem equals the problem in the model with intrinsic 
motivation to give, with the only difference that   and   are always set to zero and the 
preference parameters    and    are replaced by    and   . All other properties remain the 
same, in particular that             in the voluntary giving system;        and 
        in the church tax system and  
           in the tax assignment system. 
For all individuals in the voluntary giving system and for non-members in the church tax 
system, giving is independent from the motive to give. The utility for non-members in the 
church tax system is 
       
                  
          
     
     (A.31) 
For church members in the church tax system, religious and secular charitable contributions 
are 
                (A.32) 
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                 (A.33) 
Total voluntary giving is  
                                      (A.34) 
and the utility of members is 
       
                  
          
     
                 (A.35) 
The Cobb-Douglas-part of the utility is reduced by the factor       for church members in 
comparison to non-members. This is equivalent to saying that a fraction   of their income 
does not create any utility. However, utility is enhanced by adding      . 
The cut-off level where individuals are indifferent between being and not being a member of 
the church is 
 
    
  
     
                   
     
    
 (A.36) 
Turning the attention now to the tax assignment system, I find that the amount given 
voluntarily is the same when the church or the state receive the tax,        resp.       . 
The amount given also equals the amount given by church members in Germany: 
                (A.37) 
 
                 (A.38) 
In both cases, total giving is 
                                      (A.39) 
and utility is 
     
                 
          
     
                    (A.40) 
Total giving and utility are the same as for church members in Germany.  
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Appendix B: Church tax regulations by Land for the years 2001 to 
2006 
In the following I present the church tax regulations for each Land for the years 2001 to 2006 
– the years that my data set comprises. I restrict myself to Catholic and Protestant churches 
and do not report tax regulations for Jewish communities, the Old Catholic Church 
(“Altkatholische Kirche”) and Religious Humanist communities (“Freireligiöse 
Gemeinden”). The main source of information is the church tax regulations published in the 
Federal Tax Gazette (“Bundessteuerblatt”). For some Länder these regulations are not 
published each year or information on maximum and minimum tax rates is missing. In such 
cases I refer to information published in Suhrbier-Hahn (1999: 274-282) and Petersen (n.d.: 8, 
2006: 22-23), who explain the regulations in 1999, 2002 and 2006, respectively. I also refer to 
information published on the websites of the regional churches. Information on the current 
regulations can be found on http://www.steuer-forum-kirche.de/. 
I additionally provide information about the state authority that accepts declarations of church 
disaffiliation. Depending on the Land, this can either be the civil registry office 
(“Standesamt”) or the district court (“Amtsgericht”). The data is taken from the church 
disaffiliation laws of the Länder, which are usually published in the Law and Ordinance 
Gazettes (“Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt”) of the Länder. I also provide information about 
the fees for disaffiliations in each Land. Data is usually taken from the schedule of fees which 
is published in the Law and Ordinance Gazettes of the Länder.
132
 
Note that the church tax rate is reported as a percentage of the income tax liability calculated 
according to § 51a ITL. 
Note that minimum taxes are levied only when the taxpayer has to pay a positive amount of 
church tax, but the amount falls below the minimum church tax. 
Also note that maximum church taxes are reported as a percentage of taxable income. 
Regulations concerning maximum church taxes vary between Länder and between religious 
communities within a Land. In some Länder, maximum church taxes are considered ex 
officio, i.e. the tax office considers them in the income and church tax assessment. In these 
cases, the maximum church tax (if applicable) is the tax reported in the Taxpayer Panel. 
However, in some Länder the maximum tax is only granted upon request (to be directed to the 
                                                 
132
 The information about the fees for Hamburg was kindly provided by the civil registry office of Hamburg via 
email. 
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religious community, not the tax office), either routinely or left to the discretion of the 
religious community. Tax reductions upon request are not visible in my data set. 
Nevertheless, in calculating the church tax of each taxpayer I assume that the maximum tax 
rate is always applied. In addition, note that maximum tax rates, although legally in effect, do 
not always have consequences in practice. Consider the maximum tax rate of 4 % of taxable 
income, which is in effect in many Catholic Churches, particular in West Germany. In the 
years 2001 to 2003, the top income tax rate in Germany was 48.5 %. Applying a church tax 
rate of 9 % on the income tax rate, the church tax approached 4.365 % of taxable income. 
Consequently, restricting the church tax to a maximum of 4 % of taxable income had an effect 
on the church tax liability. However, in 2005 and 2006 the top income tax rate was reduced to 
42 %, which implies that the church tax liability approaches a maximum of 3.78 % of taxable 
income. A maximum tax rate of 4 % of taxable income is without effect. 
 
Baden-Württemberg 
Church tax rate: 8 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: 7.20 DM (2001); 3.60 Euro (2002-2006) 
Maximum church tax: 3.5 % (Catholic, all years; Evangelische Landeskirche Baden, all years; 
and Evangelische Landeskirche Württemberg, 2001-2002); 3 % (Evangelische Landeskirche 
Württemberg, 2003-2004); 2.75 % (Evangelische Landeskirche Württemberg, 2005-2006) 
NB: From the data set it is not possible to see which of the Protestant churches the taxpayer 
belongs to. Therefore I apply the average maximum church tax rate of the two Protestant 
churches to all Protestants in Baden-Württemberg. 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: civil registry office 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: varies between cities 
 
Bavaria 
Church tax rate: 8 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: none (all years) 
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Maximum church tax: none (all years) 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: civil registry office 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: 62 DM (2001); 31 Euro (2002-2006) 
 
Berlin 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: none (all years) 
Maximum church tax: 3 % (all years) 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: district court 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: none (all years) 
 
Brandenburg 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: none (all years) 
Maximum church tax: 3 % (all years) 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: district court 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: none (all years) 
 
Bremen 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: none (all years) 
Maximum church tax: 3 % (2001-2004); 3.5 % (2005-2006) 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: civil registry office; in addition church 
disaffiliation has to be declared with the religious community 
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Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: none (all years) 
 
Hamburg 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: 7.20 DM (2001); 3.60 Euro (2002-2006) 
Maximum church tax: 3 % (all years) 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: civil registry office 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: 40 DM (2001); 20 Euro (2002-2004); 31 Euro (2005-
2006) 
 
Hesse 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: 3.60 DM (2001); 1.80 Euro (2002-2006) 
Maximum church tax: 4 % (Catholic, all years; and Protestant, 2001-2003); 3.75 % 
(Protestant, 2004; and Evangelische Kirche von Kurhessen-Waldeck, 2005); 3.5 % 
(Evangelische Kirche von Hessen und Nassau and Evangelische Kirche im Rheinland, 2005; 
and Protestant, 2006) 
NB: From the data set it is not possible to see which of the Protestant churches the taxpayer 
belongs to. Therefore I apply the average of the maximum church tax rate of the Evangelische 
Kirche von Hessen and Nassau and the Evangelische Kirche von Kurhessen-Waldeck in 2005, 
the only year when maximum church tax rates differ. The Evangelische Kirche im Rheinland 
is not considered, since it covers only a small area in Hesse and regulations coincide with 
those of the Evangelische Kirche von Hessen und Nassau. 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: district court 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: 40 DM (2001); 20 Euro (2002-2003); 25 Euro (2003-
2006) 
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Lower Saxony 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: 7.20 DM (2001); 3.60 Euro (2002-2006) 
Maximum church tax: 3.5 % (all years) 
NB: For the years 2001 to 2004, Protestants and Catholics in Lower Saxony who lived in a 
region that belonged to the Bremische Evangelische Kirche had to pay a maximum church tax 
of 3 %. In 2005 and 2006, Protestants in Lower Saxony who lived in a region that belonged to 
the Nordelbische Evanglisch-Lutherische Kirche had to pay a maximum church tax of 3 %. 
Since the Bremische Evangelische Kirche and the Nordelbische Evanglisch-Lutherische 
Kirche cover only a small area in Lower Saxony, these exceptions are disregarded.  
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: civil registry office 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: 40 DM (2001); 20.40 Euro (2002); 24 Euro (2002-2006) 
 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: none (2001); 3.60 Euro (2002-2006) 
Maximum church tax: none (Protestant, all years; and Catholic, 2001); 3 % (Catholic, 2002-
2006) 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: civil registry office 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: 20 DM (2001); 10 Euro (2002-2006) 
 
 
North Rhine-Westphalia 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: none (all years) 
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Maximum church tax: 4 % (Catholic, all years; and Evangelische Kirche im Rheinland, 2001-
2003); 3.75 % (Evangelische Kirche von Westfalen and Lippische Landeskirche, 2001-2004; 
and Evangelische Kirche im Rheinland, 2004); 3.5 % (Protestant, 2005-2006) 
NB: From the data set it is not possible to see which of the Protestant churches the taxpayer 
belongs to. Therefore I apply the average of the maximum church tax rate of the Evangelische 
Kirche von Westfalen and the Evangelische Kirche im Rheinland in the years 2001 to 2003 
when maximum church tax rates differ. The Lippische Landeskirche is not considered, since it 
covers only a small area in North Rhine-Westphalia and regulations coincide with those of the 
Evangelische Kirche von Westfalen. 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: district court 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: none (2001-June 2006); 30 Euro (since June 2006) 
 
Rhineland-Palatinate 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: none (all years) 
Maximum church tax: 4 % (Catholic, all years; and Protestant, 2001-2003); 3.75 % 
(Protestant, 2004); 3.5 % (Protestant, 2005-2006) 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: civil registry office 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: 40 DM (2001); 20.45 Euro (2002-2006) 
 
Saarland 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: none (all years) 
Maximum church tax: 4 % (Catholic, all years; and Protestant, 2001-2003); 3.75 % 
(Protestant, 2004); 3.5 % (Protestant, 2005-2006) 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: district court (2001-2003); civil registry office 
(2004-2006) 
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Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: 60 DM (2001); 30.70 Euro (2002-2006) 
 
Saxony 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: 7.20 DM (Protestant, 2001); 3.60 Euro (Protestant, 2002-2006); none 
(Catholic, all years) 
Maximum church tax: 3.5 % (all years) 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: civil registry office 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: 40 DM (2001); 20.45 Euro (2002-2003); 20 Euro (2004-
2006) 
 
Saxony-Anhalt 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: 7.20 DM (Protestant, 2001); 3.60 Euro (Protestant, 2002-2006); none 
(Catholic, all years) 
Maximum church tax: 3.5 % (all years) 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: civil registry office 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: 40 DM (2001); 20.45 Euro (2002-2004); 25 Euro (2004-
2006) 
 
 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: 7.20 DM (2001); 3.60 Euro (2002-2006) 
Maximum church tax: 3 % (all years) 
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State authority responsible for disaffiliation: civil registry office 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: 20 DM (2001); 10 Euro (2002-2006) 
 
Thuringia 
Church tax rate: 9 % (all years) 
Minimum church tax: 7.20 DM (Protestant, 2001); 3.60 Euro (Protestant, 2002-2006); none 
(Catholic, all years) 
Maximum church tax: 3.5 % (all years) 
State authority responsible for disaffiliation: district court 
Fee for declaration of disaffiliation: none (all years) 
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Appendix C: Calculation of the price of church membership and 
income 
C.1 Calculation of the price of church membership 
This section describes in detail the calculation of the price of church membership with the 
help of the data available in the Taxpayer Panel and discusses limitations of the exact 
determination of the price. The general procedure is outlined in Section 4.5.4. 
C.1.1 Step 1: Calculation of church taxes paid 
The first step is the calculation of the deductible amount of church tax. As will soon become 
obvious, this step is harder to do then the calculation of the actual church tax since relevant 
data is missing in the data set. The amount paid as church tax during the year is levied either 
as an additional tax to the payroll tax or together with advance payments on the income tax. 
Unfortunately the data set only contains the amount of payroll tax paid during the year, but no 
information on advance payments on the income tax. In addition, the amount of payroll tax 
cannot simply be taken as a basis for calculating the church tax paid during the year, at least 
in those cases where the taxpayer has children. The reason is that the child allowance is not 
taken into account when the payroll tax is determined, but needs to be considered when the 
amount of church tax due during the year is calculated. Because of these problems, I decided 
not to use the payroll tax reported as a basis for estimating the church tax paid during the year, 
but instead use the yearly income reported in the income tax return and calculate the income 
tax and resulting church tax on that basis. The reasons for this choice are that (i) the income 
tax appears to be the most accurate available estimate for the payroll tax, and (ii) I have a 
basis for estimating the church tax paid for individuals who have other types of income than 
wages. 
Church taxes paid during the year are calculated in the following way: 
I take the variable c65887 “zvE unter Berücksichtigung von FB für Kinder und Korrektur 
durch Halbeinkünfte für WOP/SPZ” (“taxable income in consideration of child allowances 
and after correction for half-income”). This variable includes the taxable income for the 
calculation of the state income tax with the adjustments necessary to arrive at the taxable 
income for the calculation of church taxes. Those adjustments are established in § 51a ITL 
(“income tax law” – “Einkommensteuergesetz”)
133
. On the one hand the child allowance is 
                                                 
133
 I use the abbreviation ITL for “income tax law” instead of the German “EStG” for 
“Einkommensteuergesetz”. 
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subtracted for every child,
134
 on the other hand it is corrected for half-income 
(“Halbeinkünfte”). If variable c65887 is missing in the data set, I use variable c65883 “zvE 
für Berechnung Kirchensteuer” (“taxable income for the calculation of the church tax”) 
instead. The two values are virtually always the same. 
I need to take into account that for church members the amount of church taxes actually paid 
during the year is included in the data and deducted from the taxable income in variable 
c65887. Since my aim is to estimate church taxes paid, I add these deductions again to the 
taxable income. This procedure also ensures that there are no systematic differences in the 
deductions considered for the calculation of taxable income between church members and 
non-members. When adding church taxes paid to the taxable income I also need to take into 
account the blanket allowance for special expenses, which amounts to 108 DM in 2001 and 
36 Euro in the years 2002 to 2006 for the single assessment scheme. This blanket allowance is 
always deducted for special expenses, even if the actual amount of special expenses is lower. 
In my calculations I make sure that I always allow for a deduction of special expenses of 108 
DM/36 Euro, even if the actual amount of special expenses (less church taxes paid) is lower. 
Next, the income tax, which is the basis for the calculation of the church tax, is computed by 
applying the income tax function to the adjusted taxable income. Some exceptions have to be 
taken into account here. They refer to individuals who have extraordinary income according 
to § 34 ITL. There are two different ways to handle extraordinary income outlined in the 
income tax law, one provision is given in § 34(1) ITL, the other one in § 34(2),(3) ITL. 
I start with the case that the taxpayer has income according to § 34(1) ITL. The amount of this 
type of extraordinary income is given in variable c65549. First, the amount of extraordinary 
income is subtracted from the adjusted taxable income. The income tax function is then 
applied to the resulting amount. Second, the same is done again, but this time only 80 % of 
the extraordinary income is subtracted from the adjusted taxable income. As a result, I receive 
the income tax (i) if extraordinary income is completely disregarded and (ii) if only 20 % of 
extraordinary income is included in the taxable income. The income tax is then calculated in 
the following way: (a) if the taxable income (c65887 resp. c65883, adjusted for church taxes 
paid, less extraordinary income) is positive, then the income tax on the extraordinary income 
amounts to five times the difference between the income tax calculated in (ii) and the income 
tax calculated in (i). This difference is then added to the income tax on regular income from 
                                                 
134
 This is different from the calculation of the state income tax, where the child allowance is only subtracted if it 
is beneficial for the taxpayer in comparison to receiving child benefits.  
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(i) in order to receive the final income tax. If (b) extraordinary income exists, but taxable 
income without extraordinary income is negative, the overall income tax is equal to five times 
the income tax in case (ii). These rather difficult calculations are motivated by the following 
reasoning: Income is “extraordinary” when individuals receive it only once, and it is usually 
quite substantial. In other words, in the year when individuals receive this income, their 
taxable income would be significantly higher than usual and their marginal tax rate would 
increase steeply. In order to avoid this, the income is treated as if the individual would receive 
20 % of the total amount annually for 5 years. 
The law provides a second way of treating extraordinary income in § 34(2),(3) ITL. 
Preconditions for receiving this kind of treatment are named in the law. The extraordinary 
income according to § 34(2),(3) ITL is given in variable c65585 (“Bemessungsgrundlage § 34 
Abs. 3 EStG” – “assessment basis for § 34(3) ITL”). First, I calculate the income tax on 
adjusted taxable income including extraordinary income and identify the resulting average tax 
rate by dividing the income tax by the taxable income (including extraordinary income). This 
tax rate is then multiplied by 0.5 in 2001, 2002 and 2003 and by 0.56 in the years 2004, 2005 
and 2006. The resulting percentage is the average tax rate that is applied to the amount of 
extraordinary income, unless it is below 19.9 % in 2001 and 2002, below 17 % in 2003, below 
16 % in 2004 and below 15 % in 2005 and 2006. If this is the case, the higher tax rate applies. 
The final income tax is the income tax on extraordinary income thus calculated plus the 
income tax on the “regular” (i.e. not extraordinary) taxable income. 
On the income tax thus calculated, either by applying the income tax scale to the taxable 
income or, if necessary, by taking into account extraordinary income, I apply the church tax 
regulations. 
First, the church tax rate (8 % in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, 9 % in all other Länder) is 
applied to the adjusted income tax due. Second, there is a minimum church tax in some 
Länder for individuals who have to pay a positive amount of church tax, but less than the 
minimum amount defined. This tax usually amounts to 3.60 euro per year. For detailed 
information about church tax rates and minimum church taxes by Land and year see 
Appendix B. 
I take the amount of church tax thus calculated as an estimate for the amount of church taxes 
paid during the year.  
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C.1.2 Step 2: Calculation of the church tax 
In the second step, I calculate the final amount of church tax. The estimated amount of church 
tax paid (outcome of step 1) is used as an input variable. For church members, I replace the 
actual amount of church tax paid (which is reported in the data set) with the estimated 
amount. For non-members, I include the estimated amount as an additional type of special 
expenses which reduces their taxable income. The provisions for the blanket allowance for 
special expenses are again considered. 
Then I run calculations similar to those above in order to calculate the church tax. Again, I use 
the taxable income corrected for child allowances and half-income from variable c65887 resp. 
c65883. However, instead of assuming that the amount of church taxes paid is zero, I now 
assume that the amount of church taxes paid is the amount calculated in the first step (both for 
church members and non-members). I correct the taxable income in variables c65887 resp. 
c65883 for these deductions.  
I then calculate first the income tax and later the church tax from the taxable income thus 
defined. The steps in the calculation of the church tax are essentially the same as in the 
calculation above, but with some exceptions. As above, I apply the income tax function of the 
respective year to the taxable income, and I also take into account extraordinary income. In 
addition, I incorporate an additional exception in the calculation of income tax, which 
becomes effective when individuals have income under the “exemption with progression” rule 
(“Einkommen unter Progressionsvorbehalt”). Unemployment benefits (“Arbeitslosengeld 
I”), parental leave benefits (“Elterngeld”), sickness benefits (“Krankengeld”) and some 
further substitutes for earnings named in § 32b(1) ITL as well as foreign income belong to 
this type of income. They are tax-free, but increase the average tax rate on the remaining 
income. The income tax is calculated as follows: the taxable income is calculated (i) with and 
(ii) without including income under the “exemption with progression” rule. The average tax 
rate for case (i) is identified. This tax rate is then applied to the income in case (ii) in order to 
arrive at the actual amount of income tax. 
The taxable income in case (ii) without income under the “exemption with progression” rule 
is again the taxable income given in variable c65887 resp. c65883, corrected for the estimated 
amount of church taxes paid. The taxable income (i) including income under the “exemption 
with progression” rule has the same basis, but the amount of income under the “exemption 
with progression” rule (given in variables c66200 to c66205) is added. For this sum, I 
calculate the income tax according to the income tax function and determine the average tax 
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rate. The average tax rate is than multiplied with the taxable income (ii) without income under 
the “exemption with progression” rule in order to arrive at the income tax. I will call this 
amount of income tax “income tax – regular”. 
If the individual has extraordinary income and income under the “exemption with 
progression” rule
135
 one has to distinguish between the income tax on “regular” income and 
on “extraordinary” income. The income tax on regular income is calculated in the way 
described in the previous paragraph, i.e. it corresponds to “income tax – regular”. In addition, 
one has to take into account the effects of income under the “exemption with progression” 
rule on the taxation of extraordinary income. 
If the individual has extraordinary income according to § 34(1) ITL, the taxable income given 
in variables c65887 resp. c65883, corrected for the estimated amount of church taxes paid, 
plus the amount of income under the “exemption with progression” rule, plus 20 % of 
extraordinary income given in variable c65549 is calculated. Again, I apply the income tax 
function on the taxable income thus defined, and divide the resulting amount of income tax by 
the taxable income in order to arrive at the average tax rate. This average tax rate is then 
applied to taxable income without income under the “exemption with progression” rule (but 
corrected for church taxes paid and with 20 % of extraordinary income added). I will call the 
resulting income tax “income tax – extra § 34(1) ITL”. The amount of income tax that 
eventually needs to be paid on extraordinary income is five times the difference between 
“income tax – extra § 34(1) ITL” and “income tax – regular”. 
If the individual has extraordinary income according to § 34(2),(3) ITL, the taxable income 
given in variables c65887 resp. c65883, corrected for the estimated amount of church taxes 
paid, plus the amount of income under the “exemption with progression” rule, plus the 
complete amount of extraordinary income given in variable c65585, is calculated. The 
average tax rate is calculated as in the previous two cases, however, the income tax law 
defines lower bounds for the average tax rate. The calculation of these minimum tax rates is 
the same as above in Section C.1.1. Once the appropriate tax rate is identified, the income tax 
on extraordinary income according to § 34(2),(3) ITL is given by the tax rate multiplied with 
the total amount of extraordinary income (given in variable c65585). 
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 An example of how the income tax is calculated if both income under the “exemption with progression” rule 
and extraordinary income according to § 34(1) ITL are present can be found in the income tax guidelines 2003 
(“Einkommensteuerrichtlinie 2003”), R 198. 
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When the income tax in all cases (with and without income under the “exemption with 
progression” rule, with and without extraordinary income) is determined, I subtract from the 
income tax all tax abatements. Tax abatements are calculated as the difference between the 
collective income tax (“tarifliche Einkommensteuer”, variable c65584) and income tax due 
(“festzusetzende Einkommensteuer”, variable c65613). Before I take this difference, I correct 
the income tax due for the amount of effectively added child benefit (“tats. 
hinzuzurechnendes Kindergeld”, variable c65880). The reason for this is that individuals who 
choose the child allowance instead of child benefit need to pay back the child benefit they 
received during the year. This increases the amount of tax they actually have to pay at the end 
of the year (variable c65613). However, whether someone pays back the child benefit is 
irrelevant for the calculation of church taxes, therefore the income tax due has to be corrected. 
Finally, I subtract the tax abatement according to § 35 ITL (“Ermäßigung nach § 35 EStG”, 
variable c65630). This is in accordance with § 51(2) clause 3 ITL which states that this type 
of tax abatement should not be considered when calculating the church tax. 
On the income tax less tax abatements I then apply the church tax regulations. The provisions 
for the application of church tax rates and the minimum church tax are the same as in the step 
one (Section C.1.1). Additionally, I take into account the maximum church tax rate which is 
defined as a percentage of the taxable income (corrected for church taxes paid, including 
extraordinary income) and is usually between 3 % and 4 % depending on the church tax laws 
in each Land. The respective percentage is applied to the taxable income. Then I compare the 
church tax calculated with the usual church tax rate and the church tax calculated with the 
maximum tax rate and keep the one that is lower. Information about maximum church tax 
rates can also be found in Appendix B. 
There are some differences in the estimation of church taxes paid and the calculation of final 
church taxes. First, the reason for considering income under the “exemption with progression” 
rule in the calculation of the final church tax, but not in the estimation of church taxes paid, is 
that on this type of income individuals do not pay payroll tax and consequently no church tax 
during the year. In contrast, when calculating the income tax at the end of the year and the 
final church tax, it is considered. Second, tax abatements only matter in the calculation of the 
final church tax, but do not matter for payroll taxes and church taxes paid during the year. 
Third, maximum church tax rates are only applied in the calculation of the final church tax, 
but not for church taxes paid during the year. 
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C.1.3 Step 3: Reductions in income tax liability and solidarity surcharge 
The church tax so far calculated must not be regarded as the price of church membership. This 
is because the amount of church taxes paid during the year reduces the taxable income, the 
income tax liability and the solidarity surcharge. In order to find out how large this reduction 
in income tax liability and solidarity surcharge is, I calculate the income tax and solidarity 
surcharge (i) under the assumption that the taxpayer does not pay any church tax during the 
year (as would be true for non-members) and (ii) under the assumption that the taxpayer does 
pay church tax and the amount of church taxes paid during the year is equal to the amount 
estimated above in step one (Section C.1.1). Except for the difference in assumptions, the 
procedure of the calculation is exactly the same in (i) and (ii). Detailed information about how 
the income tax and the solidarity surcharge are calculated can be found in Section C.3. The 
price of church membership is then calculated as lined out in Figure A.1. 
 
Figure A.1: Calculation of the “price of church membership” 
Final church tax 
+  Income tax as church member 
+ Solidarity surcharge as member 
% Income tax as non-member 
% Solidarity surcharge as non-member
 
= “Price of church membership” 
 
C.1.4 Limitations 
Both the church tax paid during the year and the final church tax are not calculated exactly. 
For the church tax paid during the year, this is obvious, since it is based on the payroll tax and 
advance payments of the income tax, not on the final income tax which I use for calculation. 
In my own calculations, I basically include all tax exemptions of the individual. In the 
calculation of the payroll tax, some tax exemptions are always granted, while others have to 
be requested. Unfortunately, I do not know which ones the individual requested. In addition, 
the payroll tax is sometimes consolidated into a lump sum. As a consequence, the respective 
church tax is also paid as a lump sum and therefore not directly dependent on the income tax. 
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In the calculation of the final church tax there is also some imprecision. First, instead of using 
the church tax paid during the year as reported in the data set, I use the estimate of church tax 
paid. Second, in some of the Länder there are different maximum tax rates because the latter 
are determined by the regional church and there is often more than one regional church in one 
Land. The data set does not allow identifying which of the regional churches the taxpayer 
belongs to. Third, in some Länder the maximum tax rate takes effect only when the taxpayer 
applies for it (if he or she does not, the regular church tax rate is applied). In such cases, I 
assume that the maximum tax rate is implemented because the church tax with the maximum 
tax rate in place is the minimum amount of tax the person has to pay in order to be a member 
and all further payments (including the additional church tax when the person does not apply 
for the application of the maximum tax rate) can be avoided by the taxpayer. Fourth, some 
taxpayers move to a different region where different church tax regulations might apply. The 
church tax is then calculated according to two different church tax regulations proportional to 
the number of months spent in the two regions during the year. However, I cannot see in the 
data set when the individual moves, therefore I apply the regulations of the new Land for the 
whole year. Fifth, there are some additional types of extraordinary income, mainly referring to 
income from agriculture and forestry, to which specific regulations for the calculation of the 
income tax apply. Since accounting for them would require an enormous effort in 
programming, while only a very small number of taxpayers are affected, I disregard them. 
Sixth, under specific circumstances a (partial) reimbursement of church taxes is possible. The 
typical case when a reimbursement is granted is when the individual has extraordinary income 
according to § 34(2) ITL. The decision on reimbursements lies with the churches themselves 
(Petersen, 2010: 129). Since I have no information about reimbursements granted, they are 
not included in my estimation of church taxes. 
C.2 An alternative calculation for changes in the price of church membership 
caused by changes in church tax regulations 
In Section 4.5.4.2.1 I explain how I split the total change in the price of church membership 
into changes that are caused by changes in church tax laws and changes with different causes 
(in particular changes in the income tax laws or individual attributes). However, there are at 
least two ways to split up changes in price into these two categories. In the method I apply in 
my research, calculations are based on the income and income tax of the year 2005. The 
second approach is to take the income and income tax of 2001 and then apply the church tax 
laws of both 2001 and 2005, calculate the difference between the two amounts of church tax 
and take this difference as the change in price that is attributed to new church tax regulations. 
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The change in price that is attributed to the other factors would then be the difference between 
the church tax amounts under the church tax laws of 2005 attributed to both the income of 
2001 and the income of 2005. 
The main difference between these two ways of calculation is the classification of changes in 
the price of church membership that occur because of a simultaneous change in both taxable 
income and church tax rates. Imagine for a moment that both income and church tax rates 
increase over time. The change in church taxes can then be separated in three parts: (i) church 
taxes (calculated with the “old” church tax system) on the additional income, (ii) a higher 
church tax on the original income, and (iii) a higher church tax on the additional income.
136
 In 
the calculation I use in this chapter, the changes in church tax described in (ii) and (iii) are 
attributed to the change in church tax rates. With the alternative calculation method the 
amount in (iii) would be attributed to changes in the income tax law and/or individual 
characteristics. Individuals should be aware that an increase in taxable income will also 
increase the amount of church taxes they have to pay. However, the decision for the first 
calculation method is based on the assumption that when they assess the increase in church 
tax they probably have in mind the church tax system that they are used to and blame the 
church tax laws for any differences between the increase in the price of church membership 
that they expect given the old tax regulations and the actual price they have to pay under the 
new regulations. 
C.3 Calculation of income 
Figure 4.1 in Section 4.5.5.2 gives an overview of the calculation of economic income. In the 
present section I describe each item in more detail and discuss some shortcomings of this 
definition of economic income. 
C.3.1 The aggregate income measure 
Ideally I would use as a starting point for my calculations the sum of income (“Summe der 
Einkünfte”) since it correspond to the “primary market income” (Merz and Zwick, 2001: 517 
[my own translation]) and is used by both Merz (2001), Merz and Zwick (2001) and Kalusche 
(2006) as the relevant income measure. However, since the sum of income is missing for 
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 Consider the following example (for simplicity, assume that the church tax is a linear tax on taxable income): 
In 2001 the taxable income is 30,000 euro and the tax rate is 5 %. In 2005, the taxable income is 50,000 euro and 
the tax rate is 10 %. In 2001, the church tax would be 1,500 euro, in 2005 it would be 5,000 euro; the increase is 
3,500 euro. This increase can be separated in three parts: (i) the old church tax rate is applied to the additional 
income, i.e. 5 % on 20,000 euro (= 50,000 euro – 30,000 euro), resulting in an increase in 1,000 euro. (ii), the 
increase in the church tax rate of 10 %-5 %=5 % is applied to the original income of 30,000 euro, resulting in an 
increase of 1,500 euro, and (iii), the difference in the church tax rate (5 %) is applied to the additional income 
(20,000 euro), resulting in an increase of 1,000 euro. 
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some taxpayers (Bönke, Neher and Schröder, 2007: 592) I start from the overall income 
(“Gesamtbetrag der Einkünfte”). According to § 2(3) ITL the difference between the two 
income measures are the reduction for aged persons (“Altersentlastungsbetrag”, variable 
cc65321), the reduction for single parents (“Entlastungsbetrag für Alleinerziehende”, variable 
c65319) and the reduction for income from farming (variable c65336). By adding these 
reductions to the overall income, I arrive at the sum of income. 
C.3.2 Subtraction of taxes 
In the next step, the income tax due and the solidarity surcharge are subtracted from the 
income because they reduce the income that is available to the individual. Unfortunately, it is 
not always possible to simply take the income tax due and the solidarity surcharge reported in 
the data set. The reason is that I want my income measure to be independent of whether the 
taxpayer is a church member or not, since my dependent variable is the (change in) church 
membership status, which should not affect the independent variable (in this case, income) in 
order to avoid endogeneity bias. Therefore I calculate the economic income for church 
members as if they were no church members. That is, church taxes are assumed not to reduce 
the economic income and church taxes paid during the year are not counted as special 
expenses. While for people who do not declare any church taxes paid as special expenses I 
use the income tax payments and the solidarity surcharge reported in the tax return, I need to 
re-calculate the income tax and the solidarity surcharge for people who have declared church 
taxes paid because leaving them out affects the taxable income and thereby the income tax as 
well as the solidarity surcharge as an additional tax to the income tax. Re-calculating the 
income tax can be rather complicated if the individual has extraordinary income or income 
under the “exemption with progression” rule. 
No matter which of the following rules for calculating the income tax I apply, the income tax 
due which I finally use in the calculation of economic income is always corrected for tax 
abatements. Tax abatements directly reduce the income tax of a taxpayer (not the taxable 
income). They are calculated as the difference between the collective income tax (“Tarifliche 
Einkommensteuer”, variable c65584) and the income tax due (“Festzusetzende 
Einkommensteuer”, variable c65613). 
C.3.2.1 Correction for church taxes paid 
When taxpayers report church taxes paid as special expenses, I start by re-calculating the sum 
of special expenses that is deducted from total income. First, I subtract the church taxes paid 
from the sum of special expenses. Second, I check if the blanket allowance for special 
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expenses applies. That is, I use the sum of special expenses less church taxes paid as special 
expenses if it is larger than 36 euro (in 2001: 55.22 euro). If the sum of special expenses less 
church taxes paid is lower than 36 (55.22) euro, the re-calculated amount of special expenses 
is 36 (55.22) euro. Next, I calculate the difference between the original amount of special 
expenses deducted and the re-calculated amount of special expenses (with church taxes paid 
set to zero). Then, this difference is added to the taxable income. Eventually, I apply the 
normal tax scale to the taxable income thus calculated in order to assess the income tax paid. 
If the taxpayer has neither extraordinary income nor income under the “exemption with 
progression” rule, the re-calculation of the income tax is completed at this point. 
C.3.2.2 Correction for church taxes paid in concomitance with extraordinary income 
I separately calculate the income tax for church tax payers who have extraordinary income. 
For extraordinary income according to § 34(1) ITL I apply the tax function, first, to the 
income excluding extraordinary income and, second, to the income including 20 % of 
extraordinary income. Both measures of income are corrected for church taxes paid, as 
described above. The income tax is then calculated as the income tax on income without 
extraordinary income plus five times the difference between the tax on income with and 
without extraordinary income. If the taxable income – including the correction for church 
taxes paid – is below zero, the income tax is simply five times the income tax on income 
including 20 % of extraordinary income. 
When taxpayers have extraordinary income according to § 34(2),(3) ITL and they report 
church taxes paid, I first calculate their income tax with and without extraordinary income 
(again corrected for church taxes paid) and apply the income tax function to both. I then 
determine the average tax rate by dividing the income tax on income including extraordinary 
income by the respective amount of income. The relevant tax rate for extraordinary income is 
then calculated as described in Section C.1.1, i.e. the calculated tax rate is either cut by a fixed 
percentage, or it is equal to some minimum tax rate. The total amount of taxes is calculated by 
adding up the income tax on the income without extraordinary income and the income tax on 
extraordinary income. 
In the rare case when taxpayers declare both types of extraordinary income, only the tax on 
extraordinary income according to § 34(2),(3) ITL is calculated separately and extraordinary 
income according to § 34(1) ITL is treated as if it was regular income. This is a simplification 
and can lead to imprecise measurement of taxes paid, however, the case is rare. 
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C.3.2.3 Corrections for church taxes paid in concomitance with income under the 
“exemption with progression” rule 
Further calculations are necessary when the individual declares church taxes paid and has 
income under the “exemption with progression” rule. The amount of this type of income is 
calculated by adding up variables c66200 to c66205. The tax function is then applied to the 
regular income plus income under the “exemption with progression” rule. I calculate the 
average tax rate by dividing the resulting income tax by the income including income under 
the “exemption with progression” rule. Next, I apply this average tax rate to regular income in 
order to receive the final amount of income tax. 
If the taxpayer has both income under the “exemption with progression” rule and 
extraordinary income according to § 34(1) ITL, I do the following: (i), I calculate the sum of 
regular taxable income and income under the “exemption with progression” rule and apply the 
tax function. The resulting average tax rate is then multiplied with regular taxable income 
only, i.e. taxable income without income under the “exemption with progression” rule. The 
amount of taxes calculated corresponds to the income tax if income under the “exemption 
with progression” rule, but no extraordinary income is declared. (ii), in order to quantify the 
effect of income under the “exemption with progression” rule on extraordinary income, I 
calculate the sum of regular taxable income, income under the “exemption with progression” 
rule and 20 % of extraordinary income and apply the tax function again. From the result of 
this calculation, I derive the average tax rate and apply this to the sum of regular taxable 
income and 20 % of extraordinary income (i.e. excluding income under the “exemption with 
progression” rule). The total amount of taxes is now calculated by adding up the result of (i) 
and five times the difference between the result of (ii) and the result of (i). 
The last type of special calculation is for taxpayers who have both income under the 
“exemption with progression” rule and extraordinary income according to § 34(2),(3) ITL. 
Here I first calculate the sum of regular taxable income, income under the “exemption with 
progression” rule and extraordinary income. To this income, I apply the tax function and 
determine the average tax rate. This tax rate is again reduced by a certain percentage resp. 
substituted by the minimum tax rate (again, see Section C.1.1). The resulting tax rate is then 
applied to the amount of extraordinary income, resulting in the tax on extraordinary income. 
The second part of income taxes is the tax on regular taxable income, which is equal to the tax 
when income under the “exemption with progression” rule, but no extraordinary income is 
declared. 
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In the very rare case that the taxpayer has income under the “exemption with progression” 
rule and both types of extraordinary income, extra calculations are only done for income 
under the “exemption with progression” rule and for extraordinary income according to § 
34(2),(3) ITL, while the other form of extraordinary income is treated as if it was regular 
income. This was done in order to limit the programming effort, given that this case is very 
rare. 
C.3.2.4 Corrections for church taxes paid in the calculation of the solidarity surcharge 
Apart from the income tax, another type of tax is to be considered since it reduces available 
income: the solidarity surcharge. The solidarity surcharge is an additional tax to the income 
tax, therefore the same reasoning as for the income tax applies, i.e. for individuals who do not 
report church taxes paid as part of their special expenses, the solidarity surcharge reported in 
the tax data (variable c65975) is used. However, when church taxes paid are reported, I 
exclude them from the tax deductions, which increases taxable income, income taxes and 
thereby the tax base of the solidarity surcharge. Unfortunately I cannot use the income tax 
calculated above as the tax base, since it is not identical with the tax base of the solidarity 
surcharge. The main difference is the treatment of the child allowance. In the calculation of 
the income tax, the child allowance is only granted to taxpayers if this is beneficial to them in 
comparison to receiving child benefit. However, according to § 3(3) SolZG 
(“Solidaritätszuschlagsgesetz” – “Law on Solidarity Surcharge”) the child allowance is 
granted to all taxpayers with children when calculating the solidarity surcharge. 
I calculate the solidarity surcharge as follows: (i), if the taxpayer uses the child allowance in 
the calculation of taxable income for the income tax, I simply use the taxable income 
corrected for church taxes paid (as described in Section C.3.2.1) as the tax base. (ii), if the 
individual does not utilize the child allowance, I also use the taxable income corrected for 
church taxes paid, but subtract the child allowance that the taxpayer is entitled to (“Summe 
der KFB nach § 51 a EStG”, variable c66998)
137
. (iii), if the individual has income under the 
“exemption with progression” rule, I apply (i) resp. (ii), but in each case add the reported 
income under the “exemption with progression” rule. Then I apply the tax function on the 
income thus calculated. In cases (i) and (ii), the result of these calculations is the collective 
income tax (“tarifliche Einkommensteuer”). In case (iii), i.e. when the taxpayer has income 
under the “exemption with progression” rule, I first determine the average tax rate by dividing 
the income tax calculated by the income including income under the “exemption with 
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 If the taxpayer does not have children, variable c66998 is equal to zero. 
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progression” rule. Then I apply the average tax rate to the income without income under the 
“exemption with progression” rule (but corrected for the child allowance). The result is again 
the collective income tax. If the individual has extraordinary income (and either of the cases 
(i), (ii) or (iii) applies) I simply use the income tax on extraordinary income from the 
calculations above (see Section C.3.2.2) and add this to the collective income tax from 
calculations (i), (ii) or (iii).
138
  
The tax base for the calculation of the solidarity surcharge is then the collective income tax 
described in the previous paragraph minus all tax reliefs. Tax reliefs are calculated as the 
difference between the collective income tax reported in the data set (variable c65584) and the 
income tax due (“festgesetzte Einkommensteuer”, variable c65613), corrected for child 
benefit payments. Finally, I apply the tax scale laid out in § 4 and § 3(3) SolZG. 
C.3.3 Child benefit 
I also calculate the child benefit the taxpayer receives since it is not directly reported in the 
data set. I use the “sum of child allowances” (variable c66998) and divide it by the monthly 
child allowance. This gives the number of children-months
139
 for which the individual 
received child benefit. The amount of child benefit varies according to the number of 
children. I make the assumption that the individual receives the child benefit for the first child 
(154 euro from 2002 until 2006) for the first 12 children-months, child benefit for the second 
child for any additional months up to 24 children-months and so on. It should be noted that 
being granted a child allowance does not require that the children live in the taxpayer’s 
household and it may well be the case that the child benefit is paid out to the other parent. If 
the individual utilizes the child allowance (i.e. variable c65879 is greater than zero) in the 
calculation of the income tax instead of receiving child benefit, then child benefit is zero in 
my calculation. 
C.3.4 Pensions 
Pensions need to be calculated because only a (minor) part of income from pensions is 
taxable, while the (usually larger) share of pensions is tax-exempt. This has two implications: 
first, the majority of pensioners are not included in the data set since their taxable pension 
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 This calculation is not entirely correct for individuals with children. However, the total amount of solidarity 
surcharge is small in comparison to the income, and the problem only arises for a small number of taxpayers 
who have extraordinary income, children and do not use the child allowance. The size of the problem is further 
reduced since people who have a high extraordinary income will probably utilize the child allowance. If they do 
not use the child allowance, extraordinary income is not exceptionally high and therefore the miscalculation in 
the solidarity surcharge is negligible. 
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 If the taxpayer has more than one child, this number can be greater than 12. 
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income does not exceed the basic personal allowance (“Grundfreibetrag”); second, the actual 
income of pensioners in the data set is underestimated if only their taxable income is 
considered. Therefore I calculate the amount of income from pensions that is tax-free and add 
it to the taxable income. 
The determination of the tax-free amount of pensions changed beginning in 2005. I start by 
describing the calculations for the years 2001 to 2004. There are several variables in the data 
set that refer to pensions. The largest share of pension payments is reported in variable 
c65263 (“Besteuerungsanteil aller Renten nach § 22 Nr. 1+5 außer § 52 Abs. 34c EStG –A–
”). If the individual receives more than one pension, variables c65265 (“Ertragsanteil 2. 
Renten –A–”), c65267 (“Ertragsanteil weitere Rente (1) –A–”) and c65269 
(“Steuerpflichtiger Teil der Rente f. mehrere Jahre –A–”) enter the picture. All these 
variables report only the taxable part of pensions. Which share of the pension is taxable 
depends on the age of the taxpayer when he or she first received the pension payment. That 
share is reported in variables c55052 (“Ertragsanteil Leibrenten, 1. Rente –A–”) and c55056 
(“Ertragsanteil Leibrenten, 2. Rente –A–”). With the help of the taxable amount of pensions 
and the percentage that is taxable I calculate the tax-free amount.
140
 I apply the percentage 
reported in variable c55052 to the pension reported in variables c65263 and c65269. The 
percentage in variable c55056 is matched with the pension in variable c65265. Unfortunately 
there is no percentage given for the additional pensions in variable c65267, therefore I assume 
an average share of taxable pension income of 30 %. This share is taken from Kalusche 
(2006: 52). 
In 2005, the taxation of pensions changed. In that year 50 % of the pension income was 
taxable. In 2006, the same amount of pensions as in 2005 was tax-exempt, while the rest 
(including possible increases in pensions) was taxable. For individuals receiving a pension for 
the first time in 2006, 52 % were taxable and 48 % were tax-exempt. I simplify the calculation 
and assume that the tax-exempt amount is as large as the taxable amount, both in 2005 and 
2006. This induces some errors for the year 2006, since the tax-exempt share of the pension is 
slightly over-estimated for those who receive a pension for the first time in 2006 and under-
estimated for those experiencing a rise in pension payments in 2006. However, the error 
should be small here because there was no increase in pensions from the public pension 
system in 2006. The reporting of pension payments in the data set also changed in 2005. All 
pensions are reported in variable c65263, while variables c65265 and c65267 are missing. 
                                                 
140
 For the year 2001 there appears to be an error in the data. Obviously the percentages reported in variables 
c55052 and c55056 were divided by the conversion factor between euro and DM. I corrected for this error. 
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Sometimes pensions are also reported as recurring payments in variable c65271 (“Einkünfte 
wiederkehrende Bezüge –A–”). Therefore I use the amounts reported in this variable if 
c65263 is zero. However, since income from alimony payments (“Einnahmen aus 
Unterhaltsleistungen –A–”, variable c65273) also count as recurring payments, I subtract 
them first.
141
 
C.3.5 Tax-exempt capital gains, allowable deductions, income-related expenses 
In accordance with Merz (2001), Merz and Zwick (2001) and Kalusche (2006) I add tax-
exempt capital gains (“steuerfrei bleibende Veräußerungsgewinne”) from agriculture and 
forestry (variable c65112), business (variable c65127) and self-employment (variable 
c65149). Furthermore, I add allowable deductions. These include an allowable deduction for 
income from agriculture and forestry (“Freibetrag nach § 14a Abs. 4 EStG”, variable 
c65110), a deduction for pensions of civil servants (“Freibeträge für Versorgungsbezüge”, 
variable c65167), the savings allowance (“Sparerfreibetrag”, variable c65227), as well as 
two types of allowable deductions for other income (“Versorgungs-FB bein Einn. i.S.d. § 52 
Abs. 34c S. 1 EStG”, variable c65289, and “Versorgungs-FB zu Abgeordnetenbezügen”, 
variable c65295).
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 My calculations differ from Merz (2001), Merz and Zwick (2001) and 
Kalusche (2006) in that I allow income-related expenses (“Werbungskosten”) to reduce the 
income, while the other authors count them as part of the income. My reason for subtracting 
income-related expenses from the income is that according to the definition in § 9 ITL they 
are “expenditures for the acquisition, safeguarding and maintenance of income” (my own 
translation), which makes them necessary expenditures of the individual that are not available 
for consumption or saving. 
C.3.6 Extraordinary financial burdens, alimony, transfer income 
Following Merz (2001), Merz and Zwick (2001) and Kalusche (2006) I subtract some 
extraordinary financial burdens (“außergewöhnliche Belastungen”, variables c65469, c65472 
and c65475) as well as alimony to a separated or divorced partner (“Unterhaltsleistungen 
nach § 10 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 EStG”, variable c65401). A valid measure of economic income would 
also include transfer income. Unfortunately, only few types of transfer income are included in 
the data set. Apart from child benefits, which are discussed in Section C.3.3, I include the 
employee’s savings premium (“Arbeitnehmersparzulage”) and the pensions-savings grant 
(“Altersvorsorgezulage”).  
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 Kalusche (2006: 52) also reports that recurring payments are the sum of pensions and alimony payments. 
142
 These two types of allowable deductions are neither mentioned in Merz (2001), Merz and Zwick (2001) nor 
in Kalusche (2006). However, I simply decided to treat them in the same way as the other allowable deductions. 
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The employee’s savings premium (“Festgesetze SPZ”, variable c66515)
143
 is a transfer paid 
by the state to employees who receive employment benefits to encourage capital formation 
(“vermögenswirksame Leistungen”), i.e. an additional payment by the employer that must be 
used for building up private capital over a long period of time. Obviously the economic 
income should also include the amount of employment benefits to encourage capital 
formation paid by the employer.
144
 However, this data is only available for 2001 and 2002. 
Therefore I decided to exclude it completely from the calculation of income since I want to 
avoid fluctuations in the economic income that are caused by missing data. 
Finally, I add the pensions-savings grant (“Altersvorsorgezulage”, variable c65895) to the 
economic income. This is a transfer payment for individuals who pay into a private pension 
insurance. The pensions-savings grant is not mentioned by Merz (2001), Merz and Zwick 
(2001) and Kalusche (2006) since it was only introduced in 2002 and the authors work with 
older data. However, I could not find an argument against including this new type of transfer 
payment. 
C.3.7 Half-income 
Interest in corporations are only 50 % taxable according to § 3(40) ITL (so-called “half-
income” – “Halbeinkünfte”). In order to calculate the complete income of the taxpayer I add 
the tax-exempt half of these incomes. They are given in variable c65883 
(“Hinzurechnungsbetrag stfr. Halbeinkünfte”). 
C.3.8 Problems and shortcomings of the definition of economic income 
In my own definition of income I try to stay as close to the data given in the Taxpayer Panel 
as possible and avoid estimations with average values. The most severe consequence is that 
my definition of economic income does not account for social security contributions paid 
because they are not included in the Taxpayer Panel. Merz (2001), Merz and Zwick (2001) 
and Kalusche (2006) calculate social security contributions on the basis of the income data 
given. 
Another difference between my definition and those by Merz and Kalusche is that the two 
authors account for tax concessions for businesses and for earners of income from rent and 
leasing. The authors argue that businesses have a lot of opportunities to reduce their actual 
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 The values of variable c66515 are negative, although the employee’s savings premium increases income. 
Therefore in my calculation of income the variable is subtracted. 
144
 Kalusche (2006) includes neither employee’s savings premium nor employment benefits to encourage capital 
formation in his definition of income since he lacks data on both. In contrast, Merz (2001) and Merz and Zwick 
(2001) include both. 
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income (Merz, 2001: 30-31), with different kinds of depreciations as just one example. Some 
of these tax concessions are reported in an attachment to the tax declaration (“Anlage St”). 
Unfortunately, this data is completely lacking in the data set available to me. Therefore I 
underestimate the economic income of individuals who have business income or income from 
rent and leasing. However, this is mainly relevant for high-income individuals (Merz, 2001: 
29) who are partly excluded from my study since I do not have information about their federal 
state of residence (see Section 4.5.2). 
Apart from the data given in the attachment “Anlage St”, Merz (2001), Merz and Zwick 
(2001) and Kalusche (2006) include some minor corrections of the income from agriculture 
and forestry and from trade or business. As to the former, some small enterprises in 
agriculture and forestry are allowed to calculate their profit with a simplified method, which – 
according to Merz and Zwick (2001, footnote 19) – leads to an underreporting of profits. 
Merz and Zwick (2001: 517) assume an average reporting of profits of 60 % and correct the 
income accordingly. I do not do this here in order to be consistent with not accounting for tax 
concessions and because I lack current data on the extent of underreporting. In addition, 
taxpayers who benefit from this simplified method of profit calculation have on average a 
quite small amount of income from agriculture and forestry (Bayerischer Oberster 
Rechnungshof, 2012: 63). Concerning income from participating interest (“Einkünfte aus 
Beteiligungen”, variable c65125) I simply take the value reported in the data set while Merz 
(2001), Merz and Zwick (2001) and Kalusche (2006) only include the value if it is positive. 
Merz and Zwick (2001: 517) argue that this type of income is often used for tax planning. In 
order to be consistent with the above and since I do not have any information which of the 
losses are real reductions in income and which are due to tax planning, I do not follow Merz 
and Zwick (2001) here. 
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Appendix D: Additional results for Chapter 4 
D.1 Summary statistics 
Table A.1: Summary statistics for the subsamples of West Germany and East Germany 
separately 
 Subsample West Germany Subsample East Germany 
 Mean std. dev. mean std. dev. 
Church disaffiliation 0.091 0.288 0.141 0.348 
Price of church    
membership 
    
Price 2001 (in 100€) 1.87 22.51 1.27 14.32 
Dummy Price 2001 
positive 
0.710 0.454 0.617 0.486 
  Price (in 100€) 0.50 23.69 0.45 14.95 
Dummy Price increase 0.526 0.499 0.488 0.500 
  Price positive         
(in 100€) 
1.81 26.90 1.71 18.95 
  Price negative        
(in 100€) 
-0.95 17.83 -0.75 9.42 
Income     
Income 2001             
(in 1,000€) 
21.456 84.949 17.220 60.562 
  Income (in 1,000€) 1.802 117.414 1.762 59.595 
Age     
Below 25 0.195 0.396 0.168 0.374 
25 to 34 0.255 0.436 0.280 0.449 
35 to 44 0.218 0.413 0.244 0.430 
45 to 54 0.138 0.345 0.162 0.369 
55 to 64 0.081 0.274 0.081 0.273 
65 and above 0.113 0.316 0.064 0.245 
Gender     
Male 0.507 0.500 0.513 0.500 
Female 0.493 0.500 0.487 0.500 
Children     
No children 0.836 0.371 0.695 0.460 
Parent, no change 0.100 0.299 0.167 0.373 
Became parent 0.021 0.143 0.059 0.235 
More children 0.006 0.076 0.017 0.128 
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Fewer children 0.013 0.113 0.023 0.149 
No longer have 
children 
0.025 0.156 0.039 0.195 
Interaction               
Gender*Children 
    
No children 0.816 0.388 0.652 0.476 
Parent, no change 0.118 0.323 0.204 0.403 
Became parent 0.015 0.121 0.050 0.218 
More children 0.004 0.065 0.016 0.127 
Fewer children 0.016 0.126 0.029 0.168 
No longer have 
children 
0.031 0.173 0.049 0.216 
Main source of income     
Wage  0.781 0.413 0.750 0.433 
Agriculture and 
forestry 
0.008 0.092 0.005 0.070 
Business activity 0.078 0.268 0.117 0.321 
Capital 0.041 0.198 0.027 0.161 
Other 0.091 0.288 0.102 0.303 
Denomination     
Protestant 0.453 0.498 0.795 0.404 
Catholic 0.547 0.498 0.205 0.404 
Land     
North Rhine-       
Westphalia 
0.274 0.446   
Baden-Württemberg 0.165 0.371   
Bavaria 0.246 0.430   
Bremen 0.007 0.081   
Hamburg 0.011 0.103   
Hesse 0.094 0.291   
Lower Saxony 0.096 0.295   
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.062 0.241   
Saarland 0.016 0.127   
Schleswig-Holstein 0.030 0.169   
Berlin   0.313 0.464 
Brandenburg   0.110 0.313 
Mecklenburg-           
W. Pomerania 
  0.069 0.253 
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Saxony   0.247 0.431 
Saxony-Anhalt   0.085 0.279 
Thuringia   0.175 0.380 
Mobility     
No mobility 0.957 0.203 0.956 0.205 
West-West 0.034 0.181   
West-East 0.009 0.095   
East-East   0.010 0.099 
East-West   0.034 0.181 
Sample size 144,675  20,471  
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Data is weighted with sample weights provided by the Federal Statistical Office. Areas 
shaded in grey refer to variables that are not available for the particular subsample. 
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Table A.2: Summary statistics for the subsamples of Protestants and Catholics separately 
 Subsample Protestants Subsample Catholics 
 Mean std. dev. mean std. dev. 
Church disaffiliation 0.112 0.316 0.078 0.269 
Price of church  
membership 
    
Price 2001 (in 100€) 1.83 20.19 1.83 23.21 
Dummy Price 2001     
positive 
0.707 0.455 0.701 0.458 
  Price (in 100€) 0.44 20.42 0.57 25.14 
Dummy Price increase 0.506 0.500 0.540 0.498 
  Price positive (in 100€) 1.77 24.75 1.83 27.48 
  Price negative (in 100€) -0.93 13.34 -0.93 20.34 
Income     
Income 2001 (in 1,000€) 21.196 79.031 21.146 86.166 
  Income (in 1,000€) 1.595 79.340 1.985 139.182 
Age     
Below 25 0.176 0.380 0.210 0.407 
25 to 34 0.256 0.436 0.257 0.437 
35 to 44 0.217 0.412 0.223 0.416 
45 to 54 0.143 0.350 0.136 0.343 
55 to 64 0.086 0.281 0.077 0.267 
65 and above 0.123 0.328 0.097 0.297 
Gender     
Male 0.489 0.500 0.525 0.499 
Female 0.511 0.500 0.475 0.499 
Children     
No children 0.814 0.389 0.837 0.369 
Parent, no change 0.111 0.315 0.098 0.297 
Became parent 0.025 0.157 0.022 0.147 
More children 0.007 0.082 0.006 0.078 
Fewer children 0.014 0.119 0.013 0.113 
No longer have children 0.029 0.167 0.024 0.152 
Interaction                   
Gender*Children 
    
No children 0.791 0.407 0.819 0.385 
Parent, no change 0.132 0.339 0.116 0.320 
Became parent 0.019 0.136 0.015 0.123 
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More children 0.005 0.074 0.005 0.068 
Fewer children 0.018 0.134 0.016 0.125 
No longer have children 0.034 0.182 0.030 0.169 
Main source of income     
Wage  0.768 0.422 0.789 0.408 
Agriculture and forestry 0.008 0.091 0.008 0.090 
Business activity 0.082 0.275 0.079 0.270 
Capital 0.042 0.202 0.038 0.190 
Other 0.099 0.299 0.086 0.280 
Land     
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.211 0.408 0.296 0.457 
Baden-Württemberg 0.162 0.368 0.146 0.353 
Bavaria 0.124 0.329 0.325 0.468 
Bremen 0.011 0.103 0.002 0.045 
Hamburg 0.017 0.130 0.003 0.057 
Hesse 0.113 0.316 0.064 0.245 
Lower Saxony 0.140 0.347 0.044 0.205 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.049 0.216 0.066 0.248 
Saarland 0.007 0.085 0.023 0.148 
Schleswig-Holstein 0.053 0.224 0.004 0.066 
Berlin 0.032 0.177 0.011 0.104 
Brandenburg 0.014 0.115 0.002 0.044 
Mecklenburg-                
W. Pomerania 
0.008 0.091 0.001 0.037 
Saxony 0.030 0.172 0.004 0.065 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.010 0.098 0.002 0.047 
Thuringia 0.019 0.135 0.006 0.076 
Mobility     
No mobility 0.954 0.209 0.960 0.197 
West-West 0.032 0.176 0.031 0.174 
West-East 0.009 0.095 0.008 0.089 
East-East 0.001 0.032 0.0003 0.018 
East-West 0.004 0.060 0.001 0.033 
Sample size 86,575  78,571  
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Data is weighted with sample weights provided by the Federal Statistical Office.
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D.2 Additional results for the complete sample 
Table A.3: Estimation results for the complete sample, and for the subsamples of males and 
females separately 
 Complete sample Subsample males Subsample females 
 Model 1a Model 1a Model 1a 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
Intercept -2.072 2535.800 
(0.000) 
-1.992 1458.320 
(0.000) 
-2.171 1277.956 
(0.000) 
Price       
Price 2001 0.059 125.619 
(0.000) 
0.059 69.621 
(0.000) 
0.061 55.615 
(0.000) 
Dummy Price 
2001 positive 
0.022 0.5388 
(0.463) 
-0.023 0.322 
(0.571) 
0.079 3.134 
(0.077) 
  Price 0.055 164.905 
(0.000) 
0.053 92.799 
(0.000) 
0.060 67.069 
(0.000) 
Income       
Income 2001 
-0.000 0.0261 
(0.872) 
-0.001  0.253 
(0.615) 
0.001 0.126 
(0.723) 
  Income -0.002 8.334 
(0.004) 
-0.003 6.500 
(0.011) 
-0.002 1.692 
(0.193) 
Age       
Below 25 reference --- reference --- reference --- 
25 to 34 0.049 2.459 
(0.117) 
0.056 1.910 
(0.167) 
0.042 0.721 
(0.396) 
35 to 44 -0.361 99.527 
(0.000) 
-0.395 70.363 
(0.000) 
-0.307 29.363 
(0.000) 
45 to 54 -0.857 368.981 
(0.000) 
-0.941 231.648 
(0.000) 
-0.772 140.876 
(0.000) 
55 to 64 -1.527 572.462 
(0.000) 
-1.674 303.089 
(0.000) 
-1.415 262.806 
(0.000) 
65 and above -2.588 991.511 
(0.000) 
-2.531 248.244 
(0.000) 
-2.573 653.652 
(0.000) 
Gender       
Male reference ---     
Female 0.020 0.646 
(0.422) 
    
Children       
No children reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Parent, no change 0.1881 12.606 
(0.000) 
0.219 16.314 
(0.000) 
-0.291 23.987 
(0.000) 
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Became parent -0.072 0.850 
(0.357) 
-0.068 0.749 
(0.387) 
-0.217 4.180 
(0.041) 
More children -0.382 4.408 
(0.036) 
-0.370 4.075 
(0.044) 
-0.991 10.693 
(0.001) 
Fewer children 0.083 0.251 
(0.616) 
0.141 0.711 
(0.399) 
-0.100 0.465 
(0.495) 
No longer have 
children 
0.299 8.244 
(0.004) 
0.348 10.855 
(0.001) 
0.321 11.466 
(0.001) 
Interaction 
Gender*Children 
      
No children reference ---     
Parent, no change -0.460 36.799 
(0.000) 
    
Became parent -0.161 1.510 
(0.219) 
    
More children -0.605 2.938 
(0.087) 
    
Fewer children -0.143 0.429 
(0.512) 
    
No longer have 
children  
0.073 0.279 
(0.597) 
    
Main source of 
income 
      
Wage  reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Agriculture and 
forestry 
-1.866 87.249 
(0.000) 
-2.050 112.402 
(0.000) 
-0.771 1.868 
(0.172) 
Business activity 0.220 57.466 
(0.000) 
0.196 29.669 
(0.000) 
0.262 27.211 
(0.000) 
Capital -0.214 11.754 
(0.001) 
-0.241 7.670 
(0.006) 
-0.197 4.822 
(0.028) 
Other -0.074 1.982 
(0.159) 
-0.060 0.651 
(0.420) 
-0.093 1.543 
(0.214) 
Denomination       
Protestant reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Catholic -0.357 220.105 
(0.000) 
-0.401 160.926 
(0.000) 
-0.297 64.017 
(0.000) 
Land       
North Rhine- 
Westphalia 
reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Baden-
Württemberg 
-0.160 17.257 
(0.000) 
-0.079 2.456 
(0.117) 
-0.277 20.849 
(0.000) 
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Bavaria -0.082 5.715 
(0.017) 
-0.138 8.970 
(0.003) 
-0.006 0.015 
(0.902) 
Bremen 0.725 125.448 
(0.000) 
0.736 67.026 
(0.000) 
0.717 58.689 
(0.000) 
Hamburg 1.013 289.150 
(0.000) 
1.068 166.642 
(0.000) 
0.965 125.965 
(0.000) 
Hesse 0.102 5.609 
(0.018) 
0.062 1.177 
(0.278) 
0.156 5.640 
(0.018) 
Lower Saxony 0.068 2.410 
(0.121) 
0.037 0.396 
(0.529) 
0.114 2.885 
(0.089) 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
-0.203 14.958 
(0.000) 
-0.134 4.057 
(0.044) 
-0.312 13.111 
(0.000) 
Saarland -0.323 19.538 
(0.000) 
-0.301 10.329 
(0.001) 
-0.345 8.803 
(0.003) 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
0.305 27.928 
(0.000) 
0.389 28.353 
(0.000) 
0.198 4.385 
(0.036) 
Berlin 1.256 651.065 
(0.000) 
1.344 384.555 
(0.000) 
1.175 268.604 
(0.000) 
Brandenburg 0.099 1.020 
(0.313) 
0.017 0.017 
(0.895) 
0.207 1.803 
(0.179) 
Mecklenburg-  
W. Pomerania 
0.141 1.706 
(0.192) 
0.050 0.149 
(0.700) 
0.236 2.204 
(0.138) 
Saxony 0.147 4.270 
(0.039) 
0.074 0.610 
(0.435) 
0.252 5.460 
(0.020) 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.285 8.471 
(0.004) 
0.245 3.580 
(0.059) 
0.342 5.189 
(0.023) 
Thuringia -0.399 21.583 
(0.000) 
-0.476 18.206 
(0.000) 
-0.283 4.342 
(0.037) 
Mobility       
No mobility reference --- reference --- reference --- 
West-West 
1.461 1208.793 
(0.000) 
1.447 677.611 
(0.000) 
1.484 528.827 
(0.000) 
West-East 3.505 1676.500 
(0.000) 
3.487 983.255 
(0.000) 
3.533 689.637 
(0.000) 
East-East 2.454 115.804 
(0.000) 
2.542 71.311 
(0.000) 
2.356 45.726 
(0.000) 
East-West 0.919 55.246 
(0.000) 
1.036 38.019 
(0.000) 
0.814 20.139 
(0.000) 
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Sample size 165,146  85,779  79,367  
-2 Log L 
(constant only) 
2,769,469  1,513,861  1,249,272  
-2 Log L 
(constant and 
covariates) 
2,426,852  1,346,487  1,077,929  
Likelihood-Ratio 
χ
2
  
342,617 
(53 df) 
 167,374 
(41 df) 
 171,343 
(41 df) 
 
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Areas shaded in grey refer to variables that are not included in the estimation for the 
particular subsample. Bold coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table A.4: Estimation results for the complete sample with different definitions of the 
variables measuring church tax and income
 Complete sample Complete sample 
 Model 2a Model 2d 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
Church tax     
Church tax 2001 0.033 179.602 
(0.000) 
0.017 24.349  
(0.000) 
Dummy Church tax 2001 
positive  
0.056 3.931    
(0.047) 
0.132 21.815  
(0.000) 
  Church tax 0.026 145.229 
(0.000) 
  
Dummy Church tax     
increase 
  0.086 11.602  
(0.001) 
  Church tax positive   0.042 268.215 
(0.000) 
  Church tax negative   -0.012 9.027    
(0.003) 
Income     
Income 2001 -0.001 1.539    
(0.215) 
-0.003 10.079  
(0.002) 
  Income -0.002 4.641    
(0.031) 
-0.003 9.776    
(0.002) 
Sample size 165,146  165,146  
-2 Log L (constant only) 2,769,469  2,769,469  
-2 Log L (constant and 
covariates) 
2,426,806  2,422,328  
Likelihood-Ratio χ
2
  342,663       
(53 df) 
 347,141  
(55df) 
 
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: All estimations include intercept, gender dummy, dummy for children, interaction of 
gender and children, denomination, regional dummies, mobility and main source of income. 
Areas shaded in grey refer to variables that are not included in the estimation for the 
particular model. Bold coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table A.4 shows the estimation results when the amount of church tax instead of the price of 
church membership is used as an independent variable for estimating the probability of church 
disaffiliation. Model 2a (2d) in Table A.4 mirrors model 1a (1d) in Table 4.3 in Section 4.7.1. 
The results based on the church tax are substantially the same as those for the price of church 
membership. Both the amount of church tax paid in 2001 (“Church tax 2001”) and the 
change in church tax between 2001 and 2005 (“Δ Church tax”) significantly increase the 
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probability of disaffiliation. The estimated coefficients for the church tax variables are 
somewhat smaller than for the price variables. Part of this difference can be explained by the 
fact that an individual’s price of church membership is usually lower than the amount of 
church tax paid, or in other words a change in church tax by 100 euro coincides with a change 
in price by less than 100 euro. Looking at model 2d, I find that an increase in church taxes has 
a larger effect on the probability of leaving the church than a decrease in church taxes. 
However, I do find that even a decrease in church taxes can raise the probability of 
disaffiliation.
145
 This stands in contrast to the results of the estimation including the price of 
church membership (model 1d in Table 4.3), where a decrease in the price of membership 
does not have a significant influence on the probability of disaffiliation. Nevertheless, the 
estimated effect of a positive change in church taxes is much larger than that of a negative 
change and also has a considerably larger p-value, therefore the basic conclusion from Section 
4.7.1 that increases and decreases in price resp. church tax have asymmetric effects on the 
probability of disaffiliation is unchanged. 
 
                                                 
145
 The estimate of the variable “Δ Church tax negative” has a negative sign, however, the change in church tax 
is also negative. Multiplying these two numbers results in a positive sign, i.e. an increase in the probability of 
disaffiliation. 
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Table A.5: Estimation results for the complete sample for two-year periods 
 Complete sample 
(all disaffiliations) 
Disaffiliation 2002 Disaffiliation 2003 Disaffiliation 2004 Disaffiliation 2005 
 Model 1a Model 1a Model 1a Model 1a Model 1a 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
Intercept -2.072 2535.800 
(0.000) 
-3.392 2106.494 
(0.000) 
-3.366 1854.472 
(0.000) 
-3.205 1332.815 
(0.000) 
-3.116 1101.007 
(0.000) 
Price of church 
membership 
           
Price  0.059 125.619 
(0.000) 
0.052 50.195  
(0.000) 
0.059 85.699 
(0.000) 
0.056 73.283 
(0.000) 
0.022 9.821 
(0.002) 
Dummy Price 
positive 
0.022 0.5388 
(0.463) 
-0.061 1.207 
(0.272) 
0.021 0.129 
(0.719) 
-0.179 7.838 
(0.005) 
-0.268 15.274 
(0.000) 
  Price 0.055 164.905 
(0.000) 
0.045 43.901 
(0.000) 
0.040 35.119 
(0.000) 
0.029 32.409 
(0.000) 
0.022 14.516 
(0.000) 
Income           
Income  -0.000 0.0261 
(0.872) 
0.000 0.017 
(0.898) 
-0.001 6.025 
(0.014) 
-0.002 10.909 
(0.001) 
0.000 0.061 
(0.805) 
  Income -0.002 8.334 
(0.004) 
0.000 0.105 
(0.746) 
-0.001 2.012 
(0.156) 
-0.000 17.156 
(0.000) 
-0.001 6.677 
(0.010) 
Age           
Below 25 reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- 
25 to 34 0.049 2.459 
(0.117) 
-0.076 1.729 
(0.189) 
-0.116 4.077 
(0.044) 
-0.198 9.467 
(0.002) 
-0.199 8.304 
(0.004) 
35 to 44 -0.361 99.527 
(0.000) 
-0.415 38.339 
(0.000) 
-0.517 62.227 
(0.000) 
-0.549 60.318 
(0.000) 
-0.795 105.038 
(0.000) 
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45 to 54 -0.857 368.981 
(0.000) 
-0.848 100.303 
(0.000) 
-0.968 146.240 
(0.000) 
-1.062 153.880 
(0.000) 
-1.116 160.501 
(0.000) 
55 to 64 -1.527 572.462 
(0.000) 
-1.571 139.018 
(0.000) 
-1.735 210.594 
(0.000) 
-1.667 195.576 
(0.000) 
-1.754 208.271 
(0.000) 
65 and above -2.588 991.511 
(0.000) 
-2.684 223.379 
(0.000) 
-3.109 352.905 
(0.000) 
-2.185 278.460 
(0.000) 
-3.153 458.154 
(0.000) 
Gender           
Male reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Female 0.020 0.646 
(0.422) 
-0.019 0.156 
(0.693) 
0.038 0.687 
(0.407) 
0.008 0.025 
(0.874) 
0.115 5.219 
(0.022) 
Children           
No children reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Parent, no change 0.1881 12.606 
(0.000) 
-0.046 0.252 
(0.615) 
0.069 0.630 
(0.427) 
0.168 3.626 
(0.057) 
-0.187 3.210 
(0.073) 
Became parent -0.072 0.850 
(0.357) 
0.126 0.292 
(0.589 
-0.044 0.033 
(0.855) 
0.264 1.363 
(0.243) 
0.299 1.650 
(0.199) 
More children -0.382 4.408 
(0.036) 
0.058 0.019 
(0.891) 
-0.133 0.088 
(0.767) 
-0.004 0.000 
(0.993) 
-1.398 3.992 
(0.046) 
Fewer children 0.083 0.251 
(0.616) 
0.275 0.419 
(0.517) 
0.444 1.239 
(0.266) 
-0.485 0.719 
(0.397) 
0.019 0.002 
(0.966) 
No longer have 
children 
0.299 8.244 
(0.004) 
0.493 2.621 
(0.106) 
0.413 2.018 
(0.155) 
0.123 0.159 
(0.691) 
-0.665 1.771 
(0.183) 
Interaction 
Gender*Children 
          
No children reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- 
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Parent, no change -0.460 36.799 
(0.000) 
-0.301 4.918 
(0.027) 
-0.387 8.842 
(0.003) 
-0.409 9.230 
(0.002) 
-0.150 1.027 
(0.311) 
Became parent -0.161 1.510 
(0.219) 
-0.358 0.572 
(0.450) 
0.516 1.957 
(0.162) 
0.187 0.233 
(0.630) 
0.114 0.090 
(0.764) 
More children -0.605 2.938 
(0.087) 
-0.792 0.546 
(0.460) 
-0.678 0.716 
(0.398) 
0.225 0.102 
(0.749) 
1.661 3.751 
(0.053) 
Fewer children -0.143 0.429 
(0.512) 
-1.097 1.996 
(0.158) 
-0.338 0.367 
(0.545) 
0.727 1.079 
(0.299) 
-0.209 0.095 
(0.757) 
No longer have 
children 
0.073 0.279 
(0.597) 
-1.144 4.406 
(0.036) 
-0.515 1.267 
(0.260) 
0.253 0.316 
(0.574) 
0.676 1.256 
(0.262) 
Main source of 
income 
          
Wage  reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Agriculture and 
forestry 
-1.866 87.249 
(0.000) 
-2.450 39.463 
(0.000) 
-1.593 13.193 
(0.000) 
-2.377 41.547 
(0.000) 
-2.258 45.016 
(0.000) 
Business activity 0.220 57.466 
(0.000) 
0.259 23.218 
(0.000) 
0.210 16.034 
(0.000) 
0.295 28.299 
(0.000) 
0.361 37.254 
(0.000) 
Capital -0.214 11.754 
(0.001) 
-0.420 10.788 
(0.001) 
-0.423 10.543 
(0.001) 
-0.518 17.084 
(0.000) 
-0.528 14.327 
(0.000) 
Other -0.074 1.982 
(0.159) 
-0.218 3.850 
(0.050) 
-0.110 1.079 
(0.299) 
-0.197 3.918 
(0.048) 
0.090 0.816 
(0.366) 
Denomination           
Protestant reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Catholic -0.357 220.105 
(0.000) 
-0.276 35.790 
(0.000) 
-0.254 32.425 
(0.000) 
-0.291 34.092 
(0.000) 
-0.124 6.141 
(0.013) 
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Land           
North Rhine- 
Westphalia 
reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Baden-
Württemberg 
-0.160 17.257 
(0.000) 
-0.284 12.763 
(0.000) 
0.120 2.876 
(0.090) 
-0.082 1.098 
(0.295) 
-0.061 0.572 
(0.450) 
Bavaria -0.082 5.715 
(0.017) 
-0.180 7.234 
(0.007) 
-0.147 4.846 
(0.028) 
-0.132 3.427 
(0.064) 
-0.107 2.261 
(0.133) 
Bremen 0.725 125.448 
(0.000) 
0.632 30.306 
(0.000) 
0.897 66.324 
(0.000) 
0.584 20.251 
(0.000) 
0.488 7.887 
(0.005) 
Hamburg 1.013 289.150 
(0.000) 
0.817 60.747 
(0.000) 
1.193 157.092 
(0.000) 
1.359 187.635 
(0.000) 
1.131 80.373 
(0.000) 
Hesse 0.102 5.609 
(0.018) 
0.102 1.590 
(0.207) 
0.055 0.449 
(0.503) 
0.132 2.367 
(0.124) 
0.150 2.833 
(0.092) 
Lower Saxony 0.068 2.410 
(0.121) 
0.147 3.333 
(0.068) 
0.249 10.066 
(0.002) 
0.107 1.500 
(0.221) 
0.148 2.704 
(0.100) 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
-0.203 14.958 
(0.000) 
-0.212 4.260 
(0.039) 
0.051 0.293 
(0.588) 
-0.117 1.215 
(0.270) 
-0.220 3.741 
(0.053) 
Saarland -0.323 19.538 
(0.000) 
-0.263 3.570 
(0.059) 
-0.193 1.899 
(0.168) 
-0.112 0.587 
(0.444) 
-0.345 4.507 
(0.034) 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
0.305 27.928 
(0.000) 
0.336 10.335 
(0.001) 
0.427 17.397 
(0.000) 
0.428 14.899 
(0.000) 
0.450 14.753 
(0.000) 
Berlin 1.256 651.065 
(0.000) 
1.213 207.151 
(0.000) 
1.195 185.840 
(0.000) 
1.080 122.630 
(0.000) 
1.093 111.967 
(0.000) 
Brandenburg 0.099 1.020 
(0.313) 
0.090 0.229 
(0.632) 
0.181 0.927 
(0.336) 
0.004 0.000 
(0.985) 
0.045 0.042 
(0.838) 
Mecklenburg-  
W. Pomerania 
0.141 1.706 
(0.192) 
0.133 0.498 
(0.481) 
0.027 0.016 
(0.900) 
-0.217 0.630 
(0.427) 
0.497 5.940 
(0.015) 
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Saxony 0.147 4.270 
(0.039) 
-0.019 0.016 
(0.899) 
0.016 0.013 
(0.910) 
0.067 0.201 
(0.654) 
-0.036 0.049 
(0.825) 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.285 8.471 
(0.004) 
0.341 3.399 
(0.065) 
-0.040 0.034 
(0.853) 
-0.181 0.654 
(0.419) 
0.084 0.141 
(0.707) 
Thuringia -0.399 21.583 
(0.000) 
-0.256 2.471 
(0.116) 
-0.435 6.404 
(0.011) 
-0.369 4.700 
(0.030) 
-0.547 6.825 
(0.009) 
Mobility           
No mobility reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- reference --- 
West-West 1.461 1208.793 
(0.000) 
0.396 4.406 
(0.036) 
0.603 15.996 
(0.000) 
0.616 15.302 
(0.000) 
0.598 13.527 
(0.000) 
West-East 3.505 1676.500 
(0.000) 
1.326 8.878 
(0.003) 
1.129 7.136 
(0.008) 
0.336 0.459 
(0.498) 
1.332 9.705 
(0.002) 
East-East 2.454 115.804 
(0.000) 
0.875 1.353 
(0.245) 
0.707 0.418 
(0.518) 
1.327 1.599 
(0.206) 
-8.906 588.816 
(0.000) 
East-West 0.919 55.246 
(0.000) 
-0.441 0.397 
(0.529) 
-0.027 0.005 
(0.943) 
0.462 0.947 
(0.331) 
0.343 0.413 
(0.521) 
Sample size 165,146  172,199  169,140  165,229  161,579  
-2 Log L 
(constant only) 
2,769,469  912,658  968,943  842,720  790,234  
-2 Log L 
(constant and 
covariates) 
2,426,852  868,309  915,956  800,099  742,211  
Likelihood-Ratio 
χ
2
  
342,617 
(53 df) 
 44,349 
(53 df) 
 52,987 
(53 df) 
 42,621 
(53 df) 
 48,024 
(53 df) 
 
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own 
calculations. 
Note: Bold coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
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In Table A.5 I present separate estimations for church disaffiliations that happen in each year 
between 2002 and 2005. The motivation is to make better use of the panel structure of the 
data and to see if results in Chapter 4, which are based on the period between 2001 and 2005, 
are constant over time. The results in Table A.5 confirm the overall conclusion from the main 
discussion in Chapter 4: both the price of church membership in the original year and the 
change in price have a positive and significant effect on the probability to disaffiliate. The 
estimated effects of the price level are similar to that found for the complete sample in Table 
4.2, with the exception of the results for the year 2005, where it is somewhat smaller. When 
looking at the change in the price of membership, all estimates in Table A.5 are smaller than 
in the estimates for the complete sample. One can also observe a decrease in the size of the 
estimates for the variable “Δ Price” over time. In addition, in the estimations for the years 
2004 and 2005 the dummy variables indicating whether someone had to pay at all for being a 
church member is negative and significant. This is contrary to expectations because it 
suggests that those who have to pay for membership are less likely to leave the church. Taken 
together, the findings suggest that the effect of the price of membership plays a larger role in 
the membership decision in 2002 and 2003 than it does in 2004 and 2005. They also support 
the conclusion that inertia plays a role in the membership decision. The consistent estimates 
of a positive effect of the price level point to the fact that people do not react to price changes 
immediately, but after experiencing a higher price for some period of time. This picture is 
reinforced by the smaller size of the effect of a change in the price of membership when 
looking at only one year as opposed to a five year period. It seems that only some individuals 
react to price changes immediately, while others react with some lag that only shows in the 
estimation for a longer time period. 
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D.3 Results for selected subsamples 
Table A.6: Estimation results for the complete sample, and for the subsamples of West 
Germany and East Germany separately 
 Complete sample West Germany East Germany 
 Model 1a Model 1a Model 1a 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
Intercept -2.072 2535.800 
(0.000) 
-2.119 2373.874 
(0.000) 
-1.373 220.953 
(0.000) 
Price of church 
membership 
      
Price 2001 0.059 125.619 
(0.000) 
0.061 111.981 
(0.000) 
0.029 6.927 
(0.009) 
Dummy Price 
2001 positive 
0.022 0.5388 
(0.463) 
0.047 2.107 
(0.147) 
-0.187 7.206 
(0.007) 
  Price 0.055 164.905 
(0.000) 
0.057 155.832 
(0.000) 
0.026 6.456 
(0.011) 
Income       
Income 2001 -0.000 0.0261 
(0.872) 
-0.000 0.090 
(0.764) 
0.001 0.329 
(0.566) 
  Income -0.002 8.334 
(0.004) 
-0.002 6.521 
(0.011) 
-0.003 2.739 
(0.098) 
Age       
Below 25 reference --- reference --- reference --- 
25 to 34 0.049 2.459 
(0.117) 
0.085 6.421 
(0.011) 
-0.394 23.389 
(0.000) 
35 to 44 -0.361 99.527 
(0.000) 
-0.331 72.870 
(0.000) 
-0.787 69.416 
(0.000) 
45 to 54 -0.857 368.981 
(0.000) 
-0.851 307.168 
(0.000) 
-1.087 102.135 
(0.000) 
55 to 64 -1.527 572.462 
(0.000) 
-1.565 465.658 
(0.000) 
-1.509 134.117 
(0.000) 
65 and above -2.588 991.511 
(0.000) 
-2.620 803.792 
(0.000) 
-2.510 228.400 
(0.000) 
Gender       
Male reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Female 0.020 0.646 
(0.422) 
0.032 1.521 
(0.218) 
-0.109 2.850 
(0.091) 
Children       
No children reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Parent, no change 0.188 12.606 
(0.000) 
0.283 25.535 
(0.000) 
-0.535 14.060 
(0.000) 
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Became parent -0.072 0.850 
(0.357) 
-0.039 0.196 
(0.658) 
-0.272 2.976 
(0.085) 
More children -0.382 4.408 
(0.036) 
-0.302 2.284 
(0.131) 
-0.710 3.131 
(0.077) 
Fewer children 0.083 0.251 
(0.616) 
0.028 0.023 
(0.880) 
0.349 1.062 
(0.303) 
No longer have 
children 
0.299 8.244 
(0.004) 
0.306 7.093 
(0.008) 
0.255 1.101 
(0.294) 
Interaction     
Gender*Children 
      
No children reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Parent, no change -0.460 36.799 
(0.000) 
-0.510 38.907 
(0.000) 
0.101 0.288 
(0.591) 
Became parent -0.161 1.510 
(0.219) 
-0.197 1.648 
(0.199) 
0.037 0.022 
(0.882) 
More children -0.605 2.938 
(0.087) 
-0.433 1.234 
(0.267) 
-1.095 2.064 
(0.151) 
Fewer children -0.143 0.429 
(0.512) 
-0.054 0.049 
(0.826) 
-0.477 0.952 
(0.329) 
No longer have 
children 
0.073 0.279 
(0.597) 
0.101 0.448 
(0.503) 
-0.030 0.009 
(0.923) 
Main source of 
income 
      
Wage  reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Agriculture and 
forestry 
-1.866 87.249 
(0.000) 
-1.850 76.945 
(0.000) 
-1.810 17.004 
(0.000) 
Business activity 0.220 57.466 
(0.000) 
0.267 71.686 
(0.000) 
-0.123 3.166 
(0.075) 
Capital -0.214 11.754 
(0.001) 
-0.194 8.155 
(0.004) 
-0.382 7.233 
(0.007) 
Other -0.074 1.982 
(0.159) 
-0.078 1.673 
(0.196) 
-0.135 1.672 
(0.196) 
Denomination       
Protestant reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Catholic -0.357 220.105 
(0.000) 
-0.384 230.851 
(0.000) 
0.029 0.187 
(0.665) 
Land       
North Rhine- 
Westphalia 
reference --- reference ---   
Baden-
Württemberg 
-0.160 17.257 
(0.000) 
-0.161 17.343 
(0.000) 
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Bavaria -0.082 5.715 
(0.017) 
-0.074 4.591 
(0.032) 
  
Bremen 0.725 125.448 
(0.000) 
0.712 119.745 
(0.000) 
  
Hamburg 1.013 289.150 
(0.000) 
0.995 275.608 
(0.000) 
  
Hesse 0.102 5.609 
(0.018) 
0.094 4.795 
(0.029) 
  
Lower Saxony 0.068 2.410 
(0.121) 
0.062 1.968 
(0.161) 
  
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
-0.203 14.958 
(0.000) 
-0.202 14.735 
(0.000) 
  
Saarland -0.323 19.538 
(0.000) 
-0.315 18.493 
(0.000) 
  
Schleswig-
Holstein 
0.305 27.928 
(0.000) 
0.290 25.038 
(0.000) 
  
Berlin 1.256 651.065 
(0.000) 
  1.152 200.999 
(0.000) 
Brandenburg 0.099 1.020 
(0.313) 
  -0.004 0.001 
(0.973) 
Mecklenburg-  
W. Pomerania 
0.141 1.706 
(0.192) 
  0.028 0.056 
(0.813) 
Saxony 0.147 4.270 
(0.039) 
  reference --- 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.285 8.471 
(0.004) 
  0.134 1.372 
(0.242) 
Thuringia -0.399 21.583 
(0.000) 
  -0.634 36.019 
(0.000) 
Mobility       
No mobility reference --- reference --- reference --- 
West-West 1.461 1208.793 
(0.000) 
1.486 1221.887 
(0.000) 
  
West-East 3.505 1676.500 
(0.000) 
3.536 1680.574 
(0.000) 
  
East-East 2.454 115.804 
(0.000) 
  2.320 115.629 
(0.000) 
East-West 0.919 55.246 
(0.000) 
  0.677 27.909 
(0.000) 
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Sample size 165,146  144,675  20,471  
-2 Log L       
(constant only) 
2,769,469  2,518,574  243,573  
-2 Log L       
(constant and 
covariates) 
2,426,852  2,205,089  216,683  
Likelihood-Ratio 
χ
2
  
342,617 
(53 df) 
 313,485 
(51 df) 
 26,890 
(51 df) 
 
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Areas shaded in grey refer to variables that are not included in the estimation for the 
particular subsample. Bold coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table A.7: Estimation results for the complete sample, and for the subsamples of Protestants 
and Catholics separately 
 Complete sample Protestants Catholics 
 Model 1a Model 1a Model 1a 
 coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
coeff. Wald χ
2
 
(p-value) 
Intercept -2.072 2535.800 
(0.000) 
-1.906 1342.749 
(0.000) 
-2.588 1940.707 
(0.000) 
Price of church 
membership 
      
Price 2001 0.059 125.619 
(0.000) 
0.055 64.995 
(0.000) 
0.063 56.868 
(0.000) 
Dummy Price 
2001 positive 
0.022 0.5388 
(0.463) 
0.058 2.232 
(0.135) 
-0.020 0.185 
(0.667) 
  Price 0.055 164.905 
(0.000) 
0.051 85.550 
(0.000) 
0.059 63.916 
(0.000) 
Income       
Income 2001 -0.000 0.0261 
(0.872) 
0.002 1.669 
(0.196) 
-0.003 1.632 
(0.201) 
  Income -0.002 8.334 
(0.004) 
-0.001 1.383 
(0.240) 
-0.004 5.529 
(0.019) 
Age       
Below 25 reference --- reference --- reference --- 
25 to 34 0.049 2.459 
(0.117) 
-0.029 0.491 
(0.483) 
0.130 7.479 
(0.006) 
35 to 44 -0.361 99.527 
(0.000) 
-0.477 99.871 
(0.000) 
-0.236 18.156 
(0.000) 
45 to 54 -0.857 368.981 
(0.000) 
-0.917 248.895 
(0.000) 
-0.802 132.919 
(0.000) 
55 to 64 -1.527 572.462 
(0.000) 
-1.524 373.899 
(0.000) 
-1.599 208.387 
(0.000) 
65 and above -2.588 991.511 
(0.000) 
-2.608 717.852 
(0.000) 
-2.599 298.493 
(0.000) 
Gender       
Male reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Female 0.020 0.646 
(0.422) 
-0.050 2.351 
(0.125) 
0.101 7.209 
(0.007) 
Children       
No children reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Parent, no change 0.1881 12.606 
(0.000) 
0.141 4.066 
(0.044) 
0.242 8.780 
(0.003) 
Became parent -0.072 0.850 
(0.357) 
-0.033 0.110 
(0.740) 
-0.128 1.033 
(0.310) 
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More children -0.382 4.408 
(0.036) 
-0.300 1.665 
(0.197) 
-0.530 3.239 
(0.072) 
Fewer children 0.083 0.251 
(0.616) 
-0.135 0.325 
(0.569) 
0.304 1.750 
(0.186) 
No longer have 
children 
0.299 8.244 
(0.004) 
0.344 6.720 
(0.010) 
0.206 1.487 
(0.223) 
Interaction 
Gender*Children 
      
No children reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Parent, no change -0.460 36.799 
(0.000) 
-0.398 16.398 
(0.000) 
-0.519 18.888 
(0.000) 
Became parent -0.161 1.510 
(0.219) 
-0.157 0.897 
(0.344) 
-0.155 0.541 
(0.462) 
More children -0.605 2.938 
(0.087) 
-1.191 5.463 
(0.019) 
0.095 0.037 
(0.848) 
Fewer children -0.143 0.429 
(0.512) 
0.175 0.352 
(0.553) 
-0.526 2.412 
(0.120) 
No longer have 
children 
0.073 0.279 
(0.597) 
0.095 0.303 
(0.582) 
0.063 0.074 
(0.785) 
Main source of 
income 
      
Wage  reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Agriculture and 
forestry 
-1.866 87.249 
(0.000) 
-1.851 82.565 
(0.000) 
-1.870 20.883 
(0.000) 
Business activity 0.220 57.466 
(0.000) 
0.150 16.175 
(0.000) 
0.308 45.391 
(0.000) 
Capital -0.214 11.754 
(0.001) 
-0.293 13.473 
(0.000) 
-0.111 1.258 
(0.262) 
Other -0.074 1.982 
(0.159) 
-0.170 6.474 
(0.011) 
0.053 0.404 
(0.525) 
Denomination       
Protestant reference ---     
Catholic -0.357 220.105 
(0.000) 
    
Land       
North Rhine- 
Westphalia 
reference --- reference --- reference --- 
Baden-
Württemberg 
-0.160 17.257 
(0.000) 
-0.163 10.044 
(0.002) 
-0.201 11.463 
(0.001) 
Bavaria -0.082 5.715 
(0.017) 
-0.214 14.160 
(0.000) 
0.023 0.261 
(0.610) 
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Bremen 0.725 125.448 
(0.000) 
0.637 77.727 
(0.000) 
0.833 30.631 
(0.000) 
Hamburg 1.013 289.150 
(0.000) 
0.922 190.202 
(0.000) 
1.170 74.644 
(0.000) 
Hesse 0.102 5.609 
(0.018) 
-0.087 2.401 
(0.121) 
0.361 29.669 
(0.000) 
Lower Saxony 0.068 2.410 
(0.121) 
-0.007 0.016 
(0.901) 
0.129 2.463 
(0.117) 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
-0.203 14.958 
(0.000) 
-0.366 21.674 
(0.000) 
-0.073 1.043 
(0.307) 
Saarland -0.323 19.538 
(0.000) 
-0.331 5.803 
(0.016) 
-0.289 10.657 
(0.001) 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
0.305 27.928 
(0.000) 
0.184 8.686 
(0.003) 
0.910 29.055 
(0.000) 
Berlin 1.256 651.065 
(0.000) 
1.082 322.986 
(0.000) 
1.544 314.247 
(0.000) 
Brandenburg 0.099 1.020 
(0.313) 
-0.114 1.072 
(0.300) 
0.813 12.607 
(0.000) 
Mecklenburg-  
W. Pomerania 
0.141 1.706 
(0.192) 
-0.026 0.053 
(0.818) 
0.540 4.873 
(0.027) 
Saxony 0.147 4.270 
(0.039) 
-0.024 0.088 
(0.766) 
0.689 18.439 
(0.000) 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.285 8.471 
(0.004) 
0.010 0.814 
(0.367) 
0.740 11.808 
(0.001) 
Thuringia -0.399 21.583 
(0.000) 
-0.502 25.411 
(0.000) 
-0.310 3.191 
(0.074) 
Mobility       
No mobility reference --- reference --- reference --- 
West-West 1.461 1208.793 
(0.000) 
1.162 398.123 
(0.000) 
1.761 875.453 
(0.000) 
West-East 3.505 1676.500 
(0.000) 
3.129 736.605 
(0.000) 
3.898 977.753 
(0.000) 
East-East 2.454 115.804 
(0.000) 
2.446 87.648 
(0.000) 
2.414 25.353 
(0.000) 
East-West 0.919 55.246 
(0.000) 
0.819 32.880 
(0.000) 
1.092 19.870 
(0.000) 
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Sample size 165,146  86,575  78,571  
-2 Log L 
(constant only) 
2,769,469  1,480,215  1,274,641  
-2 Log L 
(constant and 
covariates) 
2,426,852  1,310,355  1,108,689  
Likelihood-Ratio 
χ
2
  
342,617 
(53 df) 
 169,860 
(52 df) 
 165,951 
(52 df) 
 
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Areas shaded in grey refer to variables that are not included in the estimation for the 
particular subsample. Bold coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Appendix E: Additional results for Chapter 5 
Table A.8: Estimation results and marginal effects of Heckman estimation for total donations 
in 2003 of regular itemizers 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation Outcome On pro-
bability 
Con-
ditional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -5.076 0.058 
(0.000) 
-5.025 0.090 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) -0.305 0.018 
(0.000) 
-0.931 0.027 
(0.000) 
-0.121 -0.649 -0.868 
Income (log) 0.446 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.782 0.009 
(0.000) 
0.177 0.371 1.001 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male  -0.053 0.006 
(0000) 
0.016 0.010 
(0.114) 
-0.021 0.065 -0.070 
Single female 0.096 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.162 0.010 
(0.000) 
0.038 0.074 0.216 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of 
children 
       
None -0.314 0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.580 0.013 
(0.000) 
-0.125 -0.301 -0.754 
One -0.313 0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.638 0.013 
(0.000) 
-0.124 -0.360 -0.779 
Two -0.171 0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.410 0.013 
(0.000) 
-0.068 -0.262 -0.469 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 1.097 0.010 
(0.000) 
1.801 0.016 
(0.000) 
0.416 0.853 2.498 
60-69 0.846 0.008 
(0.000) 
1.318 0.015 
(0.000) 
0.327 0.551 1.831 
50-59 0.451 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.631 0.014 
(0.000) 
0.173 0.196 0.876 
40-49 0.279 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.387 0.013 
(0.000) 
0.105 0.111 0.521 
30-39 0.154 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.197 0.013 
(0.000) 
0.057 0.042 0.271 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
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Region        
East Germany -0.204 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.313 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.080 -0.119 -0.422 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Member 0.134 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.041 0.010 
(0.000) 
0.053 -0.167 0.178 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
-0.129 0.013 
(0.000) 
-0.456 0.024 
(0.000) 
-0.049 -0.331 -0.362 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
-0.141 0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.471 0.030 
(0.000) 
-0.054 -0.334 -0.383 
After 
disaffiliation 
-0.109 0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.367 0.030 
(0.000) 
-0.042 -0.261 -0.301 
N 579,873     
  0.855 0.002 
(0.000) 
     
   1,644    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of regular itemizers only; borderline itemizers and non-itemizers are 
excluded. Sample is a cross-section of the year 2003. P-values of t-tests are given in 
parentheses. 
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Table A.9: Estimation results and marginal effects of Cragg’s two-part model for total 
donations in 2003 of regular itemizers 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation – 
Probit estimation 
Outcome – 
Truncated 
regression 
On pro-
bability 
Con-
ditional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -4.374 0.248 
(0.000) 
-0.540 0.072 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) -0.360 0.061 
(0.000) 
-0.624 0.021 
(0.000) 
-0.143 -0.624 -0.968 
Income (log) 0.373 0.025 
(0.000) 
0.511 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.148 0.510 0.938 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male -0.091 0.016 
(0.000) 
0.134 0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.036 0.134 -0.110 
Single female 0.063 0.017 
(0.000) 
0.126 0.008 
(0.000) 
0.025 0.126 0.178 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of 
children 
       
None -0.299 0.014 
(0.000) 
-0.334 0.010 
(0.000) 
-0.119 -0.334 -0.747 
One -0.292 0.013 
(0.000) 
-0.403 0.010 
(0.000) 
-0.116 -0.403 -0.765 
Two -0.154 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.295 0.009 
(0.000) 
-0.061 -0.295 -0.456 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 1.109 0.019 
(0.000) 
0.827 0.012 
(0.000) 
0.420 0.826 2.516 
60-69 0.853 0.015 
(0.000) 
0.530 0.012 
(0.000) 
0.330 0.530 1.842 
50-59 0.463 0.012 
(0.000) 
0.155 0.011 
(0.000) 
0.177 0.155 0.882 
40-49 0.292 0.012 
(0.000) 
0.059 0.011 
(0.000) 
0.110 0.059 0.524 
30-39 0.166 0.011 
(0.000) 
-0.008 0.011 
(0.445) 
0.061 -0.008 0.274 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
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Region        
East Germany -0.217 0.009 
(0.000) 
-0.087 0.010 
(0.000) 
-0.085 -0.087 -0.434 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Church member 0.163 0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.222 0.008 
(0.000) 
0.064 -0.222 0.212 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
-0.102 0.020 
(0.000) 
-0.387 0.019 
(0.000) 
-0.039 -0.386 -0.335 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
-0.108 0.026 
(0.000) 
-0.407 0.024 
(0.000) 
-0.041 -0.406 -0.352 
After 
disaffiliation 
-0.092 0.025 
(0.000) 
-0.303 0.023 
(0.000) 
-0.035 -0.303 -0.287 
N 579,873 342,680    
   1.226    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of regular itemizers only; borderline itemizers and non-itemizers are 
excluded. Sample is a cross-section of the year 2003. P-values for Wald’s Chi-Square test 
(probit estimation) and t-test (truncated regression) are given in parentheses. 
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Table A.10: Estimation results and marginal effects of Heckman estimation for total 
donations in 2003 of regular itemizers in all sample years 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation Outcome On pro-
bability 
Con-
ditional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -6.150 0.107 
(0.000) 
-6.382 0.146 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) 0.014 0.033 
(0.672) 
-0.619 0.045 
(0.000) 
0.006 -0.631 -0.302 
Income (log) 0.585 0.011 
(0.000) 
0.973 0.014 
(0.000) 
0.233 0.475 1.358 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male  0.008 0.009 
(0.387) 
0.125 0.014 
(0.000) 
0.003 0.118 0.075 
Single female 0.156 0.009 
(0.000) 
0.261 0.014 
(0.000) 
0.062 0.131 0.366 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of 
children 
       
None -0.342 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.552 0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.134 -0.275 -0.812 
One -0.343 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.639 0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.134 -0.360 -0.856 
Two -0.183 0.011 
(0.000) 
-0.386 0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.071 -0.242 -0.493 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 1.143 0.014 
(0.000) 
1.919 0.022 
(0.000) 
0.418 1.039 2.731 
60-69 0.899 0.012 
(0.000) 
1.445 0.020 
(0.000) 
0.343 0.714 2.079 
50-59 0.402 0.010 
(0.000) 
0.588 0.018 
(0.000) 
0.159 0.229 0.846 
40-49 0.232 0.010 
(0.000) 
0.357 0.018 
(0.000) 
0.091 0.144 0.481 
30-39 0.112 0.010 
(0.000) 
0.152 0.018 
(0.000) 
0.043 0.047 0.217 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
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Region        
East Germany -0.088 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.081 0.019 
(0.000) 
-0.035 -0.005 -0.170 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Member -0.066 0.019 
(0.000) 
-0.567 0.028 
(0.000) 
-0.026 -0.511 -0.403 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
-0.312 0.033 
(0.000) 
-0.904 0.052 
(0.000) 
-0.124 -0.630 -0.920 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
-0.248 0.049 
(0.000) 
-0.938 0.077 
(0.000) 
-0.099 -0.722 -0.844 
After 
disaffiliation 
-0.263 0.041 
(0.000) 
-0.858 0.065 
(0.000) 
-0.105 -0.629 -0.829 
N 313,448     
  0.849 0.002 
(0.000) 
     
   1.603    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of taxpayers who are regular itemizers in all sample years. Taxpayers 
who are non-itemizers or borderline itemizers in any year are excluded. Sample is a cross-
section of the year 2003. P-values of t-tests are given in parentheses. 
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Table A.11: Estimation results and marginal effects of Cragg’s two-part model for total 
donations in 2003 of regular itemizers in all sample years 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation – 
Probit estimation 
Outcome – 
Truncated 
regression 
On pro-
bability 
Con-
ditional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -5.278 0.423 
(0.000) 
-2.025 0.114 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) -0.078 0.106 
(0.461) 
-0.431 0.035 
(0.000) 
-0.031 -0.431 -0.373 
Income (log) 0.494 0.042 
(0.000) 
0.683 0.011 
(0.000) 
0.197 0.683 1.297 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male -0.043 0.028 
(0.119) 
0.236 0.011 
(0.000) 
-0.017 0.236 0.036 
Single female 0.109 0.028 
(0.000) 
0.228 0.011 
(0.000) 
0.043 0.228 0.330 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of 
children 
       
None -0.342 0.020 
(0.000) 
-0.270 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.134 -0.270 -0.814 
One -0.334 0.019 
(0.000) 
-0.376 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.131 -0.376 -0.852 
Two -0.175 0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.258 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.068 -0.258 -0.489 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 1.162 0.027 
(0.000) 
0.970 0.017 
(0.000) 
0.424 0.969 2.734 
60-69 0.901 0.022 
(0.000) 
0.674 0.016 
(0.000) 
0.344 0.674 2.075 
50-59 0.407 0.016 
(0.000) 
0.180 0.014 
(0.000) 
0.161 0.180 0.838 
40-49 0.237 0.016 
(0.000) 
0.091 0.014 
(0.000) 
0.093 0.091 0.470 
30-39 0.119 0.016 
(0.000) 
-0.004 0.014 
(0.766) 
0.046 -0.004 0.210 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
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Region        
East Germany -0.103 0.016 
(0.000) 
0.020 0.015 
(0.187) 
-0.041 0.020 -0.188 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Church member 0.000 0.026 
(0.996) 
-0.618 0.021 
(0.000) 
0.000 -0.617 -0.320 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
-0.259 0.046 
(0.000) 
-0.734 0.040 
(0.000) 
-0.103 -0.733 -0.860 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
-0.166 0.071 
(0.018) 
-0.869 0.058 
(0.000) 
-0.066 -0.869 -0.752 
After 
disaffiliation 
-0.225 0.060 
(0.000) 
-0.702 0.050 
(0.000) 
-0.089 -0.702 -0.784 
N 313,448 210,448    
   1.222    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of regular itemizers only; borderline itemizers and non-itemizers are 
excluded. Sample is a cross-section of the year 2003. P-values for Wald’s Chi-Square test 
(probit estimation) and t-test (truncated regression) are given in parentheses. 
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Table A.12: Estimation results and marginal effects of Heckman estimation for regular 
itemizers and for donations which are tax deductible up to an amount of 5 % of overall 
income 
 Estimation results  Marginal effects 
Variable Participation Outcome On pro-
bability 
Con-
ditional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -5.087 0.026 
(0.000) 
-6.516 0.043 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) -0.071 0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.450 0.013 
(0.000) 
-0.027 -0.381 -0.269 
Income (log) 0.424 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.908 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.161 0.492 0.937 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male  -0.040 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.099 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.015 0.138 -0.020 
Single female 0.088 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.227 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.034 0.142 0.213 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of 
children 
       
None -0.260 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.511 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.101 -0.262 -0.593 
One -0.268 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.581 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.104 -0.325 -0.630 
Two -0.148 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.378 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.058 -0.239 -0.384 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 0.945 0.004 
(0.000) 
1.672 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.359 0.787 2.102 
60-69 0.717 0.004 
(0.000) 
1.197 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.269 0.502 1.479 
50-59 0.400 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.583 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.144 0.178 0.720 
40-49 0.250 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.341 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.087 0.083 0.421 
30-39 0.126 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.146 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.043 0.015 0.196 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
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Region        
East Germany -0.244 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.355 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.089 -0.110 -0.448 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Member 0.190 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.040 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.070 -0.230 0.254 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
-0.101 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.486 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.035 -0.381 -0.280 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
-0.116 0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.498 0.016 
(0.000) 
-0.040 -0.378 -0.302 
After 
disaffiliation 
-0.054 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.347 0.013 
(0.000) 
-0.019 -0.292 -0.179 
N 3,295,334     
  0.844 0.001 
(0.000) 
     
   1.661    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of regular itemizers only; borderline itemizers and non-itemizers are 
excluded. Estimation also includes year dummies (results not shown). P-values for t-tests are 
given in parentheses. 
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Table A.13: Estimation results and marginal effects of Cragg’s two-part model for regular 
itemizers and non-itemizers and for donations which are tax deductible up to an amount of 
5 % of overall income 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation – 
Probit estimation 
Outcome – 
Truncated 
regression 
On pro-
bability 
Con-
ditional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -2.878 0.017 
(0.000) 
0.427 0.029 
(0.000) 
   
Price (log) -2.218 0.006 
(0.000) 
-1.660 0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.597 -1.656 -2.883 
Income (log) 0.117 0.002 
(0.000) 
0.361 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.031 0.360 0.203 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male  -0.259 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.030 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.067 0.030 -0.283 
Single female -0.105 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.037 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.029 0.037 -0.117 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of 
children 
       
None -0.250 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.330 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.072 -0.330 -0.391 
One -0.223 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.376 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.065 -0.375 -0.368 
Two -0.116 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.273 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.035 -0.273 -0.221 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 1.004 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.875 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.308 0.874 1.655 
60-69 0.736 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.546 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.207 0.545 1.039 
50-59 0.385 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.148 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.093 0.148 0.419 
40-49 0.229 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.040 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.051 0.040 0.219 
30-39 0.105 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.029 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.022 -0.028 0.087 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
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Region        
East Germany -0.405 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.009 0.005 
(0.040) 
-0.095 0.009 -0.410 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Church member 0.405 0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.086 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.102 -0.086 0.428 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
0.075 0.009 
(0.000) 
-0.268 0.009 
(0.000) 
0.016 -0.267 0.032 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
0.050 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.276 0.013 
(0.000) 
0.011 -0.276 0.009 
After 
disaffiliation 
0.043 0.008 
(0.000) 
-0.235 0.010 
(0.000) 
0.009 -0.234 0.008 
N 5,014,594 1,684,296    
   1.205    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of regular itemizers and non-itemizers. Taxpayers are excluded in 
those years when they are borderline itemizers. Estimation also includes year dummies 
(results not shown). P-values for Wald’s Chi-Square test (probit estimation) and t-test 
(truncated regression) are given in parentheses. 
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Table A.14: Estimation results and marginal effects of Cragg’s two-part model for regular 
itemizers and non-itemizers and for donations which are tax deductible up to an amount of 
10 % of overall income 
 Estimation results Marginal effects 
Variable Participation – 
Probit estimation 
Outcome – 
Truncated 
regression 
On pro-
bability 
Con-
ditional 
Uncon-
ditional 
 Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Intercept -3.387 0.032 
(0.000) 
0.059 0.042 
(0.167) 
   
Price (log) -1.636 0.010 
(0.000) 
-1.546 0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.206 -1.539 -0.955 
Income (log) 0.128 0.003 
(0.000) 
0.370 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.016 0.368 0.091 
Type of 
assessment and 
gender 
       
Single male  -0.179 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.112 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.021 0.112 -0.081 
Single female -0.020 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.136 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.003 0.136 -0.002 
Married couple ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Number of 
children 
       
None -0.140 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.241 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.019 -0.240 -0.098 
One -0.136 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.305 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.018 -0.304 -0.100 
Two -0.064 0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.223 0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.009 -0.222 -0.056 
Three or more ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Age        
70 and above 0.712 0.007 
(0.000) 
0.877 0.009 
(0.000) 
0.105 0.875 0.542 
60-69 0.566 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.540 0.009 
(0.000) 
0.074 0.538 0.357 
50-59 0.297 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.155 0.008 
(0.000) 
0.031 0.154 0.136 
40-49 0.222 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.064 0.008 
(0.000) 
0.022 0.064 0.092 
30-39 0.162 0.006 
(0.000) 
0.025 0.009 
(0.004) 
0.015 0.025 0.062 
Below 30 ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
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Region        
East Germany -0.070 0.004 
(0.000) 
0.088 0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.008 0.087 -0.030 
West Germany ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Membership        
Church member 0.159 0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.012 0.005 
(0.013) 
0.019 -0.012 0.079 
Non-member ref. --- ref. --- ref. ref. ref. 
Before 
disaffiliation 
0.065 0.011 
(0.000) 
-0.157 0.014 
(0.000) 
0.007 -0.156 0.021 
Year of 
disaffiliation 
0.063 0.014 
(0.000) 
-0.151 0.018 
(0.000) 
0.007 -0.150 0.020 
After 
disaffiliation 
0.057 0.010 
(0.000) 
-0.171 0.014 
(0.000) 
0.006 -0.170 0.016 
N 5,014,594 686,998    
   1.233    
Data source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices 
of the Länder, Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006, own calculations. 
Note: Sample consists of regular itemizers and non-itemizers. Taxpayers are excluded in 
those years when they are borderline itemizers. Estimation also includes year dummies 
(results not shown). P-values for Wald’s Chi-Square test (probit estimation) and t-test 
(truncated regression) are given in parentheses.  
 
